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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Previous studies of the determinants of federal criminal antitrust case outcomes generally 
focus on a few observable and measurable factors that could influence one or a few of the 
observed outcomes at various stages of case disposition.  For example, the studies examine 
whether the industry represented by the defendant or the corporate rank of the defendant 
influence the government’s case-bringing activity or the outcomes of plea bargaining, trial, or 
sentencing.  These studies acknowledge in various degrees that the case selection and plea 
bargaining processes could influence observed case outcomes.  None of these studies recognizes 
that (or examines how) case outcomes could be affected by the existence of private information 
about the defendant’s chances at trial that one of the litigants knows during plea bargaining.   
This study contributes to the economics literature a comprehensive theoretical framework 
that: specifies the mechanics and predicted effects of the process by which the prosecutor decides 
to initiate a case; the process by which the defendant chooses a plea; the process by which the 
judge (or jury) decides to convict a defendant at trial; and the existence of private information 
about the defendant’s chances at trial that one of the litigants knows during plea bargaining.  
This study also supplies new empirical tests of these theoretical predictions.  
This study examines the implications of the decision process by which a federal 
prosecutor initiates criminal antitrust cases.  The prosecutor’s case-bringing decision determines 
the mix of case characteristics (e.g., the litigants’ respective trial costs, the amount and strength 
of the prosecutor’s evidence) observed in cases that the prosecutor initiates.  Controlling for the 
prosecutor’s case selection process is important because it is not only the value of a particular 
case characteristic, but also the values of other case characteristics determined by the 
prosecutor’s case selection process, that influence expected trial rates, trial conviction rates, and 
sentencing decisions.   
This study tests – for the first time – how the case selection process determines the 
observed characteristics of initiated cases.  Specifically, this study tests the extent to which 
prosecutors initiated observed cases as predicted.  If the process by which prosecutors choose 
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cases to initiate is non-random, then the determinants of case outcomes include the case selection 
process. 
The case selection model developed in this study generally specifies the prosecutor’s 
case-bringing decision in terms of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of initiating a potential 
case.  In the case selection model, the prosecutor decides to initiate a case if the ex ante expected 
value of bringing the case is non-negative.  Existing empirical studies of federal antitrust 
enforcement inform the case selection model’s specification of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected 
value of initiating a potential case.  In particular, the empirical findings and expert opinions of 
antitrust scholars and practitioners, including Posner (1970), Siegfried (1975), Weaver (1977), 
and Baker (1978), strongly suggest that obtaining convictions is a Department of Justice (DOJ) 
Antitrust Division prosecutor’s primary motivation for initiating a criminal antitrust case.  
Accordingly, in this study’s case selection model, the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of 
initiating a case increases in the probabilities of conviction by trial or pleas of guilty or nolo 
contendere.   
The prosecutor’s case selection process is conceptually analogous to the trade-offs 
required by binding budget constraints.  Imagine a child in a candy store with a dollar in her 
pocket, a love for chocolate bars that cost 75 cents apiece, and a lesser preference for bubble 
gum that costs 25 cents apiece.  She cannot afford to buy more than one chocolate bar and one 
piece of bubble gum.  If the child walks out of the candy store with no money left in her pocket, 
then it is reasonable to expect that she purchased a chocolate bar.  If, for whatever reason, she 
spends her dollar but walks out of the store with two pieces of bubble gum, then we know that 
the other candy she purchased did not include one of her beloved chocolate bars. 
Higher expected penalties elevate the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of bringing a 
case.  Suppose the prosecutor initiates a case with a relatively high (or higher) expected sentence 
upon trial conviction, where the higher expected value is from an exogenous shock like the 
enactment of the Antitrust Policies and Procedures Act of 1974 (APPA).1  Then it is likely that 
the initiated case will feature characteristics such as relatively low conspiracy sales or other 
relatively weak evidence with values (relative to the values expected in initiated cases with lower 
                                                 
1  This law raised violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (e.g., price-fixing and bid-rigging) from 
misdemeanor to felony status and increased the statutory maximum penalties for these offenses. 
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expected penalties) that, ceteris paribus,  reduce the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of 
bringing a case.   
That is because the relatively high expected penalty due to the provisions of the APPA, 
ceteris paribus, increases the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of initiating the case.  With 
that “surplus” in her ex ante expected value of bringing the case, the prosecutor can better 
“afford” to initiate the case even if it is further characterized by relatively weak evidence.2    
Notwithstanding the APPA’s tendency to raise expected sentences, weaker evidence in 
initiated cases due to the prosecutor’s case selection process could translate, for example, into 
lower observed trial conviction rates.  Snyder (1989, 1990) does not consider the potential effects 
of the case selection process, but his findings suggest that cases in which the provisions of the 
APPA applied involved relatively lower dollar amounts of conspiracy sales than cases in which 
the APPA did not apply.  Snyder also finds that the observed trial conviction rate was lower in 
cases in which the APPA applied than in cases in which the APPA did not apply. 
The theoretical framework developed below combines several existing models of the case 
disposition process in order to provide a more complete model of case disposition – from pre-
indictment through sentencing.  For example, this study uses the litigation model developed by 
Katz (1988) to specify the ex ante expected (optimal) values of the litigants’ chosen levels of 
trial expenditure should the case go to trial.  The litigants’ respective expected trial expenditures 
determine the value of the endogenous variables that represents the litigants’ common ex ante 
expected probability of trial conviction, as well as their common ex ante expected sentences 
following a trial conviction.  These expected trial expenditures also influence the values of the 
endogenous variables that represent the ex ante expected probability of the defendant choosing to 
go to trial and the ex ante expected value of a sentence following a guilty or nolo contendere 
plea.  All of these ex ante expected values affect the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of 
bringing a case, which is the fundamental equation of the case selection model.  In this way this 
study uses the litigation model developed by Katz (1988) to improve Eisenberg and Farber’s 
(2003) case selection model.   
Moreover, specifying the litigants’ trial expenditures as choice variables and the ex ante 
expected probability of trial conviction as an endogenous variable improves upon the plea 
bargaining models generally used in the law and economics literature.  The existing models treat 
                                                 
2  Of course, the prosecutor generally would prefer initiating cases strengthened by sound evidence. 
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the ex ante probability of trial conviction as an exogenous variable and, at least implicitly, do not 
treat litigants’ trial expenditures as choice variables.  Such specifications inadequately capture 
the endogenous nature of the litigants’ trial expenditure decisions and the ex ante probability of 
trial conviction.   
This study also originates empirical tests for the existence of private information during 
plea bargaining, as well as the identity of the privately informed litigant, if one exists, during 
plea bargaining in federal criminal antitrust cases.  The identity of the litigant that possesses 
private information in plea bargaining has important policy implications.  In general, plea 
bargaining is expected to be socially efficient when the defendant is privately or better informed 
about his chances at trial, while plea bargaining is expected to be socially inefficient when the 
prosecutor is privately or better informed.   
The defendant could have private or superior information about his chances at trial 
because he might be the only one who truly knows whether he committed the alleged crime.  As 
noted by Reinganum (1988), however, the prosecutor could have better information about the 
defendant’s chances at trial.  In particular, the prosecutor could have better information on 
aspects of the case which do not necessarily depend on the actual actions of the defendant than 
the defendant has.  For example, the prosecutor may have appeared more frequently or more 
recently before the judge(s) than the defendant’s attorney(s) have.  This could give the 
prosecutor more intimate familiarity with the judge’s (current) legal philosophy or other judicial 
tendencies.  This knowledge, in addition to the prosecutor’s familiarity with the details of her 
case against the defendant, could give the prosecutor better information about the defendant’s 
chances at trial. 
When the defendant possesses private or better information about his chances at trial 
(including knowledge about the defendant’s “true culpability”), plea bargaining facilitates 
gathering accurate (and socially useful) information about the defendant.  Plea bargaining 
induces defendants with a high probability of conviction (which is safely assumed to be 
correlated with “true guilt”) to plead guilty.  The defendant’s decision to accept or reject a plea 
deal can thus reveal his culpability.   
Further, when defendants are privately informed about their chances at trial (or true level 
of culpability), plea bargained penalties that are lower than expected penalties upon trial 
conviction are justified in socially efficiency terms.  That is because the discounted penalties can 
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induce guilty defendants to admit their guilt and avoid adding to courts’ or government 
prosecutors’ workloads.3   
In contrast, if the prosecutor is privately informed about the defendant’s chances at trial, 
then the prosecutor can offer a sufficiently enticing plea deal that puts great pressure on 
defendants who may not be guilty (in truth or after trial) to plead guilty.  In this scenario, 
wrongful convictions are more likely.  As a result, society receives mixed or improper signals 
about legal behavior.4
Using theoretical and empirical analyses, this study provides answers to the following 
questions:   
 
• How do the observable characteristics of cases influence i) the federal prosecutor’s 
decision to initiate a criminal antitrust case, ii) the defendant’s plea choice, iii) the 
judge’s or jury’s decision to convict a defendant at trial, and iv) the judge’s sentencing 
decision after a trial conviction? 
 
• How do the selection processes by which i) the federal prosecutor decides to initiate a 
case, ii) the defendant chooses a plea, and iii) the judge (or jury) decides to convict a 
defendant at trial influence the observable characteristics of criminal antitrust cases that 
proceed to subsequent stages of case disposition? 
 
• How do these processes influence the predicted effects of case characteristics on 
observed federal criminal antitrust case outcomes?   
 
• Did the observed characteristics of federal criminal antitrust cases influence, as 
theoretically predicted, the defendants’ decisions to go to trial, the judges’ (or juries’) 
decisions to convict defendants at trial, and the judges’ sentencing decisions after trial 
convictions in cases initiated from 1956 through 1979? 
 
                                                 
3  Grossman and Katz (1983); Froeb (1993). 
4  Reinganum (1988); Froeb (1993). 
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• Did selection processes influence, as theoretically predicted, the observed characteristics 
of federal criminal antitrust cases that proceeded to subsequent stages of case disposition 
in cases initiated from 1956 through 1979? 
 
• How does private information about the defendant’s chances at trial held by one of the 
litigants during plea bargaining influence observed federal criminal antitrust case 
outcomes? 
 
• Did defendants, prosecutors, or neither hold private information regarding their chances 
at trial during plea bargaining in federal criminal antitrust cases initiated from 1956 
through 1979? 
 
Chapter II of this study provides a review of relevant studies from the law and economics 
literature, including the antitrust literature.  Previous studies, including Siegfried’s (1975) 
analysis of DOJ Antitrust Division case-bringing activity, strongly suggest that the prosecutor’s 
selection of cases to pursue – the prosecutor’s “case selection process” – is not a random process 
in federal criminal antitrust enforcement.  Snyder (1989, 1990) demonstrates that defendants in 
criminal antitrust cases do not randomly make plea choices.  Meanwhile, Hylton’s (1993) 
empirical findings from data on civil antitrust cases suggest that it is reasonable to expect 
defendants to possess private information during plea bargaining in federal criminal antitrust 
cases.  
Chapters III-V fully develop components of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of 
bringing a case.  Chapter III defines the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of bringing a case.  
This expected value depends on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probabilities of possible plea 
bargaining outcomes and the prosecutor’s ex ante expected values of sentences across modes of 
conviction.  The prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of initiating a case is central to the 
theoretical model of the prosecutor’s case-bringing decision rule.  According to this decision 
rule, the prosecutor will initiate a case if her ex ante expected value of initiating the case is non-
negative.   
Chapter IV develops a model of plea bargaining similar to Eisenberg and Farber’s (2003) 
model, in which the defendant, instead of the prosecutor, has private information about his 
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chances at trial.  This model relies on a Nash solution in the value of a plea agreement.  This 
model develops more fully the definition of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of a 
negotiated plea agreement and her ex ante expected probability of trial. 
Chapter V develops a model of litigation similar to the Katz (1988) model in which the 
prosecutor and defendant choose their levels of trial expenditure, given their unit costs of trial 
and other case characteristics, in order to maximize their expected values of litigation.  The 
litigation model relies on Nash solutions in the litigants’ trial expenditures and predicts how 
changes in the values of case characteristics will affect the litigants’ optimal levels of trial 
expenditure.  The litigants’ optimal levels of trial expenditure directly affect the prosecutor’s ex 
ante probability of trial and the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial conviction.  
These ex ante expected probabilities are central components of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected 
value of bringing a case.  Accordingly, the litigation model predictions are integral to several 
testable implications of the theoretical framework.   
Chapter VI defines and explains the case selection effect, which requires determining 
how marginal changes in individual case characteristics affect the prosecutor’s expected value of 
bringing a case.  Chapter VI also defines the ex post probability of trial, which is conditioned by 
the case selection process.  In part, changes in the values of case characteristics are expected to 
influence the ex post probability of trial as they are expected to influence the ex ante expected 
probability of trial.  Changes in the values of case characteristics also indirectly influence the ex 
post expected probability of trial through the “case selection effects” created by the case 
selection process that conditions the ex post expected probability of trial.   
Chapter VII defines the ex post probability of trial conviction, which is conditioned by 
the case selection process and the trial selection process.  Changes in the values of case 
characteristics influence the ex post probability of trial conviction, directly and, through case 
selection effects and trial selection effects, indirectly. 
Chapter VIII defines the ex post expected sentence following a trial conviction, which is 
conditioned by the case selection process, the trial selection process, and the trial conviction 
selection process.  All of these processes influence expected sentences imposed after trial 
convictions.   
Chapter IX explains the normative and positive implications of one of the parties 
possessing private or better information during plea bargaining regarding the defendant’s 
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chances at trial.  Chapter IX also explains how the case selection process can distort statistics 
popularly used in tests for the existence and possessor of private information in plea bargaining 
and other settlement negotiations.  This chapter explores alternative approaches to testing the 
information structure of plea bargaining in federal criminal antitrust cases initiated from 1956 
through 1980.   
Chapter X describes the data used for this study’s empirical tests and reports the test 
results.  The results suggest that the selection processes involved in case disposition do not sort 
defendants (and the associated cases) randomly, and that they sort defendants according to the 
theoretical predictions developed in this study.  The results further suggest that this study’s 
theoretical specifications of the prosecutor’s case selection process, the defendant’s plea 
decision, and the judge’s (or jury’s) trial conviction decision process are applicable to different 
types of criminal cases.   
This study conducts six tests of the information structure of plea bargaining in the sample 
of cases used in this study.  Two test results suggest that the defendants held private or better 
information during plea bargaining, one result suggests that the prosecutors were privately or 
better informed, and three results suggest that neither party possessed private information during 
plea bargaining.  These mixed results suggest that the informational structure of plea bargaining 
in federal criminal antitrust cases remains an open question.  In normative terms, these mixed 
results leave open the question of whether plea bargaining was socially efficient or not in federal 
criminal antitrust cases initiated from 1956 through 1979.   
Chapter XI summarizes this study’s contributions to theoretical and empirical analyses of 
federal criminal antitrust enforcement.  This chapter concludes with a discussion of unexplored 
research topics in federal criminal antitrust enforcement.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 The following literature review summarizes the relevant contributions of primarily two 
branches of the law and economics literature.  The first set of studies examines federal criminal 
antitrust enforcement.  The second set explores the nature of sample selection biases created by 
the prosecutor’s (or plaintiff’s in the civil litigation literature) decision to initiate a case and the 
defendant’s decision to go to trial.  This literature review also identifies areas for investigation 
unexplored by the previous studies.  
 
Prosecutors’ Motivations for Initiating Cases 
 
Posner (1970) began a criminal antitrust literature that provides alternative descriptions 
of and explanations for observed federal criminal antitrust enforcement activity and case 
outcomes.  In particular, the criminal antitrust literature has focused on prosecutors’ case-
bringing activity, defendants’ plea choices, trial conviction rates, and sentencing. 
Posner (1970) suggests that the government’s high winning percentage in antitrust cases 
could reflect an excessively cautious enforcement policy, from a legal perspective more than an 
economic efficiency perspective.5  Posner’s description of Department of Justice (DOJ) 
enforcement strongly suggests that prosecutors in the DOJ Antitrust Division place the highest 
priority on convictions.  According to Posner, 
 
[I]t would appear that both legal doctrine and the enforcement machinery 
are geared more to the apprehension of unsuccessful attempts to fix prices 
than to the apprehension of successful price fixing.  In general, the fact of 
an agreement or conspiracy to fix prices is all that the government need 
prove in a price-fixing case and all that it attempts to prove.6   
 
Consistent with Posner’s (1970) view of federal antitrust enforcement, Baker (1978) 
explains that the DOJ Antitrust Division generally files a companion civil case with any criminal 
                                                 
5  Posner also notes that the DOJ’s high success rate in Supreme Court cases could reflect careful screening 
by the Solicitor General, as suggested by the weaker Supreme Court record of private claimants. 
6  Posner (1970), 410 
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indictment when the subject conduct has not ended.  According to Baker (1978), however, if the 
DOJ Antitrust Division does not think it can meet the “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard for blatantly illegal conduct, the Division simply does not initiate the case. 
Siegfried (1975), meanwhile, reasons that if the DOJ Antitrust Division’s objective is to 
maximize something akin to social welfare, then the Division will allocate resources to activities 
that create benefits that exceed the costs of successful prosecution.  Potential social welfare 
benefits result from efficiency gains and income redistribution.  Siegfried’s empirical tests 
expand and improve upon the tests conducted by Long et al. (1973).  Neither study, however, 
finds evidence that measures of the social welfare benefits from federal antitrust enforcement 
play significant roles in explaining DOJ antitrust case-bringing.   
According to Siegfried (1975), these findings are not surprising given that the reward 
structure for prosecutors in the Antitrust Division of the DOJ is likely to favor winning cases 
rather than reducing social efficiency losses or social inequities.  Nonetheless, Siegfried notes 
that pursuing cases with a high probability of successful prosecution could be consistent with 
some sort of economic welfare maximization.  For instance, the DOJ may seek to maintain a 
credible threat of successful prosecution in order to dispose of cases by plea bargaining or deter 
potential violations. 
Similarly, Asch (1975) concludes that the ambiguities of the DOJ’s case selection process 
places limits on the inferences drawn from relations between antitrust enforcement activity and 
associated industry economic characteristics, such as the numbers of firms in the industries and 
average firm size.  He notes, for example, that prosecutors may expect legal precedents created 
in certain cases to affect unrelated industries.  Although Asch does not discuss this point, it is 
worth noting that trial convictions (more than guilty or nolo contendere plea agreements) set 
precedent favorable and useful to the DOJ.  Thus, prosecutors use litigation for precedent-setting, 
which suggests both their interest and commitment to win at trial.   
Weaver (1977) studies the factors that influence federal prosecutors’ decisions in antitrust 
cases and finds that prosecutors are less likely to bring cases based on their economic 
significance and more likely to bring cases when the alleged activity is clearly illegal or when the 
cases otherwise can be won easily.  Such empirical evidence of a typical DOJ Antitrust Division 
prosecutors’ interest in convictions supports the assumption in this study that the prosecutor is 
conviction-motivated in order to specify theoretical predictions regarding the indirect effects of 
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the prosecutor’s case-bringing decision on the observed trial rate, trial conviction rate, and 
sentencing outcomes. 
 
Per Se Illegality of Certain Types of Sherman Act Violations 
 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits price-fixing and bid-rigging,7 is 
particularly important in antitrust enforcement.  According to Baker (1978), the Trenton 
Potteries case (1927) clearly established the per se illegality of price-fixing.  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Appalachian Coal (1933) created some confusion regarding the Trenton 
Potteries decision.  Then the Saucony-Vacuum Oil (1940) decision firmly reestablished the per 
se illegality of price-fixing.   
Baker (1978) explains that traditional enforcement involves two types of cases: 1) cases 
that involve per se illegal activity regardless of other circumstances, and 2) cases that involve the 
application of the rule of reason that require consideration of circumstances beyond the business 
activity in question.  Meanwhile, federal courts effectively recognize three categories of antitrust 
cases: 1) “hard core” per se cases involving price fixing and market allocation;8 2) “soft core” 
per se cases in which courts consider facts surrounding conduct that is technically subject to per 
se rules, such as various vertical arrangements and joint ventures;9 and 3) cases in which the rule 
of reason applies and all facts are relevant.10   
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has consistently rejected the creation of the middle 
category of “soft core” offenses that are per se illegal, even though the Supreme Court has 
changed its opinion about certain types of conduct.  As Baker notes, for example, in United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. (1967), the Supreme Court ruled that territorial restrictions are 
                                                 
7  Currently, Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, which contains the provisions 
regarding “trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty,” states: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, 
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in 
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not 
exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by 
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the 
discretion of the court.  
8  See e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
9  See e.g., Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).  See also Worthern Bank & 
Trust Co. v. National Bank-Americard Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973). 
10  See e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
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per se illegal.  Then in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. (1977), the Supreme Court 
reversed (or refined) its position about which types of territorial restraints are per se illegal.11
Justice Thurgood Marshall captured a popular justification for the judicial rules that 
Sherman Act Section 1 violations are per se illegal when he wrote: 
 
They are justified on the assumption that the gains from imposition of the 
rule will far outweigh the losses and that significant administrative 
advantages will result.12   
 
Elzinga and Wood (1988) and Wood (1993) take issue with such cost-benefit justifications of per 
se rules against price-fixing and horizontal market division.  They argue that the cost savings and 
the benefits of such per se rules may have been overstated and, because of case selection or 
litigation strategies, per se cases may be more expensive and produce fewer convictions than rule 
of reason cases.13   
Notwithstanding the various views of the DOJ’s methods of deciding which antitrust 
cases to initiate as well as the merits of per se rules against horizontal restraints of trade like 
price-fixing and bid-rigging, Gallo et al. (2000) provide useful statistics on observed DOJ 
antitrust case-bringing activity.  They report that from 1955 through 1997, 80 percent of the total 
number of cases recorded by the Commerce Clearing House (“CCH”) involved horizontal per se 
violations (“HPSVs”).  Of the cases involving HPSVs, 80 percent were criminal cases.  Further, 
criminal prosecution of HPSVs increased after 1980, such that the ratio of criminal to civil 
prosecutions of HPSVs went from about one-to-one in the 1960s to about seventeen-to-one in the 
1980s.14  Moreover, the DOJ’s focus on HPSV cases during the 1980s is consistent with a 
                                                 
11  Echoing Posner’s (1970) concerns, Baker (1978) also observes that the Supreme Court has greatly 
expanded the types of business conduct that is per se illegal, even conduct that enhances competition. 
12  U.S. v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969). 
13  Wood (1993) theoretically demonstrates how per se rules can increase litigation costs and lower the 
observed probability of conviction.  As Wood explains intuitively, in cases involving per se rules, both parties may 
change their strategies.  The defendant would increase legal efforts, which could increase the plaintiff’s costs to the 
point of lowering the probability of conviction.  Meanwhile, the plaintiff might respond to per se rules by filing 
weak cases that require more legal effort, thereby increasing litigation costs and lowering the probability of 
conviction.  In his sample of private antitrust cases, Wood finds that civil price-fixing cases involved greater 
expenditure of legal resources than other types of civil antitrust cases under a rule of reason, as measured by the 
number of docket entries, duration, number of trial days, depositions, and judges’ rulings.  He also finds empirical 
evidence of lower conviction rates in per se cases compared to rule of reason cases. 
14  Former Antitrust Division chief Donald I. Baker (1978) argues that the DOJ Antitrust Division’s decision 
to bring a civil or criminal case follows extensive analysis of the facts and issues by trial staff and senior officials.  
Ultimately, the Assistant Attorney General decides whether to bring a civil or criminal case based upon articulated 
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prosecutorial objective of convicting defendants.  From 1955 to 1997, the DOJ won about 92 
percent of the total number of cases involving HPSVs. 
 
Judicial Discretion in Sentencing 
 
Another important aspect of federal criminal antitrust enforcement is the influence of 
idiosyncratic judicial discretion in sentencing prior to the introduction of federal sentencing 
guidelines.15  Existing studies demonstrate, by the nature of their hypotheses or their empirical 
findings, the importance of judicial discretion in sentencing in federal criminal antitrust cases.   
For example, Posner (1970) emphasizes that a change in statutory maximum penalties is 
an indirect method of changing imposed penalties and the magnitude of the changes in imposed 
penalties is uncertain.  Posner appears to consider the effects of judicial discretion in sentencing 
the source of this uncertainty.   
Cohen (1989, 1992) examines sentences imposed on criminal antitrust offenders from 
1955 to 1980.  Judges can impose fines on corporate defendants and fines and prison on 
individual defendants.  Overall, Cohen’s (1992) regression analysis of sentencing decisions 
shows that a judge’s promotion potential positively affects the level of fines imposed on 
corporate defendants in federal HPSV cases.  More specifically, Cohen (1992) also finds that 
judges appointed by Presidents Nixon and Carter imposed corporate fines that were statistically 
significantly lower than judges appointed by President Johnson imposed in federal HPSV 
antitrust cases.  Thus, while the nature of the influence of political ideology on judges’ 
discretionary (i.e., pre-sentencing guidelines) sentencing decisions, for example, may not be 
obvious, there is evidence for its existence. 
Gallo et al. (2000) report that following the enactment of each penalty-enhancing law 
since 1955, there has been a significant increase in average real fines for both firm and individual 
defendants, but less than the proportionate increases in the statutory maximum penalties.  The 
fines imposed on firms have increased more than fines imposed on individuals.  According to 
Gallo et al. (2000), since 1955, the imprisonment of convicted individuals increased in 
                                                                                                                                                             
principles and the facts of the particular case, but also based partly upon intuition and experience.  According to 
Baker, criminal cases usually involve conduct that gives the prosecutor no reasonable choice other than criminal 
prosecution. 
15  Only cases involving criminal antitrust offenses committed after November 1, 1987 are subject to the 
Sentencing Guidelines. 
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frequency, especially after 1974.  Gallo et al. (2000) posit that the DOJ and the federal courts 
pragmatically fit the punishment to the crime instead of relying solely on fines or imprisonment 
for deterrence.  Such speculation lends further support for the importance of judicial (and 
prosecutorial) discretion in sentences imposed for Sherman Act violations. 
For further empirical support of the influence of judicial discretion in sentencing, 
consider the following empirical findings regarding the effect of the passage of the Antitrust 
Policies and Procedures Act (“APPA”) of 1974.  The APPA elevated violations of Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act from misdemeanor to felony status.  The APPA also dramatically increased the 
statutory maximum penalties for violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Statutory 
maximum fines increased from $50,000 to $1,000,000 per count.   
The statutory maximum prison sentences rose from one year to three years per count.  
Gallo, et al. (1994) report nearly a six-fold increase in the average nominal corporate fine and 
nearly a threefold increase in the nominal fine per individual for cases following enactment of 
the APPA.  In dollar amounts, however, these increases were small relative to the dollar 
increases in the statutory maximums.   
Additionally, Cohen’s (1992) regression analysis demonstrates that corporate fines were 
statistically significantly lower by more than $60,000 in cases brought under the misdemeanor 
regime compared to the felony regime.  Further, the percentage of individuals receiving the 
maximum fine rose by just over one percent after the enactment of the APPA.  In addition, 
Snyder (1990) reports that the change to the felony status brought significant increases in 
average fines.  Meanwhile, Gallo, et al. (2000) report that the corresponding percentage of firms 
receiving the maximum fine decreased by roughly five percent.   
With respect to incarceration, the APPA seems to have increased sanctions.  According to 
Gallo, et al. (1994), the number of cases after 1974 in which judges imposed imprisonment 
doubled the corresponding number of cases for the previous fourteen-year period, yet the number 
of individuals sentenced to prison remained nearly constant.  Moreover, Gallo, et al. find that the 
APPA brought a significant increase in the imposition of the maximum prison term.   
Cohen (1992) reports a statistically significant lower probability of imprisonment for 
convictions occurring before the increase in statutory penalties for antitrust offenses.  Cohen 
does not, however, find a statistically significant difference in the magnitudes of prison sentences 
before and after the APPA.  Meanwhile, Snyder (1990) reports that felony cases, compared to 
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misdemeanor cases, were associated with a higher frequency of prison sentences for individual 
defendants, and a higher average prison term per defendant. 
 
Determinants of Observed Trial and Trial Conviction Rates 
 
Existing studies in the criminal antitrust literature also examine the indirect effects of the 
shift from misdemeanor to felony penalties on non-sentencing aspects of case disposition.  
Snyder (1989, 1990) discusses and tests empirically various hypotheses regarding the 
determinants of observed trial rates and trial conviction rates in bid-rigging and price-fixing 
cases.  Snyder’s data cover the period 1970-1985.  In particular, his hypotheses consider how 
defendants, judges, and, to a lesser extent, prosecutors would react to the enhanced penalties 
allowed under the APPA.   
According to Snyder (1989, 1990) the possibility of harsher felony penalties reduces the 
frequency and severity of criminal activity.  Snyder (1990) assumes that the probability of 
conviction and the expected penalty likely increase with the severity of the offense.  Snyder 
expects that higher penalties will deter “marginal offenders” for whom the expected returns from 
illegal business conduct are similar to the expected returns from legal activity.  Meanwhile, he 
predicts that potential defendants not deterred by higher penalties – the “intramarginal offenders” 
– will tend to reduce the frequency or severity of potentially illegal conduct.   
The higher stakes associated with felony penalties also are likely to increase the 
defendants’ willingness to go to trial and otherwise increase their defensive efforts.16  According 
to Snyder, such reactions by potential and actual antitrust offenders to the shift to felony 
penalties from misemeanor penalties help explain the decline in economically meaningful 
criminal antitrust cases and the increase in trial rates. 
In addition, Snyder (1989, 1990) proposes that social efficiency considerations cause the 
courts to be more concerned about legal error and thus exercise more care in deciding guilt in 
felony cases than when misdemeanor penalties applied.  Since he finds no evidence that the 
courts were moving towards harsher penalties for criminal antitrust violations before the passage 
                                                 
16  Snyder bases these arguments on the assumption that risk-neutral potential defendants jointly decide 
whether to commit a crime, the severity of the crime, and their level of defensive efforts according to the 
maximization of income net of the expected costs from illegal activity.  His assumptions are consistent with the 
foundations of this study’s case selection and litigation models. 
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of the APPA, Snyder expects judges to raise the (implied) burden of proof for prosecutors under 
a felony penalty regime compared to a misdemeanor penalty regime.  Thus, Snyder (1989, 1990) 
suggests that the courts’ reluctance to apply harsher sanctions for antitrust offenses caused the 
trial conviction rate to decline.   
Snyder (1990) also stresses the importance of the sequential nature of case disposition in 
determining the effects on trial outcomes from the shift to felony penalties.  The cases that go to 
trial are selected according to the defendants’ plea decisions.  Because the set of cases that go to 
trial are not randomly drawn from the set of initiated cases, observed changes in trial conviction 
rates may be caused by changes in the types of cases that go to trial.  Accordingly, 
notwithstanding Snyder’s hypothesis that judges would raise their conviction standards in cases 
brought under the APPA, Snyder (1990) recognizes that the trial conviction rate could increase 
because the additional cases that go to trial (because of higher stakes of conviction) are likely to 
be drawn from cases involving defendants with greater probability of trial conviction.17   
Meanwhile, Snyder (1990) notes that the government’s case selection process could 
produce effects that mitigate the expected positive effect on trial rates that he expects the shift to 
felony penalties to produce.  Snyder recognizes the potential for political influence on the 
enforcement decisions of prosecutors in the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, but concludes that the 
DOJ consistently vigorously enforces Section 1 of the Sherman Act.18   
Instead, Snyder (1990) hypothesizes that prosecutors may raise their standards for the 
likelihood of conviction in cases they bring under a felony penalty regime.  He notes that if 
prosecutors raise their standards for the likelihood of conviction in cases they bring under a 
felony penalty regime, they may bring fewer cases.  Moreover, the defendants whom the 
                                                 
17  Snyder (1990) does not mention any assumptions regarding the information structure of plea bargaining 
with respect to his expectation that additional cases that go to trial will be associated with higher probabilities of trial 
conviction.  As explained later, this expectation is consistent with defendants possessing private information during 
plea bargaining about their chances at trial. 
18  Gallo et al. (2000) find that contrary to common assumptions, the presidential administration does not have 
much influence on the level of antitrust enforcement activity.  Gallo et al. (2000) report that for the period 1953-
1997, relative to the number of years spent controlling the White House, Democrat administrations brought slightly 
disproportionately more cases than Republican administrations.  In addition, Gallo et al. (2000) find that Democrat 
administrations are more likely than Republican administrations to explore uncharted areas of antitrust law.   
 Likewise, Snyder (1989) rules out explanations based on the DOJ Antitrust Division’s enforcement policy.  
Even though the Reagan administration sought to relax antitrust prohibitions on vertical restraints and mergers, it did 
not advocate reducing efforts to prosecute price-fixing cases, which was consistent with previous enforcement 
regimes.  Snyder also rules out explanations based on budget cuts during the Reagan administration and the 1977 
Illinois Brick decision.  The Illinois Brick decision limits eligibility to sue for treble damages to direct customers of 
the cartel but nonetheless assigned damage rights, thereby encouraging appropriate civil claims while deterring 
price-fixing activity. 
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prosecutors indict (with higher standards of conviction) may decide to avoid trial.19  Snyder also 
suggests that this increase in the prosecutors’ standards of conviction could increase trial 
conviction rates.   
Snyder’s (1989, 1990) empirical findings regarding the effects of the shift to felony 
penalties support his predictions as well as my case selection model’s predictions under certain 
assumptions.  In his earlier study, Snyder (1989) uses multinomial logit regression techniques to 
estimate the determinants of the relative probabilities of plea outcomes.  In his later study, 
Snyder (1990) uses bivariate probit analysis to estimate the determinants of the probability of 
trial (i.e., not guilty pleas versus nolo contendere and guilty pleas) and the probability of trial 
conviction.   
In particular, Snyder (1989) observes that after 1979,20 the total number of HPSV cases filed 
increased.21  With respect to trial rates, Snyder (1989) reports that for individual and 
corporate defendants, the statutory application of felony penalties reduces the probability of 
nolo contendere pleas in favor of not guilty pleas.22  For individual defendants, however, 
Snyder (1989) finds that the shift to felony penalties had no significant effect on the 
probability of guilty pleas relative to not guilty pleas.  In contrast, for corporate defendants, 
he finds that felony penalties increase the probability of guilty pleas relative to not guilty 
pleas.  For HPSV cases brought during the period 1970-1985, Snyder (1990) finds that the 
applicability of felony penalties increases the observed trial rate for corporate and individual 
defendants.  
Based on their inspection of the data they compile regarding federal antitrust 
enforcement, Gallo et al. (2000) observe changes in plea outcomes in criminal antitrust cases 
after 1979, the first year cases were brought under the APPA.  They disagree with Snyder (1989, 
                                                 
19  This reason for lower trial rates in cases brought under the APPA implicitly assumes or recognizes that 
relative to the statutory maximum penalties allowed under the APPA, judges did not significantly increase the levels 
of the sentences they imposed under the APPA.  It is possible, therefore, that the parties’ expected sentences under 
the APPA did not constitute sufficiently large trial stakes to induce defendants to trial despite the prosecutors’ 
elevated conviction standard. 
20  Felony penalties under the APPA applied for violations that occurred after 1974.  Thus, in legal terms, the 
provisions of the APPA apply in cases initiated in 1979 and later. 
21  The data reported by Gallo et al. (2000) supports Snyder’s observation. 
22  Gallo, et al. (2000) provide an institutional explanation for the timing of the observed decrease in the 
frequency of nolo contendere pleas.  As previously mentioned, the DOJ has a long-standing policy of opposing a 
nolo contendere plea if the violation was blatant, if the defendant would not be exposed to the same sentence as she 
would by pleading guilty, or if a conviction would aid plaintiffs in treble damage suits against the defendant.  The 
DOJ reinforced this policy in 1979, however, by directing prosecutors to oppose nolo contendere pleas unless they 
receive oversight approval to do otherwise. 
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1990), however, about whether or not the trial rate increased after 1979.  They also disagree 
slightly with Snyder about whether the shift to felony penalties under the APPA or a shift in DOJ 
Antitrust Division plea bargaining policy caused the changes in plea outcomes. 
Gallo, et al. (2000) do not find an increase in the trial rate after 1979.  They find changes 
in the observed annual rates of nolo contendere and guilty pleas, however.  According to their 
calculations, the percentage of total HPSV cases ending in conviction that were disposed by nolo 
contendere pleas fell from 88 percent during 1975 to 1979 to 24 percent during 1980 to 1984.  
Meanwhile, the same statistic for guilty pleas was 11 percent for the period 1975 to 1979 and 75 
percent for the period 1980 to 1984. 
According to Snyder (1990), “[p]rice-fixing cases are the core of Antitrust Division 
enforcement activity, are a key input into private enforcement, and their deterrent effects may 
account for the greatest welfare gains from antitrust enforcement.”  In contrast, Snyder finds 
that bid-rigging cases usually involve less economic harm.  In cases initiated between 1970 
and 1985, Snyder finds that the conspiracy sales involved in price-fixing cases were many 
times larger than the amount of commerce involved in bid-rigging cases.   
Snyder (1990) also reports a sharp decrease in average sales involved in price-fixing cases 
after 1979.23  Snyder (1990) finds, however, that the number of bid-rigging cases steadily 
increased while the number of price-fixing cases fell after the shift to felony penalties.  
Snyder (1989) also finds an increase in the number of cases disposed by plea agreement from 
1970 to 1985, most of which were bid-rigging cases. 
Snyder also analyzes the effects of higher conspiracy sales on the disposition of price-fixing 
and bid-rigging cases.  Snyder (1989) finds that the higher the sales affected by the alleged 
                                                 
23  Snyder’s finding applies across case outcomes and comports with Joyce’s (1989) finding that corporate 
defendants in price-fixing cases during the 1980s tended to have few assets.  Gallo et al. (2000) also find that after 
1980, criminal convictions have almost exclusively involved relatively small firms.  In addition, Snyder (1990), like 
Marvel, Netter and Robinson (1988), points out that the decline in the number of significant price-fixing cases 
following the enactment of the APPA may explain the decline in the number of follow-on private suits. 
Marvel, et al. argue that federal prosecutors were able to win many cases in the 1970s that involved 
ineffective cartels because the defendants in those cases did not strongly contest the charges, even if they did not 
actually attempt to fix prices.  The reason for weak defense efforts in the 1970s, according to Marvel et al., is that 
the expected penalties following criminal convictions did not outweigh the defendants’ expected litigation costs.  
After matching a sample of federal criminal price fixing cases from 1972-1979 with subsequent civil (treble) 
damage filings against the same defendants, Marvel et al. find that nearly half of the price-fixing cases in their 
sample did not result in any civil follow-on civil suits for damages.  Based on these findings, they argue that the 
cartels that were prosecuted were likely to have been ineffective in elevating prices above competitive levels and 
earning monopoly rents.  Moreover, their findings and conclusions are consistent with those of Posner (1970), Long 
et al. (1973), Siegfried (1975) and Weaver (1977) regarding federal antitrust enforcement in general. 
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conspiracy, the higher the probability that corporate defendants will plead not guilty relative 
to the other pleas.  Snyder (1990) finds that a 10 percent increase in sales over its mean 
increases the probability that the defendant goes to trial by just over one percent (and 
decreases the probability of trial conviction by less than one percent). 
Snyder (1990) argues that, taken together, his regression estimates of the determinants of 
plea choice demonstrate that the shift to felony penalties produced a broad range of effects.  In 
fact, Snyder (1990) suggests that his findings of a rise in the trial rate and a reduction in the trial 
conviction rate after 1979 provides evidence of a combination of effects on case disposition from 
the shift to felony penalties.  In particular, he argues that the rise in the trial rate after 1979 
clearly indicates that defendants (whom felony penalties did not deter from potentially illegal 
activity) increased their defensive efforts in response to the higher-stakes felony penalty regime.  
Moreover, Snyder argues that these effects outweighed the mitigating effects of other (e.g., 
prosecutors’ and judges’) reactions to the APPA.   
This study follows Snyder’s (1990) suggestion to research further the effects of harsher 
potential sanctions on individual behavior and the enforcement process.  This study does not 
simply restate others’ research in terms of the case selection model developed later.  In fact, this 
study’s case selection model relies on factors not considered by Snyder.   
As previously mentioned, Snyder’s explanation for the higher trial rate when (alleged) 
conspiracy sales are higher is that a defendant is willing to go to trial – even when the evidence 
is stacked against him – because he expects the sympathetic judge to raise the conviction 
standard (at least in that particular case).24  Notwithstanding the accuracy of Snyder’s depiction 
of federal judges, this study demonstrates that the process by which federal prosecutors initiate 
certain cases instead of other potential cases could at least partly drive Snyder’s empirical 
findings.   
For example, the case selection model demonstrates how the prosecutor’s case selection 
process, indpendent of the potential deterrent effect highlighted by Snyder, increases the 
likelihood that the prosecutor will initiate weaker cases (from the prosecutor’s perspective) when 
felony penalties apply than when misdemeanor penalties applied.  The case selection model 
generally specifies the prosecutor’s case-bringing decision in terms of the prosecutor’s ex ante 
                                                 
24  Cohen and Scheffman (1989) use this logic to predict the effects of sentencing guidelines on federal 
criminal antitrust case disposition. 
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expected value of initiating a potential case.  If that expected value is non-negative, the 
prosecutor is “duty bound” to bring the case.   
In particular, as shown below, higher expected penalties elevate the prosecutor’s ex ante 
expected value of bringing a case.  Suppose the prosecutor initiates a case with a relatively high 
(or higher) expected sentence upon trial conviction (where the higher expected value is from an 
exogenous shock like the enactment of the APPA).  Then it is just as likely that the initiated case 
will feature case characteristics such as relatively low conspiracy sales or other relatively weak 
evidence with values (relative to the values expected in initiated cases with lower expected 
penalties) that, ceteris paribus, tend to reduce the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of bringing 
a case, as it is likely that such an initiated case will feature relatively strong evidence that, ceteris 
paribus, tend to increase the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of bringing a case.  Weaker 
evidence in initiated cases could translate into higher observed trial rates, lower observed trial 
conviction rates, and lower observed sentences.  
In this way, the shift to felony penalties can affect the mix of case characteristics in cases 
that the prosecutor decides to initiate.  The mix of case characteristics in initiated cases that 
results from the prosecutor’s case-bringing decision (i.e., case selection) process, in turn, is 
expected to influence several observed case outcomes, including the defendant’s plea decision, 
the judge’s trial conviction decision, and the judge’s sentencing decision after conviction by trial 
or plea. 
To various but limited extents, the criminal antitrust literature discusses and empirically 
tests for selection effects (i.e., selection bias) on observed case outcomes, where the defendant’s 
choice of type (or degree) of illegal business activity and his plea choice, as well as the judge’s 
trial conviction decision create these selection effects.25  The authors pay little attention, 
                                                 
25  For example, in developing his empirical test of the determinants of judges’ prison sentencing decisions, 
Cohen observes that the determination of a jail sentence is a sequential decision problem, spanning the conviction 
decision through the judge’s determination of the length of the jail term. This description of the determination of a 
jail sentence focuses mainly, if not exclusively, on judges’ decisions at various stages of criminal antitrust case 
disposition.  The prosecutor, defendant, and judge all may make decisions that determine a jail sentence.  For 
example, in the sequence of decisions that determine a prison sentence, the prosecutor decides to bring the case, the 
defendant decides which plea to enter, (the prosecutor could accept that plea or object to that plea, as Cohen notes), 
and the judge decides whether to accept or reject that plea (possibly over the prosecutor’s objection).   
Cohen (1992) does not find any statistically significant difference in corporate fines imposed across means 
of conviction – i.e., trial conviction, non-negotiated guilty plea, negotiated guilty plea, negotiated nolo contendere 
plea, and negotiated nolo contendere plea accepted by the judge over the government’s objection.  In contrast, 
Cohen finds that the type of plea is a significant determinant of prison sentencing.  Specifically, Cohen finds a 
statistically significantly higher probability of a jail sentence and a statistically significantly longer jail sentence in 
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however, to the case selection process by which prosecutors decide which cases to initiate.  The 
implications of the prosecutor’s case selection process deserve more attention. 
 
Information Structure of Plea Bargaining 
 
The criminal antitrust literature does not explicitly address the issue of asymmetric or 
private information in plea bargaining and how private information during plea bargaining could 
alter the trial selection process and create (additional) bias in observed case outcomes.  This is a 
serious omission given the policy implications of private information during plea bargaining.  
Privately informed prosecutors harm social welfare because they can fashion a settlement offer 
that induces (truly) innocent defendants to plead guilty or nolo contendere.  Such pleas send false 
signals about socially efficient business conduct.26  In contrast, privately informed defendants 
during plea bargaining benefit social welfare because the (truly) guilty ones are more likely to 
plead guilty and send the correct signals about appropriate business conduct.  This dissertation 
attempts to contribute analyses of case selection and private information during plea bargaining 
in price-fixing and bid-rigging cases that are lacking in the criminal antitrust literature. 
The asymmetric/private information theory developed by Bebchuck (1984) and others in 
the trial selection bias literature receives increasing attention.  According to this theory, one party 
knows the probability that the plaintiff will win at trial, while the other knows only the 
distribution of plaintiff victory probabilities.  When the defendant is better or privately informed, 
he will accept the (uninformed) plaintiff’s settlement offer if he is relatively pessimistic about his 
chances.  Meanwhile, the better or privately informed defendant will go to trial if he (correctly) 
expects to win at trial.  Under this theory, the selection of cases for trial is one-sided, and the ex 
                                                                                                                                                             
cases in which the defendant pleaded not guilty.  Cohen also finds a statistically significantly lower probability of a 
jail sentence in cases in which the defendant entered a nolo contendere plea over the prosecutor’s objection.  (Cohen 
uses the finding of the longer jail sentences for not guilty pleas to support the notion that judges “penalize” guilty 
defendants for using court time for trial.)  Elsewhere, however, Cohen notes that he found no evidence of selection 
bias when estimating sample selection models using Heckman’s (1976) estimation technique, with its well-known 
“Heckman’s lambda” term.   
26  Cohen and Scheffman (1989) point out the potential for socially inefficient plea bargaining with respect to 
the bargaining power transferred to prosecutors by sentencing guidelines, but they do not discuss the role of private 
information per se. 
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post probability of a plaintiff trial victory is systematically below the fraction of successful 
plaintiffs in the pool of legal disputes.27   
Empirical tests for the existence of private information (and which litigant possesses 
private information) in settlement negotiations also focus mainly on the correlation between trial 
rates and plaintiff victories at trial.  In general, this literature, which includes a wide variety of 
theoretical modeling approaches, posits that a positive (negative) correlation between trial rates 
and plaintiff victories at trial is evidence of privately informed defendants (plaintiffs) during 
settlement negotiations. 
Waldfogel (1998) uses three variables to control for the likely informational structure of 
settlement negotiations in civil cases.  First, he suspects the fraction of pro se plaintiffs may be 
related to the quality of plaintiffs’ information because attorneys are better informed about likely 
case outcomes than are non-attorneys.  Second, he hypothesizes that parties who are repeat 
players in civil litigation are better informed than are non-repeat players.  Third, he expects 
institutions to be better informed than individuals.  The last two approaches to controlling for 
private information could be used for federal criminal antitrust case data.  For example, repeat 
defendants could be relatively better informed than are non-repeat defendants (compared to 
prosecutors).  Moreover, corporate defendants could be relatively better informed than are 
individual defendants (compared to prosecutors). 
Hylton (1993) expects that defendants in civil antitrust cases are likely to have good 
information about their chances at trial.  Hylton also claims that if defendants possess more or 
better information about their chances at trial than plaintiffs possess, then as legal doctrine 
                                                 
27  Priest and Klein (1984) and others that followed develop the divergent expectations theory, in which each 
party estimates, with error, the likelihood of a plaintiff victory at trial, and legal disputes proceed to trial when the 
plaintiff is (randomly) sufficiently more optimistic than the defendant.  Accordingly, legal disputes in which the 
parties’ valuation of the quality of the plaintiff’s claim(s) is far above or below the parties’ expected decision 
standard are more likely to settle.  Conversely, legal disputes that proceed to trial are likely those in which the 
difference between the parties’ perceived quality of the plaintiff’s claim(s) and the parties’ expected decision 
standard is smaller.  The ex post probability of a plaintiff trial victory is expected to be close to 50 percent regardless 
of the fraction of plaintiff winners in the pool of legal disputes. 
The private/asymmetric information and divergent expectations theories compete in the trial selection bias 
literature to predict and explain largely the same types of data and sometimes the same data.  The data used in these 
studies almost exclusively measure only observed trial rates and, in some studies, observed trial outcomes across 
different types of cases (e.g., product liability or employment discrimination).  In particular, the empirical tests of 
divergent expectations theories usually consist of comparisons of trial outcomes (i.e., the rate of plaintiff trial 
victory) across types of cases or comparisons of observed trial outcomes to the fifty percent plaintiff victory rate.  
Fifty percent is the central tendency for plaintiff trial victory rates under the divergent expectations theory.  Shavell 
(1996), however, demonstrates that it is possible for civil cases that go to trial to result in plaintiff victory with any 
probability.   
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reduces the likelihood of judicial error over time, the plaintiffs’ win rate will fall over time.  
Hylton notes that Salop and White (1988) find that the annual average plaintiff win rate in civil 
antitrust cases has fallen over time.   
Hylton’s (1993) hypothesis and Salop and White’s (1988) finding invite examination of 
the information structure of plea bargaining in federal criminal antitrust cases.  The development 
of legal doctrine is pronounced in federal criminal antitrust cases (as well as in civil antitrust 
cases).  Using Hylton’s hypothesis, measures of prosecutors’ trial win rates over time or with the 
development of antitrust legal doctrine could test for private information among litigants in 
federal criminal antitrust cases.   
The trial selection bias literature focuses almost entirely on civil litigation.  This literature 
completely ignores criminal antitrust data.  Moreover, Froeb (1993) appears to be one of a few 
studies, along with Grossman and Katz (1984), to theoretically model plea bargaining with 
asymmetric information in criminal cases.  Froeb (1993) also appears to be the only study to 
empirically test for the trial selection effects of private information during plea bargaining in 
criminal cases (and he does not use criminal antitrust case data). 
The studies that develop or consider models of asymmetric information during settlement 
negotiations seem to arbitrarily treat the probability of a plaintiff’s or prosecutor’s victory at trial 
as an exogenous endowment about which one of the litigants has better information.  The true 
probability of a plaintiff’s or prosecutor’s victory at trial (which one party knows) is assumed to 
be revealed at trial, which is consistent with Nash solutions to games of settlement negotiations 
or plea bargaining according to Froeb (1993).  (These studies do treat the probability of trial and 
the value of the settlement as endogenous variables, however.)  The theoretical framework in this 
study also treats the probability of trial conviction as an endogenous variable. 
 In departures from the trial selection bias literature, Eisenberg and Farber (1997, 2003) 
were some of the first, if not the only, studies to analyze the potential for the selection process by 
which a plaintiff chooses to file a suit to create a “case selection effect” which can influence 
(bias) observed case outcomes.  When investigating or interpreting observed case outcomes, the 
case selection effect is just as legitimate  as the trial selection effect described in the trial 
selection bias literature. Eisenberg and Farber (1997, 2003) use models of settlement negotiation 
that assume, without much discussion at all, that the defendant has private information about his 
chances at trial.  They do not consider the potential for the plaintiff to have private information 
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about the defendant’s chances at trial.  Further, like the studies found in the trial selection 
literature, Eisenberg and Farber (1997, 2003) treat the probability of a plaintiff trial victory (and 
expected damage award) as exogenous, such that case characteristics do not directly influence 
the probability of plaintiff trial victory.  Instead, in the Eisenberg and Farber (2003) model, only 
Nature and the (indirect) case selection effect determine the observed rate of plaintiff victory at 
trial.   
It is not clear that Eisenberg and Farber (2003) actually test for case selection bias in 
observed trial and trial conviction rates.  They focus on changes in the values of case 
characteristics that produce (additive) direct and indirect case selection effects with the same 
sign.  In addition, the prediction that forms the basis of one of their tests depends on the 
assumption that the direct effect outweighs the indirect case selection effect. 
 
Department of Justice Antitrust Division Budget Levels and the  
(Opportunity) Costs of Prosecutors’ Trial Expenditures 
 
A few studies in the criminal antitrust literature briefly discuss the implications of the 
DOJ Antitrust Division budget levels on enforcement activity.  Posner (1970) finds that between 
1956 and 1967, the DOJ Antitrust Division’s funding more than doubled, yet the number of 
Antitrust Division personnel rose by less than one-third.  This increase in personnel, albeit less 
than proportional to the budget increase, was material.  Posner does not find a corresponding 
significant increase in the number of cases brought, however.   
According to Posner (1970), these findings support his hypothesis that the price of 
resources used for antitrust enforcement could increase faster than prices in general.  In addition, 
these findings could suggest a high (private sector) market demand for antitrust attorneys, whose 
fees increase faster than inflation.  If the average salary for a private antitrust attorney is higher 
than the average salary for a government prosecutor, then it is reasonable to assume that the 
defendant’s unit cost of litigation efforts is relatively higher than the prosecutor’s unit cost.   
Snyder (1990) discusses DOJ Antitrust Division budget cuts as an explanation for a 
decline in federal antitrust enforcement from the mid-1970s through the 1980s.  He notes that 
during the 1980s, budgets remained roughly constant in nominal dollars and the attorney staff 
was cut by about one-third.  He argues that while enforcement must have declined in some areas, 
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enforcement of Section 1 of the Sherman Act did not decline.  Snyder (1989) notes that the 
Reagan administration was never accused of not pursuing alleged price-fixing and bid-rigging 
activity.   
Despite his discussion of budget effects on DOJ Antitrust Division enforcement, Snyder 
(1989, 1990) does not include DOJ Antitrust Division budget information as explanatory 
variables in his regressions to explain trial and trial conviction rates.  Similarly, Long et al. 
(1973), Siegfried (1975), and Cohen (1992) do not make use of DOJ Antitrust Division budget 
information in their empirical tests of the determinants of case-bringing activity and sentencing 
decisions.  Moreover, Gallo et al. (2000) does not track such budget information.  In fact, Posner 
(1970) does not present raw budget data, either. 
 This factor suggests a significant omission in the empirical studies found in the criminal 
antitrust literature.  To fill this research void, this study investigates such questions as whether 
DOJ Antitrust Division budgets influence trial rates.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
CASE SELECTION MODEL 
 
The “case selection model” of case disposition that is developed in this study focuses on 
five stages of case disposition: the pre-indictment stage when evidence is gathered, the case 
selection (indictment) stage , the plea decision stage (with simultaneous plea bargaining), the 
trial litigation stage (if the case goes to trial) and the sentencing stage at the end of the paths to 
conviction – pleas of guilty or nolo contendere and conviction at trial.  The fundamental decision 
rule that drives the case selection model of case outcomes is the federal prosecutor’s decision to 
bring a case, based on the information available to her before she indicts an individual or 
corporate defendant for violating the Sherman Act.   
 
The Prosecutor’s Decision to Initiate a Case 
 
In the pre-indictment phase (which could include a grand jury investigation, for 
example), the federal prosecutor is endowed with knowledge about a potential Sherman Act 
violation such as price-fixing or bid-rigging that she knows she should prosecute criminally. 28  
At this stage she also knows the identity of the alleged criminal(s).  For simplicity, this study 
assumes the prosecutor is randomly tipped off by some credible informant.  Thus, if the 
prosecutor’s case selection process does not create a biased sample of cases relative to the 
universe of potential cases, then cases are randomly chosen in the model.  This study does not 
consider, for example, the deterrent effect of antitrust enforcement. 
Based on the evidence she gathers before she indicts and her pre-indictment (i.e., ex ante) 
expected values of certain case characteristics, the prosecutor evaluates her ex ante expected 
probability of trial, , as well as her ex ante expected value of her payoff from the case if it goes 
to trial, , and if it is disposed by plea agreement, B .  The prosecutor then puts all of the
information together in order to evaluate her ex ante expected value of bringing that particular 
potential case , which can be expressed generally as 
Θ
TV V  
                                                
( )VE
 
28  In general, Baker (1978) asserts that the area of overlap of the Sherman Act’s criminal and civil provisions 
is small and criminal cases usually involve conduct that gives the prosecutor no reasonable choice other than 
criminal prosecution.   
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 ( ) ( ) BT VVV Θ−+Θ= 1 .        E  [1] 
 
Assume the prosecutor is “duty bound” to indict a defendant and thus initiate a case if 
.  Accordingly, the predictions of the case selection model of case disposition depend 
on the influence of various factors on 
( ) 0≥VE
( )V .  Different values of these factors produce differe
values of  and thus determine the types or characteristics of cases the prosecutor initiates 
pursuant to the Sherman Act.  . 
E nt 
r is willing to initiate the case even if (only if) other case characteristics – even 
( )VE
A brief description of the prosecutor’s case selection process is useful  in describing the 
key insight provided by the case selection model.  Assume the prosecutor faces  a potential case  
with a relatively extreme-valued  case characteristic  that has a positive (negative) effect on 
( )VE .  With the “cushion” (“deficit”) created by that extreme-valued case characteristic, the 
ially) those with relatively extreme values – have negative (positive) effects on 
prosecuto
(espec ( )VE  as 
long as (so that) the condition  holds.     
Variables Used to Define the Prosecutor’s Ex Ante Expected Value of Bringing a Case 
te 
 
 p secutor’s unit 
cost of 
( ) 0≥VE
 
 
In order to use the case selection model to generate specific predictions that can be tested 
with a rich set of case-level data, this chapter expands the components of the prosecutor’s ex an
expected value of bringing a case .  In the pre-indictment phase, the federal prosecutor is 
endowed (i.e., provided by her informant) with a given quantity and/or quality of evidence, 
represented by the vector e.  The prosecutor’s evidence, e, determines the merits of the case.  She
also knows the values of the exogenous case characteristics, which include the ro
( )VE
trial expenditure, C , and the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, K . 
The litigation model developed below provides the optimal (Nash equilibrium
secutor’s and the defendant’s respective choices of levels of trial expenditure, 
) values of 
the pro ∗= XX  
and ∗= YY .  At the pre-indictment stage, the rosec or evaluates all of her ex ante expected 
values with ∗=
p ut
XX  and ∗= YY .  (As shown below, both ∗X  and ∗Y  are implicit functions of 
the exogenous case characteristics and other factors as specified by the litigation model.)   
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An endogenous variable that the prosecutor evaluates in the pre-indictment stage (using a 
plea-bargaining model developed in a later chapter) is her ex ante expected probability of a trial 
(i.e., not guilty plea), .  The value of Θ Θ  depends on the exogenous case characteristics, the 
litigants’ ex ante expected chosen levels of trial expenditure, ∗= XX  and ∗= YY , as well a
parties’ common ex ante expected trial sentence, T , which is endogenous and depends on the
parties’ levels of trial expenditure, 
s the 
 S
X  and Y  and the prosecutor’s evidence, e.   
In the pre-indictment stage, the prosecutor expects the parties to have potentially 
divergent expectations about the probability of a trial conviction.  Specifically, the prosecutor’s 
ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, Φ , is defined as  
 
ρ+Π= ˆ ,            [2] Φ
 
and the defendant’s expected probability of trial conviction (from the prosecutor’s perspective) is 
analogously defined as 
 
δ+Π=Γ ˆ .           [3] 
 
These expected probabilities of trial conviction share a common component, , while Πˆ ρ  and δ  
are idiosyncratic components, the values of which may diverge.   
Assume ρ  and δ  have means of zero and variances of one.  Thus, ρ  and δ  can be of 
conviction, .  For example, the prosecutor would be “optimistic” if 
either sign and can be positively or negatively correlated with the ex ante probability of trial 
Πˆ ρ  is positively correlated 
with Π , and “pessimistic” if ˆ δ  is negatively correlated with Πˆ .  Both parties can be optimisti
or pessimistic about their chances at trial to the same or differing degrees.  For example, b
c 
oth 
parties 
onviction, 
g  v
could be optimistic, or one party can be optimistic while the other is pessimistic.   
As discussed later, the parties commonly ex ante expected probability of trial c
Πˆ , is an endo enous ariable that is explicitly a function of the parties’ levels of trial 
expenditure, X  and Y ; the prosecutor’s evidence, e; as well s ta he parties’ common ex ante 
 the trial conviction standard, expected level of variability of λ . 
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The prosecutor is assumed to be risk neutral and expects ex ante the following net value29 
of going to trial: 
 
CXS TT −Φ= .          V [4] 
[6] 
ante perspective, the defendant’s value of entering a nolo contendere or 
lea agreement is 
 
U −= .           [7] 
exogenous, endogenous, or choice variables in the theoretical framework.  
                                                
 
The prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of accepting a nolo contendere or guilty plea is 
 
BB SV = ,           [5] 
 
The prosecutor’s ex ante expectation of the defendant’s net value of going to trial is the 
following: 
 
KYS TT −Γ−= .          U
 
From the prosecutor’s ex 
guilty p
BB S
 
For a list of the key variables used in the theoretical frame work developed above and 
below, see Table 1.  Table 1 defines the variables and identifies whether the variables are 
 
29  For convenience in developing my case and trial selection model, assume the costs and benefits to the 
prosecutor from her pre-indictment activity are sunk or otherwise irrelevant here.  As shown later, the litigation 
model considers the prosecutor’s pre-indictment activity. 
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Table 1. Definitions of variables used in theoretical framework 
 
Theoretical 
Framework 
Variable 
Type of Variable Theoretical Framework Definition 
C  Exogenous the unit cost of trial expenditure for the prosecutor 
K  Exogenous the unit cost of trial expenditure for the defendant 
e  Exogenous the strength and amount of the prosecutor’s evidence 
λ  Exogenous the litigants’ common expected variability of the judge’s trial conviction standard 
ρ  Exogenous 
the idiosyncratic component of the 
prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability 
of trial conviction 
M  Exogenous the statutory maximum penalty 
m  Exogenous 
the statutory minimum penalty (which is 
zero until the implementation of the federal 
sentencing guidelines in 1987) 
X  Choice the prosecutor’s level of trial expenditure 
Y  Choice the defendant’s level of trial expenditure 
∗X  
optimal value of a choice variable 
and implicit function of other 
variables 
the prosecutor’s optimal level of trial 
expenditure 
∗Y  
optimal value of a choice variable 
and implicit function of other 
variables 
the defendant’s optimal level of trial 
expenditure 
Θ  
endogenous, 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝ −Ψ Sρ
⎛ +CX=Θ T KY  the ex ante expected probability of trial 
Πˆ  endogenous, ( ) ( )[ ]( YDXP −+e )λΠ=Πˆ  the litigants’ common ex ante expected probability of trial conviction 
TS  
endogenous, ( ) ( )( )( )mMYmS T −+= DXPT ,,eµ the litigants’ common ex ante expected penalty following a trial conviction 
BS  
endogenous, 
( )
2
ˆ CXKYSS TB −++Π= ρ  
the litigants’ common ex ante expected 
penalty following a conviction by plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
PLEA BARGAINING MODEL 
 
The previous chapter introduced several ex ante expected values of possible case 
outcomes.  This chapter more fully defines the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial, 
, and her ex ante expected value of a plea agreement, BΘ BSV = . 
ettl zone 
rspective.   
[8] 
,       [8′] 
or 
                                                
 
The Prosecutor’s Ex Ante Expected Probability of a Not Guilty Plea 
 
In order to derive a mathematical definition of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected 
probability of trial, Θ , first consider the necessary conditions for the prosecutor to accept a 
negotiated plea with an ex ante value to the prosecutor of BV .30  The ex ante value of a 
negotiated s ement, BV , must fall within the applicable “settlement zone”.  A settlement 
for a particular type of plea is the range of potential plea bargaining outcomes involving the 
particular type of plea that both the prosecutor and defendant would prefer over going to trial – 
all from the prosecutor’s pe
That is, the prosecutor will accept a guilty or nolo contendere plea if the prosecutor 
values that plea at least as much as going to trial and the defendant will make an (acceptable) 
offer only if he values that plea at least as much as going to trial.  Thus, the following condition 
must hold: 
 
TBT UV −≤≤ ,          V
 
which can also be expressed as 
 
KYSSCXS TBT +Γ≤≤−Φ
 
30  According to Sullivan (1977), the DOJ Antitrust Division does not initiate negotiations but will participate 
in negotiations initiated by defendants.   
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TTB ++Φ−Γ≤ .       [8′′] 
In term of my model’s parameters, this implies the following settlement zone: 
 
T ++Φ−Γ= .         [9] 
 
e 
isposed by trial, the settlement zone must be negative and the following constraint must 
old: 
 
S CXKYSS
 
s 
( ) KYCXSZ
For a case to be disposed by trial, the settlement zone must be non-zero.  Thus, for a cas
to be d
h
( )
TS
,          [10] 
 
Importantly, assume here that at the time the pr secutor decides to bring a case based on
the valuation described by Equation [1], she does not know the idiosyncratic component of the
defendant’s expected probability of a trial conviction, 
KYCX +−< ρδ
o  
 
δ .  Instead, assume that at the time she 
selects a case, she knows that δ  is drawn from ith the cumulative distribution 
function 31  Thus, the pro
 a distribution w
( )⋅Ψ . secutor’s ex ante probability of trial, Θ , can be defined as 
follows:  
 
10 ≤⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−Ψ=Θ≤ TS
KYCXρ .        [11] 
 
The ex ante probability of trial from the prosecutor’s perspective, Θ , is higher when the 
idiosyncratic component of the prosecutor’s expected probability of trial viction is higher.  
onversely,  is lower when either parties’ trial costs are higher.  Lastly, note that the parties’ 
common  
con
C  Θ
ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, Πˆ , does not appear on the right side of 
Equation [20] and thus does not directly affect Θ .  
                                                 
31  Later, this study examines the implications of assuming instead that the prosecutor has an informational 
advantage over the defendant. 
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 Nash Equilibrium Definition of the Prosecutor’s (Conditional) 
Ex Ante Expected Value of a Plea Agreement 
 
For convenience, assume that fro ecutor’s perspective, the defendant’s ex
net gain from going to trial depends on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of tria
conviction,Φ .  That is, in the model of the plea agreement, substitute the prosecutor’s ex ante 
expected probability of trial conviction, ρ+Π=Φ ˆ , for the defendant’s ex ante expected 
probability of trial conviction, δ+Π=Γ ˆ .  In other words, assume that the idiosyncra
m the pros pected 
l 
tic 
differen s ce between the prosecutor’s and defendant’s ex ante expected probabilities of trial doe
not exist (i.e., δρ = ).32  With that assumption, the grounds for negotiation stem from the 
differences in the prosecutor’s and the defendant’s respective total trial expenditures,  and CX
KY .   
r’s ex ante expected value of a plea 
greement, , is a Nash solution that maximizes 
With these simplifying assumptions, the prosecuto
BB SV = Ω , which is the product of the net gains a
the prosecutor expects to accrue to each party from a plea agreement:33  
 
( ) [ ]
( )[ ] ( )
UVV BT −−•
     [12] 
                                                
[ ]KYSSCXSS TBTB −Φ−−−•−Φ−= , 
V TB −=Ω
 
 
32  As Eisenburg and Farber (2003) point out, this assumption implies that the prosecutor ignores any 
information there might be in the fact that the parties cannot negotiate a plea agreement and assumes the defendant 
expects the same probability of trial conviction as the prosecutor.  In the alternative and without changing the basic 
character of the theoretical results of my model, it is reasonable to assume that the prosecutor is somehow informed 
by the fact that plea negotiations failed, or to assume that the prosecutor uses some other expected value of Γ  based 
on , the ex ante probability that the case will go to trial.  These alternatives do not alter the basic character 
of the case selection model’s predictions. 
33  Depending on the informational structure of the game, the parties may not know with certainty different 
case characteristics at various stages in games that could possibly underlie my selection model.  In these situations, 
assume the parameters of prior distributions of case characteristics inform the parties’ expectations. 
 ( )⋅Ψ=Θ
 33
Recall that  is the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of a case that ends in a plea of 
guilty or ,  is the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of a case 
that goes to trial, and T −=
The first order condition from maximizing 
BB SV =
nolo contendere CXSV TT −Φ=
KYS T −Γ  ( KYS T −Φ−= , by assumption).   U
Ω  with respect to  produces the 
prosecutor’s expected value of a negotiated settlement, which is given by 
BV
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2
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2
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It is ted value of a negotiated settlement, , 
ecreases only with the prosecutor’s expected unit cost of trial expenditure, , and her expected 
trial expenditure, X.  Meanwhile,  increases with every other variable on the right 
ide of Equation [13]. 
lue of 
dicting the (potential) defendant, 
CXKYS
SV
T
BB
−+Φ=
=
.        [13] 
 
BV interesting to note that the prosecutor’s expec
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BVlevel of 
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Putting the separate components together, the prosecutor’s ex ante expected va
( )VEin , can be further expanded as follows: 
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The litigation model developed in th
    [
e next chapter specifies how changes in the values of 
case characteristics affect the prosecutor’s ex ante expected values of X  and Y .  The litigation 
model also shows how changes in the values of X  and Y  affect the litigants’ (from the 
prosecutor’s perspective) common ex ante expect uilibrium) probability of trial 
conviction, .  Thus, given that  affects 
ed (Nash eq
Πˆ Πˆ ( )VE , as shown in Equation [14], the litigation 
model helps to specify how changes in the values of X  and Y  (that are created by changes in 
the values of case characteristics) affect ( )VE  through Πˆ .  Understanding these dynamics is 
important for understanding how changes in the values of case characteristics ultimately affect 
.   
As shown in Equations [11] and [14], changes in the values of 
( )VE
X  and Y  also affect 
 through the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial, ( )VE Θ .  In addition, inspection 
of Equations [4] and [14] shows that changes in the value of X  affects ( )VE  through the 
prosecutor’s ex ante expected payoff from trial, ; and, as shown by Equations [13] and [14], 
through the prosecutor’s ex ante expected payoff from a plea agreement, .  Equations [13] 
and [14] also show that changes in the value of 
TV
BV
Y  affect ( )VE  through .   BV
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CHAPTER V 
 
LITIGATION MODEL 
 
This chapter develops a (sub-game) model of (trial) litigation with an endogenous trial 
sentence that will be used to predict the effects of changes in the values of certain variables on 
the ex ante expected values of the prosecutor’s and defendant’s (Nash equilibrium) optimal 
levels of trial expenditure, X and Y, respectively.  The directions of the predicted changes in the 
values of X and Y inform the predicted subsequent (net) direct (first- and second-order) effects of 
changes in the values of X and Y on the parties’ common ex ante expected probability of trial 
conviction, , the parties’ common ex ante expected trial sentence, T , as well as the ex ante 
probabilty of trial, .  In later chapters, these predictions determine the expected directions of 
the effects of variations in the values of case characteristics on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected 
value of bringing a case, E(V), as well as the ex post (observed) probability of trial, the ex post 
probability of trial conviction, and the ex post expected trial sentence.  The litigation model thus 
expands my case selection model’s predictions regarding the effects on 
Πˆ S
Θ
( )VE  of changing values 
of case characteristics.    
 
The Litigants’ Common Ex Ante Expected Probability of Trial Conviction and  
Ex Ante Expected Value of the Penalty Imposed upon Trial Conviction 
 
As previously mentioned, in the pre-indictment stage, the prosecutor knows her 
endowment of evidence, e, which determines the merits of the case and includes the type(s) of 
alleged violation(s), the duration of the violation(s), the number of firms involved in the 
charge(s), the offender’s previous antitrust convictions, the defendant’s culpability and the 
economic impact associated with the charges, such as the dollar value of affected commerce.  
The prosecutor’s evidence, e, also could include other information, such as the year and region of 
the country in which the alleged offense(s) happened, or other industry-specific information.  
Assume that the prosecutor’s evidence does not change after the pre-indictment stage and that 
the prosecutor never drops a case after indictment. 
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Although the litigation model (and, hence, my case selection model) does not include an 
explicit discovery process, the pre-indictment stage in my models could serve discovery 
purposes.  Nonetheless, this study assumes that a defendant who has exculpatory information 
cannot establish it during the pre-indictment stage. 34  If the defendant could, Shavell (1989) 
shows that failure to do so would itself signal guilt.  Based on the federal rules of disclosure, it is 
reasonable to assume that all of the prosecutor’s evidence is provided in the indictment.     
At the trial stage, the prosecutor and defendant choose their levels of effort at trial, X and 
Y, respectively.  It is useful to note that X and Y are the only choice variables in my model.  
Meanwhile, P(X) and D(Y) are scalars denoting the persuasive value of testimony and legal 
arguments regarding the defendant’s culpability and liability made at trial by the prosecutor and 
defendant, respectively.   
Assume that the probability of trial conviction, Π , (which is the same as the litigants’ 
common ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, Πˆ , which was discussed in the 
previous chapter) increases in e and P(X) and decreases in D(Y).  Further, X 0Y , 
, and 0<YYD .  Also assume that P(X) and D(Y) are indepe dent so that 
0==== YXXYXY DPDP .  That is, a litigant’s ability to form her arguments, given the char
and evidence, does not depend on her opponent’s arguments.  Nevertheless, by construction, any 
effect P(X) has on Π  may be offset by D(Y), and vice versa.  Thus, the persuasive value of a 
litigant’s arguments, but not the litigant’s ability to present h
0>P , D
n
ges 
er case, depend on the other 
litigant
 of 
ses, the 
are such that the prosecutor’s unit costs are lower than the defendant’s, assume  for all X 
                                                
>
0<XXP
’s arguments.  
It is plausible that the federal prosecutor’s trial costs are, on average, lower than those
a private defendant.  As Eisenberg and Farber (2003) point out and completely rely upon for 
interpreting the results of their empirical tests, the federal government (or, for my purpo
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice in particular), unlike many private 
defendants, has a standing corps of attorneys willing and able to litigate cases.  The Department 
of Justice need not retain counsel on an hourly basis to litigate a case, although this does occur.  
Because it is reasonable to assume that unit costs from the parties’ efforts across plea outcomes 
 KC <
 
34  This assumption is also consistent with assuming a Nash equilibrium for the plea-bargaining game 
underlying my model. 
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and Y. 35  For simplicity in developing the litigation model, however, the cost per unit of the 
defendant’s trial expenditure, K , is normalized to one, so that C  reflects the prosecutor’s unit 
cost of trial expenditure relative to (as a fraction of) the defen ’s.   dant
At trial, the parties expect the trial court (i.e., jury and/or judge) to be presented with e, 
P(X) and D(Y), which the trial court uses to convict or exonerate the defendant.  The outcome of 
a trial is also affected by several case-specific random factors, however.  These factors include 
the idiosyncratic biases of judges and juries, as well as random elements from the argument 
production functions and the burden of proof function.  For example, as argued by Snyder (1989, 
1990) as well as Cohen and Scheffman (1989), the discretionary ability of judges to adjust the 
conviction rule or standard according to their preferences, even for per se violations, is an 
important determinant of the defendant’s probability of conviction.  These random factors 
associated with the judge’s conviction standard are represented by v, which is distributed 
according to the cumulative density function ( )vΠ  and the probability density function ( )vπ .  
The litigants’ common ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, Πˆ , which was previou
introduced, is analogous to the cumulative density function 
sly 
( )vΠ .  
The distribution of v is assumed to be commonly known.  Several assumptions 
characterize the probability density function ( )vπ .  First, assume that all deviations have some 
positive probability.  Second, assume that the mean of v is zero.  Third, assume that ( )vπ  has
single mode and that its mode is equal to its median.  Thus, larger deviations from the median are 
less common than smaller deviations. 
 a 
                                                
Whatever a judge’s motives, 36 the leeway granted judges in making discretionary 
decisions at trial is unavoidably limited by institutional constraints of the legal system.  For 
 
1956
e budg
 brought.   
 th
titru
gher th
35  Posner finds that between  and 1967, for example, the DOJ Antitrust Division’s appropriations more 
than doubled, yet the number of Antitrust Division personnel rose by less than one-third.  This increase in personnel, 
albeit less than proportional to th et increase, was material.  Posner does not find a corresponding significant 
increase in the number of cases
According to Posner (1970), ese findings support his hypothesis that the price of resources used for 
antitrust enforcement could increase faster than prices in general.  In addition, these findings could suggest a high 
(private sector) market demand for an st attorneys, whose fees increase faster than inflation.  If the average salary 
for a private antitrust attorney is hi an the average salary for a government prosecutor, then it is reasonable to 
assume that the defendant’s unit cost of litigation efforts is relatively higher than the prosecutor’s unit cost.   
36   The economics literature contains several papers postulating a variety of factors that motivate judicial 
behavior.  According to Posner (1993), federal judges maximize “the same thing everybody else does,” their utility, 
which depends on both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits like leisure, prestige, and power.  Others have more 
narrowly focused on potential influences on judicial behavior, including a judge’s political ideology (Ashenfelter, 
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example, important procedural or evidentiary decisions of district court judges may be 
overturned by higher courts on appeal.  Thus, v is multiplied by a positive spread factor, λ , 
which is independent of v.  The spread factor λ  represents the parties common expectation 
regarding the latitude the legal system allows judges in making discretionary decisions at trial.   
The parties assume the judicial conviction rule is to find the defendant guilty if and only 
if ( ) ( )[ vYDXP ] λ>−+e .  Thus, the common component of the parties’ ex ante expected 
probabilities of trial conviction is defined as  
 
( ) ( )[ ]( )λYDXP −+Π= e .        Πˆ  [15] 
≥m
maximum sentence, M, and m.  In addition, assume .   
on  ma on of judicial objectives or motives in 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
Next, assume that the judge determines sentences simultaneously with conviction by plea 
or by trial.  That is, there is no separate sentencing stage in the case disposition process (although 
the conviction path could influence sentencing decisions, as discussed later). 
In the event that the defendant chooses to go to trial and is convicted at trial, from the 
prosecutor’s perspective, the defendant receives a sentence represented by .  As described 
previously, T  is comprised of the applicable statutory minimum sentence, m, where 0 , 
added to some expected fraction, T , of the difference between the applicable statutory 
TS
S  
µ
 10 ≤≤ Tµ
Because the indictment and the parties’ testimony and legal arguments at trial regard the 
defendant’s culpability and penalty exposure, they are determinants of Tµ .  That is, the parties 
expect µ  to increase as evidence, e, and the prosecutor’s trial arguments, P(X), increase.  
Conversely, the parties expect Tµ  to decrease in D(Y).  Further assume that the prosecutor 
always argues for higher penalties than the defendant.  The specific effects of e, P(X), and D(Y) 
T
Tµ y depend on the parties’ common expectati
 
Eisenberg and Schwab, 1995) or his reputation among peers or litigants, (Higgins and Rubin, 1980; Miceli and 
Cosgel, 1994; Rasmusen, 1994). 
Snyder (1990) posits that judges’ standards for conviction may depend on the existing statutory sentencing 
parameters.  Thus, depending on the discretionary behavior of judges, many of the factors that affect the expected 
trial penalty may also affect the probability of conviction.  Snyder’s thesis is important as a general proposition 
because it recognizes the mutual dependence among factors affecting the probability of trial conviction and factors 
that influence the sentencing decision.  
 39
sentencing. 37  The parties’ common ex ante expected sentence following a trial conviction can 
be expressed as follows   
  [16] 
    [18] 
   
respectively, produces the first order 
onditions for an optimum.  The first-order conditions are: 
 
, and        [19] 
                                                
 
( ) ( )( )( )mMYDXPm TT −+= ,,eµ .      S
 
Nash Equilibrium Definitions of the Parties’ Optimal Levels of Trial Expenditure 
 
 Assume that the outcome of the litigation game is a Nash equilibrium in the prosecutor’s 
and defendant’s trial expenditures, X and Y, respectively.  A Nash equilibrium implies that the 
parties’ choices of X and Y are optimal responses taking the opponent’s (expected) choices as 
given.  As Katz points out, the Nash equilibrium does not require communiction among the 
parties and judge.  Assume also that agency problems involving attorneys do not exist. 
The optimal levels of X and Y are solutions to a maximization problem.  The prosecutor 
and defendant solve the following simultaneous maximization problems: 
 
( ) ( ) CXmMYXSYXVMax TT
X
−Π= ,,,,,, ee , and      [17] 
 
( ) ( ) YmMYXSYXUax TT −Π−= ,,,,,, ee .  M
Y
Differentiating V  and TU  with respect to X and Y, T
c
0=−Π+Π= CSSV TXTXTX
 
37  Empirical evidence from antitrust enforcement suggests that the number, and possibly the severity of 
charges of conviction affect sentencing.  For example, Gallo, et al. (1994) suggest that the increases in the severity 
of sentences imposed since the late 1970s reflect, in part, the prosecutorial strategy of bundling charges of antitrust 
violations with charges of non-antitrust violations, which became increasingly popular around 1977.  They find that 
since 1955, the average real fine net of suspensions was about three times higher for both individuals and corporate 
defendants convicted of bundled offenses relative to those convicted of price-fixing violations only. 
A similar finding holds for prison sentences since 1955.  The average prison term net of suspensions 
imposed on individuals convicted of pure antitrust offenses was just over two months compared to over four months 
for those convicted of both antitrust and non-antitrust offenses.  Likewise, Cohen finds that cases involving more 
counts of conviction bring statistically significantly higher fines for corporate defendants and longer prison 
sentences for individual defendants. 
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 ( ) 01 =+Π+Π−= TYTYTY SSU ,        [20] 
where 
 
XX Pπ=Π  and YY Dπ=Π . 
The marginal value of trial expenditure (for example, CSSP TX
T
X −Π+π  for the 
prosecutor) is proportional to the probability that an additional argument will be decisive in the 
trial conviction decision, where “decisiveness” relates to the probability that ( ) ( )YDXP −+e  
exceeds vλ .  The probability that additional trial expenditure (and the associated additional 
argume nsity funcnt at trial) will be decisive is given by the probability de tion ( )YX ,,eπ .   
Recall the assumptions regarding the characteristics of ( )YX ,,eΠ  and ( )YX ,,eπ .  When
the prosecutor includes an additional charge in the indictment or when a party m
additional argume t at trial, the “conviction threshold value” of the trial conviction rule, 
( ) )YDXP −+e , moves relative to v
 
n
akes an 
( λ .  This movement in the threshold value changes the 
probability of trial conviction, Π , which affects π  and thus the marginal value of trial 
expenditure.  Threshold value m 38ovement in close cases offsets small  random influences on the 
probability of trial conviction; in cases that are less close, movement in the threshold value 
offsets the effects of larger random shocks.   
 
                                                 
38  The random shocks would have to be small or else the case would not be close. 
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( ) ( )⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+
λπ
YDXPe  
 
         0        Π     ( ) ( )λ
YDXP −+e  
 
  defendant favored at trial   prosecutor favored at trial 
 
Figure 1. A graphical representation of the probability distribution function π  
 
 
Because the density, π , is higher around the median of the distribution, the marginal 
value of trial effort rises as the probability of trial conviction approaches the median trial 
conviction threshold and the parties are more evenly matched as trial opponents.  Assuming 
smaller random disturbances at trial are more likely than larger ones (i.e., small probability of 
“Perry Mason endings” at trial), additional arguments in the indictment or at trial have greater 
influences, positive and negative, on the probability of trial conviction in closer cases.   
The predicted effects of additional trial arguments depend on three factors: 1) the pre-
indictment value of the trial conviction threshold relative to the median trial conviction threshold 
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value; 2) the pre-indictment level of π  relative to the median value of π ; and 3) the predicted 
directions of the effects of additional arguments on the trial conviction threshold value (or the 
probability of trial conviction).  These are the central insights underlying the predictions of the 
litigation model.     
 Like Katz (1988), this study denotes the “favorite” at trial as the party with a chance of 
winning that exceeds some threshold value like 50 percent, where 50 percent is chosen as an 
intuitively appealing example.39  Meanwhile, the “underdog” is the party with less than, for 
example, a 50 percent chance of winning.  It is not necessarily the case that the favored party has 
better trial skills.  Assume the favorite/underdog distinction is commonly known before the trial 
commences.   
The assumption that the prosecutor is the “favorite” has implications regarding trial 
conviction rates, trial rates and the prosecutors’ case-bringing decisions.  Specifically, as the 
favorite makes additional arguments (by increasing his level of expenditures at trial), the 
conviction threshold value moves away (positively or negatively) from the mode of π , the 
probability density function of Π .  Such movement along the density function π  decreases the 
favorite’s marginal value of trial expenditure (in terms of the probability of trial conviction when 
ignoring sentencing effects).  In contrast, arguments made by the underdog move the trial 
conviction threshold value toward the mode of π , which raises the marginal value of trial 
expenditure for the underdog.   
 The second-order conditions for an optimum in trial expenditure are: 
 
02 <Π+Π+Π= TXXTXXTXXTXX SSSV , and       [21] 
 
( ) 02 <Π+Π+Π−=− TYYTYYTYYTYY SSSU .       [22] 
  
 The determinants of the parties’ choices of trial expenditures, X and Y, are implicitly 
specified by the first- and second-order conditions for an optimum.  Further assume that all first- 
                                                 
39  The intuitively appealing assumption that the mean of Πˆ
am
y a m
 is 50 percent is consistent with assuming that v is 
distributed according to the logistic distribution function, for ex ple.  It is important to note that this “assumption” 
is more of a normalization.  A nonzero mean for v would impl ean of Πˆ  that is different from 50 percent. 
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and second-order necessary conditions are satisfied to ensure that each party’s optimal trial 
expenditure varies continuously with the opponent’s optimal trial expenditure.  
Under these conditions, it is convenient to refer to the implied function that describes the 
relationship between a party’s optimal trial expenditure and his opponent’s optimal trial 
expenditure as the party’s “trial expenditure reaction function.”  The implied prosecutor’s trial 
expenditure reaction function is X(Y), and the implied defendant’s trial expenditure reaction 
function is Y(X).  The prosecutor’s trial expenditure reaction function is implied by Equation 
[19]; similarly, the defendant’s trial expenditure reaction function is implied by Equation [20].  
The second-order conditions assist in signing first derivatives in the analysis below.   
The slope of the prosecutor’s trial expenditure reaction function is derived by totally 
differentiating Equation [19] with respect to X and Y and is defined as ( ) TXYTXX VVdXdY −= .  
The slope of the defendant’s trial expenditure reaction function is found by totally differentiating 
Equation [20] with respect to X and Y and is defined as TYY
T
YX UUdXdY −= .  From the second-
order optimization conditions,  and  (or ).  At a Nash equilibrium 
under these conditions and provided both parties’ trial expenditures affect the trial outcome and 
have diminishing returns, the slopes of the two trial expenditure reaction functions must be of 
opposite signs when they intersect.  Further, stability of the Nash equilibrium requires the slope 
of the prosecutor’s trial expenditure reaction function to be steeper than the slope of the 
defendant’s trial expenditure reaction function when compared as oriented on common axes. 
0<TXXV 0<− TYYU 0>TYYU
Differently signed slopes for the two trial expenditure reaction functions (when using the 
same axes to graph the reaction functions) implies only one party’s additional trial expenditure 
leads to an increase in the opponent’s trial expenditure.  Differently signed slopes also implies 
that an increase in only one party’s trial expenditure leads to a decrease in the other party’s trial 
expenditure.  In the former case, following the nomenclature of Katz, a marginal increase in a 
party’s trial expenditure is “provocative” if it leads to a marginal increase in the other party’s 
trial expenditure; conversely, in the latter case, a marginal increase in a party’s trial expenditure 
is “deterring” if it leads to a marginal decrease in the other party’s trial expenditure.40   
 The sign of each party’s reaction function can be determined by expanding my model’s 
specification of the slope of the reaction functions and making use of the favorite/underdog 
                                                 
40  The provocative/deterring distinction is analogous to the distinction between a “strategic complement” and 
a “strategic substitute” made by Bulow et al. (1985). 
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assumption.  For example, the slope of the defendant’s trial expenditure reaction function can be 
expanded as follows: 
 
( )
T
YY
T
YY
T
YY
T
YX
T
YX
T
XY
T
YX
T
YY
T
YX
SSS
SSSS
U
U
dX
dY
Π+Π+Π
Π+Π+Π+Π=−= 2 .      [23] 
 
It is reasonable to assume that  is negative like the second and third terms of the numerator 
of the right-hand side of equation [23].  For convenience, assume that  is the dominant 
(largest absolute value) term in the numerator.  Also, according to Equation [22], the 
denominator of Equation [23] is positive.   
T
YXS
T
YX SΠ
Because D(Y) is independent of X and 0=YXD , the sign of the slope of the defendant’s 
trial expenditure reaction function is [ ] [ ] [ ]ππ ′=′=Π sgnsgnsgn XYYX PD .  Making use of the 
shape of the probability density function π  as it relates to values of Π=Π , the slope, π ′ , of the 
probability distribution function is positive when the defendant is favored and negative when he 
is the underdog.  Accordingly, if  is assumed to be the dominant (largest absolute value) 
term in the numerator of the defendant’s trial expenditure reaction function, then the slope of that 
reaction function is positive when the defendant is the trial favorite and negative when he is the 
underdog.
T
YX SΠ
41   
A key insight above is that trial expenditure by the favorite makes the case less close and 
trial expenditure by the underdog makes the case closer.  Consideration of this insight and the 
(primary) determinant of the signs of the slopes of the trial expenditure reaction functions reveals 
another insight: trial expenditure by the favorite is deterring, and trial expenditure by the 
underdog is provocative.   
Figure 2 graphically depicts the Nash equilibrium of the litigation game and the 
(necessary) characteristics of the trial expenditure reaction functions.  Note in Figure 2 that the 
defendant is favored in all equilibria above the line defined by Π=Πˆ  and the prosecutor is 
favored in all equilibria below.  Also, ( )YX  is “steeper” or more positive than  at a Nash 
equilibrium, (
( )XY
*X , *Y ). 
                                                 
41  Without this simplifying assumption, the slope of the defendant’s trial expenditure reaction function is less 
negative when the defendant is the trial favorite and more negative when he is the underdog. 
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( )XY  
*Y  
*X
Π=Πˆ  
( )XY  
( )YX  
( )YX  
 
Figure 2. Trial expenditure reaction functions, ( )YX  and ( )XY  
 
 
 It is important to note that along a party’s trial expenditure reaction function, the party’s 
chances at trial always worsen as the opponent spends more.  Along the defendant’s trial 
expenditure reaction function, for example, 
 
( ) .
dX
dY
dX
Yd
YX
∗∗
Π+Π=Π          [24] 
 
Equation [24] shows the direct effect of the prosecutor’s trial expenditure is to decrease the 
defendant’s chances at trial ( ).  If the prosecutor is the favorite, then her trial expenditure 0>Π X
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is deterring ( 0<∗ dXdY ) and the direct and indirect effects have the same signs.  Then the 
prosecutor’s trial expenditure obviously worsens the defendant’s chances at trial and Equation 
[24] is positive.   
In contrast, if the prosecutor is the underdog, then, at the margin, her trial expenditure is 
provocative ( 0>∗ dXdY ).  In this case, the indirect effect of a marginal increase in X is 
negative and mitigates the positive direct effect of an increase in X.  The indirect effect must be 
weaker than the direct effect, however.  If the indirect effect could overtake the direct effect, the 
marginal value of trial expenditure would not rise, which implies that there should have been no 
increase in X in the first place.  In my model, therefore, the indirect effect of the parties’ 
adjustments (through their trial expenditure) can alter the magnitude but not the direction of the 
total effect.  Thus, Equation [24] is positive regardless of whether the prosecutor or the defendant 
is the trial favorite.  
Equation [24] is positive regardless of whether the prosecutor is the favorite or underdog 
at trial.  Thus, my model generally predicts that trial expenditure by either party, at the margin, 
improves that party’s chances at trial.  
The effects of small changes in case characteristics are found by first totally 
differentiating the first-order maximization conditions as follows:  
 
[ ] ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
−⎢⎢⎣
⎡
− dY
dX
L
dY
dX
U
V
U
V
T
YY
T
XY
T
YX
T
XX .        [25] 
 
Cramer’s Rule can be employed to show in mathematical terms the effects of changes in the 
values of case characteristics on the parties’ Nash equilibrium choices of trial expenditure.  
Assuming a locally strictly stable equilibrium implies that the following conditions hold: 
( ) ( )TYXTXYTYYTXX UVUV −>−  and [ ] .  This stable equilibrium assumption also implies the 
previously mentioned stability requirement – that the prosecutor’s trial expenditure reaction 
function be “steeper” than the defendant’s.  In turn, these conditions allow me to specify the 
litigation model’s predictions regarding the effects of changes in the values of case 
characteristics on the parties’ choices of X and Y.  Those predictions can then be used for other 
0<L
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predictions regarding the marginal effects of changes in case characteristics on Nash equilibrium 
trial outcomes.   
Table 2 reports the litigation model’s predicted signs of the total marginal effects on the 
values of 1) the prosecutor’s optimal level of trial expenditure, ∗X , 2) the defendant’s optimal 
level of trial expenditure, ∗Y , 3) the litigants’ common ex ante expected probability of trial 
conviction,  (evaluated at Πˆ ∗= XX  and ∗= YY ), and 4) the litigants’ common ex ante 
expected penalty following a trial conviction, (evaluated at TS ∗= XX  and ∗= YY ), from 
marginal changes in the values of i) the prosecutor’s level of trial expenditure, X , ii) the 
defendant’s level of trial expenditure, Y , iii) the strength and amount of the prosecutor’s 
evidence, , iv) the unit cost of trial expenditure for the prosecutor, C , v) the unit cost of trial 
expenditure for the defendant, 
e
K , vi) the litigants’ common ex ante expected penalty following a 
trial conviction, , and vii) the litigants’ common expected variability of the judge’s trial 
conviction standard, 
TS
λ .  
In other words, Table 2 summarizes the litigation model’s predictions (some of which are 
not discussed above) regarding the effects of changes in the values of certain variables on my 
litigation model’s Nash equilibrium expected values of the prosecutor’s and defendant’s optimal 
levels of trial expenditure, X and Y, respectively.  The directions of the predicted changes in the 
values of X and Y inform the predicted subsequent (net) direct (first- and second-order) effects of 
changes in the values of X and Y on the parties’ common ex ante expected probability of trial 
conviction, , the parties’ common ex ante expected trial sentence, , as well as the ex ante 
probabilty of trial, .  In later chapters, these predictions determine the expected directions of 
the effects of variations in the values of case characteristics on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected 
value of bringing a case, E(V), as well as the ex post (observed) probability of trial, the ex post 
probability of trial conviction, and the ex post expected trial sentence.   
Πˆ TS
Θ
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Table 2. The litigation model’s predicted signs of the total marginal effects on a) the litigants’ 
optimal levels of trial expenditure, ∗X  and ∗Y ; b) the litigants’ common ex ante 
expected probability of trial conviction, Πˆ ; and c) the litigants’ common ex ante 
expected penalty following a trial conviction, , from marginal changes in the 
values of case characteristics   
TS
 
 
Mathematical Expression(s) Litigation Model Prediction(s) 
dY
dX ∗ , 
dX
dY ∗  
Trial expenditure by the favorite is deterring (i.e., reduces trial 
expenditure by the opponent), and trial expenditure by the 
underdog is provocative (i.e., increases trial expenditure by 
the opponent).   
dX
dΠˆ , 
dY
dΠˆ  Trial expenditure by either party improves that party’s expected chances at trial. 
dX
dS T , 
dY
dS T  Trial expenditure by either party improves that party’s value of the sentencing decision.   
ed
dX ∗ , 
ed
dY ∗  
Changes in the merits of the case through increases in the 
amount or strength of evidence that benefit the underdog will 
cause both parties to increase trial expenditure.  Conversely, 
changes in the amount or strength of evidence that benefit the 
favorite will cause both parties to reduce trial expenditure.   
ed
dΠˆ  The party that benefits from a change in e will have better chances at trial.   
ed
dS T  
Changes in the value of e have ambiguous effects on the ex 
ante expected trial sentence.  That is because of the changes in 
both parties’ trial expenditure in response to changes in the 
value of e. 
dC
dX ∗ , 
dC
dY ∗ , 
dK
dX ∗ , 
dK
dY ∗  
An increase (a decrease) in a single party’s cost per unit of 
trial expenditure, C  or K , will lead that party to reduce 
(increase) trial expenditure.  The opponent will reduce 
(increase) trial expenditure if and only if the opponent is the 
trial favorite.   
dC
dΠˆ , 
dK
dΠˆ  An increase (a decrease) in a single party’s trial costs will reduce (improve) that party’s probability of winning at trial.   
dC
dS T , 
dK
dS T  
If the prosecutor (defendant) is the trial favorite, then an 
increase in C  (K) will cause X (Y) to fall and Y (X) to rise, 
which will reduce (increase) .  Meanwhile, if the 
prosecutor (defendant) is the trial favorite, then an increase in 
TS
K  (C) will cause X and Y  to fall, which has ambiguous (net) 
effects on . TS
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Table 2, continued 
 
Mathematical Expression(s) Litigation Model Prediction(s) 
TdS
dX ∗ , TdS
dY ∗  
An (exogenous) increase in the trial stakes for both 
parties, , or a decrease in both parties’ trial costs will 
induce both parties to increase their trial expenditure.  
Meanwhile, a decrease in common trial stakes or an increase 
in the trial costs of both parties will lead them to reduce their 
trial expenditures. 
TS
TdS
dΠˆ  The chances at trial of the party with relatively weaker diminishing returns in trial expenditure will improve.   
λd
dX ∗ , λd
dY ∗  
An increase (a decrease) in the variability of the trial court’s 
conviction decision, λ , will cause parties in relatively close 
cases to reduce (increase) trial expenditure, and will cause 
parties in relatively one-sided cases to increase (decrease) trial 
expenditure.   
λd
dΠˆ  
As long as the parties’ rates of diminishing returns from trial 
expenditure are sufficiently close, an increase (a decrease) in 
λ  will increase (decrease) the underdog’s chances at trial.   
λd
dS T  
Changes in the value of λ  have ambiguous effects on the ex 
ante expected trial sentence, .  That is because of the 
theoretical specification of  and the changes in both 
parties’ trial expenditure in response to changes in the value 
of 
TS
TS
λ . 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
DETERMINANTS OF THE OBSERVED TRIAL RATE 
 
This chapter defines the ex post probability of trial (i.e., observed trial rate), Θ~ .  Among 
the determinants of observed trial rates in federal criminal antitrust cases, it is important to 
consider both the direct effects of changes in the values of case characteristics and the indirect 
effects created by the prosecutor’s case selection process.  The prosecutor’s case selection 
process conditions the sample of initiated cases that proceed to plea bargaining, which influences 
the observed trial rate.   
These considerations are necessary for meaningful empirical tests of the determinants of 
trial rates in federal criminal antitrust cases.  A brief description of the prosecutor’s case 
selection process specified in the case selection model is useful to describe generally the key 
insight provided by the case selection model.  Assume the prosecutor is faced with a potential 
case that has a certain case characteristic with a relatively extreme value that has a positive 
(negative) effect on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of bringing a case, .  With that 
“cushion” (“deficit”) created by that extreme-valued case characteristic, the prosecutor would be 
willing to initiate the case even if (only if) other case characteristics – even (especially) with 
relatively extreme values – have negative (positive) effects on 
( )VE
( )VE  as long as (so that) the 
condition  holds.     ( ) 0≥VE
Empirically analyzing the sample selection bias created by the prosecutor’s case selection 
process is generally difficult, however, because of the lack of information regarding the potential 
cases that prosecutors do not pursue.  Thus, for example, controlling for sample selection bias 
created by the prosecutors’ case-bringing decisions in regression models of defendants’ plea 
choices is not possible using the usual approaches (e.g., the approach introduced by Heckman).   
Moreover, as explained in this section, the second-order direct effects referred to as “trial 
expenditure effects” and “stakes effects,” as well as the indirect “case selection effects” on the ex 
post expected probability of trial from changes in the values of case characteristics generally 
render ambiguous all predicted net effects on the ex post expected probability of trial from 
changes in the values of case characteristics.  Thus, the following theoretical analysis generally 
 51
provides ambiguous predictions for estimated coefficients on empirical variables that represent 
case characteristics in regression models of defendants’ plea choices. 
Despite the ambiguous expected indirect case selection effects on the observed trial rate, 
the theoretical implications of the prosecutor’s case selection process, as specified in the case 
selection model, are nonetheless empirically testable.  That is because the theoretical model of 
the prosecutor’s case-bringing decision implies particular expected mixes of case characteristics, 
given the relative value of at least one case characteristic, in cases that the prosecutor decides to 
initiate.  These predictions suggest firm relationships among the relative values of different pairs 
of case characteristics in cases that are initiated (i.e., along the same game tree branch stemming 
from the case-bringing decision mode).  These relationships can be tested meaningfully using 
sample means tests using the sample of initiated (observed) cases.   
 
Direct Effects on the Observed Trial Rate 
 
The conditional ex post probability of trial is defined as follows: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
( )( )0
00Pr~
≥Θ=
≥>−−−=Θ
VEE
VEKYCXS Tδρ
.      [26] 
 
As shown in Equation [26], the ex post expected probability of trial, Θ~ , is a conditional expected 
value of the ex ante expected probability of trial, Θ .  The weak inequality, , which 
conditions the ex post probability of trial, Θ
( ) 0≥VE
~ , was introduced in Equation [1].  The condition 
 simply states that the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of bringing the case was 
non-negative, which is why the prosecutor initiated the case. 
( ) 0≥VE
Both E(V) and Θ , which is a component of E(V), are functions of several variables that 
have already been introduced.  The litigation model provides the optimal (Nash equilibrium) 
values of the prosecutor’s and the defendant’s respective choices of levels of trial expenditure, so 
that all of the ex ante expected values are evaluated with ∗= XX  and ∗= YY .  Both ∗X  and ∗Y  
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are implicit functions of , C K , , , TS e λ , as well as each other as specified by the litigation 
model.   
The exogenous variables C  and K  represent the prosecutor’s and defendant’s respective 
unit costs of trial expenditure.  The prosecutor’s evidence that forms the merits of the 
prosecutor’s case is represented by the vector of exogenous variables, e.  The exogenous variable 
λ  represents the parties’ common expected value of the variability of the judge’s trial conviction 
decision standard.   
Recall that the exogenous variables ρ  and δ  are the idiosyncratic elements of the 
prosecutor’s and defendant’s ex ante expected probability of trial conviction,  and 
, respecively, where Π  is an endogenous variable that represents the parties’ common 
ex ante expected probability of trial conviction.  For completeness, recall that  is a component 
of E(V) and is a function of X, Y, e, and 
ρ+Π=Φ ˆ
δ+Π=Γ ˆ ˆ
Πˆ
λ .  Specifically, 
 
( ) ( )[ ]( λYDXP −+Π=Π eˆ )
)
.         [15] 
   
Recall further that the endogenous variable  is the parties’ common ex ante expected 
trial sentence, which is a function of X, Y, e, as well as the (exogenous) statutory maximum and 
minimum penalties for Sherman Act violations, M and m, respectively.  Specifically, 
TS
 
( ) ( )( )( mMYDXPmS TT −+= ,,eµ .        [16] 
 
This section focuses on the effects of the case characteristics , C K , , TS ρ , e, and λ  on 
the first element of the right-hand side of Equation [26], the expected value of the ex ante 
expected probability of trial,  (which equals ( )ΘE Θ ).  A full discussion of the signs of the total 
marginal effects of the case characteristics (as well as X and Y) on Θ  is found in Appendix A, as 
part of the examination of the effects of different factors on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected 
value of bringing a case, E(V), as discussed later.   
It is important to recognize that because the ex ante probability of trial, , is a function 
of endogenous variables it is necessary to examine the first- and second-order effects of factors 
Θ
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affecting .  The second-order effects on Θ Θ  arise from the effects of changes in the values of 
these factors on the endogenous variables X, Y, and .  The second-order effects that involve X 
and Y are the “trial expenditure effects” on 
TS
Θ  and the second-order effects that involve  are 
the “stakes effects” on 
TS
Θ .  The expected signs of the the total (net) marginal effects of C , K , 
and   (but not TS ρ ) on Θ  are ambiguous because of the ambiguity created by the trial 
expenditure effects and the stakes effects.   
For example, according to the litigation model, an increase in a single party’s cost per 
unit of trial expenditure,  or K, will lead that party to reduce trial expenditure.  The opponent 
will reduce trial expenditure if and only if the opponent is the trial favorite.  It follows that if the 
prosecutor is the trial favorite (underdog), an increase in her unit trial cost, C , will reduce 
C
∗X  
and increase (reduce) ∗Y .  Thus, as discussed in Appendix A, the trial expenditure effect on Θ~  
through ∗X  and ∗Y  from an increase in C  ( K ) is ambiguous when the prosecutor (defendant) is 
the trial favorite.  In contrast, when the prosecutor (defendant) is the trial underdog, the trial 
expenditure effect on the ex ante probability of trial, Θ , through ∗X  and ∗Y  from an increase in 
 (C K ) is positive, which counters the negative expected direct effect on Θ  from an increase in 
the value of  (C K ). 
Meanwhile, an exogenous increase in the trial stakes for both parties, including the 
parties’ common expected sentence following a trial conviction, , will induce the prosecutor 
and defendant to increase their (Nash) optimal choices of levels of trial expenditures, 
TS
∗X  and 
∗Y , respectively.  Thus, the trial expenditure effect on the ex ante probability of trial, , 
through both 
Θ
∗X  and ∗Y  from exogenous increases in  is negative, which counters the 
positive expected direct effect on Θ  from an increase in the value of .   
TS
TS
It is also important to note that there are other exogenous variables that affect X, Y, and 
 that do not directly influence the value of TS Θ  but nonetheless create purely second-order trial 
expenditure effects or stakes effects on Θ .  For example, in this study’s theoretical framework 
(i.e., in the case selection model and the litigation model embedded in the case selection model), 
the amount or strength of evidence, e, produced in the pre-indictment stage is taken by the 
prosecutor as given at the case selection stage in which she evaluates her ex ante expected value 
of bringing a case, .  The evidence represents the merits of the case.  For example, higher ( )VE
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values of the sales or profits attributed to an alleged conspiracy or more counts of conspiracy in 
an indictment provide stronger evidence of the existence (and success) of a conspiracy than 
lower returns from an alleged conspiracy.  In terms of the litigation model, higher conspiracy 
sales or more counts in the indictment imply higher values of e. 
When evaluating the direct determinants of the ex ante probability of trial, , (as part of 
the evaluation of the ex post probability of trial, 
Θ
Θ~ ) it is important to recognize the influence of 
more evidence on Θ  through the effects of evidence on the ex ante expected trial sentence, , 
which are the “stakes” effects of evidence on 
TS
Θ .  (Evidence influences  directly and through TS
∗X  and ∗Y , thus creating two types of stakes effects.)  As discussed in Appendix A, the 
marginal direct effect of more or better evidence, e, on the ex ante probability of trial, Θ , is 
ambiguous because of the ambiguous signs and magnitudes of the trial expenditure effects and 
the stakes effects of evidence on .  Θ
 As explained in Appendix A, the litigation model provides predictions regarding the 
effects on the prosecutor’s and the defendant’s respective levels of trial expenditure, X and Y, 
from changes in the value of the parties’ common expected value of the variability of the judge’s 
trial conviction decision standard, λ .  Those predicted changes in X and Y create the trial 
expenditure effects that determine the total marginal effect on the ex ante probability of trial, Θ .  
Those predictions, however, require the assumption that the litigants’ respective diminishing 
returns from trial expenditure are “close.”  Without any reasonable justification for that 
assumption, the expected sign of the net trial expenditure effect on the ex ante probability of 
trial, Θ , from increases in λ  is ambigous. 
In (stark) contrast, the endogenous variables X, Y, and  are not functions of TS ρ .  Thus, 
changes in the value of ρ  do not create second-order trial expenditure effects or stakes effects 
and the expected sign of the marginal direct effect of ρ  on Θ  is unambiguously positive.   
 
Indirect Case Selection Effects on the Observed Trial Rate 
 
Specifying Equation [26] to include the condition ( ) 0≥VE  in the definition of the 
(conditional) ex post probability of trial, Θ~ , highlights the theoretical and empirical need to view 
Θ~  from the perspectives associated with direct effects as well as the indirect case selection 
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effects of changes in the values of case characteristics.  That is, with respect to the direct effects 
of changes in the values of case characteristics on Θ~ , it is important and convenient to view Θ~  
as the probability that a case that was initiated went to trial.  With respect to the indirect selection 
effects of changes in the values of case characteristics on Θ~ , however, Θ~  also should be viewed 
as the probability that a case that was going to trial was initiated by the prosecutor in the first 
place (and observed).   
If the bias created by the case selection process is not taken into consideration, the direct 
effect of changes in case characteristics on the ex post probability of trial, Θ~ , may be over- or 
under-stated – whether theoretically predicted or empirically estimated.  That is, while Equation 
[26] can be used to predict the direct effects of changes in values of case characteristics on Θ~ , 
these changes in the values of case characteristics also have indirect effects on Θ~  through the 
prosecutor’s case selection process (i.e., initiate a case if ( ) 0≥VE ).   
A brief description of a stylized version of the prosecutor’s case selection process is 
useful to describe the indirect case selection effects from changes in the values of case 
characteristics.  Assume the prosecutor is faced with a potential case that has a certain case 
characteristic with a relatively extreme value that has a positive (negative) effect on .  With 
that “cushion” (“deficit”) created by that extreme-valued case characteristic, the prosecutor 
would be willing to initiate the case even if (only if) other case characteristics – even (especially) 
with relatively extreme values – have negative (positive) effects on 
( )VE
( )VE  as long as (so that) the 
condition  holds.     ( ) 0≥VE
Appendix A provides the mathematical analysis of the expected total marginal effects of 
changes in the values of particular case characteristics on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value 
of initiating a case, .  The case characteristics that are included in this analysis are the 
following: the parties’ commonly expected trial sentence, ; the prosecutor’s and defendant’s 
unit costs of trial expenditure,  and 
( )VE
TS
C K , respectively; the prosecutor’s evidence, e; the 
variability of the judge’s conviction decision standard, λ ; as well as the idiosyncratic 
component, ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, .   ρ+Π=Φ ˆ
The idiosyncratic component, δ , of the defendant’s ex ante expected probability of trial 
conviction, , is not expected to create a case selection effect on the ex post probability δ+Π=Γ ˆ
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of trial, Θ~ .  That is because of the innocuous simplifying assumption that when the prosecutor 
evaluates  at the case selection stage, she expects the defendant to adopt the prosecutor’s ex 
ante expected probability of trial conviction, , in the defendant’s expected payoff 
from going to trial.  Intuitively, it is reasonable to expect that when the prosecutor evaluates 
 that she would rely on her idiosyncratic ex ante expected probability of trial conviction 
instead of her expectation of the defendant’s idiosyncratic ex ante expected probability of trial 
conviction.  (Moreover, it is changes in the difference between 
( )VE
ρ+Π=Φ ˆ
( )VE
ρ  and δ  that are expected to 
affect the observed trial rate, so it is reasonable to focus on changes in the value of ρ , holding 
other factors constant.)   
Now recall the definition of ( )VE : 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
22
ˆ
2
1
1
CXKYCXKYS
CXKYSCXS
VVVE
T
TT
BT
+Θ−−++Π=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+ΦΘ−+−ΦΘ=
Θ−+Θ=
ρ
,     [14] 
 
where  
 
CXSV TT −Φ= ,          [4] 
 
( )
2
ˆ
2
CXKYSCXKYSSV TTBB −++Π=−+Φ== ρ ,      [13] 
 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−Ψ=Θ TS
KYCXρ ,          [11] 
 
( ) ( )[ ]( λYDXP −+Π=Π eˆ ) .and        [15] 
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 ( ) ( )( )( mMYDXPmS TT −+= ,,eµ )         [16] 
 
In addition, recall that the litigation model provides the optimal (Nash equilibrium) values of the 
prosecutor’s and the defendant’s respective choices of levels of trial expenditure, so that all of 
the ex ante expected values are evaluated with ∗= XX  and ∗= YY .  Both ∗X  and ∗Y  are 
implicit functions of C , K , , e , TS λ , as well as each other as specified by the litigation model.   
The following equations are discussed in Appendix A.  They show the expected total 
marginal effects of increases in the values of case characteristics on the prosecutor’s ex ante 
expected value of bringing a case, ( )VE .   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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and 
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These equations feature several common elements.  They all feature a direct effect on 
E(V) and four potential indirect effects on E(V) from increases in the values of the case 
characteristics.  It is also important to note that this study’s case selection model realistically 
allows the prosecutor to focus (i.e., “orient” herself, in the terminology introduced in Appendix 
A) on (or be movtivated by the outcomes of) particular aspects of case disposition when 
evaluating whether or not to initiate a potential federal criminal antitrust case.  The particular 
aspects of case disposition on which the prosecutor may focus correspond to different 
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endogenous elements of the mathematical definition of ( )VE .  These aspects are : i) her own 
expected trial effort or trial expenditure, ∗= XX ; ii) the defendant’s expected trial effort or 
expenditure, ∗= YY , iii) the ex ante probability of trial, Θ ; iv) the ex ante probability of trial 
conviction, ; or v) the ex ante expected trial sentence, .  These aspects of case disposition 
are associated with the five types of predicted indirect (second-order) effects on  from 
increases in the values of case characteristics.  
Πˆ TS
( )VE
In particular, as discussed below and again in Appendix A, it is reasonable to give 
relatively more weight to the predicted marginal effect of ( ) 0ˆ >Π∂
∂ VE .  This assumption also 
implies that the case selection model’s predictions should place less weight on the predicted 
marginal effects of ( ) 0<∂
∂
X
VE , ( ) 0>∂
∂
Y
VE , ( ) 0<Θ∂
∂ VE , and ( ) 0>∂
∂
TS
VE .   
Studies by Posner (1970), Siegfried (1975), Weaver (1977) and Baker (1978) strongly 
suggest that government prosecutors are primarily motivated by (total) conviction rates, 
regardless of how convictions are achieved (i.e., either through trial or plea agreement).  In 
particular, Posner (1970) is sharply critical of the DOJ Antitrust Division.  According to Posner, 
 
[I]t would appear that both legal doctrine and the enforcement machinery 
are geared more to the apprehension of unsuccessful attempts to fix prices 
than to the apprehension of successful price fixing.  In general, the fact of 
an agreement or conspiracy to fix prices is all that the government need 
prove in a price-fixing case and all that it attempts to prove.42   
 
Like the study by Long et al. (1973) upon which his empirical analysis builds , 
Siegfried’s empirical tests fail to find much evidence that measures of the social welfare benefits 
from federal antitrust enforcement play significant roles in explaining DOJ antitrust case-
bringing activity.  According to Siegfried,  
 
Perhaps this is not too surprising if we consider the reward structure 
confronting decision makers in the Antitrust Division.  It is probably more 
important to win cases than to reduce economic losses or inequities in 
order to move up the success ladder in the Justice Department.  
                                                 
42  Posner (1970), 410.  
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Unfortunately, it has not been possible to identify a variable to measure 
the expected probability of winning various alternative cases.43  
 
(Incidentally, this study seeks to find what Siegfried was seeking – a variable or variables that 
measure the expected probability of winning various alternative cases.) 
Consistent with Posner’s and Siegfried’s empirical findings, Weaver’s (1977) empirical 
analysis suggests that prosecutors are less likely to bring cases based on their economic 
significance and more likely to bring cases when the alleged activity is clearly illegal or when the 
cases otherwise can be won easily.  In addition, former U.S. Assistant Attorney General for 
Antitrust, Donald I. Baker (1978) claims that if the government does not think it can meet the 
“proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for a suspected price-fixing offense, it simply does 
not bring the case.  In a more recent study, Snyder (1989) reports that the Antitrust Division 
tends to secure more convictions in cases involving lower sales.  If federal prosecutors are 
willing to target cases involving low sales, it is reasonable to suspect that they are primarily 
targeting cases that are easy to win. 
Henceforth, prosecutors who are primarily motivated by (total) conviction rates are 
characterized as “conviction-motivated”.  The assumption that federal prosecutors are 
“conviction-motivated” in criminal antitrust cases is intuitively appealing and has solid and 
abundant support from empirical tests and other studies conducted by experts in the area of 
criminal antitrust enforcement – including practitioners such as a notable Seventh Circuit judge 
and a former U.S. Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust.  It is a reasonable assumption.   
Again, in terms of the case selection model (i.e., ( ) 0≥VE ), assuming the prosecutor is 
conviction-motivated implies that relatively more weight should be placed on the predicted 
marginal effect of ( ) 0ˆ >Π∂
∂ VE .  This assumption also implies that the case selection model’s 
predictions should place less weight on the predicted marginal effects of ( ) 0<∂
∂
X
VE , ( ) 0>∂
∂
Y
VE , 
( ) 0<Θ∂
∂ VE , and ( ) 0>∂
∂
TS
VE .   
Although the assumption that the prosecutor is conviction-motivated involves the 
litigants’ common ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, Πˆ , the assumption does not 
                                                 
43  Siegfried (1975), 573. 
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mean that the prosecutor is motivated only by the prospects of a trial conviction.  Consider the 
structure of the equation ( ) ( ) BT VVVE Θ−+Θ= 1 .  To the extent that a marginal increase in (or 
a higher value of) Π  in a potential case increases her ex ante expected value of bringing that 
case, E(V), the prosecutor is motivated by the prospects of a conviction, even if the case goes to 
trial, since 
ˆ
0ˆ >Π∂
∂ TV .  The prosecutor is also (just as) motivated to bring a case by the other 
(second-order) positive effects on E(V) that are created by a marginal increase in (or a higher 
value of) Π  in cases that she considers pursuing in the pre-indictment stage.  In particular, the 
prosecutor’s decision to bring a case is also motivated by a marginal increase in (higher value of) 
 because a marginal increase in  creates a marginal increase in , which, in turn, creates a 
marginal increase in E(V). 
ˆ
Πˆ Πˆ BV
The predicted total (net) marginal effects on E(V) from increases in the values of case 
characteristics are summarized in Tables 21 through 26 at the end of Appendix A.  These tables 
show the implications of different assumptions about the prosecutor’s focus on different aspects 
of case disposition. 
Two points of additional background will facilitate the following examination of the 
indirect case selection effects on observed case outcomes, including the observed trial rate.  First, 
consider how the values of case characteristics are determined.  Some case characteristics’ values 
may be determined by external (institutional) shocks and some case characteristics’ values may 
be inherently associated with certain types of cases or certain types of defendants, while the 
remaining case characteristics’ values could be determined through the prosecutor’s case 
selection process.  The external shocks and the inherent differences across types of cases (i.e., 
bid-rigging versus price-fixing) or types of defendants provide opportunities for empirical tests 
of the implications of the case selection model (including the plea bargaining model and the 
litigation model). 
Second, according to the specifications of the model of the prosecutor’s case selection 
process, after the prosecutor has committed to prosecuting a case, neither the values of the case 
characteristics nor her (non-negative) ex ante expected value of bringing that case,  can 
change.  These values are “frozen” once the prosecutor decides to initiate a case.  
( )VE
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An example is useful for explaining the implications of this “frozen” case characteristic 
value concept.  Suppose that an initiated case is observed to have a particular case characteristic 
with a relative value that is expected to increase ( )VE  – for example, a relatively low value of 
the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C .  In this situation, because that case was 
initiated, we know that the relatively low value of  did not create sufficiently large negative 
second-order effects on  that would render 
C
( )VE ( )VE  to be negative.44  This concept of the 
“frozen” values of the case characteristics in the sample of cases observed after a particular 
decision-stage of the case disposition process is important, especially because this concept 
facilitates analysis in subsequent chapters of this study (i.e., Chapters VII , VIII, and IX).45   
 
Case selection effects on observed trial rates from the amount or strength of the prosecutor’s 
evidence  
 
As previously mentioned, at the case selection stage, the prosecutor expects that the given 
amount and strength of her evidence, e, and other exogenous case characteristics (e.g., the 
prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C ) will affect the prosecutor’s and the defendant’s 
behavior at trial.  From the prosecutor’s perspective at the case selection stage, the prosecutor’s 
and defendant’s expected behavior at trial, if the case should go to trial, is captured by their 
expected optimal choices of levels of trial expenditure, ∗X  and ∗Y , respectively.  At the case 
selection stage, the prosecutor expects that the litigants’ optimal choices of trial expenditure will 
affect the litigants’ common ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, Π .  Working 
backwards in game theoretical fashion, the prosecutor’s expectations of the parties’ choices of 
ˆ
                                                 
44  On the other hand, it is still possible that the relatively low value of C created positive second-order effects 
on E(V) that made E(V) higher than it would have been if the value of C were not relatively low.  This possibility is 
of no consequence, however. 
 Considerations of the expected second-order effects of case characteristics on which E(V) does not directly 
depend (i.e., the prosecutor’s evidence, e, the idiosyncratic element, ρ , 
ecision
of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected 
probability of trial, and the variability of the judge’s conviction d  standard, λ ) are important for evaluating 
whether relatively low or high values of these case characteristics are likely to produce relatively high or low values 
of E(V).  As explained later, understanding these relationships between the relative values of case characteristics and 
E(V) is an integral part of the analysis of expected indirect case selection effects on the ex post probability of trial, 
the ex post probability of trial conviction, as well as expected sentences following conviction by trial or plea 
agreement. 
45  The concept of “frozen” values of the case characteristics  is not as important in the analysis of indirect 
case selection effects in the rest of this section, because it is not possible for the second-order direct effects on E(V) 
from changes in the values of case characteristics to confound the predicted first-order effects when the prosecutor is 
assumed to be “conviction-motivated.”  
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trial expenditure will affect her ex ante expected probability of trial, Θ , and, finally, the 
prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of bringing the case, ( )VE .  Thus, because the given level 
(in terms of quantity and quality) of evidence, e, affects ( )VE , the level of evidence creates 
indirect case selection effects on the ex post probability of trial, Θ~ . 
As discussed in Appendix A and shown in Table 24. b., an increase in the prosecutor’s 
evidence, e, increases  when the prosecutor is reasonably assumed to be “conviction-
motivated.”  Thus, if a conviction-motivated prosecutor decides to initiate a case characterized 
by a relatively low level of evidence, e, the relative values of the other case characteristics in the 
initiated (observed) case are expected to increase 
( )VE
( )VE , ceteris paribus.   
Conversely, if a conviction-motivated prosecutor decides to initiate a case characterized 
by a relatively high level of evidence, e, it is possible, as with the previous scenario (i.e., low 
level of evidence), that the initiated (observed) case will have other case characteristics that, 
ceteris paribus, are expected to increase ( )VE .  But it is also more likely in this scenario (i.e., 
high level of evidence) than the previous scenario (i.e., low level of evidence) that the initiated 
(observed) case will have other case characteristics that, ceteris paribus, are expected to 
decrease .( )VE 46  It is worth noting that Eisenberg and Farber (2003) mention the latter 
possibility and ignore the former possibility. 
For example, ceteris paribus, compared to an initiated case in which the prosecutor has 
weaker or less evidence, an initiated case in which the prosecutor has relatively stronger or more 
evidence is just as likely to to be characterized by a relatively high value of the prosecutor’s unit 
cost of trial expenditure, C , as such an initiated case is likely to be characterized by a relatively 
low value of .  The same predictions apply for the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C
K , the parties’ common ex ante expected trial sentence, , the parties’ common ex ante TS
                                                 
46  While this expected case selection “adjustment” in the mix of case characteristics may seem counter-
intuitive in several respects, it is perfectly consistent with the case selection rule.  First, it is important to recognize 
that there are more factors than the amount of evidence that determine the parties’ common ex ante expected 
probability of trial conviction.  Second, it is important to recognize that the assumption that the prosecutor is 
conviction-motivated deals only with the weight that the prosecutor’s generally places on various (endogenous) 
aspects of case disposition for all types of federal criminal antitrust cases. 
Understanding the previous two paragraphs in the body is crucial for understanding the predicted case 
selection effects from changes in the values of case characteristics.  Understanding the previous paragraphs 
conceptually is also crucial for understanding the other predicted sample selection effects (e.g., trial selection effect) 
discussed later. 
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expected probability of trial conviction, Πˆ ,47 and the idiosyncratic element, ρ , of the 
prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial.   
In addition, when compared to an initiated case with weaker or less evidence, an initiated 
case with a relatively higher level of evidence may be characterized by relatively high or low 
values of the variability of the judge’s conviction decision standard, λ .  This prediction is based 
on the ambigous effect of λ  on , as discussed in Appendix A, and not due to the mechanics 
of the modeled case selection process.  
( )VE
In sum, the total (net) indirect case selection effect of more or stronger evidence, e, on the 
observed trial rate, Θ~ , is ambiguous.  Nonetheless, this ambiguity does not preclude meaningful 
empirical tests of the implications of the case selection process and initiated cases with 
(systematically) more or stronger – or less or weaker – evidence.  In general, the case selection 
process followed by a conviction-motivated prosecutor, as modeled, suggests different mixes of 
case characteristics in initiated cases with relatively extreme values of certain case 
characteristics, like e.  The conviction-motivated prosecutor’s expected case selection 
adjustments, and the associated expected mixes of case characteristics in initiated cases that are 
implied by the case selection model (i.e., initiate if ( ) 0≥VE ) suggest meaningful empirical 
tests, as discussed later. 
 
Case selection effects of allegations of bid-rigging 
 
Based on the insight into the prosecutor’s case-bringing decision process provided by 
former U.S. Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Donald I. Baker (1978), it is reasonable to 
assume that a high probability of conviction is a criterion for federal criminal antitrust cases that 
the DOJ Antitrust Division initiates.  As several researchers and, in particular, Snyder (1989, 
1990), have discussed, prosecutors can generally prove bid-rigging conspiracies more easily than 
they can prove price-fixing conspiracies.  Victims of bid-rigging are government agencies who 
gather the conspirators’ bids, so probative evidence is generally easier for prosecutors to discover 
and gather in bid-rigging cases compared to price-fixing cases.  In addition, bid-rigging cases 
                                                 
47  For completeness, note that does not directly influence  Πˆ  Θ~ . 
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usually feature direct testimony about the conspiracy (Snyder, 1989) given by a conspirator 
(Snyder, 1990).   
In terms of the case selection model, it follows that the parties’ common ex ante expected 
probability of trial conviction, , is higher in bid-rigging cases than non-bid-rigging cases like 
cases involving alleged exclusionary practices or price-fixing.  According to the prosecutor’s 
case selection process, if the prosecutor initiates a bid-rigging case, compared to a federal 
criminal antitrust case that does not involve alleged bid-rigging, the initiated case is just as likely 
to be characterized by a relatively low value of the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, 
Πˆ
K , 
which would decrease , as the initiated case is likely to be characterized by a relatively high 
value of 
( )VE
K , which would increase ( )VE . 48   
The same predictions apply for the parties’ common ex ante expected trial sentence, , 
the idiosyncratic element, 
TS
ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, 
the expected relative value(s) of the level of the prosecutor’s evidence, e,.49 as well as the 
prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C .  Meanwhile, as before, an initiated case with a 
relatively high value of  may be characterized by relatively high or low values of the 
variability of the judge’s conviction decision standard, 
Πˆ
λ .  In sum, the total (net) indirect case 
selection effect on the observed trial rate, Θ~ , from a (systematically) relatively high value of Πˆ  
in certain types of initiated cases is ambiguous.   
 
Case selection effects of higher (opportunity) trial costs for the prosecutor 
 
                                                 
48  The previous explanation of the case selection effects of relatively low and high values of the level of 
evidence in initiated cases was meant to provide the reader with a complete understanding of the implications of the 
case selection process.   Because this study uses Chapter VI to analyze the implications of marginal increases in the 
values of case characteristics, which are relevant for regression analysis and for comparison to the analogous 
predictions developed by Eisenberg and Farber (2003), this study does not discuss the implications of marginal 
decreases in   (or a relatively low value of Πˆ Πˆ  observed in an initiated case).   
Discussing both scenarios would add unnecessarily to the volume of this already voluminous study.  Thus, 
the reader should keep in mind the implications of the case selection process when the value of the subject case 
characteristic is relatively high or low in initiated cases.  Both scenarios will be relevant for the sample means tests 
reported in Chapter X. 
49  Recall that a vector, e, represents evidence so that it can be measured in terms of quality and quantity.  
Thus, a prosecutor may initiate a bid-rigging case with good but little evidence.  That is, sometimes quality matters 
more than quantity. 
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Researchers like Posner (1970) and Gallo, et al. (2000) have commented on the DOJ 
Antitrust Division’s traditionally low funding levels.  Lower funding or budget levels imply 
higher per unit (opportunity) costs of trial expenditure, .  Higher values of C  are expected to 
negatively directly affect the ex post probability of trial, Θ
C
~ , as shown in Equation [26].  Higher 
values of  in the cases that the prosecutor initiates, are also expected to create indirect case 
selection effects (and a net case selection effect) on 
C
Θ~ .   
Importantly, in contrast to the above analyses of case selection effects created by more 
evidence, e, or a relatively high value of Πˆ , the model of the prosecutor’s case selection decision 
implies particular relative values of case characteristics other than C  in initiated cases that are 
characterized by a relatively high value of C .  That is because, ceteris paribus, a relatively high 
value of C  lowers the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of bringing a case, , and creates 
a “deficit” in .  In order for a case to be initiated, this “deficit” must be at least balanced (if 
not outweighed) by relative values of other case characteristics that increase .  Thus, if an 
initiated case is characterized by a relatively high value of , the model of the prosecutor’s 
case-bringing decision suggests that such an initiated case must be further characterized by 
relative values of other case characteristics that increase 
( )VE
( )VE
( )VE
C
( )VE .  Hence the specificity of the 
following predictions. 
Under the reasonable assumption that the prosecutor is (purely) “conviction-motivated,” 
if the prosecutor considers initiating a case characterized by a relatively high value of C , the 
model of the case selection process implies that the prosecutor would be likely to initiate that 
case if it is also characterized by relatively (compared to initiated cases with lower values of ) 
high values of the parties’ common ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, Π ; the 
idiosyncratic element, 
C
ˆ
ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial conviction; the 
prosecutor’s evidence, e; the defendant’s unit trial cost, K ; and the ex ante expected trial 
sentence, .TS 50  Meanwhile, an initiated case with a relatively high value of  may be C
                                                 
50  These expectations for the relative values of Πˆ  (and ρ ) in initiated cases characterized by higher values 
of C suggest that if the DOJ Antitrust Division’s budgeted resources are limited, antitrust prosecutors will be more 
inclined to bring cases that are relatively easier to successfully prosecute.  Some argue that the DOJ’s rising 
conviction rate after the late 1970s reflects the effects of prosecutors’ limited budgets.  As Snyder (1989) notes, 
when the DOJ’s antitrust enforcement budgets diminished during this period, the cases brought usually involved 
unsophisticated and otherwise easily prosecuted conspirators. Thus, if a particular case is brought that requires a 
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characterized by relatively high or low values of the variability of the judge’s conviction decision 
standard, λ .   
As discussed in more detail in Appendix A, in initiated cases with a (systematically) 
relatively high values of C , the expected relatively (compared to cases not characterized by 
relatively high values of C ) higher values of , e, and TS K  have ambiguous direct marginal 
effects on the ex ante expected probability of trial, Θ , and thus, the observed trial rate, Θ~ .  The 
expected relatively higher value of ρ  in initiated cases with relatively high values of C  is 
expected to have a positive effect on Θ  and thus Θ~ .  (Note that Πˆ  does not directly affect Θ~ .)  
In sum, the total (net) indirect case selection effect on the observed trial rate, Θ~ , from a 
(systematically) relatively high value of C  in initiated cases is ambiguous.   
 
Case selection effects of higher (opportunity) trial costs for the defendant 
 
The defendant’s unit cost of litigation, K , is expected to vary by type of defendant.  As 
the law and economics literature (e.g., Eisenberg and Farber (2003)) commonly assumes, it is 
reasonable to expect corporate defendants to face lower unit costs of trial expenditure than 
individual defendants face, (and for higher ranking corporate officials to have lower unit costs of 
trial expenditure than lower ranking defendants).   
The composition of types of defendants in federal antitrust cases and, in particular, the 
types of criminal defendants, has varied over the years.  Gallo et al. (2000) report that from 
1955-1997 about 88 percent of the total number of CCH cases (criminal and civil) involved firms 
as defendants and about 40 percent involved individuals as defendants.  After 1980, the total 
number of defendants in all CCH cases (criminal and civil) decreased, but the percentage of 
cases with individuals as defendants increased relative to the percentage of cases with firms as 
defendants.  According to Gallo et al. (2000), the majority of individual defendants are high-
ranking corporate officials.   
                                                                                                                                                             
significant amount of trial expenditure (or effort) by the prosecutor, then, given that the case has been brought, the 
case is one in which the prosecutor anticipates a trial conviction.  Snyder’s arguments are consistent with this 
study’s case selection model’s predicted case selection effects on the observed trial conviction rate from higher trial 
costs for the prosecutor. 
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With respect to criminal CCH cases in particular, Gallo et al. (2000) find that since 1955 
about 80 percent of the criminal cases involved firms as defendants and about 27 percent of the 
criminal cases involved individuals as defendants.  The number of criminal cases with 
individuals as defendants generally increased since 1955, especially after 1979, but the total 
number of individual defendants decreased in the 1980s.  Further, nearly every criminal case 
from 1955-1972 involved a firm as a defendant, but that is not true for the period 1972-1997.  
Moreover, Snyder (1989, 1990) finds that most of the corporate defendants in the 1980s were 
small firms.  In general, these trends suggest an increase in the defendant’s unit cost of trial 
expenditure in federal criminal antitrust cases from the 1950s to at least the 1990s. 
According to Equation [26], a higher value of the defendant’s unit cost of trial 
expenditure, K , negatively affects the ex post probability of trial, Θ~ .  Meanwhile, because 
increases in K  positively affect , if the prosecutor is conviction-motivated and is willing to 
bring a case against an individual defendant (i.e., with a relatively high values of 
( )VE
K  compared to 
a case involving a corporate defendant), the initiated case is just as likely to be characterized by a 
relatively low value of prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C , which would increase 
, as the initiated case is likely to be characterized by a relatively high value of C , which 
would decrease .
( )VE
( )VE  51   
The same predictions apply for the parties’ common ex ante expected trial sentence, , 
the idiosyncratic element, 
TS
ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, 
the parties’ common ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, Πˆ , and the expected 
relative value(s) of the level of the prosecutor’s evidence, e.  In contrast, as before, an initiated 
case with a relatively high value of K  may be characterized by relatively high or low values of 
the variability of the judge’s conviction decision standard, λ .  Thus, the total (net) indirect case 
                                                 
51  The previous explanation of the case selection effects of relatively low and high values of the level of 
evidence in initiated cases was meant to provide the reader with a complete understanding of the implications of the 
case selection process.   Because this study uses Chapter VI to analyze the implications of marginal increases in the 
values of case characteristics, which are relevant for regression analysis and for comparison to the analogous 
predictions developed by Eisenberg and Farber (2003), this study does not discuss the implications of marginal 
decreases in   (or a relatively low value of Πˆ Πˆ  observed in an initiated case).   
Discussing both scenarios would add unnecessarily to the volume of this study.  Thus, the reader should 
keep in mind the implications of the case selection process when the value of the subject case characteristic is 
relatively high or low in initiated cases.  Both scenarios will be relevant for the sample means tests reported in 
Chapter X. 
 69
selection effect on the observed trial rate, Θ~ , from a (systematically) relatively high value of K  
in initiated cases is ambiguous.   
 
Case selection effects of the change from misdemeanor to felony status of certain offenses 
 
On several occasions Congress has increased statutory penalties for federal criminal 
antitrust offenses.  Notably, the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974 (“APPA”) 
elevated Sherman Act violations from misdemeanor to felony status.  This increased the 
maximum fine to $100,000 for individuals and to $1 million for corporations, thereby doubling 
the maximum fine for individuals and increasing maximum fines for corporate defendants by a 
factor of twenty.  For individual offenders, the shift to felony penalties also increased the 
maximum prison term from one to three years per count.52   
As discussed in Chapter II, Cohen (1992), Gallo, et al. (1994, 2000), and Snyder (1990) 
find significant increases in fines imposed by judges following the enactment of the APPA.  In 
terms of the case selection model, the elevation of maximum penalties for federal criminal 
antitrust offenses translates into a higher value of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected sanctions 
following a trial conviction, .TS 53  This exogenous institutional increase in  positively 
directly affects the ex post probability of trial, Θ
TS
~ .   
In order to specify the case selection model’s predicted indirect effects on case outcomes 
from the shift to felony penalties, continue to assume that the prosecutor is (purely) “conviction 
motivated” and the prosecutor has weaker diminishing returns in trial expenditure.  Given these 
                                                 
52  In 1977, the DOJ adopted a new policy regarding sentencing recommendations for Sherman Act 
convictions (Gallo, et al. 2000).  The aim of the DOJ policy change was to increase deterrence through stiffer 
antitrust penalties.  It mandated that prosecutors seek a base corporate fine of ten percent of the convicted firm’s 
total sales affected by the violation.  The directive also suggested upward adjustments for evidence of excessively 
high markups and for recidivism; but it allowed downward adjustments if the defendant cooperated with the 
government or if the suggested base fine jeopardized the defendant firm’s competitive viability. 
53  The provisions of the APPA only apply to violations that occurred after November 1, 1974.  It is still 
possible that judges, in order to enhance their promotion potential (Cohen 1992), would be motivated, post-APPA, 
to increase the sanctions they impose even when the provisions of the APPA do not apply.  Imposing harsher 
penalties for criminal antitrust violations could elevate their standings in the eyes of politicians or prosecutors who 
supported the spirit of the APPA to enhance penalties for criminal antitrust violations.  As Cohen (1992) explains, 
the White House and key U.S. Department of Justice officials are main actors in appeals court appointments.  
Gallo et al. (2000) report that following the enactment of each penalty-enhancing law since 1955, there has 
been a significant increase in average real fines for both firm and individual defendants, but less than the 
proportionate increases in the statutory maximum penalties.  The fines imposed on firms have increased more than 
fines imposed on individuals.   
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assumptions, the prosecutor’s case selection process implies that a federal criminal antitrust case 
that the prosecutor initiates under the APPA (an exogenous shock that increases the value of ) 
is likely to be characterized by a relatively (compared to pre-APPA cases) high or low values of 
the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C , the defendant’s unit trial cost, 
TS
K ; the 
prosecutor’s evidence, e; the parties’ common ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, 
; and the idiosyncratic element, Πˆ ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial 
conviction.  On the contrary, an initiated case with a relatively high value of  may be 
characterized by relatively high or low values of the variability of the judge’s conviction decision 
standard, 
TS
λ .   
As discussed above with respect to the expected direct effects of case characteristics on 
the observed trial rate, and in more detail in Appendix A, in initiated cases with a 
(systematically) relatively high value of  (e.g., post-APPA) compared to other types of cases, 
the expected relatively high value of and the expected relatively low values of  e and 
TS
C K  have 
ambiguous direct marginal effects on the ex ante expected probability of trial, Θ , and thus, on 
the observed trial rate, Θ~ .  In contrast, the expected relatively low value of ρ  is expected to 
decrease the ex ante expected probability of trial, Θ , and thus, the observed trial rate, Θ~ .  (Note 
that Π  does not directly influence ˆ Θ~ .)  In sum, the total (net) indirect case selection effect on 
the observed trial rate, Θ~ , from (systematically) relatively high values of  (caused by an 
exogenous shock to ) in certain types of initiated cases (e.g., post-APPA) is ambiguous.   
TS
TS
 
Case selection effects from the alleged amount of economic harm from the antitrust violation 
 
Higher alleged conspiracy sales implies greater alleged economic harm from the 
conspiracy, which implies a higher value of the parties’ common ex ante expected sentence 
following a trial conviction, .  The analysis and predictions regarding the case selection 
effects on the ex post probability of trial, Θ
TS
~ , are identical to those regarding the enactment of the 
APPA.  The various determinants of  provide several potential empirical tests. TS
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Case selection effects of a more confident prosecutor 
 
Suppose that based on previous trial outcomes in similar or recent cases, for example, the 
prosecutor is relatively more confident about the chances of a trial conviction in a particular case 
than she is in other cases.  The prosecutor’s confidence can be expressed by a relatively high 
value of the idiosyncratic component, ρ , of the prosecutor’s expected probability of trial 
conviction.  An increase in ρ  (and/or a decrease in the idiosyncratic component of the 
defendant’s expected probability of trial conviction, δ ) is expected to increase the observed trial 
rate.  As discussed in Appendix A and shown in Table 26. b., an increase in ρ  is expected to 
increase a conviction-motivated prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of initiating a case, ( )VE .   
According to the case selection process, when compared to cases in which the 
(conviction-motivated) prosecutor is less confident, initiated cases in which the prosecutor is 
relatively more confident are just as likely to be characterized by relatively high or low values of 
the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C , the defendant’s unit trial cost, K ; the 
prosecutor’s evidence, e; the parties’ common expected trial sentence, , and even the parties’ 
common ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, 
TS
Πˆ .  (Note that Πˆ  does not directly 
influence Θ~ .)  As before, an initiated case with a relatively high value of ρ  may be 
characterized by relatively high or low values of the variability of the judge’s conviction decision 
standard, λ .  Thus, as with case selection effects associated with other case characteristics, the 
total (net) indirect case selection effect on the observed trial rate, Θ~ , from a (systematically) 
relatively high value of ρ  in certain types of initiated cases is ambiguous.   
 
Empirically Testable Implications of Indictment as a Selection Process 
 
Table 3 provides the theoretical implications of the prosecutor’s case selection process 
and the defendant’s plea decision (i.e., trial selection) process with respect to the influence of 
marginal increases in the values of case characteristics on the observed trial rate.54  The 
theoretical implications summarized in Table 3 are relevant for regression analysis used to 
                                                 
54  The predictions in Table 3 assume the prosecutor is “conviction-motivated” and has weaker diminishing 
returns in trial expenditure than the defendant. 
 72
identify the determinants of the observed trial rate.  Inspection of Table 3 demonstrates that the 
second-order direct “stakes effects” and “litigation expenditure effects,” as well as the indirect 
“case selection effects” on the ex post expected probability of trial from changes in the values of 
case characteristics generally render ambiguous all predicted net effects on the ex post expected 
probability of trial from marginal increases in the values of case characteristics.   
These regression-related predictions are relevant at least for purposes of comparisons to 
the predictions in Eisenberg and Farber (2003), who developed the case selection model upon 
which the case selection model is built.  Because Eisenberg and Farber did not treat the litigants’ 
trial expenditures as choice variables or the expected penalty as an endogenous variable, they did 
not consider the direct second-order “stakes effects” or “litigation expenditure effects” that create 
ambiguity in the predictions of this study.  Moreover, Eisenberg and Farber employed a 
“majority rules” signing convention to determine a net effect of indirect case selection effects.  
This questionable signing convention allowed them to report unambiguous indirect case 
selection effects on the ex post probability of trial. 
These regression-related predictions are also relevant for comparisons to the predictions 
in Snyder (1989, 1990).  Snyder recognized, through limited discussion, the potential effects of 
the prosecutor’s case-bringing decision on the observed trial rate.  He did not, however, 
systematically consider case selection effects on the observed trial rate as this study does.   
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Table 3. Signs of expected direct and indirect effects on the observed trial rate, Θ~  
 
 
Expected Net 
Second-Order 
Direct “Trial 
Expenditure” 
Effect on Θ~ * 
Expected Net 
Second-Order 
Direct “Stakes” 
Effect on Θ~ * 
Case 
Characteristic 
Expected 
First-
Order 
Direct 
Effect on 
Θ~  When 
Π≥Πˆ  
When 
Π<Πˆ  
When 
Π≥Πˆ  
When 
Π<Πˆ  
Expected 
Indirect  
Case 
Selection 
Effect on 
Θ~  
Expected 
Total 
(Net) 
Effect on 
Θ~  
Πˆ ** 0 0 0 ? ? 
C  - ? + - ? ? ? 
K  - + ? ? + ? ? 
TS ** + - 0 ? ? 
e  0 + - ? ? ? 
λ  0 ? ? ? ? ρ  + 0 0 ? ? 
 
* As discussed above and, in detail, in Appendix A,.these second-order direct effects involve movements in both 
litigants’ optimal levels of trial expenditure, sometimes in the same direction but sometimes in opposite 
directions.  Hence the “net” reference.   
** The marginal increases in  and  are from exogenous shocks. Πˆ TS
 
 
Despite the ambiguous expected indirect case selection effects on the observed trial rate 
shown in Table 3, the theoretical implications of the prosecutor’s case selection process, as 
specified in the case selection model, are empirically testable.  That is because the theoretical 
model of the prosecutor’s case-bringing decision implies particular expected mixes of case 
characteristics, given the relative value of at least one case characteristic, in cases that the 
prosecutor does initiate.  These predictions suggest firm relationships among the relative values 
of different pairs of case characteristics in cases that are initiated (i.e., along the same game tree 
branch stemming from the case-bringing decision node).55  These relationships can be tested 
meaningfully using sample means tests using the sample of initiated (observed) cases.   
                                                 
55  If potential cases that prosecutors chose not to initiate were observable, then it would be possible to test 
other predictions provided by the model of the case selection process related to the more straightforward question of 
whether relative values for case characteristics that are associated with a higher (lower) value of E(V) are found in 
cases that the prosecutor does (does not) initiate.  That is, if cases that are not initiated were observable, then another 
meaningful test would be to look for differences in the relative values of the same case characteristic in the sample 
of cases that are initiated versus the sample of cases that are not initiated (i.e., across game tree branches stemming 
from the case-bringing decision node). 
 74
Table 4 summarizes the predicted relationships among the relative values of different 
pairs of case characteristics in cases that are initiated.  To understand Table 4 it is useful to first 
understand what relationships among the relative values of different pairs of case characteristics 
in initiated cases that the model of the prosecutor’s case selection process does not predict.   
For example, suppose an initiated case is characterized by a relatively high value of the 
prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C .  Ceteris paribus, a relatively high value of  is 
expected to be associated with a relatively low value of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value 
of initiating a case, .  In this situation, the model of the prosecutor’s case selection process 
does not predict that the initiated case also would be characterized by values of other case 
characteristics that are expected to further reduce 
C
( )VE
( )VE .  In this situation, relative values of other 
case characteristics not predicted by the model of the prosecutor’s case selection process include 
relatively low values of the defendant’s unit trial cost, K ; the level of the prosecutor’s evidence, 
e; the parties’ common expected trial sentence, ; the parties’ common ex ante expected 
probability of trial conviction, ; or the idiosyncratic component, 
TS
Πˆ ρ , of the prosecutor’s 
expected probability of trial conviction.   
Continuing the preceding example, if an initiated case is characterized by a relatively 
high value of C , then observed relatively high values of K , e, , TS Πˆ , or ρ  in such an initiated 
case would support the predictions of the model of the prosecutor’s case selection process.  
Meanwhile, if an initiated case is characterized instead by a relatively low value of C , then 
observed relatively high or low values of K , e, , TS Πˆ , or ρ  in such an initiated case also 
would be consistent with the predictions of the model of the prosecutor’s case selection process.   
Table 4 provides the combinations of relative values of pairwise combinations of case 
characteristics, in cases that are initiated, that are consistent and inconsistent with the predictions 
implied by the model of the prosecutor’s case selection process.56  Table 4 serves as the basis of 
sample means tests reported in Chapter X. 
 
                                                 
56  The predictions in Table 4 assume the prosecutor is “conviction-motivated” and has weaker diminishing 
returns in trial expenditure than the defendant. 
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Table 4. Pairs of relative values of case characteristics in initiated cases and their consistency 
with the predictions of the case selection model 
 
 
 High 
 Πˆ
Low 
 Πˆ
High 
 C
Low 
 C
High 
K  
Low 
K  
High 
 TS
Low 
 TS
High 
 e
Low 
 e
High ρ  Low ρ  
High 
 Πˆ
C*            
Low 
 Πˆ
C* I*           
High 
 C
C I I*          
Low 
 C
C C C* C*         
High 
K  
C C C C C*        
Low 
K  
C I I C C* I*       
High 
 TS
C C C C C C C*      
Low 
 TS
C I I C C I C* I*     
High 
 e
C C C C C C C C C*    
Low 
 e
C I I C C I C I C* I*   
High ρ  C C C C C C C C C C C*  
Low ρ  C I I C C I C I C I C* I* 
 
*  As explained in Chapter X, different empirical variables can represent the same theoretical variable. Thus, 
combinations of relatively high and low values of the same theoretical variable represented by more than 
one empirical variable is possible for a given empirical observation.  Pairs that are consistent with case 
selection model are denoted with “C” and pairs that are inconsistent are denoted with “I”.  Horizontal axis 
provides the possible relative values of first case characteristic in a possible pair.  Vertical axis provides the 
possible relative values of second case characteristic in a possible pair. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
DETERRMINANTS OF THE OBSERVED TRIAL CONVICTION RATE 
 
This chapter defines the conditional ex post probability of trial conviction, Π~ , which is 
the observed trial conviction rate.  In order to observe a case disposed by trial conviction, two 
things must happen: the prosecutor must initiate the case and the case must go to trial.  The 
prosecutor’s case selection and the defendant’s plea decision (i.e., trial selection) processes thus 
condition the sample of initiated cases that go to trial and thus create case and trial selection 
effects, respectively, which influence the observed trial conviction rate.  This study’s theoretical 
framework thus diverges from and improves upon Snyder’s (1989, 1990) as well as Eisenberg 
and Farber’s (2003) models by recognizing that the case selection process, in addition to the trial 
selection process, affects the mix of case characteristics in the cases that go to trial, thus 
influencing the observed trial conviction rate, Π~ .   
These considerations are necessary for meaningful empirical tests of the determinants of 
trial conviction rates in federal criminal antitrust cases.  The implications of the prosecutor’s case 
selection process were explained in the previous chapter.  The implications of the defendant’s 
plea decision (i.e., trial selection) process specified above are explained in this chapter.  They are 
conceptually analogous to the implications of the case selection process, however.  Assume the 
defendant is faced with a case against him that has a certain case characteristic with a relatively 
extreme value that has a positive (negative) effect on the ex ante probability of trial, , (and 
hence the ex post probability of trial, Θ
Θ
~ ).  With that “cushion” (“deficit”) created by that 
extreme-valued case characteristic, the defendant would be willing to go to trial even if (only if) 
other case characteristics – even (especially) with relatively extreme values – have negative 
(positive) effects on the probability of trial as long as (so that) the condition  holds.     0>Θ
Empirically analyzing the sample selection bias created by the defendant’s trial selection 
process is possible because cases that go to trial and cases that do not go to trial are observable.  
One way is to control for sample selection bias created by the defendant’s plea decision in 
regression models of trial outcomes using the usual approaches (e.g., the approach introduced by 
Heckman).   
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As explained below, theory implies unambigous predicted direct effects on the observed 
trial conviction rate from marginal increases in the values of case characteristics.  Except for a 
couple of instances, however, the predicted indirect case selection effects and trial selection 
effects are ambiguous.  Thus, the predicted total (net) marginal effects on the observed trial rate 
from marginal increases in the values of case characteristics are ambigous.  
Despite these ambiguities, other meaningful empirical tests of the implications of the 
model of the defendant’s plea decision are possible.  The theoretical model of the defendant’s 
plea decision implies firm relationships among the relative values of the same case characteristic 
in the sample of cases that go to trial versus the sample of cases that do not go to trial (i.e., across 
different game tree branches stemming from the plea decision mode).  These relationships can be 
tested meaningfully with sample means tests using the samples of (initiated) cases that do and do 
not go to trial.    
In addition, the predictions of the model of the defendant’s plea decision suggest firm 
relationships among the relative values of different pairs of case characteristics either in the 
sample of cases that go to trial or in the sample of cases that do not go to trial (i.e., along the 
same game tree branch stemming from the plea decision mode).  These relationships can be 
tested meaningfully using sample means tests using either the sample of cases that go to trial or 
the sample of cases that do not go to trial (or both samples).   
 
Direct Effects on the Observed Trial Conviction Rate 
 
The observed trial conviction rate is the ex post expected trial conviction rate conditional 
on the case being filed and the case going to trial.  This implies the following expanded 
definition of the observed trial conviction rate: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]0,0ˆ~ >−−−≥Π=Π KYCXSVEEE Tδρ ,      [27] 
 
where ( ) ( )[ ]( )λYDXP −+Π=Π eˆ .  
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The definitions of the parties’ common ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, 
, the prosecutor’s arguments at trial, Πˆ ( )XP , and the defendant’s trial arguments, , in 
Equation [27] are specified by the litigation model.  Meanwhile, 
( )YD
∗= XX  and ∗= YY  are the 
optimal (Nash equilibrium) values of the prosecutor’s and the defendant’s respective choices of 
levels of trial expenditure.  Both ∗X  and ∗Y  are implicit functions of C , K , , e , TS λ , as well 
as each other as specified by the litigation model.   
The expected marginal direct effects on the (Nash equilibrium) value of  from changes 
in the values of case characteristics are also the expected marginal effects from changes in the 
values of case characteristics on the value of 
Πˆ
Π~ .  First consider the marginal effects of case 
characteristics on the ex ante probability of trial conviction, Πˆ .  The litigation model predicts 
that Π  is positively related to the prosecutor’s evidence, e.  The litigation models also predicts 
that an increase in the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure,
ˆ
K , will increase .Πˆ 57  An 
increase in  lowers , however.  Given the assumption that the prosecutor has weaker 
diminishing returns in trial expenditure, an increase in the trial stakes for both parties, , will 
increase Π .  Meanwhile, the prosecutor’s and the defendant’s respective idiosyncratic 
components, 
C Πˆ
TS
ˆ
ρ  and δ , of their ex ante expected probabilities of trial conviction, do not directly 
affect Π .  ˆ
Finally, the litigation model predicts that as long as the parties’ rates of diminishing 
returns from trial expenditure are sufficiently close, an increase (a decrease) in λ  will increase 
(decrease) the underdog’s chances at trial.  Because assumptions regarding the “closeness” of the 
parties’ trial productivities cannot be easily justified, the expected effect of λ  on  is 
ambiguous.  In sum, these are the expected “direct effects” of case characteristics on the ex ante 
probability of trial conviction,   (even if they affect 
Πˆ
Πˆ Πˆ  indirectly through ∗= XX  and 
∗= YY ).58    
                                                 
57  Gallo et al. (2000) repor at for the period 1955-1997, the overall conviction rate in minal CCH cases 
does not vary significantly by type of defendant or by the corporate rank of individual defend .  For civil CCH 
cases, however, the DOJ convicted high-ranking individuals less frequently than the DOJ con ed lower raking 
individuals. 
58  Since these expected “direct” effects are based on the predictions of the litigation m they account for 
the effects on the ex ante expected probability of trial conviction,
t th  cri
ants
vict
odel, 
 Πˆ , from changes in the litigants’ optimal levels of 
trial expenditure caused by changes in the values of case characteristics.  The predicted directions of the changes in 
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 Case Selection Effects on the Observed Trial Conviction Rate 
 
This study’s theoretical framework diverges from and improves upon Snyder’s (1989, 
1990) as well as Eisenberg and Farber’s (2003) models by recognizing that the case selection 
process, in addition to the trial selection process, affects the mix of case characteristics in the 
cases that go to trial, thus influencing the observed trial conviction rate, Π~ .  Note that the first 
conditioning event expressed in Equation [27] is that the prosecutor brought the case.  This 
conditioning event, represented by ( ) 0≥VE , produces indirect “case selection effects” on the 
observed trial conviction rate that are analogous to the indirect case selection effects discussed in 
Chapter VI with regard to the observed trial rate.  Specifically, if a conviction-motivated 
prosecutor considers initiating a case with relatively more or stronger evidence, e, then because 
her ex ante expected value of bringing a case, ( )VE , unambiguously increases in e when she is 
conviction-motivated, she would be willing to tolerate case characteristics that otherwise reduce 
.  Of course, she also would be interested (even more interested) in initiating such a case if 
it was also characterized by case characteristics that raise 
( )VE
( )VE .   
Thus, an initiated case with more or stronger evidence is just as likely to be further 
characterized by a relatively low value of the parties’ common ex ante expected probability of 
trial conviction, , (compared to cases not characterized by more or stronger evidence) as it is 
likely to be further characterized by a relatively high value of 
Πˆ
Πˆ .  (Recall that  increases in 
.)  Thus, the expected case selection effect of more or stronger evidence on the observed trial 
conviction rate, 
( )VE
Πˆ
Π~ , is ambiguous.59
In addition, if the prosecutor initiates a case with relatively more or stronger evidence, e, 
then the initiated case is just as likely to feature relatively higher or lower values of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the litigants’ optimal levels of trial expenditure that are used to determine the direct effect on Πˆ  from changes in the 
values of case characteristics are the same predictions that determine the expected indirect “trial expenditure effects” 
on the ex post probability of trial, Θ~ , from changes in the values of case characteristics, as discussed in Chapter VI.   
59  As discussed in Chapter VI, this prediction contradicts the prediction that would follow from the analytical 
approach of Eisenberg and Farber (2003).  It is still useful and important to recognize that if the prosecutor initiates 
a case with less or weaker evidence, then, ceteris paribus, the initiated case is likely to be characterized by a 
relatively high value of .  Otherwise, ceteris paribus, the conditionΠˆ  ( ) 0≥VE  is not likely to hold and the 
prosecutor would not initiate the case in the first place. 
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prosecutor’s trial cost, C , the defendant’s trial cost, K , the ex ante expected trial sentence, , 
and the idiosyncratic component, 
TS
ρ , of the prosecutor’s expected probability of trial conviction.  
Importantly, the prosecutor is likely to initiate a case with strong or abundant evidence and 
further characterized by these (ambiguous) relative values of C , K , and  without regard for 
the effects of , 
TS
C K , and  on the endogenous TS Πˆ .   
On the other hand, if the prosecutor initiates a case in which she has a relatively high unit 
trial cost, , which reduces , then the parties’ common ex ante expected probability of trial 
conviction, , is likely to be higher, since 
C ( )VE
Πˆ ( )VE  increases in Πˆ .  Thus, the indirect case 
selection effect on the observed trial conviction rate, Π~ , from higher unit costs of trial 
expenditure for the prosecutor is positive.  Without changing the expected sign of the case 
selection effect on Π~  from initiated cases with a relatively high value of C , the case selection 
process also implies that an initiated case with a relatively high value of C  is also likely to be 
characterized by a relatively high value of K , and relatively high values of , e, and TS ρ  (in 
addition to the higher value of Π ). ˆ
Conversely, if the prosecutor initiates a case characterized by a relatively high unit cost 
per defendant’s trial expenditure, K , then the initiated case is just as likely to feature relatively 
higher or lower values of the ex ante expected probability of trial conviction , the level of 
evidence, e, the prosecutor’s trial cost, , the ex ante expected trial sentence, , and the 
idiosyncratic component, 
Πˆ
C TS
ρ , of the prosecutor’s expected probability of trial conviction.  Thus, 
the expected indirect case selection effect on Π~  from initiated cases with a relatively high value 
of K  is ambiguous.   
Using the same logic as the situations involving initiated cases with relatively high values 
of e and K , the predicted case selection effects on Π~  from higher values of  and TS ρ  are 
ambiguous.  Meanwhile, the marginal effect on ( )VE  of the variability of the judge’s trial 
conviction standard,λ , is ambiguous.  Thus, the expected sign of the case selection effect on Π~  
from an increase in λ  is also ambiguous.  
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 Trial Selection Effects on the Observed Trial Conviction Rate 
 
The trial selection process indirectly affects Π~  in a manner that is similar to the way that 
the case selection process indirectly affects the ex post probability of trial.60  Despite the 
conceptual similarity, the condition for a case to go to trial (i.e., the defendant’s trial decision 
rule) differs mathematically from the condition for a case to be initiated. That is, the second 
conditioning event on the ex post probability of trial conviction, Π~ , is that the case went to trial, 
which is represented by .  This conditioning event does not depend 
directly on the parties’ common ex ante expected probability of trial conviction,  (like the case 
selection rule does); however, it does depend on variables that determine 
( ) 0>−−− KYCXSTδρ
Πˆ
Πˆ .  The defendant’s 
decision to go to trial shapes the mix of case characteristics in cases that go to trial, which, in 
turn, affects the observed trial conviction rate. 
The total (net) marginal effects of changes in the values of case characteristics have 
ambiguous effects on the ex ante expected probability of trial, Θ .  This has no bearing on the 
following evaluation of the indirect trial selection effects of case characteristics on the ex post 
expected probability of trial conviction, Π~ , however.  That is because the evaluation of the 
marginal effects of changes in the values of case characteristics on Θ  is done from an ex ante 
perspective (e.g., when evaluating the effects of case characteristics on Θ  as they relate to E(V) 
or Θ~ , as done in Appendix A and Chapter VI, respectively).61  In contrast, the evaluation of the 
trial selection effect on the observed trial rate from changes in the values of case characteristics 
is performed from an ex post perspective.   
When evaluating ex post the trial selection effects, all that matters are the relative values 
of case characteristics that, when taken together or at least in pairs, ceteris paribus, are expected 
to satisfy the condition for a case to go to trial, ( ) 0>−−− KYCXS Tδρ .  Once a case has gone 
to trial, the values of the case characteristics upon which the defendant relied in making his plea 
decision (and upon which the prosecutor relied in her case-bringing decision) are “frozen.”  In 
particular, the endogenous variables ∗= XX  and ∗= YY  , as well as , which cause the TS
                                                 
60  In this way, this study’s theoretical framework diverges from and improves upon Eisenberg and Farber’s 
(2003) model, since Eisenberg and Farber consider only the indirect effects of the case selection process on the 
observed plaintiff trial win rate. 
61  See Appendix A for discussions of the indirect “trial expenditure effects” on Θ . 
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second-order direct “trial expenditure effects” and “stakes effects” on Θ  and thus Θ~ , are 
“frozen.”  That is, once a case goes to trial, the second-order effects on the ex ante probability of 
trial, Θ , that the defendant may consider when making his plea decision are not relevant.  As 
demonstrated below, all that matters is the relative value of a given case characteristic and the 
fact that the defendant has chosen to go to trial (or to avoid trial).  With that background, the 
evaluation of the expected indirect trial selection effects of changes in the values of case 
characteristics on the observed trial conviction rate, Π~ , is relatively straightforward.   
Suppose a case that goes to trial is characterized by a relatively high ex ante commonly 
expected trial sentence, , the first-order direct effect of which on the ex post probability of 
trial, Θ
TS
~ , is positive.  In that situation, it is just as likely that the case is characterized further by 
values of case characteristics that, ceteris paribus, are expected to decrease Θ~ , as it is likely that 
the case is characterized further by values of case characteristics that, ceteris paribus, are 
expected to increase Θ~ .62   
For example, if a case that goes to trial is characterized by a relatively high value of , 
then that case could be characterized by relatively high or low values of the litigants’ unit costs 
of trial expenditure, C and K.  The expected ex post probability of trial, 
TS
Π~ , could rise or fall with 
such a range of possible values of C and K.  Thus, the expected (net) trial selection effects on the 
observed trial conviction rate, Π~ , from a marginal increase in the value of  are ambiguous.   TS
Using the same logic, the expected (net) trial selection effect on Π~  from a marginal 
increase in the values of the idiosyncratic component, ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected 
probability of trial conviction, is ambiguous.  The expected trial selection effect on Π~  from a 
marginal increase in C is also ambiguous.  As explained below, meaningful empirical tests of the 
implications of the defendant’s plea choice (i.e., trial selection) and the implications of cases 
going to trial with higher values of , TS ρ , and C are nonetheless possible.63   
                                                 
62  In contrast, if a case that goes to trial is characterized by a relatively low value of which is expected to 
decrease the ex post probability of trial, 
TS , 
Θ~ , then that case is likely to be further characterized by case characteristics 
that, ceteris paribus, are expected to in ecreas  Θ~ . 
63  Recall that  and thusΠˆ  Π~  do not depend directly on the idiosyncratic component, ρ , of the prosecutor’s 
ex ante expected probability of trial conviction. 
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In contrast, if a case that goes to trial is characterized by a relatively high value of the 
defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, K, then that case is expected to be further characterized 
by a relatively low value of the prosecutor’s unit costs of trial expenditure, C, a relatively high 
value of , as well as relatively low values of the litigants (pre-trial) optimal levels of trial 
expenditure, 
TS
∗X  and ∗Y .  Assuming the prosecutor has weaker diminishing returns in trial 
expenditure, these expected relative values of C, , TS ∗X  and ∗Y  imply that the expected 
indirect trial selection effect on the ex post probability of trial conviction, Π~ , from a marginal 
increase in K is positive. 
 
Empirically Testable Implications of the Defendant’s  
Decision to Go to Trial as a Selection Process 
 
Table 5 summarizes the theoretical implications of the judge’s trial conviction decision 
(i.e., trial conviction selection) process with respect to the influence of case characteristics on the 
observed trial conviction rate.64  The theoretical implications summarized in Table 5 apply to 
regression analysis used to identify the determinants of the observed trial rate.  Such regression 
analysis must control for sample selection bias from the defendant’s plea decision (i.e. trial 
selection) process.  Traditional regression techniques do not allow controlling for the sample 
selection bias created by the prosecutor’s case selection process, however. 
These regression-related predictions are relevant for comparisons to the predictions in 
Snyder (1989, 1990).  Snyder recognized, through limited discussion, the potential effects of the 
plea decision process and the prosecutor’s case-bringing decision on the observed trial 
conviction rate.  He did not, however, systematically consider those selection effects on the 
observed trial conviction rate as this study does.   
 
                                                 
64  The predictions in Table 5 assume the prosecutor is “conviction-motivated” and has weaker diminishing 
returns in trial expenditure than the defendant. 
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Table 5. Signs of expected direct and indirect effects on the observed trial conviction  
rate, Π~  
 
 
Case 
Characteristic 
Expected 
Direct Effect 
on Π~ * 
Expected Indirect  
Case Selection 
Effect on Π~  
Expected Indirect  
Trial Selection 
Effect on Π~  
Expected Total 
(Net) Effect on 
Π~  
Πˆ ** + ? 0 ? 
C  - + ? ? 
K  + ? + ? 
TS ** + ? ? ? 
e  + ? ? ? 
λ  ? ? 0 ? ρ  0 ? ? ? 
 
* The expected direct effects include first- and second-order effects, as explained in Appendix A.   
** The marginal increase in  and  are from exogenous shocks. Πˆ TS
 
 
Despite the ambiguous expected indirect trial selection effects on the observed trial rate 
shown in Table 5, the theoretical implications of the defendant’s trial selection process, as 
specified in the model of the defendant’s plea decision, are empirically testable.  Table 6 
summarizes the predicted relationships among the relative values of different pairs of case 
characteristics in cases that go to trial and in cases that end in a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.  
To understand Table 6, first consider the  relationships among the relative values of different 
pairs of case characteristics in cases that go to trial that are not predicted by the model of the 
defendant’s plea decision (i.e., trial selection) process.  For example, suppose a case that goes to 
trial is characterized by a relatively high value of the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, 
.  Ceteris paribus, a case that goes to trial is not expected to have a relatively high value of . C C
In that situation, the model of the defendant’s plea decision (i.e., trial selection) process 
does not predict that the case that goes to trial also would be characterized by values of other 
case characteristics that are expected to further reduce Θ~ .  In this situation, relative values of 
other case characteristics not predicted by the model of the defendant’s trial selection process 
include relatively high values of the defendant’s unit trial cost, K ; or relatively low values of the 
parties’ common expected trial sentence, ; or the idiosyncratic component, TS ρ , of the 
prosecutor’s expected probability of trial conviction.   
 85
Continuing the preceding example, if a case that goes to trial is characterized by a 
relatively low value of , then observed relatively high values of  or C TS ρ , or relatively low 
values of K  in such an initiated case would support the predictions of the model of the 
defendant’s trial selection process.  Meanwhile, if a case that goes to trial is characterized instead 
by a relatively low value of , then observed relatively high or low values of C K , , or TS ρ  in 
such a case that goes to trial also would be consistent with the predictions of the model of the 
defendant’s trial selection process.   
These predictions of the model of the defendant’s plea decision suggest firm relationships 
among the relative values of different pairs of case characteristics either in the sample of cases 
that go to trial or in the sample of cases that do not go to trial (i.e., along the same game tree 
branch stemming from the plea decision node).  These relationships can be tested meaningfully 
with sample means tests using either the sample of cases that go to trial or the sample of cases 
that do not go to trial (or both).   
Table 6 provides the combinations of relative values of pairwise combinations of case 
characteristics in the sample of cases that go to trial that are consistent and inconsistent with the 
predictions implied by the model of the defendant’s trial selection process.65  Importantly, if the 
combinations that are inconsistent with the predictions of the model of the defendant’s trial 
selection process for the sample of cases that go to trial are observed in the sample of cases that 
do not go to trial, then those observed combinations in the sample of cases that do not go to trial 
provide support for the predictions of the trial selection model.  That is, if a combination of case 
characteristic values is not conducive for a defendant choosing to go to trial, then that 
combination is conducive for a defendant choosing not to go to trial.  Thus, all (statistically 
significant) observed combinations of case characteristic values in the sample of initiated cases 
can be used to test the implications of the trial selection model.  Table 6 serves as the basis of 
sample means tests reported in Chapter X. 
 
                                                 
65  The predictions in Table 6 assume the prosecutor is “conviction-motivated” and has weaker diminishing 
returns in trial expenditure than the defendant. 
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Table 6. Pairs of relative values of case characteristics in cases that go to trial and their 
consistency with the predictions of the trial selection model  
 
 
 High C  Low C  High K  Low K  High 
 TS
Low  TS High ρ  Low ρ  
High C  I*        
Low C  C* C*       
High 
K  
I C I*      
Low K  C C C* C*     
High 
 TS
C C C C C*    
Low 
 TS
I C I C C* I*   
High ρ  C C C C C C C*  
Low ρ  I C I C C I C* I* 
 
*  As explained in Chapter X, different empirical variables can represent the same theoretical variable. Thus, 
combinations of relatively high and low values of the same theoretical variable represented by more than 
one empirical variable is possible for a given empirical observation.  Pairs that are consistent with plea 
bargaining model are denoted with “C” and pairs that are inconsistent are denoted with “I”.  Horizontal axis 
provides the possible relative values of first case characteristic in a possible pair.  Vertical axis provides the 
possible relative values of second case characteristic in a possible pair. 
 
 
Other empirical tests of the implications of the model of the defendant’s plea decision are 
possible.  The theoretical model of the defendant’s plea decision implies firm relationships 
among the relative values of the same case characteristic in the sample of cases that go to trial 
versus the sample of cases that do not go to trial (i.e., across different game tree branches 
stemming from the plea decision mode).  These relationships can be tested meaningfully with 
sample means tests using the samples of (initiated) cases that do and do not go to trial.    
Specifically, cases that go to trial (do not go to trial) are expected to be characterized by a 
relatively low (high) value of the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, , and the 
defendant’s unit trial cost, 
C
K .  Meanwhile, cases that go to trial (do not go to trial) are expected 
to be characterized by a relatively high (low) value of the parties’ common expected trial 
sentence, ; and the idiosyncratic component, TS ρ , of the prosecutor’s expected probability of 
trial conviction. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
DETERMINANTS OF OBSERVED TRIAL SENTENCES  
 
This chapter defines the conditional ex post expected sentence imposed following a trial 
conviction, TS~ , which is the observed trial sentence.  Observing a case in which a trial sentence 
is imposed requires the prosecutor to bring the case, the case to go to trial, and the trial to end in 
a conviction.  The processes that determine the prosecutor’s case selection, the defendant’s plea 
decision (i.e., trial selection), and the judge’s (or jury’s) trial conviction decision thus condition 
the sample of initiated cases that go to trial and end in conviction at trial.  Accordingly, these 
processes create case selection, trial selection, and trial conviction selection effects, respectively, 
which influence the observed trial sentence.   
Consideration of these indirect selection effects is necessary and useful for empirical tests 
of the determinants of observed trial sentences in federal criminal antitrust cases.  Consistent 
with the analyses in the previous chapters of this study, the predicted indirect case selection 
effects, trial selection effects, and trial conviction selection effects are generally ambiguous and 
render ambiguous the predicted total (net) marginal effects on the observed trial sentences from 
marginal increases in the values of case characteristics.  Meaningful empirical tests similar to 
those described above, however, are possible in this case as well. 
 
Direct Effects on Observed Trial Sentences 
 
It is important to recognize that a trial sentence is observed only if the case is initiated, 
the case goes to trial, and the defendant is convicted at trial.  The expected value of the observed 
trial sentence can be expressed as the following conditional ex post expected value: 
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where, according to Equation [16], 
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In addition, recall that the litigation model provides the optimal (Nash equilibrium) 
values of the prosecutor’s and the defendant’s respective choices of levels of trial expenditure, so 
that all of the ex ante expected values are evaluated with ∗= XX  and ∗= YY .  Both ∗X  and ∗Y  
are implicit functions of , C K , , , TS e λ , as well as each other as specified by the litigation 
model.  As shown in Equation [28] the definition of the conditional ex post expected trial 
sentence draws from all of the elements of the case selection model of federal criminal antitrust 
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case disposition, including the model of plea bargaining and the litigation model (with 
endogenous sentencing). 
This section focuses on the effects of the case characteristics , C K , ρ , e, and λ  on the 
first element of the right-hand side of Equation [28], the expected value of the ex ante expected 
probability of trial, ( )TSE , which equals .  A full discussion of the signs of the total marginal 
effects of the case characteristics (as well as X and Y) on  is found in Appendix A, as part of 
the examination of the effects of different factors on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of 
bringing a case, E(V). 
TS
TS
Briefly, the expected sign of the marginal direct effect on  and thus TS TS~  from increases 
in the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C , is negative (amibiguous) when the 
prosecutor (defendant) is the trial favorite.  Further, the expected sign of the marginal direct 
effect on  and thus TS TS~  from increases in the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, K , is 
positive (ambiguous) when the prosecutor (defendant) is the trial favorite.   
An increase in the amount and/or strength of evidence against the defendant, e, causes a 
unidirectional change in the prosecutor’s and defendant’s optimal levels of trial expenditure, 
∗= XX  and ∗= YY , respectively, which are implicit functions of e.  This type of change in 
∗= XX  and ∗= YY  has ambiguous marginal effects on .  Thus, the marginal direct effect on TS
TS~  from an increase in e is ambiguous. 
The litigation model’s predictions about the effects of the variability of the trial court’s 
conviction standard, λ , on the parties’ trial expenditures, X and Y, rely on the “closeness” of the 
parties’ diminishing returns in trial expenditure.  Without any reasonable means of accurately 
predicting (or measuring) this “closeness,” the expected sign of the marginal direct effect on TS~  
from an increase in λ  is ambiguous.   
Neither the ex ante expected trial sentence, , nor the parties’ trial expenditures, X and 
Y, are functions of the idiosyncratic element, 
TS
ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probabilty 
of trial conviction, .  Thus, the expected value of the marginal direct effect on Πˆ TS~  from an 
increase in ρ  is zero. 
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Case Selection Effects on Observed Trial Sentences 
 
Note that the first conditioning event expressed in Equation [28] is that the prosecutor 
brought the case.  This conditioning event, represented by ( ) 0≥VE , produces indirect “case 
selection effects” on the observed trial sentences that are analogous, but not identical, to the 
indirect case selection effects discussed in Chapters V and VI with regard to the observed trial 
rate and the observed trial conviction rate, respectively.   
This analysis takes advantage of the fact that E(V) is a function of , which simplifies 
determining the case selection effects on  from marginal increases in the values of case 
characteristics.  Specifically, if the prosecutor initiates a case in which she has a relatively high 
unit trial cost, 
TS
TS
C, then the parties’ common ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, , 
in the initiated case is likely to be higher.  Thus, the indirect cases selection effect on the 
observed trial conviction rate, 
TS
TS~ , from higher unit costs of trial expenditure for the prosecutor 
is positive.  That is because the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of bringing a case, ( )VE , 
unambiguously decreases in C when she is conviction-motivated and, in order to initiate such a 
case, other case characteristics such as  would need to raise TS ( )VE .   
On the other hand, if a conviction-motivated prosecutor initiates a case with relatively 
more or stronger evidence, e, then the initiated case is just as likely to be characterized by a 
relatively low value of  as it is likely to be characterized by a relatively high value of .  
Thus, the expected case selection effect of more or stronger evidence on the observed trial 
sentence, 
TS TS
TS~ , is ambiguous. 
Similarly, since  increases in marginal increases in the values of the defendant’s 
unit cost of trial expenditure,
( )VE
K , the parties commonly expected ex ante expected probability of 
trial conviction, , and the idiosyncratic component, Πˆ ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected 
probability of trial conviction, the expected indirect case selection effects on TS~  from marginal 
increases in K , Π , and ˆ ρ  are ambiguous.  These ambiguities do not preclude meaningful 
empirical tests of the model of the case selection process, however. 
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Meanwhile, the marginal effect on ( )VE  of the variability of the judge’s trial conviction 
standard,λ , is ambiguous.  Thus, the expected sign of the indirect case selection effect on TS~  
from an increase in λ  is also ambiguous.  
 
Trial Selection Effects on Observed Trial Sentences 
 
The second conditioning event on the ex post expected trial sentence, TS~ , is that the case 
went to trial, which is represented by ( ) 0>−−− KYCXSTδρ .  This conditioning event 
depends directly on the ex ante expected trial sentence, .  The defendant’s decision to go to 
trial shapes the mix of case characteristics in cases that go to trial, including , which, in turn, 
affects the ex post expected trial sentence, 
TS
TS
TS~ .66  The following abbreviated description of the 
trial selection effects on the ex post expected trial sentence, TS~ , from marginal increases in the 
values of case characteristics, takes advantage of the fact that the ex ante expected probability of 
trial, Θ , is a function of .TS 67   
Suppose a case that is characterized by either a relatively high value of the unit cost of 
trial expenditure for the prosecutor, C, or a relatively high value of the unit cost of the 
                                                 
66  As previously mentioned, in the sequence of selection processes and decisions that determine a prison 
sentence, the prosecutor decides to bring the case, the defendant decides which plea to enter, the prosecutor could 
accept that plea or object to that plea, as Cohen (1992) notes, and the judge decides whether to accept or reject that 
plea (possibly over the prosecutor’s objection).  Cohen (1992) does not find any statistically significant difference in 
corporate fines imposed across means of conviction – i.e., trial conviction, non-negotiated guilty plea, negotiated 
guilty plea, negotiated nolo contendere plea, and negotiated nolo contendere plea accepted by the judge over the 
government’s objection.  In contrast, Cohen finds that the type of plea is a significant determinant of prison 
sentencing.  Elsewhere, however, Cohen notes that he found no evidence of selection bias when estimating sample 
selection models of sentencing decisions using the estimation technique introduced by Heckman (1976).   
67  It is worth mentioning here that the fact that the total (net) marginal effects of changes in the values of case 
characteristics have ambiguous effects on the ex ante expected probability of trial, Θ , has no bearing on the 
following evaluation of the indirect trial selection effects of case characteristics on .  That is because the 
evaluation of the marginal effects of changes in the values of case characteristics on 
TS~
Θ  is done from an ex ante 
perspective (e.g., when evaluating the effects of case characteristics on Θ  as they relate to E(V) or Θ~ , as done in 
Appendix A and Chapter VI, respectively).  In contrast, the evaluation of the trial selection effect on the observed 
trial sentence from changes in the values of case characteristics is performed from an ex post perspective.   
In an ex post evaluation of the trial selection effects, all that matters are the relative values of case 
characteristics that, when taken together or at least in pairs, ceteris paribus, are expected to satisfy the condition for 
a case to go to trial, .  Once a case has gone to trial, the values of the case characteristics 
(in particular, the e
( ) 0>−−− KYCXS Tδρ
ndogenous variables ∗= XX  and ∗= YY  that cause the “trial expenditure effects” on Θ ) upon 
which the defendant relied in making his plea decision (and upon which the prosecutor relied in her case-bringing 
decision) are “frozen.”  
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defendant’s trial expenditure, K – or by relatively high values of C and K – goes to trial.  The 
model of the defendant’s plea decision predicts that such a case would be further characterized 
by a relatively high value of .  Thus, the indirect trial selection effects on the ex post expected 
trial sentence, 
TS
TS~ , from marginal increases in C or K are positive. 
Now suppose a case that goes to trial is characterized by a relatively high value of the 
idiosyncratic component, ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial conviction.  
In that circumstance, the case that goes to trial is just as likely to be characterized by a relatively 
low value of the ex ante commonly expected trial sentence, , as it is likely to be characterized 
by a relatively high value of .  Thus, the predicted indirect trial selection effect on the ex post 
expected trial sentence, 
TS
TS
TS~ , from a marginal increase in ρ  is ambiguous.  Using the same logic 
(because the ex post expected probability of trial, Θ~ , increases in ), the predicted indirect trial 
selection effect on the ex post expected trial sentence, 
TS
TS~ , from a marginal increase in the value 
of the ex ante expected trial sentence, , is ambiguous. TS
 
Trial Conviction Selection Effects on Observed Trial Sentences 
 
The judge’s (or jury’s) trial conviction decision censors the sample of cases that proceed 
to sentencing following a trial conviction.  Thus, the trial conviction decision creates selection 
(bias) effects associated with increases in the values of case characteristics on the observed 
sentences following conviction at trial.  The mechanics of the trial conviction selection effects 
from changes in the values of case characteristics are analogous to the mechanics of the case 
selection effects and trial selection effects that have already been discussed.   
For example, the litigation model predicts that a case characterized by a relatively high 
value of the unit cost of trial expenditure for the prosecutor, C, is likely to have a lower ex ante 
expected probability of trial conviction, Πˆ , and thus a lower ex post expected probability of trial 
conviction, Π~ .  Accordingly, if a case characterized by a high value of C results in a trial 
conviction, then, ceteris paribus, that case is also likely to be characterized by a high (low) value 
of the ex ante expected trial sentence, , when the prosecutor (defendant) has weaker 
diminishing returns from trial expenditure.  That is because such relative values of  under 
TS
TS
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such circumstances are expected to increase the value of Πˆ  (and Π~ ) according to the litigation 
model.  Thus, the expected indirect trial conviction selection effect on the ex post expected trial 
sentence, TS~ , from an increase in the value of C is positive (negative) when the prosecutor 
(defendant) has weaker diminishing returns in trial expenditure.   
On the other hand, if a case characterized by a relatively high value of K results in a trial 
conviction, then that case is just as likely to be characterized by a relatively low value of the ex 
ante expected trial sentence, , as it is likely to be characterized by a relatively high value of 
.  That is because Π  (and Π
TS
TS ˆ ~ ) increases in K.  Similarly, if a case characterized by a high 
value of e results in a trial conviction, then, ceteris paribus, that case is also just as likely to be 
characterized by a relatively low value of the ex ante expected trial sentence, , as it is likely to 
be characterized by a relatively high value of . 
TS
TS
In contrast, the marginal effect on the ex ante expected probability of trial conviction 
from an increase in the variability of the judge’s trial conviction decision standard,λ , is 
ambiguous.  Thus, the expected sign of the trial conviction selection effect on TS~  from an 
increase in λ  is ambiguous.   
Finally, the idiosyncratic component, ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability 
of trial conviction, influences neither the parties’ levels of trial expenditure nor the ex ante 
expected probability of trial conviction.  Thus, increases in ρ  do not create any trial conviction 
selection effects on TS~ . 
 
Empirically Testable Implications of Trial Conviction as a Selection Process 
 
Table 7 provides the theoretical implications of the judge’s sentencing decision following 
a trial conviction with respect to the influence of case characteristics on observed trial 
sentences.68  The theoretical implications summarized in Table 7 apply to empirical tests 
consisting of regression analysis  to identify the determinants of observed trial sentences.  Such 
regression analysis would need to control for sample selection bias from the plea decision (i.e. 
                                                 
68  The predictions in Table 7 assume the prosecutor is “conviction-motivated” and has weaker diminishing 
returns in trial expenditure than the defendant. 
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trial selection) and the trial conviction processes.  Traditional regression techniques do not allow 
controlling for the sample selection bias created by the prosecutor’s case selection process. 
The predictions shown in Table 7 are useful for comparisons to Cohen’s (1992) analysis 
of the determinants of sentences imposed in federal criminal antitrust cases.  As previously 
mentioned, Cohen recognizes that the defendant’s plea decision and the trial conviction decision 
could influence sentencing outcomes.  He does not discuss the potential effects on observed 
sentences from the prosecutor’s decision to initiate particular cases, however. 
 
 
Table 7. Signs of expected direct and indirect effects on the observed trial sentencing  
decision, TS~  
 
 
Expected Direct 
Effect on TS~ * 
Case 
Characteristic 
When 
Π≥Πˆ  
When 
Π<Πˆ  
Expected 
Indirect  
Case 
Selection 
Effect on 
TS~  
Expected 
Indirect  
Trial 
Selection 
Effect on 
TS~  
Expected 
Indirect  Trial 
Conviction 
Selection 
Effect on TS~  
Expected 
Total (Net) 
Effect on 
TS~  
Πˆ ** 0 ? 0 ? ? 
C  - ? + + + ? 
K  + ? ? + ? ? 
TS ** + ? ? ? ? 
e  ? ? ? ? ? 
λ  ? ? 0 ? ? ρ  0 ? ? 0 ? 
 
* The expected direct effects include first- and second-order effects, as discussed in Appendix A.   
** The marginal increase in  and  are from exogenous shocks. Πˆ TS
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Despite the ambiguous expected indirect trial conviction selection effects on observed 
trial sentences shown in Table 7, the theoretical implications of the trial conviction selection 
process, as specified in the model of the rule by which the judge (or jury) decides to convict a 
defendant after trial, are empirically testable. Table 8 summarizes the predicted relationships 
among the relative values of different pairs of case characteristics in cases that end in trial 
conviction.  To understand Table 8, first consider the relationships among the relative values of 
different pairs of case characteristics for cases  ending in trial conviction that are not predicted by 
the model. 
For example, suppose a case that is disposed by a trial conviction is characterized by a 
relatively high value of the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C .  Ceteris paribus, a 
litigated case that ends in trial conviction is not expected to be associated with a relatively high 
value of C , since  is expected to negatively directly affect the ex post probability of trial 
conviction, 
C
Π~ .   
In that situation, the model of the judge’s trial conviction decision rule (i.e., trial 
conviction selection process) does not predict that the case that ends in a trial conviction also is 
characterized by values of other case characteristics that are expected to further reduce Π~ .  In 
this situation, relative values of other case characteristics not predicted by the model of the trial 
conviction selection process include relatively low values of the defendant’s unit trial cost, K ; or 
relatively low values of the parties’ common expected trial sentence, ; (assuming the 
prosecutor has weaker diminishing returns in trial expenditure than the defendant), or the amount 
or strength of the prosecutor’s evidence, e.   
TS
Continuing the preceding example, if a case that is disposed by trial conviction is 
characterized by a relatively high value of , then observed relatively high values of , e, or C TS
K  in such a case would be consistent with the predictions of the model of the judge’s trial 
conviction decision rule.  Meanwhile, if a case that ends in trial conviction is characterized 
instead by a relatively low value of , then observed relatively high or low values of C K , , or 
e in such a case also would be consistent with the predictions of the model of the trial conviction 
decision rule.   
TS
These predictions of the model of the defendant’s plea decision suggest firm relationships 
among the relative values of different pairs of case characteristics either in the sample of cases 
that end in trial conviction or in the sample of cases that go to trial but do not end in trial 
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conviction (i.e., along the same game tree branch stemming from the trial conviction decision 
node).  These relationships can be tested meaningfully using sample means tests using either the 
sample of cases that end in trial conviction or the sample of cases that go to trial but do not end 
in trial conviction (or both).   
Table 8 provides the combinations of relative values of pairwise combinations of case 
characteristics for the sample of cases  ending in trial conviction that are consistent and 
inconsistent with the predictions implied by the model of the trial conviction selection process.69  
Note well that if the combinations that are inconsistent with the predictions of the model of the 
judicial trial conviction decision for the sample of cases that are disposed by trial conviction are 
observed in the sample of cases that go to trial but do not end in trial conviction, then those 
observed combinations in the sample of cases that go to trial but do not end in trial conviction 
provide support for the predictions of the model of the judicial trial conviction decision.  That is, 
if a combination of case characteristic values is not conducive for a judge convicting a defendant 
at trial, then that combination is conducive for a judge acquitting that defendant at trial (or 
dismissing the case).  Thus, all (statistically significant) observed combinations of case 
characteristic values in the sample of litigated cases can be used to test the implications of the 
trial conviction selection model.  Table 8 serves as the basis of sample means tests reported in 
Chapter X. 
 
 
                                                 
69  The predictions in Table 8 assume the prosecutor is “conviction-motivated” and has weaker diminishing 
returns in trial expenditure than the defendant. 
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Table 8. Pairs of relative values of case characteristics in cases that end in trial conviction and 
their consistency with the predictions of the trial conviction model 
 
 
 High C  Low C  High K  Low K  High 
 TS
Low  TS High e  Low  e
High C  I*        
Low C  C* C*       
High 
K  
C C C*      
Low K  I C C* I*     
High 
 TS
C C C C C*    
Low 
 TS
I C C I C* I*   
High  e C C C C C C C*  
Low  e I C C I C I C* I* 
 
*  As explained in Chapter X, different empirical variables can represent the same theoretical variable. Thus, 
combinations of relatively high and low values of the same theoretical variable represented by more than 
one empirical variable is possible for a given empirical observation.  Pairs that are consistent with plea 
bargaining model are denoted with “C” and pairs that are inconsistent are denoted with “I”.  Horizontal axis 
provides the possible relative values of first case characteristic in a possible pair.  Vertical axis provides the 
possible relative values of second case characteristic in a possible pair. 
 
 
Other empirical tests of the implications of the model of the trial conviction decision are 
possible.  The theoretical model of the trial conviction decision implies firm relationships among 
the relative values of the same case characteristic in the sample of cases ending in trial 
conviction versus the sample of cases that go to trial but do not end in conviction (i.e., across 
different game tree branches stemming from the trial decision node).  These relationships can be 
tested meaningfully using sample means tests using the samples of (initiated) cases that end in 
trial conviction and (versus) cases that go to trial but do not end in conviction.   
Specifically, assuming the prosecutor has weaker diminishing returns in trial expenditure 
than the defendant, cases that end in trial conviction (go to trial but end in acquittal, dismissal, or 
directed verdict in favor of the defendant) are expected to be characterized by a relatively low 
(high) value of the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C .  Meanwhile, cases that end in 
trial conviction (go to trial but do not end in conviction) are expected to be characterized by a 
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relatively high (low) value of the defendant’s unit trial cost, K , the parties’ common expected 
trial sentence, ; and the amount or strength of the prosecutor’s evidence, e. TS
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CHAPTER IX 
 
INFORMATION STRUCTURE OF PLEA BARGAINING 
 
As highlighted in the literature review in Chapter II, the criminal antitrust literature 
ignores (or does not explicitly address) the issue of how private information in plea bargaining 
could alter the trial selection process and create (additional) bias in observed case outcomes.  
This is a significant omission given the policy implications of private information during plea 
bargaining.   
Privately informed prosecutors harm social welfare because they can fashion a settlement 
offer that induces (truly) innocent defendants to plead guilty or nolo contendere.  Such pleas 
send false signals about legal and socially efficient business conduct.  In contrast, privately 
informed defendants during plea bargaining benefit social welfare because the (truly) guilty ones 
are more likely to plead guilty and send the correct signals about appropriate business conduct.   
This section explains the implications of potential indirect case selection effects on plea 
decisions and trial outcomes, as well as potential indirect trial selection effects on trial outcomes, 
in a commonly used empirical test for the existence and type of private information during plea 
bargaining (or settlement negotiations in civil litigation).  As explained below, the potential for 
indirect case selection effects and trial selection effects could confound and render meaningless 
the correlation between trial rates and trial conviction rates, which is the empirical test 
commonly used to identify the information structure of plea bargaining (settlement negotiations).   
This chapter concludes by describing five alternative empirical testing approaches that 
avoid such problems.  Four of the alternative approaches are suggested by Hylton (1993) and one 
is contributed by this study.  It is important to empirically assess the underlying information 
structure of plea bargaining in the observed federal criminal antitrust cases used to test the 
theoretical predictions developed in this study.  That is because the models of the defendant’s 
plea decision, as well as the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of the sentence following a plea 
of guilty or nolo contendere, assume that the defendant is privately informed about his chances at 
trial. 
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Information Structure of Plea Bargaining in This Study’s Theoretical Framework 
 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the models of the defendant’s plea decision, as well as the 
prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of the sentence following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, 
assume that the defendant is privately informed about his chances at trial.  This is a fundamental 
assumption.  Thus, it is important to test empirically the validity of the assumption. 
If it were not appropriate to assume that during plea bargaining the defendant is privately 
informed about his chances at trial, then the theoretical framework used in this study would need 
to be changed significantly.  For example, an incentive compatibility constraint that defines the 
probability of trial would still be relevant, but it likely would involve the prosecutor’s 
objective(s) (e.g., conviction rate maximization, trial cost minimization).  Accordingly, a 
privately informed prosecutor could set the value of the plea negotiated sentence just low enough 
to induce a guilty or nolo contendere plea.  In this study’s theoretical framework, the value of the 
negotiated penalty would not be the Nash equilibrium solution to a non-cooperative plea 
bargaining game.  Instead, for example, the Nash equilibrium solution could be the choice-
variable solution to the prosecutor’s maximization of some objective.      
 
Existing Empirical Tests of Information Structure of Plea Bargaining 
 
According to the asymmetric/private information theory developed by Bebchuck (1984) 
and others, including Froeb (1993), one party knows the probability that the prosecutor will win 
at trial, while the other knows only the distribution of plaintiff victory probabilities.  When the 
defendant is better or privately informed, he will accept the (uninformed) prosecutor’s settlement 
offer if he is relatively pessimistic about his chances.  Meanwhile, the better or privately 
informed defendant will go to trial if he (correctly) expects to win at trial.  Under this theory, the 
selection of cases for trial is one-sided, and the ex post probability of a prosecutor’s trial victory 
is systematically below the fraction of trial convictions in the pool of initiated cases. 
Previous empirical tests for the existence of private information (and which litigant 
possesses private information) in plea bargaining, including the test used by Froeb (1993), focus 
mainly on the correlation between trial rates and plaintiff victories at trial.  In general, existing 
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studies posit that a positive (negative) correlation between trial rates and prosecutors’ victories at 
trial is evidence of privately informed defendants (prosecutors) during settlement negotiations. 
With respect to testing for trial selection bias from plea bargaining, Froeb (1993) 
observes that determining whether only the defendant or only the prosecutor is privately 
informed during plea bargaining is a simple matter of testing whether the trial conviction rate of 
cases that go to trial were lower than the trial conviction rate of cases that do not go to trial.  The 
latter statistic does not exist, however, rendering this approach infeasible.   
Froeb devises an alternative empirical testing strategy to determine what type of trial 
selection process underlies observed case outcomes.  He illustrates his approach by referring to a 
specific plea bargaining game in which a group of identically charged defendants receives the 
same take-it-or-leave-it plea offer from the prosecutor.  If these defendants are privately 
informed about their private information, those with higher probabilities of trial conviction will 
accept the offer, while those with lower probabilities of trial conviction will reject it.   
Now suppose the prosecutor offers a harsher sentence in exchange for a guilty plea.  
Some defendants with poor chances at trial who had previously accepted the more lenient offer 
will reject the harsher offer and go to trial.  This increases the mean probability of trial 
conviction among the sample of cases that go to trial, which creates positive correlation between 
observed trial rates and observed trial conviction rates.  Conversely, according to Froeb’s testing 
strategy, if plea bargaining exhibits reverse adverse selection, then observed trial and trial 
conviction rates are negatively correlated.  Pooling (e.g., both parties privately informed), 
meanwhile, would imply that there is no correlation.   
Froeb further argues that this testing strategy does not depend on the specification of plea 
bargaining according to a take-it-or-leave-it model.  According to Froeb, this testing strategy 
only requires that changes in trial rates are exogenous and sufficiently large.  He points to 
evidence of adverse trial selection from plea bargaining suggested by increases in trial rates and 
associated increases in trial conviction rates in Alaska and Arizona when plea bargaining was 
banned.  Froeb notes that these examples provide useful natural experiments because the changes 
in trial rates were probably exogenous, since the plea bargaining bans were likely the result of a 
change in the local political climates. 
In addition, using federal court data for various crimes, including white-collar crimes 
other than antitrust offenses, Froeb estimates cross-district and cross-crime regression models 
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and finds a positive correlation between trial and trial conviction rates.  That is, these regressions 
suggest adverse selection in plea bargaining.  Tax fraud cases are the only sample for which 
Froeb’s time-series regressions provide evidence of adverse selection in plea bargaining.  For all 
other types of cases, his time-series regressions suggest pooling (i.e., no correlation between trial 
and trial conviction rates). 
Existing studies of federal criminal antitrust case outcomes find that following an 
increase in the trial rate, the trial conviction rate fell.  Specifically, Snyder (1990) finds, for 
HPSV cases brought during the period 1970-1985, the applicability of felony penalties increases 
the (ex post) probability of trial for corporate and individual defendants.  Meanwhile, Snyder 
(1990) finds that giving HPSV offenses felony status lowered trial conviction rates. 
In comparison, the available empirical evidence suggests that the Antitrust Guideline had 
some impact on the defendants’ choices between nolo contendere and guilty pleas.  Gallo, et al. 
(1996) report that the percentage of convicted defendants who plead  nolo contendere  fell from 
10 percent during 1985 to 1989 to 2 percent during 1990 to 1994.  Meanwhile, cases disposed by 
guilty pleas rose from 89 percent of all convictions during 1985-89 to 98 percent during 1990-
94.70  Gallo et al. (1996) do not report trial rates separately.  Nonetheless, the changes in the 
relative percentages of cases disposed by nolo contendere or guilty pleas that are reported by 
Gallo et al. (1996) suggest a decrease in trial rates following the Antitrust Guideline. 71  
Meanwhile, Gallo, et al. (1996) reports a dramatic decrease in the overall conviction rate from 97 
percent of all criminal antitrust cases in 1991 to 2 percent in 1992.  Moreover, DOJ prosecutors 
were winless in 1993 and won only 12 percent of all criminal antitrust cases in 1994.72  From this 
evidence, it is reasonable to infer that after the introduction of the Antitrust Guideline, both the 
observed trial rate and trial conviction rate fell. 
Based on the (inferred) trends of trial and trial conviction rates in federal criminal 
antitrust cases following the passage of the APPA, a direct application of Froeb’s test would 
suggest that plea bargaining in HPSV cases creates reverse adverse trial selection (i.e., 
                                                 
70  As the authors note, these observations may reflect the government’s increasing opposition to the nolo 
contendere plea. 
71  Gallo et al. (2000) provide other support for the notion that trial rates declined following the introduction of 
the Antitrust Guideline.  They report that the supporting data for their tables show that the percentage of not guilty 
verdicts to total verdicts fell from slightly more than 1 percent during 1980-1984 to less than 0.13 percent during 
1985-1997. 
72  See Gallo, et al. (1996), Table XV.  This table, which presents the annual “win rates” in criminal antitrust 
cases, apparently defines a win as any type of conviction at the case-level.   
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prosecutor’s possess private information during plea bargaining).  In contrast, the inferred 
increase in the plea rate and decrease in the overall conviction rate in federal criminal antitrust 
cases following the introduction of the Antitrust Guideline suggests adverse selection in plea 
bargaining (i.e., defendants possess private information during plea bargaining).73   
 
The Prosecutor’s Case Selection Process and Empirical Tests of the  
Information Structure of Plea Bargaining 
 
The above discussion of trial selection bias from private information during plea 
bargaining in federal criminal antitrust cases is not necessarily persuasive.  Although Froeb’s 
reduced form model of trial selection is (Nash) consistent with this study’s expanded form case 
selection model, Froeb’s reduced form model does not account for indirect case selection effects 
on the defendant’s plea decision or the judge’s (or jury’s) decision to convict a defendant at trial.  
The persuasiveness of the anecdotal and empirical evidence cited by Froeb (1993) therefore 
depends on an (implicit) assumption that the prosecutor randomly chooses cases to initiate. 
It is preferable to avoid assuming (effectively) that prosecutors do not control which 
federal criminal antitrust cases are initiated.  In fact, it is reasonable to expect that DOJ 
prosecutors are very deliberate in their decisions to initiate these cases, usually after gaining 
familiarity with many characteristics of potential cases.74  Thus, case seleciton effects (in 
addition to trial selection effects) should be considered in analyses of the determinants of federal 
criminal antitrust case outcomes, including tests for trial selection bias in plea bargaining.   
Froeb recognizes that empirically testing for trial selection bias is complicated because 
potentially unobserved factors such as prosecutors’ case-bringing decisions could induce 
spurious covariation between trial and trial conviction rates.  Citing Flanders (1976), Froeb notes 
that DOJ prosecutors initiate various types of cases at various rates depending on their views of 
                                                 
73  The expected effects of the Antitrust Guideline on case disposition are beyond the scope of this study.  
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the academic concerns regarding mandatory guideline sentencing (the guidelines 
are no longer mandatory), as implemented by the United States Sentencing Commission, focused on the asymmetric 
bargaining power that such guidelines provided prosecutors.  The particular concern was that the guidelines, as 
implemented, were based on the charges in the indictment instead of the counts of conviction.  Since the prosecutor 
better knows what charges she will file against the defendant, the sentencing guidelines, as  implemented, provided 
the prosecutor with private information during plea bargaining.  Thus, the finding inferred from the statistics 
reported by Gallo et al., that the trial rate and trial conviction rates were positively correlated after the introduction 
of the Antitrust Guideline contradicts the general academic prediction. 
74  Likewise, it is reasonable to expect that defendants in federal criminal antitrust cases – especially corporate 
defendants – make non-random decisions about whether or not to go to trial based on case characteristics.   
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enforcement needs, resources, possible problems in state law enforcement, or DOJ policy and 
other organizational pressures.  Froeb also notes that federal prosecutors’ case-bringing decisions 
depend on the rates at which various federal crimes are committed.  To the extent that crime rates 
depend on deterrence efforts, they, too, may not be randomly determined.   
As Froeb explains, if the determinants of case-bringing decisions or other potentially 
unobserved factors induce spurious correlation between trial rates and trial conviction rates, then 
the identification of adverse selection or reverse adverse selection from plea bargaining would 
require a policy instrument that shifts the probability of trial.  For example, Landes’s (1971) 
theory of prosecutorial behavior suggests that a (binding) budget constraint could serve as such a 
policy instrument. 75   
Froeb was unable to find a policy instrument that shifted the trial rate in his samples of 
cases.  Thus he warns that his regression results should be interpreted with care because he 
cannot rule out spurious correlations between trial and trial conviction rates in his data.  With 
respect to federal criminal antitrust cases for the period 1955-1980, several policy instruments 
applied by Congress (e.g., DOJ budget appropriations, statutory sentencing reform), federal 
judges (e.g., the development of the doctrine of the per se illegality of horizontal price-fixing), 
and federal prosecutors (e.g., limits on plea agreements involving nolo contendere pleas) could 
shift the trial rate over time.  
The theoretical framework developed in this study demonstrates how policy or 
institutional shifts in federal criminal antitrust enforcement are expected to influence the relative 
values of certain characteristics of the cases that prosecutors consider initiating.  In turn, changes 
in the values of case characteristics are expected to directly impact observed plea and trial 
outcomes.  Changes in the values of case characteristics also are expected to produce indirect 
case selection effects (and trial selection effects) on plea and trial outcomes that could mute or 
even reverse the signs of the direct effects.  In addition, as explained above, the predicted 
indirect case selection effects on observed trial rates and trial conviction rates, as well as the 
predicted indirect trial selection effects on observed trial conviction rates, are generally 
ambiguous.   
                                                 
75  For his sample of cases, Froeb (1993) asserts that prosecutorial budgets change slowly, perhaps with a 
sufficiently long lag that trial rates can be treated as exogenous.  While this assertion may be true for the DOJ as an 
entire law enforcement agency, it may not be true for particular divisions of the DOJ like the Antitrust Division.  
The descriptive statistics reported in Appendix B suggest that Froeb’s assertion may not apply to the DOJ Antitrust 
Division.   
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If policy instruments or other institutional factors do not create the expected exogenous 
shifts in the trial rate – that is, if the trial rate shifts for unexplained reasons – then, consistent 
with Froeb’s concerns, correlations between observed trial rates and trial conviction rates could 
be spurious.  Thus, sole reliance on correlations between observed trial rates and trial conviction 
rates is not sufficient for identifying private information in plea bargaining if case selection is 
non-random and/or correlated with observed trial rates or trial conviction rates.  For example, the 
mere observation that trial and trial conviction rates are negatively correlated following the 
passage of the APPA does not necessarily lend support for the existence of reverse adverse trial 
selection in federal criminal antitrust cases.   
 
Alternative Approaches to Empirical Tests of the Information Structure of Plea Bargaining 
 
This study uses alternatives to the empirical testing methodology employed by Froeb 
(1993) in the criminal litigation context and others in the civil litigation context.  The methods of 
Froeb and others focus on the correlation between trial rates and trial conviction rates for 
identifying the existence and type of private information during plea bargaining.  Alternative 
testing approaches are desirable because of the potentially confounding effect of the (non-
random) case selection and trial selection processes, as explained above.   
Hylton (1993) suggests several alternative approaches to testing for private information 
in plea bargaining that do not rely on the correlation between the trial rate and trial conviction 
rate.  First, Hylton explains that the distance between the expected liability (expected penalty and 
trial cost) of an innocent defendant and the expected liability of a guilty defendant increases as 
the probabilities of type I and type II legal errors76 regarding the defendant’s compliance with a 
legal standard fall.  This increases the zone of acceptable plea offers (i.e., penalties that 
defendants would accept by pleading guilty) for guilty defendants and decreases the zone of 
acceptable plea offers for innocent defendants.  Under these circumstances, it follows that the 
proportion of innocent defendants who litigate likely increases.   
Thus, assuming the probabilities of type I and type II legal errors regarding defendants’ 
compliance with legal standards are low (e.g., less than 50 percent, according to Hylton) and 
                                                 
76  Type I legal errors occur when truly guilty defendants are found not guilty and type II errors occur when 
truly innocent defendants are found guilty. 
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roughly equal, if defendants have private information regarding their chances at trial, then the 
trial conviction rate will be below 50 percent.  That is, when legal errors are relatively unlikely, a 
trial conviction rate below 50 percent is evidence that defendants are privately informed during 
plea bargaining about their chances at trial.  Conversely, a trial conviction rate above 50 percent 
is evidence that prosecutors possess private information during plea bargaining.  A trial 
conviction rate of 50 percent is evidence that neither party holds private information.  According 
to Hylton, for a given sample of defendants, comparing the value of the trial conviction rate to 
the 50 percent mark is the best test of the informational structure of plea bargaining. 
Hylton also explains hypotheses regarding changes in the trial conviction rate as legal 
doctrine develops or as time passes77 that can be used to test for the information structure of plea 
bargaining.  He posits that if the development of legal doctrine over time reduces the likelihood 
of (type I and type II) judicial error, then the trial rate and, separately, the prosecutors’ win rate 
at trial will fall over time if plea bargaining (i.e., trial selection) operates as expected when 
defendants are privately informed during plea bargaining about their chances at trial.78   
Since its enactment in 1890, the Sherman Act’s definitions of illegal business conduct 
have not changed.  Still, legal doctrine regarding applications of the Sherman Act developed over 
time – especially with Supreme Court decisions that confirm, refine, contradict, or overturn 
precedent.   
For example, as discussed previously in Chapter II, antitrust case law has come to view 
certain cartel activities like price-fixing and bid-rigging as horizontal per se violations 
(“HPSVs”) of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  According to former Assistant Attorney General 
for Antitrust Donald I. Baker (1978), the Trenton Potteries case in 1927 clearly established the 
per se illegality of price-fixing.  The Supreme Court’s decision in the Appalachian Coal case in 
1933 created some confusion regarding the Trenton Potteries decision.  Then the Socony-
Vacuum Oil case in 1940 firmly reestablished the per se illegality of price-fixing.   
Also according to Baker (1978), federal courts effectively recognize three categories of 
antitrust cases.  The first category includes “hard core” per se cases involving price fixing and 
                                                 
77  Hylton (1993) uses the passage of time as a proxy for the development of legal doctrine.  In Chapter X, this 
study uses separate measures of the passage of time and the incremental development of legal doctrine to apply 
Hylton’s tests. 
78  Hylton  (1993) expects defendants in civil antitrust cases to possess better information about their chances 
at trial than plaintiffs possess.  In support of this notion, Hylton notes that Salop and White (1988) find that the 
annual average plaintiff win rate in civil antitrust cases has fallen over time. 
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market allocation.79  The second category includes “soft core” per se cases in which courts 
consider facts surrounding conduct that is technically subject to per se rules, such as various 
vertical arrangements and joint ventures.80  The third category includes cases in which the “rule 
of reason” applies and all facts are relevant.81   
In contrast to the lower courts, however, Baker (1978) notes that the Supreme Court has 
consistently rejected the creation of the middle category of “soft core” offenses that are per se 
illegal, even though the Supreme Court has changed its opinion about certain types of conduct.  
For example, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), the Supreme 
Court ruled that territorial restrictions are per se illegal.  Then in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Supreme Court refined its position and held that some 
territorial restraints are not per se illegal.82   
This legal history suggests that the development of legal doctrine over time with respect 
to application of Section 1 of the Sherman Act has clarified what business conduct is legal and 
illegal and has reduced judicial error in HPSV cases.  Thus, if defendants (alternatively, 
prosecutors) possess private information during plea bargaining in HPSV cases, the trial rate 
should decrease (increase), over time or as antitrust legal doctrine develops incrementally.  In 
addition, the trial conviction rate should decrease (increase), over time or as antitrust legal 
doctine develops, if defendants (prosecutors) possess private information during plea bargaining.    
Gallo et al. (2000) identify the years in which the U.S. Supreme Court made decisions 
that various legal scholars categorize, though not unanimously, as “landmark” decisions.  This 
study uses these identified decisions to create an empirical variable that controls for the 
incremental development of federal criminal antitrust legal doctrine.  Observed plea decisions 
and trial outcomes are regressed on explanatory variables representing time and the issuance of 
landmark antitrust court decisions.  Consistent with Hylton’s hypotheses, negative estimated 
coefficients on the variables representing time or the issuance of landmark antitrust court 
decisions would imply that, during plea bargaining, defendants are privately informed about their 
chances at trial.    
                                                 
79  See e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
80  See e.g., Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).  See also Worthern Bank & 
Trust Co. v. National Bank-Americard Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973). 
81  See e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
82  Echoing Posner’s (1970) concerns, Baker (1978) also observes that the Supreme Court has greatly 
expanded the types of business conduct that is per se illegal, even conduct that arguably enhances competition. 
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Using the (statistically signficant) estimated regression coefficients on variables 
representing the passage of time and the incremental development of antitrust legal doctrine to 
test for the existence and type of private information during plea bargaining avoids the 
potentially confounding effects (for purposes of empirical testing) of the case selection and trial 
selection processes.  Ceteris paribus, these factors are not expected a priori to effect negatively 
or positively the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of initiating a case or the defendant’s ex 
ante expected value of going to trial.   
That is, the reduction of legal error (or the variability of the universe of potential judges’ 
or juries’ applications of law) simply “clears the air” and cannot be relied upon by prosecutors in 
their ex ante evaluation of the benefits of initiating a case, as represented by the model of the 
prosecutor’s case-bringing decision, or by defendants in their ex ante evaluation of the benefits 
of going to trial, as represented by the model of the defendant’s plea decision.  The “clarified air” 
created by the development of legal doctrine over time simply allows a potentially privately 
informed litigant to employ more effectively (or more distinctly, for purposes of empirical 
testing) his or her assessment of the defendant’s chances at trial, given the case characteristics 
represented in the theoretical framework.83   
In addition to his hypotheses regarding the overall trial conviction rate in a sample of 
cases and changes in the trial conviction rate as legal doctrine develops as time passes, Hylton 
provides a related hypothesis:  The trial rate will fall as legal doctrine develops over time (thus 
reducing type I and type II legal errors) when defendants are privately informed during plea 
negotiations about their chances at trial.  Hylton does not explain this particular hypothesis.  
Nonetheless, this hypothesis follows from the reasonable assumption that, because prosecutors 
gather evidence against defendants before indicting defendants, prosecutors do not indict 
defendants that the prosecutors believe to be innocent.  Given that assumption, because the 
reduction of legal error with the development of legal doctrine over time increases the zone of 
acceptable plea offers to guilty defendants, fewer indicted defendants (whom the prosecutors 
think are guilty based on evidence) will reject plea offers and go to trial.   
                                                 
83  This reasoning might not hold in the impossible event that one of the litigants in a particular case 
(successfully) influenced the development of legal doctrine according to that litigant’s prospective interests in that 
particular case.  That is, unless one of the litigants is or could be omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent, this 
reasoning is firm.   
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In addition to the empirical tests suggested by Hylton, this study contributes another 
approach to empirically testing for the existence and type of private information during plea 
bargaining.  This approach also avoids the problems of potentially confounding indirect selection 
effects that reduce the usefulness of the correlation of the trial rate and trial conviction rate.  That 
approach makes use of the (statistically significant) estimated coefficient of the inverse Mills 
ratio used as an explanatory variable in a regression model of trial outcomes that controls for 
sample selection bias in the sample of cases that are chosen for trial.   
The inverse Mills ratio used as a regressor in the trial outcome regression model derives 
from estimates of the probability of trial that are created by the regression model of the 
probability of trial.  The regression model of the probability of trial estimates the probability of 
trial for each observation used in the probability of trial regression model, whether or not the 
observation involves a defendant that goes to trial.   
When included as an explanatory variable in a (second-stage) regression model of trial 
outcomes, the inverse Mills ratio controls for (total or net) sample selection bias created by the 
defendant’s decision to go to trial.  As Snyder (1990) notes, estimating separate models of plea 
decisions and trial outcomes ignores the sequential nature of the case disposition process.  Plea 
decisions determine the sample of cases that go to trial, which implies that plea decisions may 
not randomly determine the set of defendants that go to trial.  This implies that the set of 
defendants that go to trial is a biased representation of the set of indicted defendants.  Thus, 
observed changes in the trial conviction rate can be due to the change in the distribution of 
defendants who go to trial from the distribution of indicted defendants.   
Ignore, as Froeb (1993) does, the potential for legal error at trial and assume that trials 
perfectly identify innocent and guilty defendants.  If the prosecutor holds private information 
during plea bargaining and offers harsher penalties for a guilty plea than she previously offered, 
then truly innocent defendants (whom the prosecutor was previously offering lighter penalties in 
plea deals) are likely to be the defendants that reject the harsher plea offers and go to trial.  In 
this situation, a defendant who is more likely to go to trial is less likely to be convicted at trial 
than a defendant who is less likely to go to trial. 
In contrast, if defendants are privately informed and the prosecutor offers harsher 
penalties than she previously offered, then the truly guilty defendants are likely to go to trial 
(because truly innocent defendants were already going to trial).  In this situation, a defendant 
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who is more likely to go to trial is more likely to be convicted at trial than a defendant who is 
less likely to go to trial. 
The sign of the estimated coefficient for the inverse Mills ratio that is estimated by the 
probability of trial regression model and included in a regression model of trial outcomes – 
where both regression models use defendant-level data – indicates whether defendants that are 
estimated to be more likely to go to trial are more or less likely to be convicted at trial (if they go 
to trial), holding other factors constant.  A regression model of trial outcomes can control for the 
reduction of legal error at trial (which Froeb assumes away) by including time and occurances of 
landmark decisions as regressors.   
In such a regression model of trial outcomes, if the sign of the estimated coefficient for 
the inverse Mills ratio suggests that defendants that are more likely to go to trial are more likely 
to be convicted at trial, then such a regression result suggests that (truly) guilty defendants are 
more likely to go to trial and that (truly) innocent defendants are more likely to accept plea 
bargains.  Such a regression result would suggest that prosecutors are privately informed during 
plea bargaining about the defendants’ chances at trial and are able to fashion plea arrangements 
that induce (truly) innocent defendants to plead guilty or nolo contendere.   
Conversely, in a regression model that controls for the reduction in legal error at trial, if 
the sign of the estimated coefficient for the inverse Mills ratio suggests that defendants that are 
more likely to go to trial are less likely to be convicted at trial, then such a regression result 
suggests that (truly) innocent defendants are more likely to go to trial and that (truly) guilty 
defendants are more likely to accept plea bargains.  Such a regression result would suggest that 
defendants are privately informed during plea bargaining about the their chances at trial and 
prosecutors are unable to fashion plea arrangements that induce such (truly) innocent defendants 
to plead guilty or nolo contendere.   
Importantly, the regression models of the plea decision and trial outcome effectively 
control for the relevant case characteristics that create the selection effects explained in this 
study.  Thus, using the sign of the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio included in the trial 
outcome regression model to test for the information structure of plea bargaining avoids the 
previously discussed potential for indirect trial selection effects (as defined in this study) to 
confound the simple correlation of the observed trial rate and trial conviction rate that Froeb 
(1993) and other studies use to test for the information structure of plea bargaining. 
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CHAPTER X 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
This study’s empirical tests use over 3,000 observations of defendant-level data 
describing federal criminal antitrust cases initiated from 1956 through 1980.  The empirical tests 
include two-sample means tests and regression analysis controlling for sample selection bias.  
The purposes of the empirical tests are to test the implications of the case selection model, trial 
selection model, and trial conviction model, as well as to test the implications of private 
information held by one of the litigants during plea bargaining 
Using two different types of means tests and three regression models, this study examines 
the implications of the selection models.  The means tests inspect differences in the five distinct 
observable samples of cases created by the case selection, trial selection, and trial conviction 
selection processes.  The means tests suggest that the observed prosecutors did not randomly 
choose cases to initiate, the observed defendants did not randomly choose to go to trial, and the 
observed judges (or juries) did not randomly convict defendants at trial.  The two-sample means 
tests also lend support to many predictions of the case selection, trial selection, and trial 
conviction models.  The selection models thus appear ripe for general application to different 
types of criminal cases.   
The first type of means test confirm that the means of variables representing case 
characteristics in the sample of cases that go to trial differ from the means of the same variables 
in the sample of cases that do not go to trial.  These means differ in ways implied by the trial 
selection model.  Similar means tests support the trial conviction model.  This type of means test 
is not appropriate for testing the implications of the case selection model, because the sample of 
unitiated cases is unobserved. 
The second type of means test supports the case selection model.  Those means tests 
employ data from the sample of initiated cases (i.e., the full dataset) to produce (statistically 
significant) combinations of the relative extreme values of pairs of empirical variables.  The 
identified combinations are consistent with the case selection model’s predictions.  Similar 
means tests – using the samples of cases that went to trial, cases that did not go to trial, cases that 
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ended in trial conviction, and cases that went to trial but did not end in conviction – support the 
trial selection and trial conviction models.   
In various ways, the regression analysis complements the previous means tests in 
assessing the implications of the trial selection model and trial conviction model.  In general, the 
regression analysis supports the relevance of trial selection and trial conviction selection as 
determinants of federal criminal antitrust case outcomes. 
Meanwhile, this study depends wholly on the regression models of the probabilities of 
trial and trial conviction to conduct tests for the existence and possessor of private (or better) 
information during plea bargaining in federal criminal antitrust cases.  As highlighted in the 
literature review in Chapter II, the criminal antitrust literature ignores (or does not explicitly 
address) the issue of how private information in plea bargaining could alter the trial selection 
process and create (additional) bias in observed case outcomes.  This is a significant omission 
given the policy implications of private information during plea bargaining.   
Privately informed prosecutors harm social welfare because they can fashion a settlement 
offer that induces (truly) innocent defendants to plead guilty or nolo contendere.  Such pleas 
send false signals about legal and socially efficient business conduct.  In contrast, privately 
informed defendants during plea bargaining benefit social welfare because the (truly) guilty ones 
are more likely to plead guilty and send the correct signals about appropriate business conduct.   
Regression models of the probabilities of trial and trial conviction suggest the existence 
of private information during plea bargaining.  What is not clear from the regression results, 
however, is whether the defendants or prosecutors in the observed cases possess private or better 
information. 
With these findings, this study’s empirical findings contribute to the antitrust literature as 
well as the law and economics literature.  The test results of this study are comparable to the 
empirical findings of other studies, but the empirical approaches differ from those of existing 
studies.  The tests conducted in this study differ in terms of statistical approach and data from 
previously described empirical analyses found in the federal (criminal) antitrust enforcement 
literature (e.g., Cohen 1992, Gallo et al. 2000, Snyder 1989, 1990).  For example, instead of 
using regression or other statistical tests, Gallo et al. (2000) describe trends in federal antitrust 
inforcement using various descriptive statistics by year, in the style of Posner (1970).  This 
study’s regression models of the ex post probabilities of trial and trial conviction in federal 
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criminal antitrust cases differ from Snyder’s (1989, 1990) in terms of model specifications, 
timeframe of data (Snyder uses 1970-1985), and approach to controlling for heteroskedasticity.   
This study’s regression model of sentencing decisions covers roughly the same period of 
observed sentencing decisions, 1956-1980, but it differs from Cohen’s (1992) regression models 
in a number of ways.  Cohen estimates general models of penalties imposed after any means of 
conviction – trial or pleas of guilty or nolo contendere.  In contrast, this study focuses on the 
sentences imposed following conviction by trial.  The model specifications differ in terms of 
explanatory variables, controlling for sample selection bias, and addressing heteroskedasticity.   
The tests also differ from the tests conducted in studies that focus on the implications and 
determinants of case selection (e.g., Eisenberg and Farber 1997, 2003) and trial selection, 
including the information structure of plea bargaining/settlement negotiations (e.g., Froeb 1993, 
Hylton 1993, and Waldfogel 1998),.  None of the existing studies uses data from federal criminal 
antitrust cases.  Eisenberg and Farber (1997, 2003) test the implications of indirect effects of the 
plaintiff’s case selection process on case outcomes by using regression models of observed trial 
rates and trial outcomes in federal civil cases.  In contrast, this study uses two-sample means 
tests. 
Froeb (1993) tests for the existence of private information and the litigant who holds 
(more or better) private information about the defendant’s chances at trial during plea bargaining 
by estimating the correlation of trial rates and trial conviction rates in a variety of types of 
federal criminal cases.  Similarly, Waldfogel (1998) examines the correlation of trial rates and 
plaintiff win rates at trial in various types of cases in which Waldfogel expects a priori whether 
plaintiffs or defendants possess private (or better) information about the defendant’s chances at 
trial.  Hylton (1993) tests the implications of informational advantages of litigants for trial rates 
and plaintiffs’ success rates at trial by examining plaintiff win rates in various types of civil cases 
in which Hylton expects a priori whether plaintiffs or defendants possess private (or better) 
information about the defendant’s chances at trial.   
In contrast to Froeb (1993), Waldfogal (1998), and Hylton (1993), this study tests for the 
existence of private information and the identity of the privately informed defendant by 
comparing the predicted and actual signs of the estimated coefficients of various explanatory 
variables in regression models of defendants’ decisions to go to trial and trial outcomes.  As 
previously mentioned, the Key explanatory variables are those that represent the passage of time, 
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the development of legal doctrine, as well as the “Heckman’s lambda” term that controls for 
sample selection bias created by the defendant’s plea decision.  
 
Data 
 
Professor Mark Cohen graciously provided most of the data that describe defendants, the 
charges they face, and the judge in federal criminal antitrust cases initiated from 1956 through 
1980.  To those data were added data about the levels of profit and employee compensation in 
the industries represented by the defendants described by Cohen’s data.84  Data also were added 
regarding the annual appropriations used to fund the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department 
of Justice, as well as the party of the U.S. President in the indictment year and sentencing year.  
The new data came from various sources – Gallo et al. (2000), U.S. Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) Antitrust Division, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (“BLS”).  Additional variables were 
created from the collected data to suit this study’s testing needs.  Table 9 describes the empirical 
variables.   
Beginning with 3,907 defendant-level observations of cases that Professor Cohen 
provided, observations in which the defendant was a trade association or a union were deleted.  
These observations were deleted because the descriptions of the cases provided by the 
Commerce Clearing House (“CCH”) give the Standard Industrial Code (“SIC”) for trade 
associations or unions as “industries” in and of themselves, instead of the more relevant SIC for 
the industries represented by the defendant trade associations or unions.   
If a hypothetical observed case involves a trade association of yo-yo manufacturers, the 
CCH description of the case would include the SIC for trade associations instead of the SIC for 
yo-yos (or toys).  As shown in Table 9, the SIC provided by the CCH (as found in the Cohen 
dataset) was used to create empirical variables representing the annual levels of profits and 
employee compensation of industries represented by the observed defendants.  These variables 
represent the defendants’ unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure.  In the hypothetical, this 
study would take interest in the annual level of profit and employee compensation in the yo-yo 
(or toy) industry, but would not be able to compile that information with the SIC provided by the 
CCH.   
                                                 
84  Cohen’s data includes the Standard Industrial Code, at least at the two-digit level, for the industry 
associated with each observed defendant. 
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Also deleted were observations that regard industries for which the BLS does not provide 
information regarding profit or employee compensation.  In addition, observations in which 
variables related to the variance of the previous year’s trial (conviction) outcomes are undefined 
because of division by zero, and observations in which variables related to the previous year’s 
trial conviction rate are undefined because of a lack of a previous observed year were deleted.  In 
order to avoid this problem, an alternative approach might be to use a three- or four-year average 
or otherwise interpolate a trial conviction rate for a previous period.  This study uses the previous 
year’s trial conviction rate based on the notion that a trial lawyer is only as good as her last case.  
Further, the DOJ Antitrust Division likely serves as a “revolving door” for attorneys seeking 
long-term careers in the private sector.  Turnover among staff attorneys at the DOJ Antitrust 
Division implies that the previous observed year could be the most relevant in terms of capturing 
the Antitrust Division prosecutors’ expectations of their abilities to convict defendants at trial in 
the observed indictment year. 
Lastly, observations in which the number of counts of conviction exceeded the number of 
counts of indictment were deleted, since that appears to be a nonsensical situation.  This situation 
could be the result of consolidation of charges in the indictment, but the benefits of trying to 
resolve this problem by going back to the original source of the data are not likely to exceed the 
costs.   
The full dataset used for testing has 3,093 observations.85  Table 1 defines the variables 
used in the theoretical analysis discussed above, and is presented here for ease of reference.  
Table 9 defines the empirical variables.   
  
                                                 
85  This study used the statistics computer program Stata Intercooled Version 9.0  to perform the means tests 
and estimate the regression models. 
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Table 1. Definitions of variables used in theoretical framework 
 
Theoretical 
Framework 
Variable 
Type of Variable Theoretical Framework Definition 
C  Exogenous the unit cost of trial expenditure for the prosecutor 
K  Exogenous the unit cost of trial expenditure for the defendant 
e  Exogenous the strength and amount of the prosecutor’s evidence 
λ  Exogenous the litigants’ common expected variability of the judge’s trial conviction standard 
ρ  Exogenous 
the idiosyncratic component of the 
prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability 
of trial conviction 
M  Exogenous the statutory maximum penalty 
m  Exogenous 
the statutory minimum penalty (which is 
zero until the implementation of the federal 
sentencing guidelines in 1987) 
X  Choice the prosecutor’s level of trial expenditure 
Y  Choice the defendant’s level of trial expenditure 
∗X  
optimal value of a choice variable 
and implicit function of other 
variables 
the prosecutor’s optimal level of trial 
expenditure 
∗Y  
optimal value of a choice variable 
and implicit function of other 
variables 
the defendant’s optimal level of trial 
expenditure 
Θ  
Endogenous, 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−Ψ=Θ TS
KYCXρ  the ex ante expected probability of trial 
Πˆ  Endogenous, ( ) ( )[ ]( λYDXP −+Π=Π eˆ )  the litigants’ common ex ante expected probability of trial conviction 
TS  
Endogenous, ( ) ( )( )( )mMYDXPmS TT −+= ,,eµ the litigants’ common ex ante expected penalty following a trial conviction 
BS  
Endogenous, 
( )
2
ˆ CXKYSS TB −++Π= ρ  
the litigants’ common ex ante expected 
penalty following a conviction by plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere 
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Table 9. Definitions of empirical variables 
 
Dependent Variables Definition 
Associated 
Theoretical 
Model 
Variable(s) 
Case Disposition 
Stage of Empirical 
Model 
TRIAL 
= 1 if defendant pleads not 
guilty; 
= 0 otherwise 
Θ , Θ~  Plea 
TRIAL CONVICTION 
= 1 if defendant convicted 
at trial; 
= 0 otherwise 
Πˆ , Π~  Trial 
FINE 
= nominal dollars fined / 
annual CPI (1967 = 100) 
for sentencing year, in 
thousands ($000) (source 
of nominal amount of fine 
and sentencing year: 
Cohen dataset; source of 
CPI data: Bureau of Labor 
Statistics website) 
TS , TS~  Sentencing 
 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Representing Prosecutor 
Characteristics 
Definition 
Associated 
Theoretical 
Model 
Variable(s) 
Case Disposition 
Stage of Empirical 
Model 
DOJBUDGET 
= nominal dollars of 
annual appropriations to 
the DOJ Antitrust Division 
/ annual CPI (1967 = 100) 
for indictment year, in 
thousands ($000) (source 
of appropriation data: DOJ 
website) 
C  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
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Table 9, continued 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Representing Prosecutor 
Characteristics (cont.) 
Definition 
Associated 
Theoretical 
Model 
Variable(s) 
Case Disposition 
Stage of Empirical 
Model 
HIGH DOJBUDGET 
= 1 if real (1967 = 100) 
annual appropriations to 
the DOJ Antitrust Division 
exceeds $8,915,747, the 
mean for the full sample (n 
= 3093); 
= 0 otherwise 
C  Plea; trial; sentencing 
%CRIMINAL 
 
Percentage of opened 
Commerce Clearing House 
antitrust cases that are 
criminal per year 
(source: Gallo, et al. 2000) 
C  Plea; trial; sentencing 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500 
Annual number of CCH 
federal criminal antitrust 
cases involving Fortune 
500 companies 
(source: Gallo, et al. 2000) 
C  Plea; Trial; sentencing 
HIGH ANNUAL 
FORTUNE500 
= 1 if the annual number 
of CCH federal criminal 
antitrust cases involving 
Fortune 500 companies 
exceeds 23 , the mean for 
the full sample (n = 3093); 
= 0 otherwise. 
C  Plea; trial; sentencing 
REPUB PRES INDICT YEAR  
= 1 if President is 
Republican; 
= 0 if President is 
Democrat 
Determinant 
of Θ , Πˆ , 
and  TS
Plea; Trial; 
Sentencing 
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Table 9, continued 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Representing Defendant 
Characteristics  
Definition 
Associated 
Theoretical 
Model 
Variable(s) 
Case Disposition 
Stage of Empirical 
Model 
#CODEFEND Number of other defendants in same case K  
Plea; Trial; 
Sentencing 
#CORP CODEFEND 
Number of other firms that 
are defendants in same 
case 
K  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
ONLY CORP DEFEND Case involves only firms as defendants K  
Plea; Trial; 
Sentencing 
ONLY INDIV DEFEND Case involves only individuals as defendants K  
Plea; Trial; 
Sentencing 
ONLY HIGH RANK 
= 1 if individual 
defendants in case  are all 
of high corporate rank 
(e.g., president); 
= 0 otherwise 
K  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
ONLY LOW RANK 
= 1 if individual 
defendants in case are all 
of low corporate rank (e.g., 
below president); 
= 0 otherwise 
K  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
ANY LOW RANK 
= 1 if any individual 
defendants in case is of 
low corporate rank (e.g., 
below president); 
= 0 otherwise 
K  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
PROFIT 
= Nominal annual 
corporate profit by 2-digit 
SIC code / annual CPI 
(1967 = 100) for the 
indictment year, in 
millions ($000,000) 
(source: U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Standards) 
e , K  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
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Table 9, continued 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Representing Defendant 
Characteristics (cont.) 
Definition 
Associated 
Theoretical 
Model 
Variable(s) 
Case Disposition 
Stage of Empirical 
Model 
HIGH PROFIT 
= 1 if the value of PROFIT 
exceeds $2,806.854 
million, the mean for the 
full sample (n = 3093); 
= 0 otherwise  
e , K  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
COMPENSATION 
= Nominal employee 
compensation by 2-digit 
SIC code / annual CPI 
(1967 = 100) for the 
indictment year, in 
millions ($000,000) 
(source: U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Standards) 
e , K  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
HIGH COMPENSATION 
= 1 if the value of 
COMPENSATION exceeds 
$15,782.14 million, the 
mean for the full sample (n 
= 3093); 
= 0 otherwise 
e , K  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
#OTHER INDICT 
Number of other 
indictments for the 
defendant in the same year 
e , K  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
ZERO OTHER INDICT 
= 1 if the number of other 
indictments for the 
defendant in the same year 
equals zero; 
= 0 otherwise 
e , K  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
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Table 9, continued 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Representing Defendant 
Characteristics (cont.) 
Definition 
Associated 
Theoretical 
Model 
Variable(s) 
Case Disposition 
Stage of Empirical 
Model 
#PREV CONVICT 
Number of previous 
antitrust convictions for 
the defendant 
e  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
ZERO PREV CONVICT 
= 1 if the number of 
previous antitrust 
convictions for the 
defendant equals zero; 
= 0 otherwise 
e  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Representing Violation 
Characteristics 
Definition 
Associated 
Theoretical 
Model 
Variable(s) 
Case Disposition 
Stage of Empirical 
Model 
COMMERCE 
= Nominal dollar amount 
of commerce involved in 
case / annual CPI (1967 = 
100) for the indictment 
year, in thousands ($000) 
e  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
HIGH COMMERCE 
= 1 if the value of HIGH 
COMMERCE exceeds 
$64,396.21 thousand, the 
mean for the full sample (n 
= 3093); 
= 0 otherwise 
e  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
#COUNTS CONVICT Number of counts of conviction e  Sentencing 
MULTI COUNTS CONVICT 
= 1 if the number of counts 
of conviction exceeds one; 
= 0 otherwise 
e  Sentencing 
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Table 9, continued 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Representing Violation 
Characteristics (cont.) 
Definition 
Associated 
Theoretical 
Model 
Variable(s) 
Case Disposition 
Stage of Empirical 
Model 
#COUNTS INDICT Number of counts of indictment e  
Plea; Trial; 
Sentencing 
MULTI COUNTS INDICT 
= 1 if the number of counts 
of indictment exceeds one; 
= 0 otherwise 
e  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
COUNTS INDICT-CONVICT 
Number of counts of 
indictment minus number 
of counts of conviction 
e  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
DURATION Duration of alleged conspiracy in years e  
Plea; Trial; 
Sentencing 
HIGH DURATION 
= 1 if the duration of the 
alleged conspiracy exceeds 
5 years, the mean for the 
full sample (n = 3093); 
= 0 otherwise 
e  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
ANY BID RIG 
= 1 if any count of 
indictment alleges bid 
rigging; 
= 0 otherwise 
e , ρ , and 
Πˆ  
Plea; Trial; 
Sentencing 
PRICE FIX NOT BID RIG 
= 1 if the defendant is 
charged with price fixing 
but not bid rigging; 
= 0 otherwise 
e , ρ , and 
Πˆ  
Plea; Trial; 
Sentencing 
BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX 
= 1 if the defendant is 
charged with bid rigging 
but not price fixing; 
= 0 otherwise 
e , ρ , and 
Πˆ  
Plea; Trial; 
Sentencing 
CONSUMER VIC 
= 1 if the alleged victim is 
a consumer; 
= 0 otherwise 
e  Plea; Trial; Sentencing 
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Table 9, continued 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Representing Sentencing 
Determinants 
Definition 
Associated 
Theoretical 
Model 
Variable(s) 
Case Disposition 
Stage of Empirical 
Model 
SENTENCE YEAR year of sentencing decision
Determinant 
of  TS Sentencing 
CASE TIME SPAN Year of sentencing minus year of indictment 
Determinant 
of  (X or 
Y) 
TS Sentencing 
POST-APPA SENTENCE 
YEAR 
= 1 if the sentencing year 
is 1975 or later; 
= 0 otherwise 
Determinant 
of  TS Sentencing 
POST-APPA INDICT YEAR 
= 1 if the indictment year 
is 1975 or later; 
= 0 otherwise 
Determinant 
of  TS Plea; Trial 
 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Representing (Sentencing) 
Judge Characteristics 
Definition 
Associated 
Theoretical 
Model 
Variable(s) 
Case Disposition 
Stage of Empirical 
Model 
REPUB JUDGE 
= 1 if judge is a 
Republican in the 
sentencing year (according 
to Cohen’s source); 
= 0 otherwise 
Determinant 
of Πˆ ,  TS Trial; Sentencing 
REPUB PRES SENTENCE 
YEAR 
= 1 if President is a 
Republican in the 
sentencing year; 
= 0 otherwise 
Determinant 
of  TS Sentencing 
PRES & JUDGE SAME 
PARTY SENTENCE YEAR 
= 1 if President and judge 
are in the same political 
party in the sentencing 
year; 
= 0 otherwise 
Determinant 
of  TS Sentencing 
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Table 9, continued 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Representing (Sentencing) 
Judge Characteristics (cont.) 
Definition 
Associated 
Theoretical 
Model 
Variable(s) 
Case Disposition 
Stage of Empirical 
Model 
PRIOR PROSECUTOR 
= 1 if the judge previously 
served as a government 
prosecutor; 
= 0 otherwise 
Determinant 
of Πˆ ,  TS Trial; Sentencing 
TENURE 
Number of years the judge 
has served on the federal 
district court 
Determinant 
of Πˆ ,  TS Trial; Sentencing 
#FILINGS Number of cases filed in district per judge 
Determinant 
of Πˆ ,  TS Trial; Sentencing 
 
 
Other Explanatory Variables Definition 
Associated 
Theoretical 
Model 
Variable(s) 
Case Disposition 
Stage of Empirical 
Model 
INDICT YEAR Year of indictment 
Determinant 
of Θ and Πˆ  Plea; Trial 
LANDMARK 
Average number of 
“landmark” antitrust cases 
identified in leading 
antitrust law treatises.  
(source: Gallo et al. 2000) 
Determinant 
of Θ , Πˆ , 
and  TS
Plea; Trial; 
Sentencing 
DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1 
Trial conviction rate for 
previous observed year by 
type of first violation in the 
indictment 
ρ  Plea 
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Table 9, continued 
 
Other Explanatory Variables 
(cont.) Definition 
Associated 
Theoretical 
Model 
Variable(s) 
Case 
Disposition 
Stage of 
Empirical 
Model 
HIGH DOJ WIN PREV 
YEAR BY VIOL#1 
= 1 if the trial conviction 
rate for the previous 
observed year by type of 
first violation in the 
indictment exceeds 
28.70472, which is the 
mean value for the full 
sample (n = 3093); 
= 0 otherwise 
ρ  Plea 
DOJ WIN PREV YEAR Trial conviction rate for previous observed year 
ρ  Plea 
VAR DOJ WIN PREV YEAR 
BY VIOL#1 
Variance of trial outcomes 
for previous observed year 
by type of first violation in 
the indictment  
λ  Trial 
VAR DOJ WIN PREV YEAR Variance of trial outcomes for previous observed year λ  Trial 
MILLS TRIAL 
Inverse Mills ratio that 
controls for probability of 
trial 
Determinant of 
Πˆ ,  TS
Trial; 
Sentencing 
MILLS TRIAL CONVICT 
Inverse Mills ratio that 
controls for probability of 
trial conviction 
Determinant of 
 TS Sentencing 
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Cross-Branch Means Tests of Trial Selection and Trial Conviction Selection Processes 
 
This section discusses the results of two-sample means tests used to test predictions of 
how, given the relative value of one case characteristic, the trial selection process and trial 
conviction process shape the mix of the other characteristics of cases that proceed to subsequent 
stages of case disposition.  Cursory reviews of Tables B-1 through B-5 in Appendix B86 reveals 
that the distributions of the variables differ across sub-samples associated with various stages of 
case disposition (i.e., various branches stemming from various nodes of the game tree of case 
disposition).  Differences in these distributions support the notion that the defendant’s plea 
decision, and the judge’s or jury’s decision to convict at trial are sorting processes that alter the 
mixes of the characteristics of cases as they proceed through the legal process.   
For purposes of testing the selection models’ predictions, correlation and regression 
analyses are generally not suitable because the direction of the marginal changes in the values of, 
or the relative values of, the case characteristics under consideration matters.  In part, that is 
because the theoretical predictions differ according to whether a marginal increase or decrease 
in the value of a case characteristic under consideration occurred, or whether a relatively high or 
low level of a case characteristic under consideration is observed. 
As discussed in Chapter VI, potential cases that prosecutors do not initiate are 
unobserved.  Thus, it is not possible to test the predictions of the model of the prosecutor’s case 
selection process by comparing the means of case characteristics across samples of cases that are 
and are not initiated (i.e., across the two game tree branches stemming from the node of the 
prosecutor’s case selection decision).  Such tests are possible for the model of the defendant’s 
plea decision and the judge’s or jury’s trial conviction decision, however.   
Overall, the results only moderately support the predictions of the trial selection model.  
This is not surprising given that corporate defendants and white-collar individual defendants, as 
well as their (presumably) expert attorneys likely base decisions (or advice) on entered pleas on 
considerations not easily captured by the empirical variables created from available data.  In 
                                                 
86  Appendix B provides summary statistics of the data, by samples of cases at various stages of case 
disposition.  Table B-1 summarizes the full set of data; Table B-2, the sample of observations in which the 
defendants entered pleas of guilty of nolo contendere; Table B-3, the sample of observations in which the 
defendants entered not guilty pleas; Table B-4, the sample of observations in which the defendants were convicted at 
trial; and Table B-5, the sample of observations in which the defendants were not convicted at trial (i.e., the 
defendant was acquitted, the case was dismissed, or the case ended in a directed verdict in the defendant’s favor). 
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comparison to the results of the means tests of the trial selection model, the means test results 
provide more support for the model of the judicial trial conviction decision.  Some findings 
provide somewhat ambiguous support for the model’s predictions that requires alternative 
explanations, however.  In addition, several results of both sets of means tests are not statistically 
significant. 
 
Tests of the trial selection process 
 
As discussed in Chapter VII, the theoretical model of the defendant’s plea decision 
implies firm relationships among the relative values of the same case characteristic in the sample 
of defendants in cases that go to trial versus the sample of defendants in cases that do not go to 
trial (i.e., across different game tree branches stemming from the plea decision mode).  These 
relationships can be tested meaningfully using sample means tests using the samples of 
defendants in (initiated) cases that go to trial and  defendants in cases that do not go to trial.  
Figure 3 provides a game tree diagram that shows the two samples used in the following tests of 
the trial selection model – the sample of defendants who choose to go to trial and the sample of 
defendants who choose not to go to trial – produced by the defendant’s plea decision. 
Specifically, cases that go to trial (do not go to trial) are expected to be characterized by a 
relatively low (high) value of the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, , and the 
defendant’s unit trial cost, 
C
K .  Moreover, cases that go to trial (do not go to trial) are expected to 
be characterized by a relatively high (low) value of the parties’ common expected trial sentence, 
 and a relatively high value of the idiosyncratic component, TS ρ , of the prosecutor’s expected 
probability of trial conviction. 
Overall, the results of the following tests of the difference in the values of the means of 
empirical variables representing case characteristics in the samples of defendants who do (n = 
601) and do not go to trial (n = 2492) provide mixed support for the model of the defendant’s 
plea decision (i.e., the trial selection process).  Appendix C reports the means test results.  Table 
10 summarizes the results. 
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Pre-indictment 
 
(n = ?) 
Case not 
observed 
 
(n = ?) 
Plea Bargaining 
 
(n = 3093) 
Trial 
 
(n = 601) 
Judge imposes 
sentence = BS  
 
(n = 2492) 
Case ends 
 
(n = 469) 
Judge imposes 
sentence = TS  
 
(n = 132)Judge/jury 
convicts defendant 
Judge/jury does not 
convict defendant 
Defendant pleads guilty 
or nolo contendere  
Prosecutor does not indict 
(potential) defendant 
Prosecutor indicts 
defendant 
Defendant 
pleads not guilty 
 
Figure 3. Game tree representation of the case disposition process and relevant sample sizes 
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Table 10.a. Results of cross-branch means tests of the defendant’s plea decision as a selection 
process 
 
 
Empirical Variable  
 
Associated Case 
Characteristic(s) 
Mean Value in 
Sample of 
Litigated 
Cases  
(n = 601)* 
Mean Value in 
Sample of Non-
Litigated Cases 
(n = 2492)* 
DOJBUDGET C  8139.42 9102.98 
%CRIMINAL C  0.4874542 0.4719141 
ONLY INDIV DEFEND K  0.0449251 0.0232745 
ONLY CORP DEFEND K  0.5990017 0.6508828 
PROFIT  K  3013.09 2757.12 
COMPENSATION  K  14552.8 16078.62 
#CORP CODEFEND  K  7.90183 6.831461 
#OTHER INDICT  e , K  0.1647255 0.4357945 
COUNTS INDICT-CONVICT  e , , TS ρ  1.073211 1.26565 
#COUNTS INDICT  e ,  TS 1.291181 1.369583 
DURATION  e ,  TS 4.650582 5.672151 
COMMERCE  e ,  TS 45534.5 68945.12 
BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX ρ  0.1397671 0.1175762 
ANY BID RIG  ρ  0.2312812 0.2624398 
DOJ WIN PREV YEAR ρ  25.43097 27.02271 
DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1  ρ  26.82892 29.15711 
CASE TIME SPAN None 1.329451 0.8896469 
    
POST-APPA INDICT YEAR TS  Statistically Insignificant 
#PREV CONVICT e ,  TS Statistically Insignificant 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500 C  Statistically Insignificant 
ONLY HIGH RANK K  Statistically Insignificant 
ONLY LOW RANK K  Statistically Insignificant 
COMPENSATION K  Statistically Insignificant 
 
*  Sample mean values are statistically significant unless otherwise noted. 
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Table 10.b. Comparison of expected and observed means test results 
 
 
Empirical Variable  
 
Associated Case 
Characteristic(s) 
Sample in 
Which a 
Larger Value 
is Expected 
Sample in 
Which a Larger 
Value is 
Observed 
DOJBUDGET C  Litigated Non-litigated 
C%CRIMINAL  ? Litigated 
ONLY INDIV DEFEND K  Non-litigated Litigated 
ONLY CORP DEFEND Litigated K  Non-Litigated 
PROFIT   Litigated Litigated K
COMPENSATION  Litigated Non-litigated K  
#CORP CODEFEND  Litigated Litigated K  
#OTHER INDICT  e , K  
Non-litigated 
for K ; 
Litigated for e 
Non-litigated 
COUNTS INDICT-CONVICT  e , , TS ρ  Non-litigated Non-litigated 
#COUNTS INDICT  e ,  TS Litigated Non-litigated 
DURATION  e ,  TS Litigated Non-litigated 
COMMERCE  e ,  TS Litigated Non-litigated 
BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX ρ  Litigated Litigated 
ANY BID RIG  ρ  Litigated Non-litigated 
DOJ WIN PREV YEAR ρ  Litigated Non-litigated 
DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1  ρ  Litigated Non-litigated 
CASE TIME SPAN None Litigated Litigated 
    
POST-APPA INDICT YEAR TS  Litigated Neither 
#PREV CONVICT e ,  TS Litigated Neither 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500 C  Non-litigated Neither 
ONLY HIGH RANK K  Litigated Neither 
ONLY LOW RANK K  Non-litigated Neither 
COMPENSATION K  Litigated Neither 
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The means test results suggest that the trial selection process is complicated and that the 
empirical variables do not capture all of the subtle considerations that go into the defendants’ 
plea decisions.  Alternatively, the number of statistically insignificant results could suggest that 
the defendant’s plea decision is a random process.   
The latter interpretation is not satisfying intuitively in the context of federal criminal 
antitrust cases, however.  These cases involve white-collar individual and corporate defendants 
represented by skilled attorneys.  These defendants are not likely prone to whimsical, random 
decision-making in the face of generally high stakes in terms of personal and corporate finances 
and reputations. 
In order to interpret the means test results in relation to the theoretical predictions, recall 
the condition that, according to the theoretical framework, must hold in order for a defendant to 
go to trial: ( ) .  The condition for a defendant to be observed choosing to 
go to trial suggests that cases that go to trial are more likely to be characterized by a relatively 
low value of the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, 
0>−−− KYCXSTδρ
K , compared to value of K  observed 
in cases that do not go to trial.  The means test results regarding PROFIT, #OTHER INDICT, and 
#CORP CODEFEND support the theoretical predictions if, as expected, the defendants’ 
(opportunity) cost of trial expenditure: falls with the subject defendant industry’s profits, rises 
with the number of indictments the subject defendant faces in the same year, and falls with the 
number of corporate defendants in the subject case.   
On the other hand, the results of two means tests related to the defendant’s trial costs 
contradict the theoretical predictions.  As discussed above and by Eisenberg and Farber (2003), 
the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, K , is expected to be higher for individual 
defendants than corporate defendants.  Accordingly, ceteris paribus, cases in which all of the 
defendants are individuals are expected to end in a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, while cases 
involving all corporate defendants are expected to go to trial.  Thus, the findings that the mean 
values or the empirical variables ONLY INDIV DEFEND and ONLY CORP DEFEND are higher 
and lower, respectively, in cases that proceeded to trial versus cases that did not proceed to trial 
run counter to the predictions of the model of the defendant’s plea decision.   
Similarly, the finding that the value of COMPENSATION is higher in the sample of non-
litigated cases contradicts the trial selection model’s prediction that defendants with lower unit 
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(opportunity) costs of trial expenditure are more likely to go to trial.  As the defendant’s level of 
compensation rises, his opportunity cost from trial falls. 
Assuming that the prosecutor is more confident about her chances of winning at trial in a 
bid-rigging case than a price-fixing case, then the idiosyncratic component, ρ , of the 
prosecutor’s expected probability of trial conviction is higher in a bid-rigging case than in a 
price-fixing case.  Thus, the finding that cases that involved bid-rigging charges but not price-
fixing charges, as represented by the dummy variable BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX, were more 
likely to go to trial than to end in a plea of guilty or nolo contendere supports the theoretical 
predictions of the model of the defendant’s plea decision. 
 In contrast, the values of the empirical variables that are supposed to more directly 
represent ρ  -- DOJ WIN PREV YEAR and  DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1 – have lower 
mean values in cases that go to trial than in cases that do not go to trial.  These findings 
contradict the theoretical predictions. 
A smaller difference in the number of charges in the indictment versus charges for which 
the defendant is convicted suggests stronger evidence, e.  Further, the ex ante expected trial 
sentence, , is expected to increase in e.  Thus, the finding that the mean value of COUNTS 
INDICT-CONVICT is lower in cases that go to trial than in cases that do not go to trial supports 
the theoretical prediction of the model of the defendant’s plea choice.
TS
87
On the other hand, the findings that the mean values of COMMERCE and #COUNTS 
INDICT are lower in the sample of cases that go to trial than in the sample of cases that end in 
pleas of guilty or nolo contendere does not support the theoretical predictions of the model of the 
defendant’s plea decision.  That is because the ex ante expected trial sentence, , and the 
probability of trial are expected to increase in the amount of commerce involved in an alleged 
conspiracy and, more generally the amount of evidence (notwithstanding the strength of the 
evidence).   
TS
Meanwhile, the finding that the mean value of DURATION is lower in the sample of 
cases that go to trial than in the sample of cases that do not go to trial does not necessarily 
support or contradict the theoretical predictions of the model of the defendant’s plea choice.  To 
the extent that the ex ante expected sentence, and hence the probability of trial, increases in the 
                                                 
87  Meanwhile the finding that the value of CASE TIME SPAN is higher in cases that go to trial than in cases 
that do not go to trial simply supports the common sense prediction that cases that go to trial last longer. 
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duration of the alleged conspiracy, this finding contradicts the theoretical predictions.  The ex 
ante expected sentence does not necessarily increase in the duration of the conspiracy, however, 
if the conspiracy was unsuccessful and did not cause much economic harm.   
Similarly, the finding that the mean value of %CRIMINAL is higher in the sample of 
cases that go to trial than in the sample of cases ending in a plea agreement does not necessarily 
contradict or support the theory developed in this study.  If the prosecutor’s unit (opportunity) 
cost of trial expenditure, C , increases with the percentage of criminal cases in which the DOJ 
Antitrust Division is involved in a given year, then the finding does not support the model’s 
predictions.  It is possible, however, that there are some economies of scale or economies of 
focus from bringing a larger percentage of criminal cases in a given year.  If so, this means test 
result supports the theory.  
Taken together, some of these means test results confirm the theoretical predictions of the 
model of the defendant’s plea choice.  Some of the findings undermine the model’s predictions, 
however.  Some findings provide ambiguous support for the model’s predictions.  Several means 
test results are not statistically significant.88
Such mixed support for the model of the defendant’s plea choice are not surprising given 
that corporate defendants and white-collar individual defendants, as well as their (presumably) 
expert attorneys likely base decisions (or advice) on entered pleas on considerations not easily 
captured by the empirical variables created from available data.  For example, the empirical 
variables do not control for the defendant’s pre-trial assessment of the strength of his legal 
representation or the credibility of his best defense if he chooses to go to trial. 
 
Tests of the trial conviction selection process 
 
The following tests compare the means of empirical variables representing case 
characteristics in the sample of defendants in cases that proceed to trial (i.e., “litigated cases”) 
and end in trial conviction (n = 132) with the sample of defendants in litigated cases that do not 
                                                 
88  Specifically, the tests of the difference of means values across the samples of cases that did and did not go 
to trial, using the following variables, did not produce statistically significant results:  POST-APPA INDICT YEAR 
(which is positively related to ), #PREV CONVICT (which is positively related to  ANNUAL FORTUNE500 
(which is positively related to C), ONLY HIGH RANK (which is negatively related to K), and ONLY LOW RANK 
(which is positively related to K).) 
TS TS ),
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end in trial conviction (n = 469).  The results generally support the predictions of the theoretical 
model of the rule by which the judge or jury decides to convict the defendant at trial (i.e., the 
trial conviction process).   
The theoretical model of the trial conviction decision implies certain relationships among 
the relative values of the same case characteristic in the sample of defendants in litigated cases 
that end in trial conviction and the sample of defendants in litigated cases that do not end in 
conviction (i.e., across different game tree branches stemming from the trial decision node).  
These relationships can be tested meaningfully using sample means tests using the samples of 
defendants in (initiated) cases that end in trial conviction and samples of defendants in litigated 
cases that do not end in conviction.   
Specifically, the trial conviction model predicts that when the prosecutor has weaker 
diminishing returns in trial expenditure than the defendant, a case characterized by a relatively 
low value of the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C  is more likely to end in trial 
conviction.  Meanwhile, a case characterized by a relatively high value of  is more likely to 
end in acquittal, dismissal, or directed verdict in favor of the defendant.  Meanwhile, a case that 
ends in trial conviction  is expected to be characterized by  relatively high values of the 
defendant’s unit trial cost, 
C
K , the parties’ common expected trial sentence, ; and the amount 
or strength of the prosecutor’s evidence, e.  Out of all cases that go to trial, cases that do not end 
in trial conviction are expected to be characterized by relatively low values of 
TS
K , , e. TS
With two exceptions, the means tests discussed below use the same empirical variables 
used in the tests related to the trial selection process.  The two exceptions are the omission of 
empirical variables representing the idiosyncratic component, ρ , of the prosecutor’s expected 
probability of trial conviction, and the inclusion of empirical variables representing λ , the 
parties common expectation regarding the latitude that the legal system allows judges in making 
discretionary decisions at trial,    
Most of the statistically significant test results are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions discussed in Chapter VIII.  None of the statistically significant results is completely 
inconsistent with the theoretical predictions, although several of the test results are statistically 
insignificant.  Appendix D reports the means test results.  Table 11 summarizes the statistically 
significant results. 
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Table 11.a. Results of cross-branch means tests of the trial conviction decision as a selection 
process 
 
 
Empirical Variable  Associated Case Characteristic(s) 
Mean Value in 
Sample of 
Litigated 
Cases That 
End in 
Conviction  
(n = 132)* 
Mean Value 
in Sample of 
Litigated 
Cases That 
Do Not End 
in Conviction 
(n = 469)* 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500  C  19.06818 25.18763 
%CRIMINAL C  0.515303 0.4796162 
#CODEFEND  C , K  9.560606 12.55437 
ONLY INDIV DEFEND  K  0.0833333 0.0341151 
ONLY HIGH RANK  e , K  0.8939394 0.7654584 
ONLY LOW RANK  e , K  0.0909091 0.2089552 
PROFIT   K  2579.31 3135.18 
DURATION  e  5.545455 4.398721 
#COUNTS INDICT  e  1.181818 1.321962 
COMMERCE  e ,  TS 61510.3 41038.11 
PRIOR PROSECUTOR  Πˆ ,  TS 0.5909091 0.4626866 
PRICE FIX NOT BID RIG  Πˆ  0.6590909 0.7377399 
BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX  Πˆ  0.2045455 0.1215352 
VAR DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1 λ  11.00835 12.96607 
    
DOJBUDGET C  Statistically Insignificant 
ONLY CORP DEFEND K  Statistically Insignificant 
COMPENSATION K  Statistically Insignificant 
#OTHER INDICT e , K  Statistically Insignificant 
#PREV CONVICT e  Statistically Insignificant 
COUNTS INDICT-CONVICT e  Statistically Insignificant 
POST-APPA INDICT YEAR TS  Statistically Insignificant 
VAR DOJ WIN PREV YEAR λ  Statistically Insignificant 
CASE TIME SPAN None Statistically Insignificant 
 
*  Sample mean values are statistically significant unless otherwise noted. 
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Table 11.b. Comparison of expected and observed means test results 
 
Empirical Variable  Associated Case Characteristic(s) 
Sample in 
Which a 
Larger Value 
is Expected 
Sample in 
Which a Larger 
Value is 
Observed 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500  C  Not conviction Not conviction 
%CRIMINAL C  ? Conviction 
#CODEFEND  C , K  ? Not conviction 
ONLY INDIV DEFEND  K  Conviction Conviction 
ONLY HIGH RANK  e , K  
Conviction for 
;  e
Not conviction 
for K  
Conviction 
ONLY LOW RANK  e , K  
Not conviction 
for ;  e
Conviction for 
K  
Not conviction 
PROFIT   K  Not conviction Not conviction 
DURATION  e  Conviction Conviction 
#COUNTS INDICT  e  ? Not conviction 
COMMERCE  e ,  TS Conviction Conviction 
PRIOR PROSECUTOR  Πˆ ,  TS Conviction Conviction 
PRICE FIX NOT BID RIG  Πˆ  Not conviction Not conviction 
BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX  Πˆ  Conviction Conviction 
VAR DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1 λ  ? Not conviction 
    
DOJBUDGET C  Conviction Neither 
ONLY CORP DEFEND K  Not conviction Neither 
COMPENSATION K  Not conviction Neither 
#OTHER INDICT e , K  Conviction Neither 
#PREV CONVICT e  Conviction Neither 
COUNTS INDICT-CONVICT e  Not conviction Neither 
POST-APPA INDICT YEAR TS  Conviction Neither 
VAR DOJ WIN PREV YEAR λ  ? Neither 
CASE TIME SPAN None ? Neither 
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To see how the results relate to the theoretical predictions, recall from Chapter V the 
theoretical condition that the judicial trial conviction rule is to find the defendant guilty if and 
only if ( ) ( )[ vYDXP ] λ>−+e .  Recall that e is the quality or quantity of the prosecutor’s 
evidence against the defendant.  P(X) and D(Y) are scalars that denote the persuasive value of 
testimony and legal arguments regarding the defendant’s culpability and liability made at trial by 
the prosecutor and defendant, respectively.  X and Y represent the prosecutor’s and defendant’s 
levels of trial expenditure, respectively; v represents the random factors associated with the 
judge’s conviction standard; and the spread factor λ  represents the parties’ common expectation 
regarding the latitude the legal system allows judges in making discretionary decisions at trial.89   
The theory developed earlier predicts that the probability of trial conviction increases in 
the ex ante expected trial sentence, , if the prosecutor has weaker diminishing returns in trial 
expenditure than the defendant.  Also, the probability of trial conviction increases in the 
defendant’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, 
TS
K , and decreases in the prosecutor’s unit 
(opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, C . 
As shown in Table 11, several means test results are not statistically significant.90  
Nonetheless, the means test results reported in Table 11 provide more support for the model of 
the trial conviction decision than the results of the tests regarding the trial selection model 
reported in Table 10.  It is possible that the empirical variables employed in the means tests 
capture the factors relevant in trial conviction decisions better than they capture the factors that 
influence plea decisions.  That is, the empirical variables likely reflect entries into evidenciary 
records on which judges and juries are legally bound to base their trial conviction decisions.  In 
contrast, it is less likely that the empirical variables capture more speculative or nuanced 
considerations, based on the information contained in the empirical variables or other 
information, that influence defendants’ plea decisions.  
                                                 
89  Since the expected value of v is zero, the judicial trial conviction rule can be rewritten as 
, which simplifies the instant analysis.   
  In particular, the tests of the difference of means values across the samples of litigated cases that did and 
did not end in trial conviction, using the following variables, did not produce statistically significant results:  
DOJBUDGET (which is negatively related to C); ONLY CORP DEFEND, COMPENSATION (which is negatively 
related to K); #OTHER INDICT (which is positively related to K); #PREV CONVICT and COUNTS INDICT-
CONVICT (which are positively and negatively related to e, respectively); POST-APPA INDICT YEAR (which is 
positively related to ); as well as VAR DOJ WIN PREV YEAR (which is positively related to
( ) ( )YDXP >+e
90
TS λ ).  In addition, the 
means test involving CASE TIME SPAN produced statistically insignificant results. 
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The mean value of the empirical variable ANNUAL FORTUNE500 is lower in the sample 
of cases that go to trial (henceforth, for brevity, “litigated cases”) and end in conviction than in 
the sample of litigated cases that do not end in conviction.  It is reasonable to expect the 
prosecutor’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, C , to rise as the DOJ Antitrust Division 
brings more cases against Fortune 500 companies.  Thus, this finding supports the prediction that 
cases characterized by a relatively low value of  will end in conviction if they go to trial. C
 The mean of %CRIMINAL is higher in the sample of litigated cases that end in conviction 
than in the sample of litigated cases that do not.  If  increases in the percentage of criminal 
cases the DOJ Antitrust Division initiates in a given year, then this finding contradicts the 
predictions of the model of the trial conviction decision.  On the other hand, if there are 
economies of scale or focus from bringing a higher percentage of criminal antitrust cases, then a 
relatively higher value of %CRIMINAL implies a relatively lower value of C , and this finding 
supports the theoretical prediction of the model of the trial conviction decision. 
C
 The mean of #CODEFEND is higher in the sample of litigated cases that do not end in 
conviction than in the sample of cases that end in trial conviction.  Defendants could cooperate 
or coordinate their litigation efforts in such a way to reduce their combined trial costs – for 
example, by sharing pre-trial information.  If so, then the level of the defendant’s unit cost of 
trial expenditure, K , is higher when the value of #CODEFEND is larger.  The prosecutor’s unit 
cost of trial expenditure, C , also could increase with the number of defendants if, for example, 
the prosecutor’s preparations for cross-examining witnesses require more time or other resources 
as the number of defendants increases.  If so, then C  increases in #CODEFEND.  The means test 
result for #CODEFEND is consistent with these interpretations of how #CODEFEND represents 
 and C K , since the probability of trial conviction, as modeled, decreases in  and increases in C
K .91
 The probability of trial conviction, as modeled, increases in the defendant’s unit cost of 
trial expenditure, K .It is reasonable to expect individual defendants to have higher (opportunity) 
costs of trial than corporate defendants.  Thus, the finding that the mean value of ONLY INDIV 
                                                 
91  On the other hand, it is plausible that defendants cannot or choose not to cooperate or coordinate, which 
implies that K increases in #CODEFEND.  The prosecutor could leverage such non-cooperation among defendants 
into a lower unit cost of trial expenditure, C, if, for example, at least some of the defendants are willing to cooperate 
with the prosecutor to some extent.  The more defendants, the more potentially cooperative witnesses exist.  The 
finding that the mean of #CODEFEND is higher in the sample of non-trial conviction cases does not square with this 
interpretation of the relationship between #CODEFEND and C or K. 
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DEFEND is higher in the sample of litigated cases that end in trial conviction than in the sample 
of litigated cases that do not end in conviction supports the model.   
The higher the defendant’s industry’s level of profits, the lower the defendant’s 
opportunity cost from trial expenditure, K .  Thus, the finding that the mean value of PROFIT is 
higher in the sample of litigated cases also supports the prediction of the trial conviction model. 
The finding that the mean value of ONLY LOW RANK is lower in the sample of litigated 
cases that end in conviction suggests that litigated cases in which all of the individual defendants 
have low corporate ranks (i.e., lower than president of the company) and, accordingly, higher 
unit costs of trial expenditure, are less likely to end in conviction.  Similarly, the finding that the 
mean value of ONLY HIGH RANK is higher in the sample of litigated cases that end in 
conviction suggests that a case is more likely to end in conviction if all of the individual 
defendants are high-ranking and have lower unit costs of trial expenditure.  If the variables 
ONLY LOW RANK and ONLY HIGH RANK represent only the defendant’s unit cost of trial 
expenditure, K, then one could reasonably interpret these findings as counter to the predictions of 
the model of the trial conviction (selection) process.   
It is also reasonable, however, to suspect that cases involving only low-ranking or high-
ranking individual defendants also feature relatively weak or strong evidence, respectively.92  If 
ONLY LOW RANK and ONLY HIGH RANK represent the amount or strength of evidence, e , 
then the findings regarding ONLY LOW RANK and ONLY HIGH RANK support the prediction of 
the model of the conviction decision process.  
The mean values of DURATION and BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX are higher in the sample 
of litigated cases that end in trial conviction, confirming the trial conviction model’s prediction 
that more or stronger evidence increases the probability of trial conviction.  The latter finding 
supports Snyder’s (1990) assertion that bid-rigging cases are easier to prosecute successfully 
because the prosecutor can more easily gather convincing evidence in those cases, such as the 
testimony of co-conspirators.   
Snyder does not mention the likelihood that rigging bids for providing or supplying 
government services produces more or stronger evidence than fixing prices for goods or services 
                                                 
92  Otherwise, why would prosecuting the chief executive officers in the Enron and WorldCom fraud cases be 
so important to government prosecutors?  In the sample of litigated cases, the highest estimated correlation 
coefficient between ONLY LOW RANK and empirical variables representing the quantity or quality of evidence was 
0.13 (between ONLY LOW RANK and MULTI HPSV COUNTS).  The empirical variables created from the available 
data do not necessarily fully capture the strength of the evidence in any given case, however. 
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sold to the private sector, ceteris paribus.  Government procurement processes are more likely to 
capture and maintain relevant information that is more readily available to prosecutors than 
information captured and maintained by private sector individuals or organizations.  Thus, the 
finding that the mean of PRICE FIX NOT BID RIG is higher in the sample of litigated cases that 
did not end in conviction than in the sample of cases disposed by trial conviction adds support 
for the notion that the probability of trial conviction is higher in bid-rigging cases than price-
fixing cases.  
 To the extent that fewer counts of indictment implies weaker evidence, the finding that 
the mean value of #COUNTS INDICT is lower in litigated cases that end in conviction runs 
counter to the model’s prediction that the probability of trial conviction rises with the strength of 
the prosecutor’s evidence.  If, on the other hand, prosecutors are likely to bundle charges when 
they lack any single piece of strong evidence, this finding could be interpreted to support the 
model’s prediction.   
 If the prosecutor has weaker diminishing returns in trial expenditure than the defendant, 
then the trial conviction model predicts that the probability of trial conviction increases in the ex 
ante expected trial sentence, .  In addition, as Cohen (1992) and others hypothesize,  rises 
in the dollar value of commerce involved in the conspiracy.  Thus, the finding that the mean 
value of COMMERCE is higher in the sample of litigated cases that end in conviction supports 
the trial conviction model’s predictions. 
TS TS
 The finding that the mean value of VAR DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1, which 
represents the mean-preserving spread factor λ , is lower in the sample of litigated cases that end 
in conviction is interesting.  In terms of the litigation model, this finding suggests that the 
observed litigated cases were relatively “close.”  That is, the trial conviction model predicts that 
the probability of trial conviction increases with λ  only under the assumption that, when 
choosing their optimal levels of trial expenditure, both litigants think that their respective 
chances of winning are sufficiently close (e.g., the common ex ante expected probability of trial 
is numerically close to 50 percent).  “Sufficiently close” is determined by the shape of the 
probability distribution function for trial outcomes.  Starting from a probability of trial 
conviction close to 50 percent, an increase in the mean-preserving spread factor, λ , decreases 
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the probability of trial conviction and increases the probability of trial conviction when the 
starting point is sufficiently near the tail of the probability distribution.93
 Judicial discretion at trial may play a role in trial outcomes.  Consider the finding that the 
mean of PRIOR PROSECUTOR is higher in the sample of cases disposed by trial conviction 
than in the sample of litigated cases that do not end in conviction.  This finding suggests that 
judges who previously worked as government prosecutors tend to favor prosecutors’ trial 
arguments over defendants’ arguments and use their discretionary influence over a trial to benefit 
the prosecutors.   
 
Same-Branch Means Tests of the Case Selection, Trial Selection,  
and Trial Conviction Selection Processes 
 
This section reports additional types of two-sample means tests that test with specificity 
(and for the first time) the theoretical implications of the model of the prosecutor’s case selection 
decision, and with more specificity, the defendant’s plea decision and the judge’s or jury’s 
decision to convict (or acquit) at trial.  Unlike the previously reported means tests, these tests 
focus on the predicted relationships among the values of case characteristics in five samples of 
observed cases created by the prosecutor’s case selection decision, the defendant’s plea decision, 
and the judge’s (or jury’s) decision to convict (or not) at trial.  The selection processes 
represented by those decisions imply different mixes of the relative values of various pairs of 
case characteristics, as discussed in Chapters VI, VII, and VIII. 
The following five sets of means tests are designed to capture selection “adjustments” 
observed in the mix of the relative values of various pairs of characteristics in the five observed 
samples of defendants created as cases are disposed..  Those samples represent defendants in 
cases that are i) initiated by the prosecutor (n = 3093); ii) initiated and proceed to trial (n = 601); 
iii) initiated and do not proceed to trial (n = 2492); iv) initiated, go to trial, and end in conviction 
(n = 132); or v) initiated, go to trial, and do not end in conviction (n = 469).  The game tree 
diagram in Figure 3 shows which selection process – the prosecutor’s case-bringing decision, the 
                                                 
93  Meanwhile, an increase in the mean-preserving spread factor, λ , increases the probability of trial 
conviction when the starting point is sufficiently near either tail of the probability distribution of trial conviction 
outcomes. 
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defendant’s plea choice, or the judge’s or jury’s trial conviction decision – produces the five 
samples used in these means tests.   
The following means tests involve fourteen variables that represent the case 
characteristics featured in the theoretical framework.  While the means tests identify statistical 
significance, the tests employ binary variables that mitigate, if not eliminate, the potential for 
misleading results caused by observations with outlier values for certain variables. 94  The 
following list groups these fourteen variables by the associated case characteristic. 
 
Prosecutor’s trial cost (C ) 
HIGH DOJBUDGET 
HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500 
 
Defendant’s trial cost ( K ) 
ONLY LOW RANK 
HIGH PROFIT 
HIGH COMPENSATION 
ZERO OTHER INDICT (also related to the amount or strength of evidence,e ) 
 
Amount or strength of evidence (e ) 
ZERO PREV CONVICT  
HIGH DURATION 
HIGH COMMERCE (also related to the expected trial sentence, ) TS
MULTI COUNTS CONVICT 
 MULTI COUNTS INDICT  
 
Trial sentence ( TS ) 
POST-APPA INDICT YEAR 
                                                 
94  The newly created binary variables were not used in the previous means tests because there was already a 
clear-cut method of dividing the samples for the previous means tests using the defendant’s decision to go to trial (or 
not) and the judge’s or jury’s decision to convict at trial (or not).  In these tests, dummy variables had to be created 
in order to create two samples based on the relative values of a continuous variable representing a case 
characteristic. 
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 Probability of trial conviction ( Πˆ ) 
BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX (also related to the idiosyncratic component of the prosecutor’s ex 
ante expected probability of trial, ρ ) 
 
Idiosyncratic component of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial ( ρ )
HIGH DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1 
 
 In order to avoid redundancy, the means tests use each possible pair of relevant variables 
only once.  All fourteen of the above variables are relevant as factors that directly influence 
indictment and plea decisions, thus creating ninety-one (91) individual means tests (i.e., 13 pairs 
+ 12 pairs + 11 pairs  + 2 pairs + 1 pair = 91 possible pairs of the fourteen variables used for 
91 means tests).  The means tests associated with the trial stage of case disposition do not use the 
variable HIGH DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1 because 
⋅⋅⋅
ρ  does not directly influence the 
probability of trial conviction in the specification of the litigation model.  Thus, only thirteen of 
the variables listed above are relevant as factors that directly influence trial conviction decisions, 
which creates seventy-eight (78) means tests (i.e., 12 pairs + 11 pairs ⋅⋅⋅  + 2 pairs + 1 pair = 78 
possible pairs of the thirteen variables used for 78 means tests). 
The results of the individual means tests fall into three categories: i) statistically 
significant and consistent with theoretical predictions; ii) statistically significant and inconsistent 
with the theoretical expectations; and iii) statistically insignificant.  In order to be categorized as 
consistent with the predictions of the theoretical models of the case selection, trial selection, and 
trial conviction processes, the results of the following means test must be consistent with the 
predicted relationships among pairs of variables representing case characteristics summarized 
previously in Tables 4, 6, and 8, respectively.  For convenience, those tables are shown below. 
Reporting the results of up to ninety-one (91) two-sample means tests is undesirable and 
unnecessary.  It is instructive, however, to examine samples of the additional means tests 
conducted to test the theoretical predictions of the models of the case selection, trial selection, 
and trial conviction processes.  The results of some illustrative means tests are reported later. 
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Tests of the case selection process 
 
 Data for potential federal criminal antitrust cases that prosecutors decided not to pursue 
are unavailable.  Thus, it is not possible to test the difference in the means of the value of the 
same case characteristic in the sample of defendants in initiated cases versus the sample of 
potential defendants in uninitiated cases (as done in the first type of means tests of the 
implications of the plea and trial conviction decisions reported previously).   
 Despite the lack of data for uninitiated cases, another approach to testing the implications 
of the case selection model is possible.  The alternative approach uses data exclusively from the 
sample of 3093 defendants in initiated cases and tests the implications for the relationships of 
values of case characteristics in cases the prosecutor decides to initiate.  Specifically, the 
alternative approach tests the difference in the means of one empirical variable representing one 
case characteristic across samples created by the binary values of a different empirical variable 
representing either the same case characteristic95 or a different case characteristic.   
For example, the case selection model predicts the following combinations of case 
characteristics, in terms of the case characteristics’ relative values, in initiated cases: (relatively 
high value of e , relatively low value of C), (relatively high value of e , relatively high value of 
C), and (relatively low value of , relatively low value of C).  One way to state the rationale for 
those expected combinations of  and C is that, ceteris paribus, the prosecutor will not initiate a 
case with relatively weak evidence, e , when her unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, C, is 
relatively high (because of a low DOJ budget).   
e
e
Accordingly, one means test examines the difference in the mean of HIGH COMMERCE 
in observed initiated cases in which HIGH DOJBUDGET = 1 and the mean of HIGH 
COMMERCE in observed initiated cases in which HIGH DOJBUDGET = 0.  That is, the means 
test examines whether the prosecutor’s evidence, e , is relatively strong (e.g., HIGH 
COMMERCE = 1) or weak (e.g., HIGH COMMERCE = 0) in initiated cases in which the 
prosecutor’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, C, is relatively high (e.g., HIGH 
DOJBUDGET = 0) or low (e.g., HIGH DOJBUDGET = 1).   
                                                 
95  Recall that within the set of empirical variables used in this study, sometimes different empirical variables 
represent the same case characteristic.  For example, ONLY LOW RANK, HIGH PROFIT, HIGH COMPENSATION, 
and ZERO OTHER INDICT represent the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, K. 
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Table 4 summarizes the predicted relationships among the relative values of different 
pairs of case characteristics in the sample of indicted defendants (i.e., defendants in cases that 
prosecutors initiate).  (Table 4 first appeared in Chapter VI.)   
 
 
Table 4. Pairs of relative values of case characteristics in initiated cases and their 
consistency with the predictions of the case selection model 
 
 High 
 Πˆ
Low 
 Πˆ
High 
 C
Low 
 C
High 
K  
Low 
K  
High 
 TS
Low 
 TS
High 
 e
Low 
 e
High ρ  Low ρ  
High 
 Πˆ
C*            
Low 
 Πˆ
C* I*           
High 
 C
C I I*          
Low 
 C
C C C* C*         
High 
K  
C C C C C*        
Low 
K  
C I I C C* I*       
High 
 TS
C C C C C C C*      
Low 
 TS
C I I C C I C* I*     
High 
 e
C C C C C C C C C*    
Low 
 e
C I I C C I C I C* I*   
High ρ  C C C C C C C C C C C*  
Low ρ  C I I C C I C I C I C* I* 
 
*  As explained in Chapter X, different empirical variables can represent the same theoretical variable. Thus, 
combinations of relatively high and low values of the same theoretical variable represented by more than 
one empirical variable is possible for a given empirical observation.  Pairs that are consistent with case 
selection model are denoted with “C” and pairs that are inconsistent are denoted with “I”.  Horizontal axis 
provides the possible relative values of first case characteristic in a possible pair.  Vertical axis provides the 
possible relative values of second case characteristic in a possible pair. 
To understand Table 4, as it relates to the following means tests, it is useful first to 
understand what relationships among the relative values of different pairs of case characteristics 
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in an initiated case the model of the prosecutor’s case selection process does not predict.  For 
example, suppose an initiated case is characterized by relatively high values of the prosecutor’s 
unit cost of trial expenditure, C , which is represented empirically by a value of zero (0) for the 
dummy variable HIGH DOJBUDGET.96  This empirical variable represents the level of the DOJ 
Antitrust Division’s annual budget relative to the total sample (n = 3093) mean value of the 
variable DOJBUDGET.97  Ceteris paribus, a relatively high value of C  is expected to be 
associated with a relatively low value of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of inititating a 
case, .  Thus, ceteris paribus, a relatively high value of C  is not expected to characterize an 
initiated case unless the initiated case is further characterized, for example, by a relatively high 
value of the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, K, and/or a relatively high value of the 
amount or strength of the prosecutor’s evidence, e, and/or a relatively high value of the ex ante 
expected trial sentence, .   
( )VE
TS
In this situation (i.e., HIGH DOJBUDGET = 0), the model of the prosecutor’s case 
selection process does not predict that this initiated case also would be characterized by values of 
other case characteristics that are expected to further reduce ( )VE .  In this situation, relative 
values of other case characteristics not predicted by the model of the prosecutor’s case selection 
process include relatively low values of the defendant’s unit trial cost, K  (e.g., HIGH PROFIT = 
1); the level of the prosecutor’s evidence, e (e.g., HIGH DURATION = 0); the parties’ common 
expected trial sentence,  (e.g., POST-APPA INDICT YEAR = 0); the parties’ common ex ante 
expected probability of trial conviction, 
TS
Πˆ  (e.g., BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX = 0); or the 
idiosyncratic component, ρ , of the prosecutor’s expected probability of trial conviction (e.g., 
HIGH DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1 = 0).   
Continuing the preceding example, if an initiated case is characterized by relatively high 
values of  (e.g., HIGH DOJBUDGET = 0), then observed relatively high values of C K  (e.g., 
                                                 
96  The DOJ Antitrust Division’s budgets are determined prosectively by Congressional appropriations.  Lower 
budgets imply higher opportunity costs from going to trial.  Thus, the value of C is inversely related to 
DOJBUDGET and HIGH DOJBUDGET.  Similarly, the defendant’s unit trial cost, K, is inversely related to the 
level of profits and employee compensation for the industry affiliated with the defendant, represented by PROFIT 
and COMPENSATION, respectively.  Other empirical variables that represent C and K (e.g., ANNUAL 
FORTUNE500 and ONLY LOW) are positively related to C and K.  After considering the trade-offs in terms of ease 
of understanding, the empirical variables were coded according to the values of the empirical variables and not their 
associated theoretical variables.  
97  All of the dummy variables that were created especially for these additional means tests in order to capture 
relatively high (and low) values of case characteristics use the overall sample (n =3093) mean value as the 
benchmark. 
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HIGH PROFIT = 0), e (e.g., HIGH DURATION = 1),  (e.g., POST-APPA INDICT YEAR = 1), 
 (e.g., BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX = 1), or 
TS
Πˆ ρ  (e.g., HIGH DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1 
= 1) in such an initiated case would support the predictions of the model of the prosecutor’s case 
selection process.  Meanwhile, if an initiated case is characterized instead by relatively low 
values of  (e.g., HIGH DOJBUDGET = 1), then observed relatively high or low values of C K  
(e.g., HIGH PROFIT = 0 or 1), e (e.g., HIGH DURATION = 0 or 1),  (e.g., POST-APPA 
INDICT YEAR = 0 or 1),  (e.g., BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX = 0 or 1), or 
TS
Πˆ ρ  (e.g., HIGH DOJ 
WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1 = 0 or 1) in such an initiated cases also would support the 
predictions of the model of the prosecutor’s case selection process.   
In general, the combinations found in the sample of initiated cases that are consistent 
with the case selection model can be stated in terms of the prosecutor’s value of bringing a case, 
E(V): (low value of E(V), high value of E(V)), (high value of E(V), low value of E(V)), and 
(high value of E(V), high value of E(V)).  The combination (low value of E(V), low value of 
E(V)) is inconsistent with the case selection model.  Table 12 reports the statistically significant 
results of illustrative two-sample means tests of the implications of the model of the prosecutor’s 
case selection process summarized in Table 4.   
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Table 12. Sample same-branch means tests of indictment as a selection process 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample Means 
Tests 
Evidence of Expected Case Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by the Model of the 
Prosecutor’s Case Selection Process 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Case 
Selection 
Model 
 High C,  ∆E(V) > 0 
Low C,  
∆E(V) < 0 
Low C,  
∆E(V) > 0 
High C,  
∆E(V) < 0 
ttest HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)*   1 1 
ttest ONLY LOW RANK, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 0** 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN PREV 
YEAR BY VIOL#1,  by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 
  1 1 
     
TOTALS 6 6 6 6 
 
* The variable HIGH DOJBUDGET, which represents the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C, pairs with 
other variables in the tests reported here.   
 
** “0” denotes statistically insignificant results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically significant 
results. 
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A two-sample means test will always suggest the combination (high value of C, low 
value of K) or, more generally, (low value of E(V), low value of E(V)) when it suggests the 
combination (low value of C, high value of K) or, more generally, (high value of E(V), high 
value of E(V)).  Thus, in the sample of defendants in initiated cases, the percentage of 
combinations that are consistent with the case selection model’s predictions cannot fall below 50 
percent and cannot exceed 100 percent of the combinations of pairs of variables the statistically 
significant means test results support.   
As shown in Table 12, a full 75 percent of the combinations that the statistically 
significant means test results support are consistent with the predictions of the case selection 
model.  For example, in the sample of 3093 defendants in initiated cases, when HIGH 
DOJBUDGET = 1,  HIGH PROFIT = 1.  This combination implies that in cases that are 
initiated, when the defendant’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expendicture, K, is low, the 
prosecutor’s (opportunity) unit cost of trial expenditure, C , is low. 
Although 50 percent marks the minimum of the range of the percentage of potential 
statistically significant combinations, 50 percent does not imply zero support for the case 
selection model.  For example, the prosecutor could tolerate the combination (high value of C, 
low value of K) and initiate a case if the prosecutor sufficiently highly values another 
combination (or other combinations) of relative values of characteristics of the case.  In that 
situation, 50 percent could imply support for model.   
The case selection model’s implications apply to both the sample of initiated cases and 
the sample of uninitiated cases.  Ideally, this study would apply the means tests to both samples.  
This is not possible because data are not available for the sample of uninitiated cases.  Of course, 
if the sample of uninitiated cases were available and the means tests were applied to that 
(hypothetical) sample of uninitiated cases, the results of the means tests applied to the 
(hypothetical) sample of uninitiated cases might add to or detract from the support provided by 
the means tests applied to the available sample of initiated cases.   
It is reasonable for the unavailability of uninitiated case data to condition reliance on the 
results of the means tests of the implications of the case selection model.  On the other hand, it is 
reasonable to expect that prosecutors non-randomly select cases to initiate.  Thus, data 
limitations should not necessarily prevent attempts to use available information to assess 
observed case selection effects that are potentially important determinants of observed case 
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outcomes – especially when no other study directly tests the implications of prosecutors’ case 
selection decisions.   
As reported in Appendix E, the results of the rest of the ninety-one (91) two-sample 
means tests are comparable to the results reported in Table 12.  Specifically, 105 combinations 
corresponding to statistically significant results support the case selection model, while 37 
statistically significant combinations are inconsistent with the predictions of the case selection 
model.  Statistically insignificant results produce the remaining 40 combinations.  Of the 
combinations corresponding to statistically significant results, 74 percent support the case 
selection model.   
These ninety-one (91) two-sample means test results suggest that theoretical or empirical 
analyses of the determinants of federal criminal antitrust case outcomes (i.e., plea decisions, trial 
verdicts, and sentencing decisions) should not ignore the prosecutor’s case selection process or 
treat it as a random selection process.  These results also suggest that the case selection model 
developed in this study reasonably captures the process by which DOJ Antitrust Division 
prosecutors decided to initiate federal criminal antitrust cases against 3093 defendants from 1956 
through 1980.   
 
Tests of the trial selection process 
 
 The previous type of two-sample means tests of the implications of the model of the 
defendant’s plea decision tested the difference in the mean values of the same empirical variable 
representing a particular case characteristic across two samples of cases: the sample of cases that 
go to trial (i.e., “litigated cases”) and the sample of cases that do not go to trial (i.e. “non-
litigated cases”).  That is, the means tests reported previously focused on the relative values of 
the same empirical variable representing a particular case characteristic across game tree 
branches stemming from the node at which the defendant chooses whether to go to trial or to 
avoid trial by entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.  The mixed results of those tests 
provided limited support for the model of the defendant’s plea decision (i.e., trial selection 
process). 
The following tests represent a different approach to testing the implications of the trial 
selection model.  The tests examine the respective relative values of pairs of empirical variables, 
 151
representing either the same or different case characteristics, in the same sample of cases: first in 
the sample of litigated cases, and next in the sample of non-litigated cases.  That is, there is one 
distinct set of tests for each sample. 
In other words, the tests focus on the respective relative values of pairs of empirical 
variables along the same branch emanating from the node at which the defendant chooses 
whether to go to trial or to avoid trial by entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.  The tests 
are not the same as comparing, in a single test, values of empirical variables across game tree 
branches stemming from the node at which the defendant chooses whether to go to trial or to 
avoid trial, as was done previously.   
Specifically, the tests use the sample of 601 defendants in litigated cases as well as the 
sample of 2492 defendants in non-litigated cases.  The tests compare the difference in the mean 
values of one empirical variable representing one case characteristic across samples created by 
the binary values of another variable representing either the same case characteristic or a 
different case characteristic.   
For example, the trial selection model predicts the following combinations of case 
characteristics, in terms of the case characteristics’ relative values, in litigated cases: (relatively 
high value of , relatively low value of K), (relatively high value of , relatively high value 
of K), and (relatively low value of , relatively low value of K).  One way to state the rationale 
for those expected combinations of  and K is that, ceteris paribus, the defendant will not go to 
trial when the stakes of the case, as measured by the expected trial sentence,  is low, if his 
unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, K, is relatively high.   
TS TS
TS
TS
TS
Thus, one means test uses the sample of litigated cases and examines the difference in the 
mean of HIGH COMMERCE when HIGH PROFIT = 1 and the mean of HIGH COMMERCE 
when HIGH PROFIT = 0.  That is, the means test examines whether the expected trial sentence, 
, is relatively high (e.g., HIGH COMMERCE = 1) or low (e.g., HIGH COMMERCE = 0) in 
litigated cases in which the (corporate) defendant’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, 
K, is relatively high (e.g., HIGH PROFIT = 0) or low (e.g., HIGH PROFIT = 1).   
TS
Table 6 was introduced and explained in Chapter VII.  Table 6 summarizes the predicted 
relationships among the relative values of different pairs of case characteristics in the sample of 
defendants in cases that go to trial as well as the sample of defendants in cases that end in a plea 
of guilty or nolo contendere.   
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Table 6. Pairs of relative values of case characteristics in cases that go to trial and their 
consistency with the predictions of the trial selection model 
 
 
 High C  Low C  High K  Low K  High 
 TS
Low  TS High ρ  Low ρ  
High C  I*        
Low C  C* C*       
High 
K  
I C I*      
Low K  C C C* C*     
High 
 TS
C C C C C*    
Low 
 TS
I C I C C* I*   
High ρ  C C C C C C C*  
Low ρ  I C I C C I C* I* 
 
*  As explained in Chapter X, different empirical variables can represent the same theoretical variable. Thus, 
combinations of relatively high and low values of the same theoretical variable represented by more than 
one empirical variable is possible for a given empirical observation.  Pairs that are consistent with plea 
bargaining model are denoted with “C” and pairs that are inconsistent are denoted with “I”.  Horizontal axis 
provides the possible relative values of first case characteristic in a possible pair.  Vertical axis provides the 
possible relative values of second case characteristic in a possible pair. 
 
 
To understand Table 6, as it relates to the following means tests, it is useful to first 
understand what relationships among the relative values of different pairs of case characteristics 
in a case that goes to trial are not predicted by the model of the defendant’s plea decision (i.e., 
trial selection) process.  For example, suppose a case that goes to trial is characterized by a 
relatively high value of the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C , which is represented 
empirically by a value of zero (0) for the dummy variable HIGH DOJBUDGET.  Ceteris 
paribus, a case that goes to trial is not expected to have a relatively high value of C .   
In this situation (i.e., HIGH DOJBUDGET = 0), the model of the defendant’s plea 
decision (i.e., trial selection) process does not predict that the case that goes to trial also would 
be characterized by values of other case characteristics that are expected to further reduce Θ~ .  In 
this situation, relative values of other case characteristics not predicted by the model of the 
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defendant’s trial selection process include relatively high values of the defendant’s unit trial cost, 
K  (e.g., HIGH PROFIT = 0); or relatively low values of the parties’ common expected trial 
sentence,  (e.g., POST-APPA INDICT YEAR = 0); or the idiosyncratic component, TS ρ , of the 
prosecutor’s expected probability of trial conviction (e.g., HIGH DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1 = 0).   
Continuing the preceding example, if a case that goes to trial is characterized by a 
relatively low value of  (e.g., HIGH DOJBUDGET = 1), then observed relatively high values 
of  (e.g., POST-APPA INDICT YEAR = 1) or 
C
TS ρ  (e.g., HIGH DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1 = 1), or relatively low values of K  (e.g., HIGH PROFIT = 1) in such a case would 
support the predictions of the model of the defendant’s trial selection process.  Meanwhile, if a 
case that goes to trial is characterized instead by a relatively low value of C  (e.g., HIGH 
DOJBUDGET = 1), then observed relatively high or low values of K  (e.g., HIGH PROFIT = 0 
or 1), e (e.g., HIGH DURATION = 0 or 1),  (e.g., POST-APPA INDICT YEAR = 0 or 1), or TS ρ  
(e.g., HIGH DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1 = 0 or 1) in such a case that goes to trial also 
would be consistent with the predictions of the model of the defendant’s trial selection process.   
In general, the combinations found in the sample of defendants who choose to go to trial 
that are consistent with the trial selection model can be stated in terms of the relative value of the 
ex post probability of trial, Θ~ .  The combinations consistent with the trial selection model’s 
predictions are:: (low value of Θ~ , high value of Θ~ ), (high value of Θ~ , low value of Θ~ ), and 
(high value of Θ~ , high value of Θ~ ).  The combination (low value of Θ~ , low value of Θ~ ) is 
inconsistent with the trial selection model.  Table 13 reports the statistically significant results of 
illustrative two-sample means tests of the implications of the model of the defendant’s trial 
selection process summarized in Table 6.   
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Table 13. Sample same-branch means tests of the defendant’s plea decision as a selection 
process 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample Means 
Tests 
 Evidence of Expected Trial Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by Trial Selection 
Model 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Selection 
Model 
 
High C,  
∆ Θ~ > 0 
Low C, 
∆ Θ~ < 0 
Low C, 
∆ Θ~ > 0 
High C,  
∆ Θ~ < 0 
ttest HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)*   1 1 
ttest ONLY LOW RANK, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 0** 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 0 0 0 0 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)***   1 (p<0.15) 1 (p<0.15) 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET)***   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET)***   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)*** 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)*** 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN PREV 
YEAR BY VIOL#1,  by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 
  1 1 
     
TOTALS 2 2 9 9 
 
* The variable HIGH DOJBUDGET, which represents the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C, pairs 
with other variables in the tests reported here.   
** “0” denotes statistically insignificant results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically significant 
results.  
*** Assume that, ceteris paribus, more or better evidence, e, increases ρ  and/or and ΘTS ~ . 
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As Table 13 shows, 13 of the 22 combinations corresponding to statistically significant 
means test results are consistent with the predictions of the trial selection model.  As reported in 
Appendix F, the results of the rest of the ninety-one (91) two-sample means tests using data 
associated with 601 defendants in litigated cases lend somewhat more support to the trial 
selection model than the results reported in Table 13.   
Specifically, 84 (or 68 percent) of the 124 combinations suggested by the statistically 
significant test results support the trial selection model, while 40 statistically significant 
combinations are inconsistent with the predictions of the case selection model.  Statistically 
insignificant results produce the remaining 58 combinations.   
Appendix G reports the results for ninety-one (91) means tests conducted using data 
associated with 2492 defendants in non-litigated cases.  Recall from Chapter VII that if the 
combinations that are inconsistent with the predictions of the model of the defendant’s trial 
selection process for the sample of cases that go to trial are observed in the sample of cases that 
do not go to trial, then those observed combinations in the sample of cases that do not go to trial 
provide support for the predictions of the trial selection model.  That is, if a combination of case 
characteristic values is not conducive for a defendant choosing to go to trial, then that 
combination is conducive for a defendant choosing not to go to trial.  Thus, all (statistically 
significant) observed combinations of case characteristic values in the sample of initiated cases 
can be used to test the implications of the trial selection model.    
The results of the means tests using the sample of non-litigated cases provide more 
support for the trial selection model than the tests using the sample of litigated cases.  Of the 146 
combinations corresponding to statistically significant test results, 45 (or 31 percent) support the 
trial selection model, while 101combinations contradict the trial selection model.  The remaining 
36 combinations correspond to statistically insignificant test results.   
Determining the total support for the model from these means tests requires some 
explanation and calculations.  A means test always will suggest (high value of C, high value of 
K) or, more generally, (low value of Θ~ , low value of Θ~ ) when it suggests (low value of C, low 
value of K) or, more generally, (high value of Θ~ , high value of Θ~ ).  Thus, in the sample of 
defendants who choose to go to trial, the percentage of statistically significant combinations 
consistent with the trial selection model cannot fall below 50 percent and cannot exceed 100 
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percent of the statistically significant combinations of pairs of variables that the means tests 
produce. 
Similarly, a means test always will suggest (low value of C, low value of K) or, more 
generally, (high value of Θ~ , high value of Θ~ ) when it suggests (high value of C, high value of 
K) or, more generally, (low value of Θ~ , low value of Θ~ ).  Thus, using the sample of defendants 
who choose not to go to trial, the percentage of statistically significant combinations consistent 
with the trial selection model cannot fall below zero percent and cannot exceed 50 percent of the 
statistically significant combinations of pairs of variables that the means tests produce.   
Given that the first test produced 124 statistically significant combinations and the second 
test produced 146, the results of the first and second sets of means tests should be weighted by 
0.46 (= 124/270) and 0.54, respectively.  Thus, 50 percent (= 46 * (68-50)/50 + 54 * (31/50)) of 
the combinations corresponding to statistically significant results are consistent with the trial 
selection model’s predictions. 
On balance, these two-sample means test results suggest that theoretical or empirical 
analyses of the determinants of trial verdicts and sentencing outcomes in federal criminal 
antitrust cases should not treat the trial selection process as a random process.  These results also 
suggest that the trial selection model reasonably captures the process by which 3093 defendants 
chose to go to trial or to avoid trial in federal criminal antitrust cases initiated from 1956 through 
1980.   
At the same time, the divergence of support provided by tests using the sample of 
defendants in litigated cases versus the sample of defendants in non-litigated cases merits further 
consideration.  The larger (relevant) percentage of statistically significant results supporting the 
theory using the sample of defendants in non-litigated cases is striking.   
These results suggest at least two possibilities.  First, the determinants of the defendant’s 
decision to go to trial might differ systematically from the determinants of his decision to avoid 
trial by pleading guilty or nolo contendere.98  Second, but related to the first possibility, it is 
                                                 
98  One reason for this suspicion is the differences in the implications of pleading not guilty, guilty, or nolo 
contendere.  As the statistics reported by Gallo et al. (2000) make clear, nolo contendere pleas are quite popular in 
federal criminal antitrust cases.  The popularity of the nolo contendere plea stems from the defendant’s expected 
financial exposure to follow-on civil suits for treble damages following a nolo contendere plea.  While a plea of nolo 
contendere is a conviction, it does not provide prima facia evidence of a criminal violation in a follow-on civil suit 
and it forces plaintiffs to prove the violation.  Moreover, proving a violation in follow-on civil suits can be costly for 
potential plaintiffs.  For example, between the time of the disposition of the criminal case and the beginning of the 
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quite plausible that corporate defendants and white-collar individual defendants, as well as their 
(presumably) expert attorneys likely base decisions or advice on entered pleas on considerations 
not easily captured by the empirical variables created from available data.  For example, the 
defendant’s risk cost from going to trial (possibly based in part on his attorney’s assessment) 
could be a case characteristic that drives his plea decision.  Since the defendant’s risk cost from 
going to trial includes potential damage to his professional or personal reputation, it is a very 
difficult case characteristic to measure empirically. 
 
Tests of the trial conviction selection process 
 
 The results of the first type of two-sample means tests of the implications of the model of 
the judge’s (or jury’s) decision to convict the defendant at trial were presented earlier.  Those 
means tests tested the difference in the mean values of the same empirical variable representing a 
particular case characteristic across two samples: the sample of litigated cases that end in 
conviction and the sample of litigated cases that do not end in conviction.  In other words, the 
previous means tests focused on the relative values of the same empirical variable across game 
tree branches stemming from the trial node at which the judge or jury decides whether to convict 
the defendant or not convict the defendant.  Those tests’ mixed results provided reasonable 
support for the model of the judicial trial conviction process.  
 The following tests represent a different approach to testing the implications of the trial 
conviction model.  The tests examine the respective relative values of pairs of empirical 
variables, representing either the same or different case characteristics, in the same sample of 
cases: first in the sample of litigated cases that end in conviction, and next in the sample of 
litigated cases that do not end in conviction.  That is, there is one distinct set of tests for each 
sample.   
In other words, the tests focus on the respective relative values of pairs of empirical 
variables along the same branch emanating from the node at which the judge or jury decides 
whether to convict the defendant at trial.  These tests are not the same as comparing values of 
empirical variables across game tree branches in a single test, as was done previously.  
                                                                                                                                                             
follow-on civil case, the defendant could bolster his defense strategy or introduce new facts or facts that he 
otherwise did not reveal during the criminal case.  Thus, nolo contedere pleas can deter follow-on civil suits or at 
least reduce the probability of follow-on civil suits in which plaintiffs win. 
 158
Specifically, the tests use the sample of 132 defendants in litigated cases that end in 
conviction as well as the sample of 469 defendants in litigated cases that do not end in 
conviction.  The tests compare the difference in the mean values of one empirical variable 
representing one case characteristic across samples created by the binary values of another 
variable representing the same case characteristic or a different case characteristic.   
For example, the trial conviction model predicts the following combinations of case 
characteristics, in terms of the case characteristics’ relative values, in litigated cases that end in 
conviction: (relatively low value of C, relatively high value of K), (relatively low value of C, 
relatively low value of K), and (relatively high value of C, relatively high value of K).  One way 
to state the rationale for those expected combinations of C and K is that, ceteris paribus, the 
judge will not convict the defendant when the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, K, is 
relatively low, if the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C, is relatively high.   
Thus, one means test uses the sample of litigated cases that end in conviction and 
examines the difference in the mean of HIGH DOJBUDGET when HIGH PROFIT = 1 and the 
mean of HIGH DOJBUDGET when HIGH PROFIT = 0.  That is, the means test examines 
whether the prosecutor’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, C, is relatively high (e.g., 
HIGH DOJBUDGET = 0) or low (e.g., HIGH DOJBUDGET = 1) in litigated cases that end in 
conviction in which the (corporate) defendant’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, K, is 
relatively high (e.g., HIGH PROFIT = 0) or low (e.g., HIGH PROFIT = 1).   
Table 8 was introduced and explained in Chapter VIII.  Table 8 summarizes the predicted 
relationships among the relative values of different pairs of case characteristics in the sample of 
defendants in cases that end in trial conviction as well as the sample of defendants in cases that 
end in acquittal, dismissal, or directed verdict.   
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Table 8. Pairs of relative values of case characteristics in cases that end in trial conviction and 
their consistency with the predictions of the trial conviction model 
 
 High C  Low C  High K  Low K  High 
 TS
Low  TS High e  Low  e
High C  I*        
Low C  C* C*       
High 
K  
C C C*      
Low K  I C C* I*     
High 
 TS
C C C C C*    
Low 
 TS
I C C I C* I*   
High  e C C C C C C C*  
Low  e I C C I C I C* I* 
 
*  As explained in Chapter X, different empirical variables can represent the same theoretical variable. Thus, 
combinations of relatively high and low values of the same theoretical variable represented by more than 
one empirical variable is possible for a given empirical observation.  Pairs that are consistent with plea 
bargaining model are denoted with “C” and pairs that are inconsistent are denoted with “I”.  Horizontal axis 
provides the possible relative values of first case characteristic in a possible pair.  Vertical axis provides the 
possible relative values of second case characteristic in a possible pair. 
 
 
Table 8 summarizes the predicted relationships among the relative values of different 
pairs of case characteristics in cases that go to trial.  To understand Table 8 it is useful to first 
understand what relationships among the relative values of different pairs of case characteristics 
in a litigated case that ends in trial conviction are not predicted by the trial conviction model.   
For example, suppose a litigated case that ends in trial conviction is characterized by a 
relatively high value of the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C , which is represented 
empirically by a value of zero (0) for the dummy variable HIGH DOJBUDGET. Ceteris paribus, 
a litigated case that ends in trial conviction is not expected to be associated with a relatively high 
value of C , since  is expected to negatively directly affect the ex post probability of trial 
conviction, 
C
Π~ .   
In that situation, the model of the judge’s trial conviction decision rule (i.e., trial 
conviction process) does not predict that the case that ends in a trial conviction also would be 
characterized by values of other case characteristics that are expected to further reduce Π~ .  In 
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this situation, relative values of other case characteristics not predicted by the model of the trial 
conviction process include relatively low values of the defendant’s unit trial cost, K  (e.g., HIGH 
PROFIT = 1); the parties’ common expected trial sentence, ; (assuming the prosecutor has 
weaker diminishing returns in trial expenditure than the defendant) (e.g., POST-APPA INDICT 
YEAR = 0), or the amount or strength of the prosecutor’s evidence, e (e.g., HIGH DURATION = 
0).   
TS
Continuing the preceding example, if a case that is disposed by trial conviction is 
characterized by a relatively high value of , then observed relatively high values of  (e.g., 
POST-APPA INDICT YEAR = 1), e (e.g., HIGH DURATION = 1), or 
C TS
K  (e.g., HIGH PROFIT = 
0) in such a case would be consistent with the predictions of the model of the judge’s trial 
conviction decision rule.  Meanwhile, if a case that ends in trial conviction is characterized 
instead by a relatively low value of  (e.g., HIGH DOJBUDGET = 1), then observed relatively 
high or low values of 
C
K  (e.g., HIGH PROFIT = 0 or 1),  (e.g., POST-APPA INDICT YEAR = 
0 or 1), or e (e.g., HIGH DURATION = 0 or 1) in such a case would be consistent with the 
predictions of the model of the trial conviction decision rule.   
TS
In general, the combinations found in the sample of defendants who are convicted at trial 
that are consistent with the trial conviction model’s predictions can be stated in terms of the ex 
post probability of trial conviction, Π~ , as follows: (low value of Π~ , high value of Π~ ), (high 
value of Π~ , low value of Π~ ), and (high value of Π~ , high value of Π~ ).  The combination (low 
value of Π~ , low value of Π~ ) is inconsistent with the trial conviction model’s predictions.  Table 
14 reports the statistically significant results of illustrative two-sample means tests of the 
implications of the model of the judicial trial conviction rule summarized in Table 8. 
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Table 14. Sample same-branch means tests of the trial conviction decision as a selection process 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Trial Conviction 
“Adjustment” Predicted by the Model of the 
Judge’s or Jury’s Trial Conviction Decision 
Rule 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Conviction 
Model 
 
High C,     
∆ Π~ > 0 
Low C,      
∆ Π~ < 0 
Low C, 
∆ Π~ > 0 
High C, 
∆ Π~ < 0 
ttest HIGH ANNUAL 
FORTUNE500, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET)* 
  1 1 
ttest ONLY LOW RANK, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 0** 0 0 0 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION,*** 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, *** 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT, 
***  by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT, 
***  by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
     
TOTALS 3 3 6 6 
 
* The variable HIGH DOJBUDGET, which represents the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C, pairs 
with other variables in the tests reported here.   
** “0” denotes statistically insignificant results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically significant 
results.  
*** Assume that, ceteris paribus, more evidence, e, increases the value of Π~ . 
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Of the 18 statistically significant combinations associated with the results reported in 
Table 14, 12 (or 67 percent) support the trial conviction model.  As reported in Appendix H, the 
results of the rest of the 78 tests using data associated with 132 defendants in litigated cases 
disposed by conviction are comparable to the results reported in Table 14.   
In fact, 53 (or 72 percent) of the 74 combinations corresponding to statistically significant 
results support the trial conviction model, while 21 combinations corresponding to statistically 
significant results are inconsistent with the predictions of the trial conviction model.  A large 
number, 82, of test results using data from the set of defendants convicted at trial are statistically 
insignificant, however.   
Appendix I reports the results for an additional 78 means tests conducted using data 
associated with 469 defendants in litigated cases not disposed by conviction.  As explained in 
Chapter VIII, if the combinations that are inconsistent with the predictions of the model of the 
judicial trial conviction decision for the sample of cases that are disposed by trial conviction are 
observed in the sample of cases that go to trial but do not end in trial conviction, then those 
observed combinations in the sample of cases that go to trial but do not end in trial conviction 
provide support for the predictions of the model of the judicial trial conviction decision.   
That is, if a combination of case characteristic values is not conducive for a judge 
convicting a defendant at trial, then that combination is conducive for a judge acquitting that 
defendant at trial (or dismissing the case or issuing a directed verdict).  Thus, all (statistically 
significant) observed combinations of case characteristic values in the sample of litigated cases 
can be used to test the implications of the trial conviction model. 
In general, the combination found in the sample of defendants who go to trial but are not 
convicted that is consistent with the trial conviction model’s predictions can be stated in terms of 
the ex post probability of trial conviction, Π~ , as follows: (low value of Π~ , low value of Π~ ).  
The combinations (low value of Π~ , high value of Π~ ), (high value of Π~ , low value of Π~ ), and 
(high value of Π~ , high value of Π~ ) are inconsistent with the trial conviction model’s 
predictions.   
The results of the means tests using the sample of defendants in litigated cases that are 
not disposed by trial conviction provide more empirical support for the trial conviction model.  
Of the 100 combinations suggested by statistically significant results, 28 support the trial 
conviction model.  Statistically insignificant results suggested 56 combinations.   
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Determining the total support for the model from these means tests requires some 
explanation and calculations.  A means test always will suggest (high value of C, low value of K) 
or, more generally, (low value of Π~ , low value of Π~ ), when it suggests (low value of C, high 
value of K) or, more generally, (high value of Π~ , high value of Π~ ).  Thus, using the sample of 
defendants convicted at trial, the percentage of statistically significant combinations that are 
consistent with the trial conviction model cannot fall below 50 percent and cannot exceed 100 
percent of the statistically significant combinations of pairs of variables that the means tests 
report.  The reported results should be judged accordingly. 
Similarly, a means test always will suggests the combination (low value of C, high value 
of K) or, more generally, (high value of Π~ , high value of Π~ ) when it suggests (high value of C, 
low value of K) or, more generally, (low value of Π~ , low value of Π~ ).  Thus, using the sample 
of defendants who went to trial but were not convicted, the percentage of combinations 
consistent with the trial conviction model’s predictions cannot fall below zero percent and cannot 
exceed 50 percent of the statistically significant combinations of pairs of variables that the means 
tests produce.  The reported results should be judged accordingly. 
Given that the first test of the trial conviction model produced 74 statistically significant 
combinations and the second test produced 100, the results of the first and second sets of means 
tests should be weighted by 0.43 (= 74/174) and 0.57, respectively.  Thus, over half – about 51 
percent (= 43 * (72-50)/50 + 57 * (28/50)) – of the combinations associated with statistically 
significant results support the trial conviction model. 
Notwithstanding the number of statistically insignificant means test results, these test 
results suggest that theoretical or empirical analyses of the determinants of federal criminal 
antitrust trial sentencing outcomes should not treat the trial selection process as a random 
process.  These results also suggest that this study’s model of the judicial trial conviction 
decision reasonably captures the process by which judges or juries delivered trial verdicts in 
federal criminal antitrust cases initiated from 1956 through 1980.   
The theoretical model of the judicial trial conviction decision makes reasonable use of the 
range of factors that determine a trial verdict.  These tests employ a range of empirical variables 
related to the theoretical factors.  Thus, the test results suggest that the trial conviction model 
stands as a reasonable characterization of the non-random process by which a judge or jury 
decides to convict a defendant at trial.    
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Still, some intuitively appealing factors are difficult to represent theoretically or 
empirically.  Such factors include the credibility of the witnesses or their performances on the 
witness stand, since credibility does not ensure persuasiveness in favor of the desired litigant.  
Such factors also include the comparative or absolute strengths of the attorneys’ preparations for 
trial or performances at trial; as well as the political, social, or moral persuasions of the jury 
and/or judge.  Given the potential influence of such factors, neither the number of statistically 
significant results nor the limited amount of model support they provide is surprising.  
 
Regression Analysis 
 
As explained in Chapters VI, VII, and VIII, the theoretical models of the ex post 
probabilities of trial and trial conviction, as well as sentences imposed after trial conviction 
produce ambiguous predictions regarding the total marginal effects of marginal increases in the 
values of case characteristics.  That is because of the predicted influence of indirect selection 
effects produced by the prosecutor’s case selection process, the defendant’s trial selection 
process, and the process by which the judge or jury decides to convict the defendant at trial.  
Tables 3, 5, and 7, which appear below, summarize the predicted confounding influence of the 
indirect selection effects. 
This study estimates regression models of the probability of trial, the probability of trial 
conviction, as well as fines imposed after trial conviction.  Like Snyder (1990) and Cohen 
(1992), this study recognizes that trial selection effects are determinants of plea bargaining, trial, 
and sentencing outcomes.  As Snyder (1990) and Cohen (1992) note, when estimating models of 
case outcomes, it is important to recognize the sequential nature of the case disposition process.   
For example, plea decisions determine the sample of cases that go to trial, which implies 
that plea decisions may not randomly determine the set of defendants that go to trial.  This 
implies that the set of defendants that go to trial is a biased representation of the set of indicted 
defendants.  Thus, observed changes in the trial conviction rate can be due to the change in the 
distribution of defendants who go to trial from the distribution of indicted defendants.  In this 
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way, trial selection bias can confound the interpretations of estimates of the effects of other 
factors (e.g., behavior of litigants or judges, institutional changes in antitrust enforcement).99
Following Heckman’s (1979) method, this study uses the estimated model of the 
probability of trial to estimate an inverse Mills ratio for all observations used in the regression 
models of the probability of trial conviction and fines imposed following trial convictions.  An 
inverse Mills ratio associated with the probability of trial is an explanatory variable in the 
regression models of trial and sentencing outcomes.  Likewise, the specification of the regression 
model of fines imposed after trial convictions includes an inverse Mills ratio associated with the 
probability of trial conviction. 
Because data regarding uninitiated cases are unavailable, this study does not estimate a 
regression model of prosecutors’ decisions to initiate cases.  In other words, the unavailability of 
uninitiated case data renders this study’s regression models unable to identify case selection 
effects.  Thus, the estimated regression coefficients for the explanatory variables representing 
case characteristics are estimates of the combined (first- and second-order) direct and indirect 
case selection effects on the ex post probabilities of trial and trial conviction from marginal 
increases in the values of case characteristics.100   
Such data limitations do not prevent the regression analysis to examine the implications 
of trial selection effects and trial conviction selection effects.  For example, calculations 
involving estimated regression coefficients provide the estimated trial selection effects on the ex 
post probability of trial conviction from marginal increases in the values of case characteristics.   
With these estimated trial selection effects and other regression estimates, the regression 
analysis complements the previous means tests in assessing the implications of the trial selection 
model and trial conviction model.  In general, the regression analysis supports the importance of 
                                                 
99  With respect to another consideration in regression analysis, Cohen (1992) and Snyder (1989, 1990) note 
the potential for heteroskedasticity because defendants in the same case likely do not constitute independent 
observations.  They control for heteroskedasticity by clustering observations with similar types of defendants 
(individual or corporate) who make similar plea choices in the same case.  This aggregation approach sacrifices a 
significant amount of information. 
 The regression models in this study control for heteroskedasticity using the “cluster” option in the statistics 
computer program Stata.  Observations used in the regressions are “clustered” by the Commerce Clearing House 
case number.  This approach yields robust standard errors, as suggested by White (1980, 1982).  This approach is 
similar to the approach for controlling for heteroskedasticity used in Siegfried and Sapper (1994). 
100  In other words, the estimated coefficients in this study’s regression models represent the (first- and second-
order) direct effects of marginal increases in the values of case characteristics conditioned by prosecutors’ decisions 
to indict the observed defendants (i.e., initiate the observed cases).  
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trial selection and trial conviction selection as determinants of federal criminal antitrust case 
outcomes. 
Meanwhile, this study depends wholly on the regression models of the probabilities of 
trial and trial conviction to conduct tests for the existence and possessor of private (or better) 
information during plea bargaining in federal criminal antitrust cases.  As highlighted in the 
literature review in Chapter II, the criminal antitrust literature ignores (or does not explicitly 
address) the issue of how private information in plea bargaining could alter the trial selection 
process and create (additional) bias in observed case outcomes.  This is a significant omission 
given the policy implications of private information during plea bargaining.   
Privately informed prosecutors harm social welfare because they can fashion a settlement 
offer that induces (truly) innocent defendants to plead guilty or nolo contendere.  Such pleas 
send false signals about legal and socially efficient business conduct.  In contrast, privately 
informed defendants during plea bargaining benefit social welfare because the (truly) guilty ones 
are more likely to plead guilty and send the correct signals about appropriate business conduct.   
This study’s regression-based tests for private information during plea negotiations use 
the signs of the estimated coefficients for explanatory variables that do not represent the case 
characeristics used in the theoretical framework.  Those explanatory variables represent the 
passage of time, the occurance of landmark antitrust court decisions, and the inverse Mills ratio 
(or Heckman’s lambda) that controls for the estimated probability that the observed defendant 
would go to trial. 101   
The use of the estimated coefficients of those explanatory variables for testing the 
information structure of plea bargaining are described in Chapter IX.  These tests produce mixed 
evidence regarding the information structure of plea bargaining.  Some of the tests suggest that 
during plea bargaining the observed defendants possessed private (or better) information 
regarding their chances at trial, some of the tests suggest that the prosecutors held private 
information, and some tests suggest that neither litigant was privately informed. 
 
                                                 
101  The overall trial conviction rate for the sample of defendants that go to trial also will be used to test the 
information structure of plea bargaining.  This test is also discussed in Chapter IX. 
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Probit model of the observed trial rate 
 
As explained in Chapter VI (and by reference, Appendix A), the theoretical model of the 
ex post probability of trial produces ambiguous predictions for the total marginal effects on the 
ex post probability of trial from marginal increases in the values of case characteristics.  That 
occurs because of the predicted confounding influence of second-order direct effects and indirect 
selection effects produced by the prosecutor’s case selection process, as shown in Table 3 from 
Chapter VI.   
 
 
Table 3. Signs of expected direct and indirect effects on the observed trial rate, Θ~  
 
 
Expected Net 
Second-Order 
Direct “Trial 
Expenditure” 
Effect on Θ~ * 
Expected Net 
Second-Order 
Direct “Stakes” 
Effect on Θ~ * 
Case 
Characteristic 
Expected 
First-
Order 
Direct 
Effect on 
Θ~  When 
Π≥Πˆ  
When 
Π<Πˆ  
When 
Π≥Πˆ  
When 
Π<Πˆ  
Expected 
Indirect  
Case 
Selection 
Effect on 
Θ~  
Expected 
Total 
(Net) 
Effect on 
Θ~  
Πˆ ** 0 0 0 ? ? 
C  - ? + - ? ? ? 
K  - + ? ? + ? ? 
TS ** + - 0 ? ? 
e  0 + - ? ? ? 
λ  0 ? ? ? ? ρ  + 0 0 ? ? 
 
* As discussed above and, in detail, in Appendix A,.these second-order direct effects involve movements in both 
litigants’ optimal levels of trial expenditure, sometimes in the same direction but sometimes in opposite 
directions.  Hence the “net” reference.   
** The marginal increases in  and  are from exogenous shocks. Πˆ TS
 
 
Table 15 provides the coefficients – not the marginal effects – estimated by a probit 
regression model of the defendant’s decision to enter either a plea of not guilty (TRIAL = 1) and 
go to trial, or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (TRIAL = 0).  This probit model uses data 
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regarding 3093 defendants associated with 411 federal criminal antitrust cases initiated from 
1956 through 1980.   
 
 
Table 15. Probit model of the ex post probability of trial 
 
Dependent variable: TRIAL                   
Explanatory Variables 
Sign of the 
Expected 
First-Order 
Direct 
Effect 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error†
Z P > |z| 
Constant + 2.478745 2.428912 1.02 0.307 
INDICT YEAR ? -.0496947 .0486459 -1.02 0.307 
LANDMARK ? -.1627714** .081754 -1.99 0.046 
DOJBUDGET + -.0000156 .0001117 -0.14 0.889 
%CRIMINAL ? -.5892453 .9331985 -0.63 0.528 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500 - .0098087 .0089952 1.09 0.276 
REPUB PRES INDICT 
YEAR ? .2753818 .2035389 1.35 0.176 
#CODEFEND ? -.0197135 .0141426 -1.39 0.163 
#CORP CODEFEND + .0500579 .0311249 1.61 0.108 
ONLY INDIV DEFEND - .4634297 * .2486836 1.86 0.062 
ANY LOW RANK - .1200737 .0932485 1.29 0.198 
#OTHER INDICT - -.1131335 ** .0470123 -2.41 0.016 
#PREV CONVICT + .0375383 .0410079 0.92 0.360 
PROFIT + .0001367 *** .0000509 2.69 0.007 
COMPENSATION + -.0000277 *** 9.61e-06 -2.88 0.004 
DURATION + .0014363 .015017 0.10 0.924 
COMMERCE + -6.24e-07 5.94e-07 -1.05 0.294 
# COUNTS INDICT + -.02146 .1698846 -0.13 0.899 
ANY BID RIG + .0210531 .4535056 0.05 0.963 
BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX + .7357755 ** .3613693 2.04 0.042 
PRICE FIX NOT BID RIG ? .27898 .4153695 0.67 0.502 
CONSUMER VIC ? .2437632 .1971788 1.24 0.216 
 
† Standard error adjusted for 411 clusters of Commerce Clearinghouse-defined cases. 
* 0.10 level of signficance. 
** 0.05 level of significance. 
*** 0.01 level of significance. 
 169
Table 15, continued 
 
Dependent variable: TRIAL                   
Explanatory Variables 
Sign of the 
Expected 
First-Order 
Direct Effect 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error†
Z P > |z| 
DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1 + -.0160364 .0112504 -1.43 0.154 
(DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1)2 ? .0002253 * .0001268 1.78 0.076 
POST-APPA INDICT YEAR + .7429855 * .4026015 1.85 0.065 
 
Regression Statistics 
N 3093 
Wald  (25) 2χ 58.88 
Prob >  2χ 0.0001 
Log pseudolikelihood -1334.8585 
Pseudo R2 0.1236 
 
† Standard error adjusted for 411 clusters of Commerce Clearinghouse-defined cases. 
* 0.10 level of signficance. 
** 0.05 level of significance. 
*** 0.01 level of significance. 
 
 
As shown in Table 15, the estimated coefficients for several explanatory variables 
representing theoretical model variables are statistically significant.  Table 16 provides the 
estimated marginal effects on the ex post probability of trial from marginal increases in the 
values of the explanatory variables that had statistically significant estimated coefficients in the 
probit regression model reported in Table 15.   
Because we cannot observe the set of potential cases that the prosecutor chooses not to 
pursue, the regression model summarized in Table 15 also does not identify indirect case 
selection effects on the ex post probability of trial from marginal increases in the explanatory 
variables representing case characteristics.  Thus, the marginal effects reported in Table 16 are 
conditional on prosecutors initiating the observed cases.  That is, the marginal effects reported in 
Table 16 include direct and case selection effects.  
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Table 16. Estimated marginal direct effects on the ex post probability of trial, conditional on 
prosecutors initiating the observed cases 
 
Dependent Variable (y): Pr(TRIAL) 
Mean Value of Pr(TRIAL) = 0.16219994 
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Sign of 
the 
Expected 
First-
Order 
Direct 
Effect 
Estimated 
Marginal 
Effect 
(dy/dx) 
Standard 
Error Z P>|z| 
Mean Value 
of 
Explanatory 
Variable (x) 
LANDMARK ? -.0399587 .02042 -1.96 0.050 3.28449 
ONLY INDIV 
DEFEND* - .137314 .0851 1.61 0.107 .027481 
#OTHER INDICT - -.0277731 .01162 -2.39 0.017 .383123 
PROFIT + .0000336 .00001 2.66 0.008 2806.85 
COMPENSATION + -6.80e-06 .00000 -2.88 0.004 15782.1 
BID RIG NOT 
PRICE FIX* + .2260117 .12944 1.75 0.081 .121888 
(DOJ WIN PREV 
YEAR BY VIOL#1)2 ? .0000553 .00003 1.79 0.074 1710.16 
POST-APPA 
INDICT YEAR* + .2092021 .12634 1.66 0.098 .28516 
 
* Estimated marginal effect (dy/dx) is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
 
 
 According to the estimates reported in Table 16, the probability of trial fell by 0.040 
percent with increases in the average number of Supreme Court decisions in the presidential 
administration prior to the observed year that three law treatises cited by Gallo et al. (2000) 
consider “landmark” decisions (LANDMARK).  The implications of this finding and others 
regarding the information structure of plea bargaining in the observed cases are discussed later.   
If the defendants in a case are only individual defendants (ONLY INDIV DEFEND), then 
the probability of trial increases by 0.137 percent, ceteris paribus.  This is contrary to the 
predicted negative first-order direct effect of an increase in the defedant’s unit cost of trial 
expenditure (K). 
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Ceteris paribus, the probability of trial in the observed case is 0.028 percent lower for 
every other indictment in another case that the observed defendant faces in the year of the 
observed case (#OTHER INDICT).  It is reasonable to expect the defendant’s unit cost of trial 
expenditure (K) to increase with the number of legal disputes in which he is involved.  This 
finding is therefore consistent with the predicted negative first-order direct effect on the 
probability of trial from an increase in the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure. 
Ceteris paribus, every additional thousand dollars (in real dollars, 1967 = 100) in the 
profit level (PROFIT) and total employee compensation level (COMPENSATION) of the 
industry with which the defendant is associated raised and lowered by trace amounts the 
probability of trial, respectively.  The defendant’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure is 
expected to fall with increases in these variables.  Thus, the former finding is consistent, while 
the latter finding is inconsistent, with the predicted positive first-order direct effects on the 
probability of trial from a decrease in the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure. 
The probability that defendants charged with big-rigging but not price-fixing (BID RIG 
NOT PRICE FIX) would plead not guilty is 0.226 percent higher than it is for defendants not 
charged with bid-rigging, ceteris paribus.  As previously discussed, Snyder (1989) explains that 
bid-rigging cases are relatively easy to prosecute successfully.  Thus, in cases that involve bid-
rigging but not price-fixing charges, the idiosyncratic component, ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex ante 
expected probability of trial conviction is expected to be relatively high.  This finding is 
consistent with the predicted positive first-order direct effect on the probability of trial from an 
increase in ρ .  
The trial conviction rate in the previous observed year for cases involving the same 
charge as the first charge in the indictment of the observed defendant (DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1), which is positively related to ρ , had a statistically insignificant effect on the 
probability that the observed defendant would plead not guilty.  The square of that variable, 
however, had a positive but de minimus impact on the probability of trial, however.  This finding 
regarding the squared term could be construed as consistent with the predicted positive first-
order direct effect on the probability of trial from an increase in ρ .  The theory does not specify 
whether the marginal effect on the observed trial rate from a change in the value of ρ  – whether 
the change in ρ  is positive or negative – is expected to be increasing or decreasing.      
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Finally, the probability that defendants indicted in years following the passage of the 
Antitrust Policy and Procedures Act of 1974 (POST-APPA INDICT YEAR) would go to trial is 
0.209 percent higher than the probability of trial is for defendants indicted before the passage of 
the Act.  To the extent that the passage of the Act induced defendants to expect judges to impose 
harsher penalties, increases in this explanatory variable capture increases in the value of the ex 
ante expected penalty imposed after trial conviction, .  This finding is thus consistent with the 
predicted positive first-order direct effect on the probability of trial from increases in . 
TS
TS
These estimated marginal (total) direct effects of increases in the values of case 
characteristics on the probability of trial have only purely descriptive value in this study.  As 
previously explained, the estimated regression coefficients for the explanatory variables 
representing case characteristics are not readily useful, if at all, to test the predicted total 
marginal effects of changes in the values of case characteristics on the ex post probability of trial.   
That is because, as previously mentioned, the estimated regression coefficients do not 
identify the second-order direct trial expenditure or stakes effects.  Nor do the estimated 
coefficients identify indirect case selection effects on the ex post probability of trial from 
marginal increases in the explanatory variables representing case characteristics.  Further 
discussion of the estimated marginal effects for variables representing case characteristics is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
 
Probit model of the observed trial conviction rate 
 
As explained in Chapter VII, the theoretical model of the ex post probability of trial 
conviction produces ambiguous predictions for the total marginal effects on the ex post 
probability of trial from marginal increases in the values of case characteristics.  That is because 
of the predicted confounding influence of indirect selection effects produced by the prosecutor’s 
case selection process and the defendant’s decision whether to go to trial or avoid trial, as shown 
in Table 5 from Chapter VII.   
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Table 5. Signs of expected direct and indirect effects on the observed trial conviction  
rate, Π~  
 
 
Case 
Characteristic 
Expected 
Direct Effect 
on Π~ * 
Expected Indirect  
Case Selection 
Effect on Π~  
Expected Indirect  
Trial Selection 
Effect on Π~  
Expected Total 
(Net) Effect on 
Π~  
Πˆ ** + ? 0 ? 
C  - + ? ? 
K  + ? + ? 
TS ** + ? ? ? 
e  + ? ? ? 
λ  ? ? 0 ? ρ  0 ? ? ? 
 
* The expected direct effects include first- and second-order effects, as explained in Appendix A.   
** The marginal increase in  and  are from exogenous shocks. Πˆ TS
 
 
Table 17 reports the coefficients – not the marginal effects – estimated by probit 
regression models of the judge’s or jury’s decision to convict the defendant at trial (TRIAL 
CONVICTION = 1), or not to convict at trial (TRIAL CONVICTION = 0) through an acquittal, 
directed verdict, or dismissal.  This probit model uses data regarding 128 federal criminal 
antitrust cases in which 601 defendants chose to go to trial.   
The specification of the ex post probability of trial conviction tracks closely to the 
specification of the model of the ex post probability of trial, but the models differ in a few ways.  
The probit model of the probability of trial conviction controls for trial selection by including the 
explanatory variable MILLS TRIAL.  This variable represents the inverse Mills ratio associated 
with the probability of trial, as estimated by the plea model reported in Table 15.  That is, this 
variable represents the “Heckman’s lambda” associated with the trial selection process that 
produces the sample of defendants included in the trial model specification.   
For identification, the model of the probability of trial conviction includes two other 
explanatory variables not included in the probability of trial model and omits two variables that 
were included in the latter model.  The other new variables are VAR DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1 and the squared term, (VAR DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1)2.  These variables 
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representλ , the variance of the previous observed year’s trial conviction rate in cases involving 
the same violation in the first charge of the indictment.   
The variable DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1 and its square, (DOJ WIN PREV YEAR 
BY VIOL#1)2, which were included in the model of the ex post probability of trial are omitted in 
the specification of the model of the ex post probability of trial conviction.  These variables 
relate to the idiosyncratic element, ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex ante probability of trial conviction.  
According to the theory, ρ , is not expected to directly affect the ex post probability of trial 
conviction.   
Further, identification of the model of the observed probability of trial conviction is on 
firmer ground by excluding DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1 and (DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1)2.  The information provided by those variables is not totally lost, however, since those 
variables influence the estimate of the inverse Mills ratio controlling for the probability of trial.  
The statistical significance of the estimated coefficient for (DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1)2 
in the probit model of the probability of trial suggests successful identification of the selection 
model of the probability of trial conviction reported in Table 17. 
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Table 17. Probit model of the ex post probability of trial conviction 
 
Dependent variable: TRIAL CONVICTION              
Explanatory Variables 
Sign of the 
Expected 
Direct 
Effect 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error†
z P > |z| 
Constant ? .6889495 4.870969   0.14   0.888   
INDICT YEAR ? -.039796 .1283927   -0.31   0.757   
LANDMARK ? -.0941648 .2088911   -0.45   0.652   
DOJBUDGET + -.0001638 .0003552   -0.46   0.645   
%CRIMINAL ? .3679875  1.604738   0.23   0.819   
ANNUAL FORTUNE500 - -.0182584 .026341    -0.69   0.488   
REPUB PRES INDICT YEAR ? .389279 .764732    0.51   0.611   
#CODEFEND ? .0184174 .0299802   0.61   0.539   
#CORP CODEFEND - -.1015646  .0672765   -1.51   0.131   
ONLY INDIV DEFEND + 1.098368 * .6260658   1.75   0.079   
ANY LOW RANK + -.6627685 ** .2926731   -2.26   0.024   
#OTHER INDICT + -.2327006 .1895925   -1.23   0.220   
#PREV CONVICT + -.107974 .2188513   -0.49   0.622   
PROFIT - .0000701 .0001354   0.52   0.605   
COMPENSATION - -.0000153 .0000268   -0.57   0.569   
DURATION + .0419429 .0283366   1.48   0.139   
COMMERCE + 2.59e-07 1.32e-06   0.20   0.845   
#COUNTS INDICT + -.1576443 .3277478 -0.48 0.631 
ANY BID RIG + -1.879359 ** .8865568 -2.12 0.034 
BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX + 3.376874 *** 1.072895 3.15 0.002 
PRICE FIX NOT BID RIG ? -.3311841 .5816041 -0.57 0.569 
CONSUMER VIC ? 1.545526 *** .3993938 3.87 0.000 
VAR DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1 ? -.0188339 .060144 -0.31 0.754 
(VAR DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1)2 ? .0006211 .0019613 0.32 0.751 
POST-APPA INDICT YEAR + 1.082489 1.165289 0.93 0.353 
 
† Standard error adjusted for 128 clusters of Commerce Clearinghouse-defined cases. 
 
* 0.10 level of signficance. 
** 0.05 level of significance. 
*** 0.01 level of significance. 
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Table 17, continued 
 
Dependent variable: TRIAL CONVICTION              
Explanatory Variables 
Sign of the 
Expected Direct 
Effect 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error†
z P > |z| 
REPUB JUDGE ? .3612863 .2733146 1.32 0.186 
PRIOR PROSECUTOR ? .3080878 .2973616 1.04 0.300 
TENURE ? -.013631 .025368 -0.54 0.591 
MILLS TRIAL ? 1.948936 * 1.144289 1.70 0.089 
  
Regression Statistics  
N 601 
Wald  (26) 2χ 56.68 
Prob >  2χ 0.0011 
Log pseudolikelihood -219.62286 
Pseudo R2 0.3059 
 
 
† Standard error adjusted for 128 clusters of Commerce Clearinghouse-defined cases. 
* 0.10 level of signficance. 
** 0.05 level of significance. 
*** 0.01 level of significance. 
 
 
Table 17 shows that several explanatory variables representing theoretical model 
variables have statistically significant estimated regression coefficients.  Table 18 provides the 
estimated marginal effects on the ex post probability of trial conviction from marginal increases 
in the values of explanatory variables that had statistically significant estimated coefficients in 
the probit regression model reported in Table 17.  The estimates reported in Table 18 are 
conditional on prosecutors initiating the observed cases. 
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Table 18. Estimated marginal direct effects on the ex post probability of trial conviction, 
conditional on prosecutors initiating the observed cases  
 
Dependent Variable (y): Pr(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
Mean Value of Pr(TRIAL CONVICTION) = 0.12493958 
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Sign of 
Expected 
Direct 
Effect 
Estimated 
Marginal 
Effect 
(dy/dx) 
Standard 
Error Z P>|z| 
Mean Value of 
Explanatory 
Variable (x) 
ONLY INDIV 
DEFEND* + .3444573 .24135 1.43 0.154 .044925 
ANY LOW RANK* + -.1085118 .04095 -2.65 0.008 .206323 
ANY BID RIG* + -.2322762 .08083 -2.87 0.004 .231281 
BID RIG NOT 
PRICE FIX* + .9079712 .09602 9.46 0.000 .139767 
CONSUMER VIC* ? .4120851 .12126 3.40 0.001 .31614 
MILLS TRIAL ? .4010598 .23651 1.70 0.090 1.23755 
 
* Estimated marginal effect (dy/dx) is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
 
 
According to the estimates reported in Table 18, when the defendants in an observed case 
are all individuals (ONLY INDIV DEFEND), the probability of trial conviction is 0.344 percent 
higher than when not all the defendants are individuals, ceteris paribus.  This is finding is 
consistent with the predicted positive direct effect on the ex post probability of trial from an 
increase in the value of K. 
On the other hand, when any of the defendants in an observed case have low corporate 
rank (i.e., below the rank of president) and ANY LOW RANK = 1, ceteris paribus, the probability 
of trial conviction is 0.109 percent lower than when none of the defendants are low ranking.  The 
expected direct effect on the ex post probability of trial conviction from an increase in K is 
positive.  Since lower-ranking defendants’ unit costs of trial expenditure are presumably higher 
than high-ranking defendants’ unit costs of trial expenditure, this finding contradicts the 
theoretical prediction.102  
                                                 
102  This finding might suggest that prosecutors are motivated to convict higher ranking defendants and put 
forth better efforts at trial when prosecuting higher ranking defendants. 
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When the observed defendant faces any bid-rigging charge (ANY BID RIG), the observed 
trial conviction rate is 0.232 percent lower than when the defendant does not face any such 
charge.  Prosecutors are more likely to prosecute bid-rigging cases with more success than other 
types of cases, as suggested by Snyder (1989), because bid-rigging cases produce more or 
stronger evidence than other types of cases.  This finding is inconsistent with direct effect 
expectations.   
When the observed defendant is charged with big-rigging but not price-fixing (BID RIG 
NOT PRICE FIX), however, the observed trial conviction rate is 0.908 percent higher than it is 
when the observed defendant is not charged with bid-rigging, ceteris paribus.  This finding is 
consistent with the expected direct effect of more or stronger evidence on the observed trial 
conviction rate. 
In addition, when the victim of the antitrust crime is a consumer or group of consumers 
(CONSUMER VIC), ceteris paribus, the probability of trial conviction is 0.412 percent higher 
than when the victim is a firm, a competitor, or the government.  For purposes of positive 
analysis of observed applications of law, this is an interesting empirical finding.  Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act does not distinguish between the antitrust crimes committed against different types 
of victims.  That suggests that the probability of trial conviction should not necessarily depend 
on the type of victim.  Hypotheses regarding reasons for this finding or normative considerations 
regarding this finding are beyond the scope of this study. 
As mentioned previously, the estimated regression coefficients and estimated marginal 
effects derived from the regression results do not identify indirect case selection effects from 
increases in the values of the explanatory variables that represent case characteristics.  While the 
reported results are useful for positive analysis of federal criminal antitrust enforcement, those 
involving explanatory variables that represent case characteristics are not useful for testing all of 
the implications of the model of the ex post probability of trial conviction.   
Notwithstanding that caveat, with every percentage increase in the estimated probability 
that the observed defendant would go to trial (MILLS TRIAL), the ex post probability of trial 
conviction is 0.475 percent higher, ceteris paribus.  This finding has implications regarding the 
information structure of plea bargaining, as discussed later.   
Here it is worth noting that the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient for 
MILLS TRIAL supports the notion that increases in the marginal values of case characteristics 
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(that are also included in the probability of trial model) create indirect trial selection effects on 
the ex post probability of trial conviction.  In fact, the trial selection effects shape the Heckman’s 
lambda (or inverse Mills ratio), MILLS TRIAL.  Separating the estimated magnitudes of 
individual trial selection effects of specific case characteristics requires additional calculations, 
however. 
Along with the means test results presented earlier, this finding provides another reason 
why analysis of trial outcomes in federal criminal antitrust cases should not ignore potential 
indirect trial selection effects.  In fact, the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient for 
MILLS TRIAL may help explain the relatively weaker support the first type of means tests 
provided for the trial selection model103 compared to the support the first type of means tests 
provided for the trial conviction model.104   
As previously mentioned, the relatively weak support for the model of the defendant’s 
plea choice from the first type of means tests reported in Table 10 suggests that unobserved or 
unobservable factors not captured by this study’s empirical variables could be primary 
determinants of defendants’ plea choices.  Such unobserved or unobservable factors could 
incluce the defendant’s pre-trial assessment of the strength of his legal representation or the 
credibility of his best defense if he chooses to go to trial. 
It is therefore important to note that Heckman’s lambda associated with the probability of 
trial (MILLS TRIAL) controls for trial selection effects on the ex post probability of trial 
conviction created by observable factors (e.g. the probability of trial probit regressors) as well as 
unobservable factors that influence the error term of the probit model of the probability of trial.  
Thus, the combination of the weak support for the trial selection model provided by the first type 
of means tests reported in Table 10 and the statistical significance of the coefficient for MILLS 
TRIAL support the notion that unobserved or unobservable factors largely determine defendants’ 
decisions to go to trial. 
 
                                                 
103  See Table 10. 
104  See Table 10. 
 180
Estimates of indirect trial selection effects on the observed trial conviction rate 
 
The estimated coefficient for MILLS TRIAL identifies the effect of Heckman’s lambda, 
which is the expected value of the disturbance in the selection equation (here, going to trial) on 
the outcome (here, the trial outcome).  It is possible to calculate, from several inputs, the signs 
and estimated magnitudes of trial selection effects, which form Heckman’s lambda, on the 
observed trial conviction rate from marginal increases in the values of specific case 
characteristics.  The inputs are the estimated coefficient on MILLS TRIAL, the coefficients in the 
probit model of the observed trial rate, and the relationship between the estimated promit model 
index and the variable MILLS TRIAL.  All explanatory variables that appear in the probit model 
of the probability of trial have indirect effects on the trial outcome, including their effects on the 
observed probability of trial. 105
One input in the calculations, ( ) ( )Θ∂∂ ~ETRIALMILLS , where Θ~  is the ex post 
probability of trial, requires explanation.  Recall that MILLS TRIAL is Heckman’s lambda, 
conceptually the expected value of the disturbance in the probit model of the probability of trial 
given that the observed defendant actually goes to trial.  The mathematical definition of this 
variable is ( )( ) ( )( )ΘΦ−Θ= ~1~ EETRIALMILLS φ , where φ  is the standard normal probability 
distribution function (pdf) and  is the cumulative normal distribution function (cdf) evaluated 
at the mean of the data.  Accordingly, MILLS TRIAL is a single index function – that is, a 
function of a linear index of explanatory variables – and 
Φ
( ) ( )Θ∂∂ ~ETRIALMILLS  is a constant 
proportionality factor.   
As previously mentioned, 601 of the 3093 observed indicted defendants, or about 19.4 
percent of the indicted defendants, chose to go to trial.  When a probit model of defendants’ 
decision to go to trial is used, an observed trial rate of 19.4 percent implies ( )( )ΘΦ ~E  equals 
0.806.106  This, in turn, implies an average z-value in the data of 0.86124.  That is, the average z-
value (or the average index value) of 0.86124 is the value in the standard normal at which the 
                                                 
105  The variables need not have statistically significant coefficients in the probability of trial conviction model. 
106  Selection is based on the high end of the index (i.e., TRIAL = 1), so the 19.4 percent is at the high end. 
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80.6 percentile is found.  Thus, ( )( )Θ~Eφ  equals 0.275.  That is, 0.275 is the pdf value associated 
with a standard normal value (z) of 0.86124 and a cdf value of 0.806.107   
These three numbers (z = 0.86124, ( )( )Θ~Eφ  = 0.275, and ( )( )ΘΦ ~E  = 0.806) are used to 
compute the numerical estimate of the factor of proportionality linking the probit index, also 
Known as a propensity score, to Heckman’s lambda.  The first step of the computation is 
calculating the derivative of Heckman’s lambda with respect to the average z-value.  This 
derivative, which is a function of ( )( )ΘΦ ~E  and ( )( )Θ~Eφ , is defined as 
 
2
11
' ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
Φ−+Φ−=∂
∂ φφz
z
lambdasHeckman . 
 
The second step is to insert the values z = 0.86124, ( )( )Θ~Eφ  = 0.275, and ( )( )ΘΦ ~E  = 0.806.  The 
resulting numerical estimate of the factor of proportionality is 0.784.   
In sum, the indirect effect on the probability of trial conviction from a marginal increase 
in the value of an explanatory variable in the probit model of the probability of trial is the 
following: the explanatory variable’s estimated coefficient in the probit model of the probability 
of trial times the value of the derivative of Heckman’s lambda with respect to the average z-
value (here, 0.784) times the estimated coefficient on Heckman’s lambda (here, the value of the 
estimated coefficient on MILLS TRIAL, 0,401).  The last two parts of the calculation are the same 
for all explanatory variables in the probit model of the probability of trial.  The first part of the 
equation, the estimated coefficient from the probit model of the probability of trial, differs for 
each explanatory variable.108
                                                 
107  Note the calculation is in reverse: the cdf is observed, the z-value is inferred, then the pdf is calculated.  
Here, the z-value identifies the number of standard deviations above the mean the 80.6 percentile is located.  
108  The question of statistical significance arises here because more than just the probit model of the 
probability of trial is involved in calculating the estimated indirect trial selection effects on the observed probability 
of trial conviction from marginal changes in the values of case characteristics.  The calculation involves a non-linear 
transformation to Heckman’s lambda, which is represented by MILLS TRIAL, and the estimated coefficient on 
MILLS TRIAL in the probit model of the observed probability of trial conviction.  It follows that the estimated 
indirect trial selection effect of an explanatory variable can be statistically insignificant even if the estimated 
coefficient in the probit model of the probability of trial is statistically significant.   
 That concern reasonably applies only when the statistical significance of the relevant explanatory variables 
in the probit model of the probability of trial is marginal.  That is because the values of Heckman’s lambda (MILLS 
TRIAL) and thus the estimated coefficient on MILLS TRIAL in the probit model of the observed probability of trial 
conviction are based on more than 3,000 observations and apply equally to all explanatory variables in the probit 
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Table 19 shows the derivation of the estimated trial selection effects on the ex post 
probability of trial, Π~ , from marginal increases in the values of several case characteristics: the 
defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, K , as measured by ONLY INDIV DEFEND, #OTHER 
INDICT, PROFIT, and COMPENSATION; the idiosyncratic element, ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex 
ante expected probability of trial conviction, as measured by BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX; and the 
parties’ common ex ante expected trial sentence, , as measured by POST-APPA INDICT 
YEAR.   
TS
 
 
Table 19. Estimated trial selection effects on the ex post probability of trial conviction, 
conditional on prosecutors initiating the observed cases 
 
 (A) (B) (C) 
Explanatory Variable 
in the Probit Model 
of the Observed 
Probability of Trial 
Estimated 
Coefficients in 
the Probit 
Model of the 
Observed 
Probability of 
Trial* 
Calculated Factor of 
Proportionality Linking 
the Index of the Probit 
Model of the Probability 
of Trial to Heckman’s 
lambda associated with 
Probability of Trial 
(MILLS TRIAL) ** 
Estimated Coefficient for 
MILLS TRIAL in the 
Probit Model of the 
Observed Probability of 
Trial Conviction*** 
ONLY INDIV 
DEFEND 0.137314 0.784 0.4010598 
#OTHER INDICT -0.0277731 0.784 0.4010598 
PROFIT 0.0000336 0.784 0.4010598 
COMPENSATION -6.80e-06 0.784 0.4010598 
BID RIG NOT 
PRICE FIX 0.2260117 0.784 0.4010598 
POST-APPA 
INDICT YEAR 0.2092021 0.784 0.4010598 
 
*  Estimated marginal (total direct) effects on the ex post probability of trial reported in Table 16. 
**  Value obtained by inserting z = 0.86124, ( )( )Θ~Eφ  = 0.275, and ( )( )ΘΦ ~E  = 0.806, which are implied by 
the fraction of indicted defendants that chose to go to trial (601/3093), into the formula for the derivative of 
Heckman’s lambda with respect to the z-value of the data. 
***  Value reported in Table 18. 
                                                                                                                                                             
model of the probability of trial.  Of course, if the estimated coefficient on MILLS TRIAL in the probit model of the 
observed probability of trial conviction is statistically insignificant, then indirect trial selection effects is a moot 
issue. 
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Table 19, continued 
 
 (D) = (A) x (B) x (C)  
Explanatory Variable in the 
Probit Model of the Ex Post 
Probability of Trial 
Estimated Indirect Trial 
Selection Effect on the Ex Post 
Probability of Trial Conviction 
from a Marginal Increase in the 
Explanatory Variable in the 
Probit Model of the Ex Post 
Probability of Trial 
Expected Sign of  
the Indirect Trial 
Selection Effect on the Ex 
Post Probabiity of Trial 
Conviction from a 
Marginal Increase in the 
Explanatory Variable in 
the Probit Model of the 
Ex Post Probability of 
Trial **** 
ONLY INDIV DEFEND 0.043176 + 
#OTHER INDICT -0.00873 ? for e , + for K  
PROFIT 1.06E-05 - 
COMPENSATION -2.1E-06 - 
BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX 0.071065 ? 
POST-APPA INDICT YEAR 0.06578 ? 
 
**** Predicted signs reported in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 19 shows that the (trial) sample-selection probit model of the ex post probability of 
trial conviction provides mixed support for the predictions of the trial conviction model, 
nothwithstanding the ambiguity of the predicted signs for some indirect trial selection effects.  
These results, as well as the results of the other tests of the implications of the trial selection 
model nonetheless suggest that trial selection effects should not be ignored as determinants of 
observed federal criminal antitrust case outcomes. 
 
Ordinary least squares regression model of observed trial sentences 
 
As explained in Chapter VIII, the theoretical model of the ex post expected sentence 
following a trial conviction produces ambiguous predictions for the total marginal effects on the 
ex post expected trial sentence from marginal increases in the values of case characteristics.  That 
is because of the predicted confounding influence of indirect selection effects produced by the 
prosecutor’s case selection process, the defendant’s decision whether to go to trial or avoid trial, 
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and the judge’s or jury’s decision to convict the defendant at trial.  These direct and indirect 
effects are shown in Table 7 taken from Chapter VIII.   
 
 
Table 7. Signs of expected direct and indirect effects on the observed trial sentencing  
decision, TS~  
 
 
Expected Direct 
Effect on TS~ * 
Case 
Chara
cterist
ic 
When 
Π≥Πˆ
 
When 
Π<Πˆ
 
Expected 
Indirect  
Case 
Selectio
n Effect 
on TS~  
Expected 
Indirect  
Trial 
Selectio
n Effect 
on TS~  
Expected 
Indirect  
Trial 
Convicti
on 
Selectio
n Effect 
on TS~  
E
T
(
E
Πˆ ** 0 ? 0 ? ?
C  - ? + + + ?
K  + ? ? + ? ?
TS ** + ? ? ? ?
e  ? ? ? ? ?
λ  ? ? 0 ? ?ρ  0 ? ? 0 ?
 
* The expected direct effects include first- and second-order effects, as discussed in Appendix A.   
** The marginal increase in  and  are from exogenous shocks. Πˆ TS
 
 
Table 20 provides the estimated coefficients, which are also the marginal effects, 
estimated by OLS regression, of the determinants of the fine imposed by judges on defendants 
convicted at trial.  This regression uses data regarding 132 defendants convicted at trial in 43 
cases initiated from 1956 through 1980.   
The fine model specifications differ from the plea and trial model specifications in 
several ways.  The fine model specification replaces INDICT YEAR, which controls for the year 
of the indictment, with SENTENCE YEAR, which controls for the year of the observed sentence.  
The fine model also includes new variables that represent characteristics of sentencing judges, 
such as whether the judge and the President belonged to the same political party (PRES & 
JUDGE SAME PARTY SENTENCE YEAR), the judge’s tenure on the federal bench (TENURE), 
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and the judge’s workload in terms of the annual number of filings in his court (#FILINGS).  
Similarly, this model includes a variable that controls for the political party of the President 
during the sentencing year, REPUB PRES SENTENCE YEAR.  These variables control for 
judicial discretion in sentences, which could be politically motivated (especially as it relates 
judges’ motives to be promoted to a higher court). 
The fine model includes the variable MILLS TRIAL, which represents the inverse Mills 
ratio associated with the probability of trial as estimated using the plea model specification 
reported in Table 15.  This model also includes the variable MILLS TRIAL CONVICT, which 
represents the inverse Mills ratio associated with the probability of trial conviction.  The values 
of this variable are estimates calculated with the trial conviction model specification reported in 
Table 17.  These variables ensure proper identification and consistent estimates given the 
potential for sample selection bias created by the plea decision and the trial outcome. 
The model of fines imposed after trial conviction also omits the variable DOJ WIN PREV 
YEAR BY VIOL#1, which represents the previous observed year’s trial conviction rate in cases 
involving the same violation in the first charge of the indictment, VAR DOJ WIN PREV YEAR 
BY VIOL#1, which represents the variance of the previous observed year’s trial conviction rate in 
cases involving the same violation in the first charge of the indictment, and their squared terms.  
Identification of the model of the fines imposed following trial conviction is on firmer ground by 
excluding these terms.  The information provided by these omitted variables is not totally lost, 
however, since those variables influence the estimate of the inverse Mills ratios controlling for 
the probabilities of trial and trial conviction. 
Because the estimated coefficients for neither VAR DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1 
nor (VAR DOJ WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1)2 are statistically significant in the probit model of 
the observed trial conviction rate, the OLS selection model of fines imposed after trial conviction 
is not identified by omission of explanatory variables.  Nonetheless, the Heckman’s lambdas 
associated with the probabilities of trial and trial conviction identify the model non-linearly.   
If the non-linear idenfication is weak because of collinearity of explanatory variables, 
then large standard errors and no statistically significant estimated effects would result.  This is 
not the case here.  The OLS selection model of fines imposed after trial conviction contains 
several statistically significant predictors, which confirms successful non-linear identification. 
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Table 20. Ordinary least squares model of the fine imposed after trial conviction 
 
Dependent Variable = FINE 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Sign of the 
Expected First-
Order Direct 
Effect 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error†
T P > |t| 
Constant ? 1267.441 1992.148 0.64   0.528   
SENTENCE YEAR ? -22.70772 54.15703 -0.42   0.677 
LANDMARK ? -131.7301 ** 63.3963 -2.08   0.044   
DOJBUDGET ? -.12315 .1245212 -0.99 0.328 
%CRIMINAL ? -1139.185 ** 436.8057 -2.61 0.013 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500 ? -43.76564 ** 16.20524 -2.70 0.010 
REPUB PRES INDICT 
YEAR 
? 417.3306* 227.5169 1.83 0.074 
#CODEFEND ? 48.67149 ** 19.88925 2.45 0.019 
#CORP CODEFEND ? -150.1411 *** 53.65624 -2.80 0.008 
ONLY INDIV DEFEND ? 948.2954 *** 293.3048 3.23 0.002 
ANY LOW RANK ? -530.9433 ** 214.9137 -2.47 0.018 
#OTHER INDICT + -44.9275 100.285 -0.45 0.656 
#PREV CONVICT + 142.1528 143.0881 0.99 0.326 
PROFIT ? .0846083 ** .0254776 3.32 0.002 
COMPENSATION ? -.0083601 * .0046261 -1.81 0.078 
DURATION + 20.04302  12.54574 1.60 0.118 
COMMERCE + -.0002604 .0005453 -0.48 0.635 
 
† Standard error adjusted for 43 clusters of Commerce Clearinghouse-defined cases. 
* 0.10 level of signficance. 
** 0.05 level of significance. 
*** 0.01 level of significance. 
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Table 20, continued 
 
Dependent Variable = FINE 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Sign of the 
Expected 
First-Order 
Direct 
Effect 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error†
T P > |t| 
#COUNTS INDICT + -207.6047 124.5319 -1.67 0.103 
#COUNTS CONVICT + 183.3675 150.3582 1.22 0.229 
ANY BID RIG ? -2324.146 *** 705.1223 -3.30 0.002 
BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX ? 3150.505 *** 906.3422 3.48 0.001 
PRICE FIX NOT BID RIG ? -766.4474 *** 226.189 -3.39 0.002 
CONSUMER VIC ? 1177.95 *** 404.0791 2.92 0.006 
CASE TIME SPAN ? 51.12032 63.23025 0.81 0.423 
POST-APPA SENTENCE 
YEAR 
+ -146.532 215.7079 -0.68 0.501 
REPUB JUDGE ? 272.7474 ** 129.2187 2.11 0.041 
REPUB PRES SENTENCE 
YEAR 
? -697.4412 *** 246.4497 -2.83 0.007 
PRES & JUDGE SAME 
PARTY SENTENCE YEAR 
? -91.86725 91.80664 -1.00 0.323 
PRIOR PROSECUTOR ? 151.2172  98.07022 1.54 0.131 
TENURE ? 4.763831 7.008494 0.68 0.500 
#FILINGS ? .8391433 * .4242685 1.98 0.055 
MILLS TRIAL ? 1639.205 *** 461.33 3.55 0.001 
MILLS TRIAL CONVICT ? 1119.554 *** 363.9936 3.08 0.004 
 
† Standard error adjusted for 43 clusters of Commerce Clearinghouse-defined cases. 
* 0.10 level of signficance. 
** 0.05 level of significance. 
*** 0.01 level of significance. 
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Table 20, continued 
 
Dependent Variable = FINE 
 
Regression Statistics 
N 132 
F(32, 42) 31.34 
Prob > F 0.0000 
R-squared 
 
0.5351 
Root MSE 187.57 
 
 
 
As explained in Chapter VIII, the theoretical model of the ex post expected trial sentence, 
TS~ , depends largely on the theoretical model of the ex ante expected trial sentence, .  The 
theoretical model of , which is defined in Chapter V, is the least developed element of the 
theoretical framework of this study.  That is largely because judicial discretion is an important 
determinant of sentencing outcomes, especially during the pre-sentencing guidelines period 
covered by the dataset of federal criminal antitrust cases that this study employs.  The influence 
of case characteristics – other than  – on sentencing decisions made largely at the discretion 
of judges is extremely difficult to model theoretically.  This study does not attempt to model 
theoretically judicial discretion in judges’ sentencing decisions.   
TS
TS
TS
While this study does not attempt to model judicial discretion in sentencing, this study 
does treat the ex ante expected trial sentence, , as an endogenous variable that depends on 
factors that also influence the litigants’ chosen levels of trial expenditure and the ex ante 
probability of trial conviction, .  As summarized in Table 2 in Chapter V, the theoretical 
predictions regarding expected changes in  from changes in the values of case characteristics 
depend on the relative magnitudes of changes in the levels of litigants’ trial expenditures from 
changes in the values of case characteristics.  Those predictions also depend on whether the 
prosecutor or the defendant is the trial favorite and the degree that one litigant’s chances at trial 
exceed the other litigant’s chances.  A priori assumptions regarding these conditions are not 
easily defendable.   
TS
Πˆ
TS
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Thus, even ignoring the role of judicial discretion in sentencing, predicting the total, 
direct, and indirect marginal effects on observed sentencing decisions from changes in the values 
of case characteristics is extremely challenging.  Accordingly, as shown in Table 20, the 
theorectical predictions regarding the signs of the direct effects on the ex post expected trial 
sentence from marginal increases in the values of case characteristics – except those positively 
related to  – are ambiguous.  In light of these challenges and ambiguities, interpretations of 
some but not all of the estimated coefficients in the regression model of sentencing decisions 
following trial convictions are beyond the scope of this study.   
TS
Notwithstanding the challenges in predicting and interpreting the regression results 
reported in Table 20, several regression results are worth noting.  For example, the estimated 
coefficient for POST-APPA SENTENCE YEAR is statistically insignificant.  This finding differs 
from Cohen’s (1992) finding of a statistically significant positive influence of felony penalties 
(instead of misdemeanor penalties) on fines imposed on convicted corporations.  Differences in 
regression model specifications and data109 likely contribute to the differences in regression 
results.  The statistical insignificance of the estimated coefficient for POST-APPA SENTENCE 
YEAR suggests the importance of judicial discretion in (pre-sentencing guidelines) sentencing 
decisions in federal criminal antitrust cases.   
The estimated coefficients for judge-specific explanatory variables in this study’s 
regression model of fines imposed after trial conviction further support the importance of judicial 
discretion.  For example, Republican judges (REPUB JUDGE = 1) impose real fines after trial 
convictions that are more than $270,000 higher than Democrat judges, ceteris paribus.  In 
addition, when the president in the year that the fine is imposed is a Republican (REPUB PRES 
SENTENCE YEAR = 1), judges impose real fines that are nearly $700,000 lower than fines 
imposed when the president during the sentencing year is a Democrat.  Fines imposed after trial 
conviction do not change when the judge and president belong to the same political party, 
however, other factors held constant. 
The estimated coefficient for the explanatory variable representing the annual number of 
cases filed in the judge’s court (#FILINGS) suggests that, ceteris paribus, judges impose fines 
after trial convictions that rise by $1,000 (in real terms) for each filing in the judge’s court.  This 
                                                 
109  Cohen’s (1992) OLS regression model of imposed fines used different explanatory variables and employed 
data for corporate defendants convicted by pleas of guilty and nolo contendere as well as those convicted at trial.   
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supports Cohen’s (1992) hypothesis that judges “penalize” convicted defendants for using scarce 
court resources.   
Other regression results reported in Table 20 relate directly to a central focus of this study 
– the influence of trial selection effects and trial conviction selection effects on sentences 
imposed after trial conviction.  The estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables MILLS 
TRIAL and MILLS TRIAL CONVICT are statistically significant and positive.  These estimated 
coefficients suggest that, ceteris paribus, the higher the probabilities that the observed defendant 
would go to trial and would be convicted at trial, the larger the fine the defendant will receive 
upon conviction at trial.  In terms of the indirect selection effects considered in this study, these 
estimated coefficients support the notion that the processes by which defendants choose to go to 
trial and judges or juries decide to convict defendants at trial contribute to higher fines imposed 
after trial convictions.   
The estimated coefficients for MILLS TRIAL and MILLS TRIAL CONVICT do not 
identify the signs or magnitudes of indirect trial selection effects and trial conviction selection 
effects created by marginal increases in the values of case characteristics.  Nonetheless, they are 
consistent with the notion that indirect trial selection effects and trial conviction selection effects 
from changes in the values of case characteristics are determinants of the observed fines imposed 
on the sample of 132 defendants included in the regression model presented in Table 20.  Along 
with the means tests results presented earlier, these findings support the need to recognize 
potential indirect trial selection effects and trial conviction selection effects in analyses of the 
determinants of federal criminal antitrust case outcomes. 
 
Regression-based tests of the information structure of plea bargaining 
 
Privately informed prosecutors harm social welfare because they can fashion a settlement 
offer that induces (truly) innocent defendants to plead guilty or nolo contendere.  Such pleas 
send false signals about legal and socially efficient business conduct.  In contrast, privately 
informed defendants during plea bargaining benefit social welfare because the (truly) guilty ones 
are more likely to plead guilty and send the correct signals about appropriate business conduct.   
 Chapter IX presents several approaches to testing the information structure of plea 
bargaining that are alternatives to the approach taken by Froeb (1993) and others.  The same 
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intuition motivates the testing approaches used in this study and by Froeb.  When the prosecutor 
is privately informed about the defendant’s chances at trial, the prosecutor can fashion plea 
offers that are likely to induce even a truly innocent defendant to plead guilty (or nolo 
contendere) in lieu of going to trial.  In contrast, when defendants possess private information 
about their chances at trial, truly guilty defendants are likely to accept plea offers but truly 
innocent defendants are likely to maintain their innocence and go to trial.  From that common 
starting point, this study’s empirical tests of the information structure of plea bargaining diverge 
from Froeb’s testing approach. 
Recall from Chapter IX that Froeb assumes away the potential for legal error at trial and 
assumes that trials perfectly identify innocent and guilty defendants.  Under this assumption, if 
the prosecutor holds private information during plea bargaining and offers harsher penalties for a 
guilty plea than she previously offered, then truly innocent defendants (whom the prosecutor was 
previously offering lighter penalties in plea deals) are likely to be the defendants that reject the 
harsher plea offers and go to trial.  In this situation, as the trial rate increases, the trial conviction 
rate is likely to fall.   
In contrast, if defendants are privately informed and the prosecutor offers harsher 
penalties than she previously offered, then the truly guilty defendants are likely to go to trial 
(because truly innocent defendants were already going to trial).  In this situation, as the trial rate 
increases, the trial conviction rate is likely to increase. 
Froeb uses the correlation between the observed trial rate and trial conviction rate to test 
the information structure of plea bargaining.  Under this approach, a positive correlation between 
trial and trial conviction rates suggests that in the sample of cases used, defendants were 
privately informed during plea bargaining.  A negative correlation suggests that prosecutors held 
private information.   
As discussed in Chapter IX, Froeb recognizes that the case selection process – and not 
necessarily the information structure of plea bargaining – could produce defendants who are 
more likely to go to trial and either more or less likely to be convicted at trial.  To this potential 
confounding influence of the case selection process, this study points out the potential for a 
similarly confounding influence of the trial selection process whereby a mix of case 
characteristics that are likely to lead defendants to choose to go to trial could influence the 
probability of trial conviction.   
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This study’s empirical tests of the information structure of plea bargaining do not rely on 
correlations between the trial rate and trial conviction rate for a given sample of defendants.  
Instead, this study uses five tests of the information structure of plea bargaining that stem from 
hypotheses developed by Hylton (1993) and introduces one test.   
As discussed in Chapter IX, Hylton explains that the distance between the expected 
liability (expected penalty and trial cost) of an innocent defendant and the expected liability of a 
guilty defendant increases as the probabilities of (type I and type II) legal errors regarding the 
defendant’s compliance with a legal standard fall.  This increases the zone of acceptable plea 
offers (i.e., penalties that defendants would accept by pleading guilty) for guilty defendants and 
decreases the zone of acceptable plea offers for innocent defendants.  Under these 
circumstances, it follows that the proportion of innocent defendants who litigate likely increases.   
According to Hylton, the strongest evidence regarding the information structure of plea 
bargaining is the overall trial conviction rate for a given sample of defendants.  As explained in 
Chapter IX, assuming the probabilities of type I and type II legal errors regarding defendants’ 
compliance with legal standards are low110 and roughly equal, if defendants have private 
information regarding their chances at trial, then the trial conviction rate will be below 50 
percent.  That is, when legal errors are relatively unlikely, a trial conviction rate below 50 
percent is evidence that defendants are privately informed during plea bargaining about their 
chances at trial.  Conversely, a trial conviction rate above 50 percent is evidence that prosecutors 
possess private information during plea bargaining.  A trial conviction rate of 50 percent is 
evidence that neither party holds private information.  According to Hylton, for a given sample 
of defendants, comparing the value of the trial conviction rate to the 50 percent mark is the best 
test of the information structure of plea bargaining. 
It is reasonable to assume that the legal error at trial is sufficiently low111 and that the 
probabilities of type I and type II errors are roughly equal in this study’s sample of case initiated 
from 1956 through 1980.  In the sample of defendants used in this study, out of the 3,093 
indicted defendants, (only) 601 defendants chose to go to trial.  Of these 601 defendants, judges 
and juries convicted only 132.  Thus, for the sample of defendants used in this study, the trial 
conviction rate is 132/601*100 = 21.96 percent.  A trial conviction rate of less than 22 percent 
                                                 
110  Hylton claims that a probability of legal error at trial below 50 percent is sufficiently low. 
111  Notwithstanding the landmark Supreme Court decisions over the past 50 years, by 1956, the Sherman Act 
had been law for over 60 years.   
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suggests that, during plea negotiations, the observed defendants in federal criminal antitrust cases 
from 1956 through 1980 held private information about their chances at trial. 
The other tests suggested by Hylton involve movements in the trial rate and trial 
conviction rate as legal doctrine develops over time.  As legal doctrine develops over time, the 
likelihood of (type I and type II) legal error at trial falls.  Hylton explains that the distance 
between the expected liability (expected penalty and trial cost) of an innocent defendant and the 
expected liability of a guilty defendant increases as the probability of legal error at trial falls.  
This increases the zone of acceptable plea offers (i.e., penalties that defendants would accept by 
pleading guilty) for guilty defendants and decreases the zone of acceptable plea offers for 
innocent defendants.   
Accordingly, as the probability of legal error falls, then the trial conviction rate will fall 
over time if plea bargaining (i.e., trial selection) operates as expected when defendants are 
privately informed (or better informed than prosecutors) about their chances at trial during plea 
bargaining.  Based on Salop and White’s (1988) finding that the annual average plaintiff win rate 
in civil antitrust trials fell over time, Hylton expects defendants in civil antitrust cases to possess 
better information about their chances at trial than plaintiffs possess.   
Hylton uses the passage of time as a proxy for the development of legal doctrine.  In 
contrast, the explanatory variables used in this study’s regression models of the ex post 
probabilities of trial and trial conviction include separate measures of the passage of time 
(INDICT YEAR) and the incremental development of legal doctrine (LANDMARK) in order to 
apply Hylton’s tests.112
As reported previously in Table 17, the estimated coefficients for INDICT YEAR and 
LANDMARK in the regression model of the ex post probability of trial conviction are statistically 
insignificant (but negative).  These findings suggest that neither litigant held private information 
during plea bargaining. 
Hylton also hypothesizes that the trial rate will fall as legal doctrine develops over time 
(thus reducing type I and type II legal errors) when, during plea negotiations, defendants are 
                                                 
112  One advantage of departing from Hylton’s approach and using regression models is that the regression 
models control for several factors that could influence the observed trial rate and trial conviction rate.  This is 
important because some factors, such as the DOJ Antitrust Division’s budget, for example, could be correlated with 
time (although symptoms of mulicolinearity do not exist).  This study’s application of Hylton’s hypotheses thus 
better isolate the correlation of the trial rate and trial conviction rate with the cumulative (INDICT YEAR) and 
incremental (LANDMARK) development of legal doctrine. 
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privately informed (or have better information) about their chances at trial.  As reported 
previously in Table 15, in the regression model of the observed trial rate, the estimated 
coefficient for LANDMARK is negative and statistically significant.  Like the test that used the 
overall trial conviction rate, this finding suggests that defendants were privately informed during 
plea bargaining. 
Meanwhile, the estimated coefficient for INDICT YEAR in the regression model of the ex 
post probability of trial is statistically insignificant (but negative).  The explanatory variable 
INDICT YEAR controls for the passage of time as well as the cumulative development of 
antitrust legal doctrine.  The statistical insignificance of the marginal effect of the passage of 
time on the observed trial rate suggests that, during plea bargaining, neither defendants nor 
prosecutors held private or better information regarding the defendants’ chances at trial.   
The test of the information structure of plea bargaining introduced in this study uses the 
estimated coefficient of the explanatory variable MILLS TRIAL that is included in the regression 
model of the observed trial conviction rate.  The explanatory variable MILLS TRIAL controls for 
the estimated probability that the observed defendant would go to trial.   
As explained in Chapter IX, ignoring the potential for legal error at trial, if the prosecutor 
holds private information during plea bargaining and offers harsher penalties for a guilty plea 
than she previously offered, then truly innocent defendants (whom the prosecutor was previously 
offering lighter penalties in plea deals) are likely to be the defendants that reject the harsher plea 
offers and go to trial.  In this situation, a defendant who is more likely to go to trial is less likely 
to be convicted at trial than a defendant who is less likely to go to trial. 
In contrast, if defendants are privately informed and the prosecutor offers harsher 
penalties than she previously offered, then the truly guilty defendants are likely to go to trial 
(because truly innocent defendants were already going to trial).  In this situation, a defendant 
who is more likely to go to trial is more likely to be convicted at trial than a defendant who is 
less likely to go to trial. 
Accordingly, a positive sign of the estimated coefficient for MILLS TRIAL in a regression 
model of trial outcomes suggests that defendants that are more likely to go to trial are more 
likely to be convicted at trial, then such a regression result suggests that (truly) guilty defendants 
are more likely to go to trial and that (truly) innocent defendants are more likely to accept plea 
bargains.  Such a regression result would suggest that prosecutors are privately informed during 
 195
plea bargaining about the defendants’ chances at trial and are able to fashion plea arrangements 
that induce (truly) innocent defendants to plead guilty or nolo contendere.   
Conversely, if the sign of the estimated coefficient for MILLS TRIAL in a regression 
model of trial outcomes suggests that defendants that are more likely to go to trial are less likely 
to be convicted at trial, then such a regression result suggests that (truly) innocent defendants are 
more likely to go to trial and that (truly) guilty defendants are more likely to accept plea 
bargains.  Such a regression result would suggest that defendants are privately informed during 
plea bargaining about the their chances at trial and prosecutors are unable to fashion plea 
arrangements that induce such (truly) innocent defendants to plead guilty or nolo contendere.   
 As reported in Table 17, the estimated coefficient for MILLS TRIAL in this study’s 
regression model of trial outcomes is positive and statistically signficiant.  This finding suggests 
that, during plea bargaining, the prosecutors possessed private or better information about the 
defendants’ chances at trial. 
 In sum, this study conducts six tests of the information structure of plea bargaining in the 
sample of cases used in this study.  Two test results suggest that the defendants held private or 
better information during plea bargaining, one result suggests that the prosecutors were privately 
or better informed, and three results suggest that neither party possessed private information 
during plea bargaining.  These mixed results suggest that the information structure of plea 
bargaining in federal criminal antitrust cases remains an open question.  In normative terms, 
these mixed results leave open the question of whether plea bargaining was socially efficient or 
not in federal criminal antitrust cases initiated from 1956 through 1980.   
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CHAPTER XI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This study explores two categories of determinants of federal criminal antitrust case 
outcomes: selection processes by which cases are disposed, and the information structure of plea 
bargaining.  While this study’s examination of these factors was thorough, several areas remain 
ripe for expanded future research. 
This study models, as functions of case characteristics, i) the federal prosecutor’s 
decision to initiate a criminal antitrust case, ii) the defendant’s decision to go to trial or not, iii) 
the judge’s or jury’s decision to convict a defendant at trial, and iv) the judge’s sentencing 
decision after a trial conviction.  This study also explores how selection processes by which i) 
the federal prosecutor decides to initiate a case, ii) the defendant chooses a plea, and iii) the 
judge (or jury) decides to convict a defendant at trial influence the characteristics of criminal 
antitrust cases that proceed to subsequent stages of case disposition.   
By influencing the mix of characteristics in cases that pass through these selection 
processes, the selection processes can influence the case outcomes that follow.  That is, the case 
selection process can influence plea decisions, trial outcomes, and sentencing decisions.  
Similarly and separately, the trial selection process can affect trial outcomes and sentencing 
outcomes.  Likewise, the trial conviction process can shape sentencing outcomes.   
Snyder’s (1989, 1990) study of plea bargaining and trial outcomes in federal criminal 
antitrust cases, as well as Cohen’s (1992) study of sentencing outcomes, recognize the potential 
selection effects of the defendant’s plea choice and the trial process on subsequent stages of case 
disposition.  This study is the first to examine the potential influence of the prosecutor’s selection 
of cases to initiate. 
If these selection processes randomly sort defendants, then ignoring them is reasonable.  
Using defendant-level data for cases initiated from 1956 through 1980, this study’s empirical 
tests indicate that prosecutors did not randomly decide which cases to initiate, defendants did not 
randomly decide whether or not to plead not guilty and go to trial, and judges and juries did not 
randomly convict defendants at trial.  Further, this study’s empirical tests suggest that the models 
developed in this study reasonably depict the processes by which prosecutors chose cases to 
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pursue, defendants decided to plead not guilty instead of pleading guilty or nolo contendere, and 
judges and juries decided whether to convict or acquit (or otherwise not convict) defendants at 
trial. 
This study also examines how the information structure of plea bargaining can influence 
observed federal criminal antitrust case outcomes.  The information structure of plea bargaining 
has implications for normative and positive  analysis of law enforcement.   
When defendants hold private or better information about their chances at trial, plea 
bargaining is socially efficient.  Guilty defendants plead guilty and save court resources.  
Meanwhile, innocent defendants maintain their innocence and (ignoring legal error) prevail at 
trial, thereby sending proper signals about the legality of the alleged conduct.   
In contrast, when prosecutors possess better information about defendants’ chances at 
trial, they are likely to use that informational advantage to fashion plea offers that truly innocent 
defendants accept.  Such plea agreements are socially inefficient because they do not accurately 
signal the legality of alleged conduct.  Moreover, for purposes of positive analysis, defendants 
with lower probabilities of trial conviction are less likely to go to trial when prosecutors hold 
private information than when defendants are privately informed. 
This study conducts six tests of the information structure of plea bargaining in the sample 
of cases used in this study.  Five of the tests stem from hypotheses posed by Hylton (1993).  The 
results of two of those tests suggest that the defendants held private or better information during 
plea bargaining, but the results of the other three tests derived from Hylton’s hypotheses imply 
that neither litigant possessed private information during plea bargaining.   
This study contributes the sixth test, which employs a regression model of trial outcomes 
that controls for sample selection bias in order to determine the relationship, if any, between 
observed defendants’ estimated probabilities of trial and trial conviction.  This study finds that 
the estimated probability of trial conviction rises with observed defendants’ estimated probability 
of going to trial.  In contrast to the results of tests suggested by Hylton (1993), this finding 
suggests that the prosecutors held private or better information during plea bargaining.   
Based on these mixed results, the informational structure of plea bargaining in federal 
criminal antitrust cases remains an open question.  In normative terms, these mixed results leave 
open the question of whether plea bargaining was socially efficient or inefficient in federal 
criminal antitrust cases initiated from 1956 through 1980.   
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 This study’s focus on effects of selection processes and private information on federal 
criminal antitrust case outcomes, as well as the historical nature of the data used for empirical 
testing leave several topics for future research.  In several ways, respectively, this study’s 
theoretical and empirical analyses merit further consideration and expansion.  In addition, 
developments in federal criminal antitrust enforcement that occurred after 1980 suggest future 
research. 
In particular, extending Cohen’s (1992) study to explore further the influence of judicial 
discretion in sentencing would be useful.  Extensions of theoretical and empirical models of 
sentencing could and should examine the implications of changes in the latitude the legal system 
gives judges to use their discretion in sentencing.  Such model extensions could exploit the 
natural experiments created by the implementation of mandatory and, later, discretionary 
guideline sentencing over the past two decades.   
 The details of the implementation and refinement of guideline sentencing raises 
important normative questions regarding federal criminal antitrust enforcement.  For example, 
does (mandatory and/or discretionary) charge-based guideline sentencing give the prosecutor an 
informational advantage during plea bargaining?  It seems plausible that the prosecutors could 
control the expected penalty imposed upon trial conviction by controlling the charges of 
indictment.  This would give the prosecutor an informational advantage during plea bargaining.   
Based on the regression results of this study, information about expected penalties may 
be the most relevant information during plea bargaining.  In this regard, the statistically 
significant negative estimated regression coefficients for LANDMARK in the plea outcome and 
trial sentencing decision equations are noteworthy.  Using the logic of Hylton’s (1993) 
hypotheses, the signs of these coefficients suggest that the development of legal doctrine allows 
privately informed defendants to choose to go to trial when they expect judges to impose lower 
penalties upon trial conviction.   
Another post-1980 development in federal criminal antitrust enforcement suggests a 
useful natural experiment for testing the implications of this study’s theoretical models of the ex 
ante and ex post probabilities of trial conviction.  Snyder (1989) and Marvel et al. (1988) 
document the tendency of prosecutors in the Reagan administration to bring criminal price-fixing 
cases against relatively small firms involved in alleged conspiracies involving small amounts of 
commerce.  In terms of this study’s theoretical models of the ex ante and ex post probabilities of 
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trial conviction, such cases imply a relatively small value of the variable representing the ex ante 
expected trial sentence, .  Further, the high conviction rate in these cases implies a relatively 
high value of the variable representing the ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, 
TS
Πˆ .  
Moreover, the lop-sided nature of these cases (in favor of the prosecutor) could be used to test 
the implications of the direct and indirect selection effects on the ex post probability of trial 
conviction from marginal changes in the value of λ , which represents the variability of the trial 
conviction decision.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
PREDICTED EFFECTS ON THE PROSECUTOR’S EX ANTE EXPECTED  
VALUE OF BRINGING A CASE FROM CHANGES IN THE  
VALUES OF CASE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Recall that the prosecutor brings a case (i.e., a case is observed) if and only if ( ) 0≥VE .  
Because the condition  must be maintained in order for the prosecutor to initiate a case, 
it is important to evaluate the total marginal effects of changes in the values of case 
characteristics on .  Now recall the definition of 
( ) 0≥VE
( )VE ( )VE : 
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 In addition, recall that the litigation model provides the optimal (Nash equilibrium) values of the 
prosecutor’s and the defendant’s respective choices of levels of trial expenditure, so that all of 
the ex ante expected values are evaluated with ∗= XX  and ∗= YY .  Both ∗X  and ∗Y  are 
implicit functions of C , K , , e , TS λ , as well as each other as specified by the litigation model.   
 In addition, recall that at the case selection stage (i.e., after the pre-indictment stage), the 
prosecutor takes as given an amount and/or quality of evidence, e.  At the case selection stage, 
the prosecutor also takes as given the (exogenous) values of the other case characteristics (e.g., 
the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C ).   
Intuitively, from the prosecutor’s perspective at the case selection stage, the prosecutor’s 
and defendant’s expected behavior at trial, if the case should go to trial, is captured by their 
expected optimal choices of levels of trial expenditure, ∗X  and ∗Y , respectively.  At the case 
selection stage, the prosecutor expects that the litigants’ (expected) optimal choices of trial 
expenditure will inform the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of going to trial, , including 
the litigants’ common ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, 
TV
Πˆ , and their common ex 
ante expected sentence following a trial conviction, .  The prosecutor also uses TS ∗X  and ∗Y  to 
form her ex ante expected value of a plea agreement, , her ex ante expected probability of 
trial, Θ .  Putting it all together, the prosecutor uses 
BV
∗X  and ∗Y  to evaluate ex ante her expected 
value of bringing the case, . ( )VE
I can now show mathematically the total (i.e. first-order and second-order) effects on 
 of marginal changes in individual case characteristics that the prosecutor is likely to 
consider.   
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Determining the signs of the right-hand sides of equations [30]-[35] requires some 
(admittedly tedious) discussion.  This discussion is helpful, however, for understanding the 
determinants of expected case selection bias in observed case outcomes.  A better understanding 
of this bias is important for understanding the implications of policy or institutional decisions 
regarding antitrust enforcement such as funding levels for the DOJ Antitrust Division, for 
example. 
The first terms on the right-hand side of equations [30]-[32] and [35] are the direct partial 
(or “first-order”) effects on  from increases in the values of the case characteristics C , ( )VE K , 
, and TS ρ , respectively.  Inspection of Equation [14] confirms that the partial effects of 
increases in the values of K , , and TS ρ  on ( )VE  are positive, while increases in  have a 
negative first-order effect on .  Meanwhile, inspection of Equation [14] and the fact that 
 demonstrate that 
C
( )VE
10 ≤Θ≤ ( ) 0<∂
∂
X
VE , ( ) 0>∂
∂
Y
VE , ( ) 0<Θ∂
∂ VE , ( ) 0ˆ >Π∂
∂ VE , and ( ) 0>∂
∂
TS
VE .  
Note that the prosecutor’s evidence, e, and the variability of the trial court’s conviction standard, 
λ , do not directly affect .  Thus, the first term on the right-hand side of Equations [33] and 
[34] are zero. 
( )VE
With respect to the second and third terms on the right-hand sides of equations [30]-[34], 
I use predictions about litigation behavior from my litigation model to determine the signs.  For 
example, according to the litigation model, an increase in a single party’s cost per unit of trial 
expenditure,  or C K , will lead that party to reduce trial expenditure.  Further, the opponent will 
reduce trial expenditure if (and only if) the opponent is the trial “favorite.”  
Thus, when the prosecutor is the trial favorite (i.e., Π≥Πˆ ), 0<∂
∗
C
dX  and 0>
∗
dC
dY , 
while 0<
∗
dK
dX  and 0<
∗
dK
dY .  In contrast, when the defendant is the trial favorite (i.e., Π<Πˆ ), 
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0<
∗
dC
dX , and 0<
∗
dC
dY , while 0>
∗
dK
dX  and 0<
∗
dK
dY .  This implies that the second term of 
Equation [30] is always positive, and the third term is positive when the prosecutor is the trial 
favorite and negative when she is the underdog at trial.   
Similarly, with respect to right-hand side of Equation [31], the second term is positive 
when the prosecutor is the trial favorite and negative when she is the underdog at trial.  The third 
term on the right-hand side of Equation [31], meanwhile, is always negative (just as the second 
term on the right-hand side of Equation [30] is always positive).  
The litigation model predicts that an increase in  will lead both parties to increase trial 
expenditures.  Thus, 
TS
0>
∗
TdS
dX  and 0>
∗
TdS
dY , which implies that the second and third terms in 
Equation [32] are negative and positive, respectively.   
 The litigation model predicts that if the prosecutor is the trial underdog (favorite), then an 
increase in the prosecutor’s evidence, e, which increases the merits of the case, will increase 
(decrease) both parties’ trial expenditures.  Thus, if the prosecutor is the trial underdog (favorite), 
0>
∗
ed
dX  and 0>
∗
ed
dY  ( 0<
∗
ed
dX  and 0<
∗
ed
dY ), and the second and third terms on the right-
hand side of Equation [33] are positive (negative). 
 The litigation model’s predictions regarding the affect on the parties trial expenditures 
from increases in the variability of the trial court’s conviction standard, λ , depend on 
assumptions regarding the “closeness” of the parties’ relative diminishing returns in trial 
expenditure.  Such assumptions are not easily defended, so the signs of the second and third 
terms on the right-hand side of Equation [34] are ambiguous. 
Meanwhile, the litigation model’s specification that does not include the idiosycratic 
component, ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, , as an 
implicit determinant of the litigants’ optimal levels of trial expenditure, 
Πˆ
∗X  and ∗Y .  Thus, the 
second and third terms on the right-hand side of Equation [35] are zero. 
Now, consider the signs of the fourth term on the right-hand side of equation [30].  Recall 
that Equation [11] defines the ex ante probability of trial from the prosecutor’s perspective, and 
forms the basis of my trial selection model.  An increase in the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial 
expenditure, , has the following total marginal effect on the prosecutor’s ex ante probability of C
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trial, Θ , given the implicit functions represented by the Nash equilibrium values of the parties’ 
levels of trial expenditure, ∗= XX  and ∗= YY : 
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The sign of 
dC
dΘ  depends on the relative signs and magnitudes of the unambiguously 
negative marginal direct effect of  on C Θ  (i.e., 0<⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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TT S
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S
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C
ρψ ), the 
marginal “trial expenditure effects” of C  on Θ  (i.e., 
dC
dY
YdC
dX
X
∗∗
∂
Θ∂+∂
Θ∂ ), and the marginal 
“stakes effects” of  on  (i.e., C Θ
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∂
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∗∗
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
Θ∂+∂
∂
∂
Θ∂ ).  As noted above, the 
litigation model’s predictions imply that 
dC
dX ∗  is always negative and that 
dC
dY ∗  is negative if the 
prosecutor is the trial underdog.  Meanwhile, the sign of the partial marginal direct effect on the 
ex ante probability of trial from an increase in the prosecutor’s level of trial expenditure,  
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is negative.  The sign of the marginal partial direct effect on the ex ante probability of trial from 
an increase in the defendant’s level of trial expenditure,  
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=∂
Θ∂ ∗∗
TT S
K
S
KYCX
Y
ρψ   
 
is also negative.  In contrast, the sign of the marginal partial direct effect on the ex ante expected 
probability of trial from an increase in the ex ante expected trial sentence, 
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( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=∂
Θ∂ ∗∗∗∗
2TTT S
KYCX
S
KYCX
S
ρψ , 
 
is positive. 
In sum, the sign of the fourth term on the right-hand side of Equation [30] is ambiguous 
because the sign of 
dC
dΘ  is ambiguous without any defensible simplifications regarding the 
relative weights of the partial direct effect, the partial “trial expenditure effects,” and the partial 
“stakes effects.”   Similarly, the fourth term on the right-hand side of Equation [31] is ambiguous 
because the sign of 
dK
dΘ  is ambiguous.   
 The fourth term in equation [32] requires some discussion.  This term is the marginal 
effect on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of bringing a case, E(V), from a change in the 
ex ante probabiilty of trial, Θ , that is created by an increase in the value of the parties’ common 
ex ante expected trial sentence,  (where the change in  is caused by an exogenous shock).  
The sign of the fourth term on the right-hand side of equation [32] depends on the sign of 
TS TS
TdS
dΘ , 
which can be expressed as follows, when evaluated at equilibrium levels of trial expenditure, 
∗= XX  and ∗= YY : 
 
TTT
T
TT dS
dY
YdS
dX
XdS
dS
SdS
d ∗∗
∂
Θ∂+∂
Θ∂+∂
Θ∂=Θ . 
 
By inspection, the sign of TdS
dΘ  depends on the relative magnitudes of the positive partial 
marginal effect on the ex ante expected probability of trial from an increase in the ex ante 
expected trial sentence, (i.e., ( ) 02 >⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=∂
Θ∂ ∗∗∗∗
TTT S
KYCX
S
KYCX
S
ρψ , as previously 
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discussed) and the negative trial expenditure effects (i.e., 0<∂
Θ∂+∂
Θ∂ ∗∗
TT dS
dY
YdS
dX
X
).113  Without 
more information regarding these relative magnitudes, the sign of the fourth term on the right-
hand side of Equation [32] is ambiguous. 
Because the ex ante expected probability of trial, Θ , does not directly depend on the 
prosecutor’s evidence, e, the total marginal effect of e on Θ  comes entirely from the partial trial 
expenditure effects and (the two types of) stakes effects on Θ from increases in e.  These partial 
effects can be expressed mathematically as follows, when evaluated at equilibrium levels of trial 
expenditure, ∗= XX  and ∗= YY : 
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 As previously discussed, the litigation model predicts that if the prosecutor is the trial 
underdog (favorite), then 0>
∗
ed
dX  and 0>
∗
ed
dY  ( 0<
∗
ed
dX  and 0<
∗
ed
dY ).  Nonetheless, the 
ambiguous relative magnitudes of the trial expenditure effects and the two types of partial stakes 
effects (i.e., the stakes effects from increases in  due to increases in X and Y, and separately 
from increases in  due to increases in e), as well as the ambiguous sign of the net stakes effect 
renders the sign of 
TS
TS
ed
dΘ  ambiguous.  Accordingly, the sign of the fourth term on the right-hand 
side of Equation [33] is ambiguous. 
Similarly, the variability of the trial court’s conviction standard, λ , only influences the 
ex ante expected probability of trial, Θ , through the trial expenditure effects and stakes effects.  
This is evident by inspection of the following evaluation of λd
dΘ  at equilibrium levels of trial 
expenditure, ∗= XX  and ∗= YY : 
                                                 
113  Recall the litigation model predicts 0>
∗
TdS
dX
 and 0>
∗
TdS
dY
.  As previously discussed, 0<∂
Θ∂
X
 and 
0<∂
Θ∂
Y
. 
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Because of the previously discussed ambiguity of the relative magnitudes of sign of 0<∂
Θ∂
X
 and 
0>∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
Θ∂
X
P
P
S
S
T
T  and because the litigation model’s predictions regarding λd
dX ∗  and λd
dY ∗  are 
weak, the sign of the fourth term on the right-hand side of Equation [34] is ambiguous.   
Due to the specification of the litigation model (i.e., *X and *Y  do not depend on ρ ), ρ  
does not create any confounding “trial expenditure effects” on Θ .  Thus, it is only necessary to 
recognize that  increases in Θ ρ  and ( )VE  decreases in Θ .  Thus, the fourth term on the right-
hand side of Equation [35] is negative.  
With respect to the fifth term on the right-hand sides of equations [30]-[35], I will use the 
litigation model to predict the second-order effects of increases in the values of case 
characteristics on  through .  For instance, according to the litigation model, an increase 
in a single party’s cost per unit of trial expenditure, C  or 
( )VE Πˆ
K , will decrease that party’s 
probability of winning at trial.  Thus, with respect to Equation [30], the litigation model predicts 
that 
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D
DdC
dX
X
P
PdC
d .114  
 
Accordingly, the fifth term of equation [30] is negative.  In Equation [31], however, the litigation 
model predicts that 0
ˆ >Π
dK
d , which implies that the fifth term is positive. 
With respect to the fifth term of Equation [32], my litigation model predicts that an 
increase in the trial stakes for both parties through an increase in , for example, will induce TS
                                                 
114  While it is possible for 
dC
dY ∗
 to be negative, it would be irrational for the defendant to decrease his trial 
expenditure to the point of letting the ex ante probability of trial conviction increase.   
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both parties to increase their trial expenditure.  This will improve the chances at trial of the party 
with relatively weaker diminishing returns in trial expenditure.115  Assumptions regarding the 
parties’ relative rate of diminishing returns in their own trial expenditures require some 
discussion. 
 It is reasonable to assume that the prosecutor is the party with relatively weaker 
diminishing returns in trial expenditure (i.e., ).  In my litigation model 
and, arguably, in practice, the defendant must react to the case, A(e), that the prosecutor develops 
in the pre-indictment stage.  Other factors held constant, the defendant has less “control” over the 
case than the prosecutor.  Along those lines, it is well established in the game theoretical 
industrial organization literature that by having more strategic “tools” than the defendant, the 
prosecutor should be more productive at trial than the defendant.  For example, in the litigation 
model, the prosecutor has evidence, e, and trial expenditure, X, as her tools at trial, while 
defendant only has his trial expenditure, Y.   
0// 22 << XXXYYY PPDD
In addition, as Cohen (1992) argues to underpin his principal hypothesis regarding the 
promotion potential of judges as a primary motivator of their sentencing decisions, the 
prosecutor generally has a more advantageous relationship with the typical federal district judge 
than the defendant has for purposes of winning at trial.  Further, defendants in criminal antitrust 
trials could be confined in how far they can develop arguments if doing so could (inadvertently) 
work against other arguments or otherwise increase their liability.   
For completeness of discussion, however, the assumption that the prosecutor has stronger 
diminishing returns from trial expendture (i.e., ) has some appeal.  
Defense attorneys often specialize in certain types of cases.  In fact, anecdotally, antitrust 
defense and litigation support have blossomed as cottage industries.  This suggests high levels of 
trial productivity for federal criminal antitrust defendants’ litigation teams.  The criminal 
0// 22 << YYYXXX DDPP
                                                 
115  Meanwhile, as discussed in Chapter V, an increase in the trial costs of both parties, or a decrease in 
common trial stakes, will lead them to reduce their trial expenditure.  Again, this will improve the chances at trial 
and at sentencing for the party with relatively weaker diminishing returns in trial expenditure. 
The intuition behind these predictions is that the party with weaker diminishing returns in trial efforts will 
react to the same increase in trial stakes with a larger increase in trial arguments because that party finds it “cheaper” 
to increase trial expenditure, and vice versa.  That is, the party with weaker diminishing returns gets more “bang per 
unit” from increasing trial effort and expenditure, so that party increases trial expenditure more than the opponent 
does.  Using the same logic in the opposite direction, the party with stronger diminishing returns in trial efforts will 
react to a common decrease in trial stakes with a smaller decrease in trial arguments. 
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antitrust defense industry has not always been as well developed as it may be today, however, 
and my empirical tests (will) cover years going back to 1955.   
Further, anecdotally, prosecutors in the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division are 
possibly more singly focused on prosecuting antitrust offenses than private defense attorneys 
who often have several types of clients at any given time.  To the extent this is an empirical 
question, the DOJ’s historically high conviction rate, particularly in price-fixing and bid-rigging 
cases, suggests that federal prosecutors in criminal antitrust cases are, in aggregate or on average, 
more productive than criminal antitrust defense teams.   
Thus, for the purposes of this study, it is reasonably safe to assume that the prosecutor 
has weaker diminishing returns in trial expenditure than the defendant has.  When the prosecutor 
has weaker diminishing returns from trial expenditure, the litigation model predicts that the 
parties’ common ex ante expected probability of trial conviction increases in the parties’ 
common trial stakes.  That is, when evaluated at equilibrium levels of trial expenditure, ∗= XX  
and ∗= YY , 
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is positive. 116  Thus, when the prosecutor (defendant) has weaker diminishing returns from trial 
expenditure, the fifth term in Equation [32] is positive (negative).   
The litigation model predicts that the party that benefits from a change in the merits of 
the prosecutor’s case will have better chances at trial.  Because the merits of a case increase in 
the prosecutor’s evidence, e, the fifth term on the right-hand side of Equation [33] is positive. 
Meanwhile, the litigation model’s predictions regarding the affect on the parties’ 
common ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, Πˆ , from increases in the variability of 
the trial court’s conviction standard, λ , depend on assumptions regarding the “closeness” of the 
parties’ diminishing returns in trial expenditure.  As with the second and third terms of Equation 
[34], because such assumptions are not easily defended, the sign of the fifth term on the right-
                                                 
116  According to my litigation model, when the prosecutor has weaker diminishing returns in trial expenditure, 
0
ˆ >ΠTdS
d
 for decreases in  as well.   TS
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hand side of Equation [34] is ambiguous.  Moreover, the fifth term on the right-hand side of 
Equation [35] is zero because neither the parties’ common ex ante expected probability of trial 
conviction, , nor the parties’ levels of trial expenditure, X and Y, depend on the idiosyncratic 
component, 
Πˆ
ρ , of her (personal) ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, . Φ
The litigation model predicts that if the prosecutor (defendant) is the trial favorite, then 
an increase in the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, , (the defendant’s unit cost of trial 
expenditure, K) will cause the prosecutor (defendant) to decrease her (his) level of trial 
expenditure, X (Y), and the defendant (prosecutor) to increase his (her) level of trial expenditure, 
Y (X), which will reduce (increase) .  Meanwhile, if the prosecutor (defendant) is the trial 
favorite, then an increase in 
C
TS
K  (C) will cause X and Y to fall, which has ambiguous net effects 
on .  Thus, the sign of the sixth term on the right hand side of Equation [30] is negative 
(amibiguous) when the prosecutor (defendant) is the trial favorite.  Further, the sign of the sixth 
term on the right-hand side of Equation [31] is positive (ambiguous) when the prosecutor 
(defendant) is the trial favorite.  (There is no sixth term on the right hand side of equation [32].) 
TS
The sixth term of the right-hand side of Equation [33] is the marginal effect of more 
evidence on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of bringing a case through the effect of more 
evidence on the value of the ex ante expected trial sentence.  The litigation model predicts that 
changes in the merits of the case through increases in the amount or strength of evidence, e, that 
benefit the underdog will cause both parties to increase trial expenditure.  Conversely, changes in 
e that benefit the favorite will cause both parties to reduce trial expenditure.  Thus, the 
unidirectional changes in the parties’ trial expenditure from changes in the value of e have 
ambiguous effects on the ex ante expected trial sentence, .  Accordingly, the sign of the sixth 
term on the right-hand side of Equation [33] is ambiguous. 
TS
 The litigation model’s predictions about the effects of the variability of the trial court’s 
conviction standard, λ , on the parties’ trial expenditures, X and Y, rely on the “closeness” of the 
parties’ diminishing returns in trial expenditure.  Without any reasonable means of accurately 
measuring this “closeness,” the sixth term on the right-hand side of Equation [34] is ambiguous.   
Neither the ex ante expected trial sentence, , nor the parties’ trial expenditures, X and 
Y, are functions of the idiosyncratic element, 
TS
ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probabilty 
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of trial conviction, .  Thus, the value of the sixth term on the right-hand side of Equation [35] 
is zero. 
Πˆ
I now turn to the expected sign of the net effect of changes in the values of case 
characteristics on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of bringing a case, E(V).  Intuitively 
appealing and otherwise defendable assumptions about the prosecutor’s relative preferences for 
different aspects of case disposition clarify the predicted signs of the marginal effects of changes 
in the values of case characteristics on E(V).   
At the margin, it is reasonable to suppose that a variety of possible instiutional or 
individual preferences regarding case disposition affect case-related decisions of prosecutors (or 
their supervisors) and judges.  These possible case-disposition preferences imply different 
“analytical weights” that should be applied to different types of partial case selection effects on 
E(V) created by changes (or just increases) in the values of case characteristics.   
For example, the prosecutor may be adverse to trial effort or expenditure, as it represents 
difficult work.  Attorneys often complain about the time consumption or stressful conditions of 
work related to trial litigation.  I label such prosecutors “own workload-averse.”  In terms of my 
case selection model, assuming the prosecutor is “workload-oriented” implies that more 
predictive weight should be placed on ( ) 0<∂
∂
X
VE  relative to ( ) 0>∂
∂
Y
VE , ( ) 0<Θ∂
∂ VE , ( ) 0ˆ >Π∂
∂ VE , 
and ( ) 0>∂
∂
TS
VE . 
Similarly, it is possible that in her decision to bring a case the prosecutor could give 
primary consideration to the amount of work a case would create for the defendant or the 
defendant’s attorney.  I call that type of prosecutor “defendant’s workload-motivated”, which 
implies that relatively more predictive weight should be placed on ( ) 0>∂
∂
Y
VE  relative to 
( ) 0>∂
∂
X
VE , ( ) 0<Θ∂
∂ VE , ( ) 0ˆ >Π∂
∂ VE , and ( ) 0>∂
∂
TS
VE .117
                                                 
117  There may be practical, if not normative, justifications for ignoring the case selection effects of Y (i.e., 
letting 
( )
0=∂
∂
Y
VE
case-bringing decision pr
ant’s attorney
).  By not making that assumption, my case selection model allows the prosecutor to base her 
imarily or solely based on how much effort, Y, a case will create for the defendant or the 
defend (s).  For the defendant’s attorney(s) or their law firm, more expecte trial effort could translate 
into higher salaries or profits.  In the extreme, questions of professional competence or ethics might be raised if a 
d 
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For some time, long and growing backlogs of court dockets have been a problem in 
federal courts.  This implies that judges, as well as government prosecutors who repeatedly 
appear before them, would prefer federal criminal antitrust cases, which are notoriously 
associated with long and complex trials, to be disposed by plea agreement (while ensuring, in the 
judges’ minds at least, that justice is served).  Under these circumstances, it would be reasonable 
to expect the prosecutor to be “trial-averse,” which implies that ( ) 0<Θ∂
∂ VE  should be given more 
weight in my case selection model’s predictions relative to ( ) 0<∂
∂
X
VE , ( ) 0>∂
∂
Y
VE , ( ) 0ˆ >Π∂
∂ VE , 
and ( ) 0>∂
∂
TS
VE .  
It is also possible that the prosecutor is “penalty-motivated” and, in deciding which cases 
to pursue, derives great value from the parties’ common ex ante expected trial sentence, possibly 
for deterrence reasons.  A penalty-motivated prosecutor implies that ( ) 0>∂
∂
TS
VE  should be given 
more weight relative to ( ) 0<∂
∂
X
VE , ( ) 0>∂
∂
Y
VE , ( ) 0<Θ∂
∂ VE , and ( ) 0ˆ >Π∂
∂ VE . 
Meanwhile, studies by Posner (1970), Siegfried (1975), Weaver (1977) and Baker (1978) 
strongly suggest that government prosecutors are primarily motivated by (total) conviction rates, 
regardless of how convictions are achieved (i.e., either through trial or plea agreement).  In 
particular, Posner (1970) is sharply critical of the DOJ Antitrust Division.  According to Posner, 
 
[I]t would appear that both legal doctrine and the enforcement machinery 
are geared more to the apprehension of unsuccessful attempts to fix prices 
than to the apprehension of successful price fixing.  In general, the fact of 
an agreement or conspiracy to fix prices is all that the government need 
prove in a price-fixing case and all that it attempts to prove.  (p. 410)   
 
Siegfried (1975) reasons that expected net social benefits from federal antitrust 
enforcement should determine enforcement activity if the DOJ Antitrust Division’s objective is 
to maximize something akin to social welfare.  Like the study by Long et al. (1973) upon which 
Siegfried’s empirical analysis builds using less aggregated data, however, Siegfried’s empirical 
                                                                                                                                                             
prosecutor selected cases based (only) on considerations of how much trial effort the case is likely to require of the 
defendant or the defendant’s attorney(s).  Further, it is reasonable to assume that K and e  capture the prosecutor’s 
expectations regarding how costly trial will be for the defendant. 
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tests fail to find much evidence that measures of the social welfare benefits from federal antitrust 
enforcement play significant roles in explaining DOJ antitrust case-bringing activity.  According 
to Siegfried,  
 
Perhaps this is not too surprising if we consider the reward structure 
confronting decision makers in the Antitrust Division.  It is probably more 
important to win cases than to reduce economic losses or inequities in 
order to move up the success ladder in the Justice Department.  
Unfortunately, it has not been possible to identify a variable to measure 
the expected probability of winning various alternative cases. (p. 573) 
 
(Incidentally, this study seeks to find what Siegfried was seeking – a variable or variables that 
measure the expected probability of winning various alternative cases.) 
Consistent with Posner’s and Siegfried’s empirical findings, Weaver’s (1977) empirical 
analysis suggests that prosecutors are less likely to bring cases based on their economic 
significance and more likely to bring cases when the alleged activity is clearly illegal or when the 
cases otherwise can be won easily.  In addition, former U.S. Assistant Attorney General for 
Antitrust, Donald I. Baker (1978) claims that if the government does not think it can meet the 
“proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for a suspected price-fixing offense, it simply does 
not bring the case.  In a more recent study, Snyder (1989) reports that the Antitrust Division 
tends secure more convictions in cases involving lower sales.  If federal prosecutors are willing 
to target cases involving low sales, it is reasonable to suspect that they are primarily targeting 
cases that are easy to win. 
Henceforth, I refer to prosecutors who are primarily motivated by (total) conviction rates 
as “conviction-motivated”.  The assumption that federal prosecutors are “conviction-motivated” 
in criminal antitrust cases is intuitively appealing and has solid and abundant support from 
empirical tests and other studies conducted by experts in the area of criminal antitrust 
enforcement – including practitioners like a notable Severth Circuit judge and a former U.S. 
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust.  It is a reasonable assumption. 
In terms of my case selection model (i.e., ( ) 0>VE ), assuming the prosecutor is 
conviction-motivated implies that relatively more weight should be placed on the previously 
predicted marginal effect of ( ) 0ˆ >Π∂
∂ VE .  This assumption also implies that my case selection 
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model’s predictions should place less weight on the previously predicted marginal effects of 
( ) 0<∂
∂
X
VE , ( ) 0>∂
∂
Y
VE , ( ) 0<Θ∂
∂ VE , and ( ) 0>∂
∂
TS
VE .   
Although the assumption that the prosecutor is conviction-motivated involves the 
litigants’ common ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, Πˆ , the assumption does not 
mean that the prosecutor is motivated only by the prospects of a trial conviction.  Consider the 
structure of the equation ( ) ( ) BT VVVE Θ−+Θ= 1 .  To the extent that a marginal increase in (or 
a higher value of) Π  in a potential case increases her ex ante expected value of bringing that 
case, E(V), the prosecutor is motivated by the prospects of a conviction, even if the case goes to 
trial, since 
ˆ
0ˆ >Π∂
∂ TV .  The prosecutor is also (just as) motivated to bring a case by the other 
(second-order) positive effects on E(V) that are created by a marginal increase in (or a higher 
value of) Π  in cases that she considers pursuing in the pre-indictment stage.  In particular, the 
prosecutor’s decision to bring a case is also motivated by a marginal increase in (higher value of) 
 because a marginal increase in  creates a marginal increase in , which, in turn, creates a 
marginal increase in E(V). 
ˆ
Πˆ Πˆ BV
In summary, it is important to account for the rational self-interested motivations of 
prosecutors (and judges) in the disposition of federal criminal antitrust cases.  By accounting for 
different types of prosecutorial preferences, my case selection model can provide a meaningful 
and useful theoretical framework for identifying and analyzing potential sources and types of 
case selection bias in observed federal criminal antitrust case outcomes. 118   
 It is worth noting an alternative or additional rationale for giving more analytical weight 
to the probability of trial conviction element of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of 
bringing a case.  Given the general degree of ambiguity regarding the prosecutor’s ex ante 
                                                 
118  It would be ideal to develop approaches that obviate the need for this signing convention.  Given 
diseconomies of more “applied mathematics,” looking for simplifying assumptions (that could be difficult to reflect 
empirically) is inappropriate.  It is also possible to simplify the analysis by making certain endogenous variables 
exogenous instead.  This would not allow for inspection of possibilities that previous researchers ignored by making 
certain variables exogenous.   
Eisenberg and Farber (2003), for example, make simplifying assumptions to ease determining signs with no 
more or less justification than asserting reasonableness.  In contrast, relying on a stylized “conviction-motivated” 
prosecutor in my model is justified by several academic studies and associated empirical findings.  Researchers 
should make use of findings in previous studies – especially consensus empirical findings – when the subject of 
those findings (i.e., prosecutorial motivation) has not likely changed over time.   
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(theoretical) expectations of the effects of different case characteristics on her ex ante expected 
value of bringing a case, E(V), it is reasonable to expect the prosecutor to focus on the single 
element of E(V) associated with the least amount of ambiguity.  That is, given the relative clarity 
of the expected effects of changes in the values of case characteristics on the ex ante expected 
probability of trial conviction, , it is reasonable to expect the prosecutor to focus on those 
(partial) effects in her ex ante evaluation of E(V) as part of her case bringing decision process. 
Πˆ
Tables A-1.a. through A-6.b. summarize the predicted signs of the partial and total effects 
on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of bringing a case, ( )VE , from increases (and 
decreases) in different case characteristics, as shown in Equations [30]-[35] and discussed above.  
In these tables, I make various assumptions regarding the whether the prosecutor or defendant is 
the trial favorite and the parties’ relative diminishing returns in trial expenditure.  These tables 
also show how predictions regarding the net effects of changes in the values of case 
characteristics on  are influenced by different assumptions regarding the prosecutor’s 
relative preferences for different aspects of federal criminal antitrust case disposition.  The 
predictions summarized in these tables are integral to predictions regarding case selection effects 
on the (conditional) ex post probabilities of trial and trial conviction, as well as ex post expected 
sentences. 
( )VE
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Table 21. a. Predicted signs of the partial effects on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of 
bringing a case, , from changes in the prosecutor’s cost per unit of trial 
expenditure,   
( )VE
C
  
Predicted Partial Effects on 
 from Increases (or 
Decreases) In  
( )VE
C
Prosecutor is Trial Favorite 
( Π≥Πˆ ) 
Prosecutor is Trial Underdog  
( Π<Πˆ ) 
( )
C
VE
∂
∂  < 0 
(> 0) 
( )
Cd
dX
X
VE ∗
∂
∂  > 0 
(< 0) 
( )
Cd
dY
Y
VE ∗
∂
∂  > 0 
(< 0) 
< 0 
(> 0) 
( )
Cd
dVE Θ
Θ∂
∂  ? 
(?) 
( )
Cd
dVE Π
Π∂
∂ ˆ
ˆ  
< 0 
(> 0) 
( )
Cd
dS
S
VE T
T∂
∂  <0 
(>0) 
? 
(?) 
 
 
Table 21. b. Predicted signs of the total (net) effect on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value 
of bringing a case, ( )VE , from changes in the prosecutor’s cost per unit of trial 
expenditure,  C
 
Predicted Total Effect on  from Increases (or 
Decreases) in  – i.e., 
( )VE
C ( )
Cd
VdE  – for Different 
Prosecutorial Motivations 
Prosecutor is 
Trial Favorite  
( Π≥Πˆ ) 
Prosecutor is 
Trial Underdog  
( Π<Πˆ ) 
Own Workload-Averse ? (?) 
Defendant’s Workload-Motivated ? (?) 
< 0 
(> 0) 
Trial-Averse ? (?) 
Conviction-Motivated < 0 (> 0) 
Penalty-Motivated < 0 (> 0) 
? 
(?) 
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Table 22. a. Predicted signs of the partial effects on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of 
bringing a case, , from changes in the defendant’s cost per unit of trial 
expenditure, 
( )VE
K  
 
Predicted Partial Effects on  ( )VE
from Increases (or Decreases) in K  
Prosecutor is Trial Favorite 
( Π≥Πˆ ) 
Prosecutor is Trial Underdog
( Π<Πˆ ) ( )
K
VE
∂
∂  > 0 
(< 0) 
( )
Kd
dX
X
VE ∗
∂
∂  > 0 
(< 0) 
< 0 
(> 0) 
( )
Kd
dY
Y
VE ∗
∂
∂  < 0 
(> 0) 
( )
Kd
dVE Θ
Θ∂
∂  ? 
(?) 
( )
Kd
dVE Π
Π∂
∂ ˆ
ˆ  
> 0 
(< 0) 
( )
Kd
dS
S
VE T
T∂
∂  > 0 
(< 0) 
? 
(?) 
 
 
Table 22. b. Predicted signs of the total (net) effect on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value 
of bringing a case, ( )VE , from changes in the defendant’s cost per unit of trial 
expenditure, K   
 
Predicted Total Effect on  from Increases (or 
Decreases) in 
( )VE
K  – i.e., ( )
Kd
VdE – for Different 
Prosecutorial Motivations 
Prosecutor is 
Trial Favorite  
( Π≥Πˆ ) 
Prosecutor is 
Trial Underdog  
( Π<Πˆ ) 
Own Workload-Averse > 0 (< 0) 
? 
(?) 
Defendant’s Workload-Motivated ? (?) 
Trial-Averse ? (?) 
Conviction-Motivated > 0 (< 0) 
Penalty-Motivated > 0 (< 0) 
? 
(?) 
 
 
 219
Table 23. a. Predicted signs of the partial effects on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of 
bringing a case, , from changes in the commonly expected sentence 
following trial conviction,   
( )VE
TS
 
Predicted Partial Effects on  from Increases (or 
Decreases) in * 
( )VE
TS
Prosecutor is Trial Favorite or Underdog 
( ) 1ˆ0 ≤Π≤
( )
TS
VE
∂
∂  > 0 
(< 0) 
( )
TSd
dX
X
VE ∗
∂
∂  < 0 
(> 0) 
( )
TSd
dY
Y
VE ∗
∂
∂  > 0 
(< 0) 
( )
TSd
dVE Θ
Θ∂
∂  ? 
(?) 
( )
TSd
dVE Π
Π∂
∂ ˆ
ˆ  
> 0 
(> 0)** 
* Assume the prosecutor has weaker diminishing returns in trial expenditure than the defendant has. 
** Note that the direction of the predicted partial change in ( )VE  is the same whether  increases or decreases. 
  
 
Table 23. b. Predicted signs of the total (net) effect on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value 
of bringing a case, 
TS
( )VE , from changes in the commonly expected sentence 
following trial conviction, 
 
Predicted Total Effect on  from Increases (or 
Decreases) in  – i.e., 
TS  
 ( )VE
TS ( )TSd
VdE  – for Different 
Prosecutorial “Orientations”* 
Prosecutor is Trial Favorite or Underdog 
) ( 1ˆ0 ≤Π≤
Own Workload-Averse ? (?) 
Defendant’s Workload-Motivated > 0 (< 0) 
Trial-Averse ? (?) 
Conviction-Motivated > 0 (?) 
Penalty-Motivated > 0 (< 0) 
* Assume the prosecutor has weaker diminishing returns in trial expenditure than the defendant has. 
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Table 24. a. Predicted signs of the partial effects on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of 
bringing a case, , from changes in the prosecutor’s evidence, e 
 
Predicted Partial Effects on  from 
Increases (or Decreases) in e 
Prosecutor is Trial 
Favorite  
( )VE
) 
Prosecutor is Trial 
Underdog ( )VE
( Π<Πˆ( Π≥Πˆ ) ( )
e∂
∂ VE  0 
(0) 
( )
ed
dX
X
VE ∗
∂
∂  < 0 
(< 0) 
> 0 
(> 0) 
( )
ed
dY
Y
VE ∗
∂
∂  < 0 
(> 0) 
> 0 
(> 0) 
( )
ed
dVE Θ
Θ∂
∂  ? 
(?) 
( )
ed
dVE Π
Π∂
∂ ˆ
ˆ  
> 0 
(< 0) 
( )
ed
dS
S
VE T
T∂
∂  ? 
(?) 
 
 
Table 24. b. Predicted signs of the total (net) effect on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value 
of bringing a case, ( )VE , from changes in the prosecutor’s evidence, e 
 
Predicted Total Effect on  from Increases (or 
Decreases) in e – i.e., 
 ( )VE
( )
ed
VdE  – for Different 
Prosecutorial Motivations 
Prosecutor is 
Trial Favorite  
) 
Prosecutor is 
Trial Underdog  
( Π≥Πˆ ( Π<Πˆ ) 
Own Workload-Averse < 0 (< 0) 
> 0 
(> 0) 
Defendant’s Workload-Motivated < 0 (> 0) 
> 0 
(> 0) 
Trial-Averse ? (?) 
Conviction-Motivated > 0 (< 0) 
Penalty-Motivated ? (?) 
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Table 25. a. Predicted signs of the partial effects on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of 
bringing a case, , from changes in the variability of the trial court’s 
conviction standard, 
( )VE
λ   
 
Predicted Partial Effects on  from Increases (or 
Decreases
( )VE
) in λ * 
Prosecutor is Trial Favorite or Underdog 
) ( 1ˆ0 ≤Π≤
( )
λ∂
∂ VE  0 
(0) 
( )
λd
dX
X
VE ∗
∂
∂  ? 
(?) 
( )
λd
dY
Y
VE ∗
∂
∂  ? 
(?) 
( )
λd
dVE Θ
Θ∂
∂  ? 
(?) 
( )
λd
dVE Π
Π∂
∂ ˆ
ˆ  
? 
(?) 
( )
λd
dS
S
VE T
T∂
∂  ? 
(?) 
* Assume the prosecutor has weaker diminishing returns in trial expenditure than the defendant has. 
 
 
Table 25. b. Predicted signs of the total (net) effect on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value 
of bringing a case, ( )VE , from changes in the variability of the trial court’s 
conviction standard, λ  
 
Predicted Total Effect on  from Increases (or 
Decreases) in 
 ( )VE
λ  – i.e., ( )λd
VdE  – for Different 
Prosecutorial Motivations* 
Prosecutor is Trial Favorite or Underdog 
) ( 1ˆ0 ≤Π≤
Own Workload-Averse ? (?) 
Defendant’s Workload-Motivated ? (?) 
Trial-Averse ? (?) 
Conviction-Motivated ? (?) 
Penalty-Motivated ? (?) 
* Assume the prosecutor has weaker diminishing returns in trial expenditure than the defendant has. 
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Table 26. a. Predicted signs of the partial effects on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value of 
bringing a case, , from changes in the idiosyncratic component, ( )VE ρ , of the 
prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of a trial conviction.  
 
Predicted Partial Effects on  from Increases (or 
Decreases
( )VE
) in ρ  
Prosecutor is Trial Favorite or Underdog 
) ( 1ˆ0 ≤Π≤
( )
ρ∂
∂ VE  > 0 
(< 0) 
( )
ρd
dX
X
VE ∗
∂
∂  0 
(0) 
( )
ρd
dY
Y
VE ∗
∂
∂  0 
(0) 
( )
ρd
dVE Θ
Θ∂
∂  < 0 
(> 0) 
( )
ρd
dVE Π
Π∂
∂ ˆ
ˆ  
0 
(0) 
( )
ρd
dS
S
VE T
T∂
∂  0 
(0) 
 
 
Table 26. b. Predicted signs of the total (net) effect on the prosecutor’s ex ante expected value 
of bringing a case, ( )VE , from changes in the idiosyncratic component, ρ , of the 
prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of a trial conviction.  
 
Predicted Total Effect on  from Increases (or 
Decreases) in 
 ( )VE
ρ  – i.e., ( )ρd
VdE  – for Different 
Prosecutorial “Orientations” 
Prosecutor is Trial Favorite or Underdog 
) ( 1ˆ0 ≤Π≤
Own Workload-Averse > 0 (< 0) 
Defendant’s Workload-Motivated > 0 (< 0) 
Trial-Averse ? (?) 
Conviction-Motivated > 0 (< 0) 
Penalty-Motivated > 0 (< 0) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF EMPIRICAL VARIABLES 
 
 The following tables summarize the data used for empirical testing, by samples of cases 
at various stages of case disposition.  Table 27 summarizes the full set of data; Table 28, the 
sample of observations in which the defendants entered pleas of guilty of nolo contendere; Table 
29, the sample of observations in which the defendants entered not guilty pleas; Table 30, the 
sample of observations in which the defendants were convicted at trial; and Table 31, the sample 
of observations in which the defendants were not convicted at trial (i.e., the defendant was 
acquitted, the case was dismissed, or the case ended in a directed verdict).  Cursory reviews of 
Tables 27 through 31 reveal that the distributions of the variables differ across sub-samples 
associated with various stages and branches of case disposition.   
 
 
Table 27 Summary statistics of the sample of observed defendants who were indicted 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
TRIAL  3093 .1943097 .3957323 0 1 
TRIAL 
CONVICTION 
3093  .042677 .2021606 0 1 
FINE 3093 132.4474 334.9416 0  5120.323 
INDICT YEAR 3093 67.52861 7.657799  56  79 
LANDMARK 3093 3.284491 1.832706 1 8 
DOJBUDGET 3093 8915.747 4096.589  4255.528  17229.21 
%CRIMINAL 3093 .4749337 .1356336 .02 .72 
ANNUAL 
FORTUNE500 
3093 23.12997 13.63491 8  52 
HIGH ANNUAL 
FORTUNE500 
3093 .3301002  .470325 0 1 
REPUB PRES 
INDICT YEAR  
3093 .5189137 .4997229 0 1 
#CODEFEND 3093 12.15745  11.5066 0  72 
#CORP 
CODEFEND 
3093 7.039444 5.490059 0  28 
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Table 27, continued 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
ONLY CORP 
DEFEND 
3093 .6408018  .479843 0 1 
ONLY INDIV 
DEFEND 
3093 .0274814 .1635079 0 1 
ONLY HIGH 
RANK 
3093 .7982541 .4013684 0 1 
ONLY LOW 
RANK 
3093 .1732945 .3785629 0 1 
ANY LOW RANK 3093 .2017459 .4013684 0 1 
#OTHER INDICT 3093 .3831232 1.656947 0  20 
ZERO OTHER 
INDICT 
3093 .8677659 .3387998 0 1 
#PREV CONVICT 3093 .1357905  .820376 0  19 
ZERO PREV 
CONVICT 
3093  .938571 .2401544 0 1 
PROFIT 3093 2806.854 2371.634 -42.49872  12251.26 
HIGH PROFIT 3093 .3912059 .4880993 0 1 
COMPENSATION 3093 15782.14 13783.53  775.6696  66998.46 
HIGH 
COMPENSATION 
3093 .2938894 .4556156 0 1 
 DURATION 3093  5.47365 5.073748 1  40 
HIGH 
DURATION 
3093 .3624313 .4807802 0 1 
COMMERCE 3093 64396.21 166428.9 0 2116402 
HIGH 
COMMERCE 
3093 .2033624  .402565 0 1 
#COUNTS 
CONVICT 
3093 .1260912 .3689188 0 2 
MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT 
3093 .0129324 .1130014 0 1 
MULTI COUNTS 
INDICT 
3093 .3032654 .4597432 0 1 
COUNTS 
INDICT-
CONVICT 
3093 1.228257 .6221573 0 3 
PRICE FIX NOT 
BID RIG 
3093 .6970579 .4596047 0 1 
BID RIG NOT 
PRICE FIX 
3093 .1218881 .3272095 0 1 
ANY BID RIG 3093 .2563854 .4367077 0 1 
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Table 27, continued 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
CONSUMER VIC 3093 .2169415 .4122291 0 1 
CASE TIME 
SPAN 
3093 .9751051  1.05187 0 7 
DOJ WIN PREV 
YEAR BY VIOL#1 
3093 88.03136  11.5329  53 100 
DOJ WIN PREV 
YEAR 
3093 86.30391 12.10904  53 100 
HIGH DOJ WIN 
PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1 
3093 .4028451 .4905494 0 1 
VAR DOJ WIN 
PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1 
3093 13.46567 11.88678 0  33.33333 
VAR DOJ WIN 
PREV YEAR 
3093  15.5146 9.477293 0  33.33333 
SENTENCE YEAR 3093 68.50372 7.496597  56  81 
POST-APPA 
SENTENCE YEAR 
3093 .3359198 .4723874 0 1 
POST-APPA 
INDICT YEAR 
3093 .28516 .4515636 0 1 
REPUB JUDGE 3093 .3750404 .4842116 0 1 
REPUB PRES 
SENTENCE YEAR 
3093 .4390559 .4963522 0 1 
PRES & JUDGE 
SAME PARTY 
SENTENCE YEAR 
3093 .5706434 .4950644 0 1 
PRIOR 
PROSECUTOR 
3093 .5851924 .4927685 0 1 
TENURE 3093 9.842548 7.422962 0  35 
#FILINGS 3093 343.1261 114.7727  97 812 
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Table 28 Summary statistics of the sample of observed defendants who entered pleas of 
guilty or nolo contendere  
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
TRIAL  2492  0  0 0 0 
TRIAL 
CONVICTION 
2492  0  0 0 0 
FINE 2492  154.213 363.7022 0  5120.323 
INDICT YEAR 2492 68.02729 7.432235  56  79 
LANDMARK 2492 3.387685 1.935138 1 8 
DOJBUDGET 2492 9102.976 4032.501  4255.528  17229.21 
%CRIMINAL 2492 .4719141 .1391065 .17 .72 
ANNUAL 
FORTUNE500 
2492 22.95787 13.71904 8  52 
HIGH ANNUAL 
FORTUNE500 
2492 .3326645 .4712621 0 1 
REPUB PRES 
INDICT YEAR  
2492  .502809 .5000925 0 1 
#CODEFEND 2492  12.2203 12.12626 0  72 
#CORP 
CODEFEND 
2492 6.831461  5.08148 0  23 
ONLY CORP 
DEFEND 
2492 .6508828 .4767867 0 1 
ONLY INDIV 
DEFEND 
2492 .0232745 .1508042 0 1 
ONLY HIGH 
RANK 
2492 .7993579 .4005611 0 1 
ONLY LOW 
RANK 
2492  .170947 .3765382 0 1 
ANY LOW RANK 2492 .2006421 .4005611 0 1 
#OTHER INDICT 2492 .4357945 1.785657 0  19 
ZERO OTHER 
INDICT 
2492 .8623596 .3445914 0 1 
#PREV CONVICT 2492  .144061 .8494176 0  19 
ZERO PREV 
CONVICT 
2492 .9357945 .2451678 0 1 
PROFIT 2492 2757.115 2274.806 -42.49872  12251.26 
HIGH PROFIT 2492 .3972713 .4894312 0 1 
COMPENSATION 2492 16078.62 13754.51  775.6696  66998.46 
HIGH 
COMPENSATION 
2492 .2973515 .4571843 0 1 
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Table 28, continued 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
DURATION 2492 5.672151 5.148191 1  40 
HIGH 
DURATION 
2492 .3760032 .4844781 0 1 
COMMERCE 2492 68945.12 179346.9 0 2116402 
HIGH 
COMMERCE 
2492  .209069 .4067254 0 1 
#COUNTS 
CONVICT 
2492 .1039326 .3317057 0 2 
MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT 
2492  .008427 .0914292 0 1 
MULTI COUNTS 
INDICT 
2492 .3138042  .464131 0 1 
COUNTS 
INDICT-
CONVICT 
2492  1.26565 .6240656 0 3 
PRICE FIX NOT 
BID RIG 
2492 .6914125 .4620031 0 1 
BID RIG NOT 
PRICE FIX 
2492 .1175762 .3221703 0 1 
ANY BID RIG 2492 .2624398 .4400487 0 1 
CONSUMER VIC 2492 .1930177  .394746 0 1 
CASE TIME 
SPAN 
2492 .8896469 1.003137 0 7 
DOJ WIN PREV 
YEAR BY VIOL#1 
2492 88.53772 11.12419  53 100 
DOJ WIN PREV 
YEAR 
2492 87.15449 11.72352  53 100 
HIGH DOJ WIN 
PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1 
2492 .4097111  .491879 0 1 
VAR DOJ WIN 
PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1 
2492 13.68986 11.96106 0  33.33333 
VAR DOJ WIN 
PREV YEAR 
2492 15.50195  9.48503 0  33.33333 
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Table 28, continued 
 
 
SENTENCE YEAR 2492 68.91693 7.292804  56  80 
POST-APPA 
SENTENCE YEAR 
2492 .3374799  .472945 0 1 
POST-APPA 
INDICT YEAR 
2492 .2905297 .4540979 0 1 
REPUB JUDGE 2492 .3579454 .4794922 0 1 
REPUB PRES 
SENTENCE YEAR 
2492 .4357945 .49596 0 1 
PRES & JUDGE 
SAME PARTY 
SENTENCE YEAR 
2492 .5778491 .4940015 0 1 
PRIOR 
PROSECUTOR 
2492 .6079454 .4883067 0 1 
TENURE 2492 10.15048 7.562308 0  35 
#FILINGS 2492 342.75 113.7765  97 812 
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Table 29 Summary statistics of the sample of observed defendants who entered not guilty 
pleas 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
TRIAL 601  1  0 1 1 
TRIAL 
CONVICTION 
 601 .2196339 .4143435 0 1 
FINE  601 42.19807 137.2063 0  1619.433 
INDICT YEAR  601  65.4609 8.219218  56  79 
LANDMARK  601 2.856606 1.238733 1 8 
DOJBUDGET  601 8139.416 4268.916  4255.528  17229.21 
%CRIMINAL  601 .4874542 .1194613 .02 .72 
ANNUAL 
FORTUNE500 
 601 23.84359 13.26771 8  52 
HIGH ANNUAL 
FORTUNE500 
 601 .3194676 .4666587 0 1 
REPUB PRES 
INDICT YEAR  
 601 .5856905 .4930127 0 1 
#CODEFEND  601 11.89684 8.469908 0  72 
#CORP 
CODEFEND 
 601  7.90183  6.87013 0  28 
ONLY CORP 
DEFEND 
 601 .5990017 .4905089 0 1 
ONLY INDIV 
DEFEND 
 601 .0449251 .2073123 0 1 
ONLY HIGH 
RANK 
 601 .7936772  .405002 0 1 
ONLY LOW 
RANK 
 601 .1830283 .3870118 0 1 
ANY LOW RANK  601 .2063228  .405002 0 1 
#OTHER INDICT  601 .1647255 .9225799 0  20 
ZERO OTHER 
INDICT 
 601  .890183 .3129219 0 1 
#PREV CONVICT  601 .1014975 .6865477 0  10 
ZERO PREV 
CONVICT 
 601 .9500832 .2179545 0 1 
PROFIT  601 3013.089 2729.285  3.229279  12251.26 
HIGH PROFIT  601 .3660566 .4821265 0 1 
COMPENSATION  601  14552.8  13847.1  775.6696  45984.84 
HIGH 
COMPENSATION 
 601 .2795341 .4491441 0 1 
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Table 29, continued 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
DURATION  601 4.650582 4.667373 1  25 
HIGH 
DURATION 
 601 .3061564 .4612794 0 1 
COMMERCE  601  45534.5 93584.29 0  807319.7 
HIGH 
COMMERCE 
 601 .1797005 .3842576 0 1 
#COUNTS 
CONVICT 
 601 .21797 .4838146 0 2 
MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT 
 601  .031614 .1751158 0 1 
#COUNTS 
INDICT 
 601 1.291181 .5196846 1 3 
COMMERCE  601  45534.5 93584.29 0  807319.7 
HIGH 
COMMERCE 
 601 .1797005 .3842576 0 1 
MULTI COUNTS 
INDICT 
 601 .2595674 .4387624 0 1 
COUNTS 
INDICT-
CONVICT 
 601 1.073211 .5898852 0 3 
PRICE FIX NOT 
BID RIG 
 601 .7204659 .4491441 0 1 
BID RIG NOT 
PRICE FIX 
 601 .1397671  .347034 0 1 
ANY BID RIG  601 .2312812  .422003 0 1 
CONSUMER VIC  601 .3161398 .4653555 0 1 
CASE TIME 
SPAN 
 601 1.329451 1.169593 0 6 
DOJ WIN PREV 
YEAR BY VIOL#1 
 601 85.93178 12.89161  53 100 
DOJ WIN PREV 
YEAR 
 601 82.77704 13.02127  53 100 
HIGH DOJ WIN 
PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1 
 601  .374376 .4843645 0 1 
VAR DOJ WIN 
PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1 
 601 12.53608 11.537 0  33.33333 
VAR DOJ WIN 
PREV YEAR 
 601 15.56709 9.452843 0  33.33333 
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Table 29, continued 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
SENTENCE YEAR  601 66.79035 8.071925  56  81 
POST-APPA 
SENTENCE YEAR 
 601 .3294509 .4704054 0 1 
POST-APPA 
INDICT YEAR 
 601 .2628952 .4405727 0 1 
REPUB JUDGE  601 .4459235 .4974812 0 1 
REPUB PRES 
SENTENCE YEAR 
 601  .452579 .4981608 0 1 
PRES & JUDGE 
SAME PARTY 
SENTENCE YEAR 
 601 .5407654 .4987505 0 1 
PRIOR 
PROSECUTOR 
 601 .4908486 .5003327 0 1 
TENURE  601 8.565724 6.670539 0  27 
#FILINGS  601 344.6855  118.899 123 812 
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Table 30 Summary statistics of the sample of observed defendants convicted at trial 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
TRIAL 132  1  0 1 1 
TRIAL 
CONVICTION 
 132  1  0 1 1 
FINE  132 192.1291 239.1611 0  1619.433 
INDICT YEAR  132 66.53788 8.903559  56  79 
LANDMARK  132 2.774242  1.28473 1 8 
DOJBUDGET  132 8525.326 4445.345  4255.528  17229.21 
%CRIMINAL  132  .515303 .1228755 .02 .72 
ANNUAL 
FORTUNE500 
 132 19.06818 8.712712 8  52 
HIGH ANNUAL 
FORTUNE500 
 132 .1136364 .3185781 0 1 
REPUB PRES 
INDICT YEAR  
 132 .7424242  .438965 0 1 
#CODEFEND  132 9.560606 7.855817 0  72 
#CORP 
CODEFEND 
 132  5.94697 4.221563 0  23 
ONLY CORP 
DEFEND 
 132 .6287879 .4849696 0 1 
ONLY INDIV 
DEFEND 
 132 .0833333 .2774383 0 1 
ONLY HIGH 
RANK 
 132 .8939394 .3090882 0 1 
ONLY LOW 
RANK 
 132 .0909091  .288575 0 1 
ANY LOW RANK  132 .1060606 .3090882 0 1 
#OTHER INDICT  132 .1136364 .3185781 0 1 
ZERO OTHER 
INDICT 
 132 .8863636 .3185781 0 1 
#PREV CONVICT  132 .0606061 .2695083 0 2 
ZERO PREV 
CONVICT 
 132 .9469697 .2249476 0 1 
PROFIT  132 2579.307 2633.807  136.4176  12251.26 
HIGH PROFIT  132  .280303 .4508583 0 1 
COMPENSATION  132 15201.25 14570.15 2070.64  45984.84 
HIGH 
COMPENSATION 
 132 .3333333 .4732004 0 1 
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Table 30, continued 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
DURATION  132 5.545455 5.315057 1  20 
HIGH 
DURATION 
 132 .3712121 .4849696 0 1 
COMMERCE  132  61510.3 113788.4 0  807319.7 
HIGH 
COMMERCE 
 132 .2121212 .4103676 0 1 
#COUNTS 
CONVICT 
 132 .1515152 .3805349 0 2 
MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT 
 132 .0075758 .0870388 0 1 
#COUNTS 
INDICT 
 132 1.181818 .4247708 1 3 
 MULTI COUNTS 
INDICT 
 132 .1666667 .3740977 0 1 
COUNTS 
INDICT-
CONVICT 
 132 1.030303 .5654073 0 3 
PRICE FIX NOT 
BID RIG 
 132 .6590909 .4758206 0 1 
BID RIG NOT 
PRICE FIX 
 132 .2045455 .4049057 0 1 
ANY BID RIG  132 .2272727 .4206667 0 1 
CONSUMER VIC  132 .4166667 .4948848 0 1 
CASE TIME 
SPAN 
 132 1.219697 1.100412 0 5 
DOJ WIN PREV 
YEAR BY VIOL#1 
 132 83.15909 15.18579  53 100 
DOJ WIN PREV 
YEAR 
 132 81.62879 14.64981  53 100 
HIGH DOJ WIN 
PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1 
 132 .4166667 .4948848 0 1 
VAR DOJ WIN 
PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1 
 132 11.00835 11.59196 0  33.33333 
VAR DOJ WIN 
PREV YEAR 
 132 16.40768 8.399533 0  33.33333 
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Table 30, continued 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
SENTENCE 
YEAR 
 132 67.75758  8.80243  56  81 
POST-APPA 
SENTENCE 
YEAR 
 132 .4393939  .498204 0 1 
POST-APPA 
INDICT YEAR 
 132 .2878788 .4544992 0 1 
REPUB JUDGE  132 .6590909 .4758206 0 1 
REPUB PRES 
SENTENCE 
YEAR 
 132 .5606061  .498204 0 1 
PRES & JUDGE 
SAME PARTY 
SENTENCE 
YEAR 
 132 .4772727  .501386 0 1 
PRIOR 
PROSECUTOR 
 132 .5909091 .4935391 0 1 
TENURE  132 7.590909 6.049357 0  25 
#FILINGS  132 352.2197 122.2653 194 728 
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Table 31 Summary statistics of the sample of observations in which the defendants went to 
trial and were not convicted at trial 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
TRIAL 469  1  0 1 1 
TRIAL 
CONVICTION 
 469  0  0 0 0 
FINE  469  0  0 0 0 
INDICT YEAR  469 65.15778 8.000043  56  79 
LANDMARK  469 2.879787 1.225886 1 8 
DOJBUDGET  469 8030.802 4216.444  4255.528  17229.21 
%CRIMINAL  469 .4796162 .1174291 .02 .72 
ANNUAL 
FORTUNE500 
 469 25.18763 14.00683 8  52 
HIGH ANNUAL 
FORTUNE500 
 469 .3773987 .4852535 0 1 
REPUB PRES 
INDICT YEAR  
 469 .5415778 .4988003 0 1 
#CODEFEND  469 12.55437 8.527966 0  72 
#CORP 
CODEFEND 
 469 8.452026 7.358083 0  28 
ONLY CORP 
DEFEND 
 469 .5906183 .4922448 0 1 
ONLY INDIV 
DEFEND 
 469 .0341151 .1817188 0 1 
ONLY HIGH 
RANK 
 469 .7654584 .4241644 0 1 
ONLY LOW 
RANK 
 469 .2089552 .4069965 0 1 
ANY LOW RANK  469 .2345416 .4241644 0 1 
#OTHER INDICT  469 .1791045 1.030471 0  20 
ZERO OTHER 
INDICT 
 469  .891258 .3116477 0 1 
#PREV CONVICT  469 .1130064 .7637775 0  10 
ZERO PREV 
CONVICT 
 469 .9509595 .2161832 0 1 
PROFIT  469 3135.177 2745.949  3.229279  12251.26 
HIGH PROFIT  469 .3901919  .488314 0 1 
COMPENSATION  469 14370.29 13647.29  775.6696  45984.84 
HIGH 
COMPENSATION 
 469 .2643923 .44148 0 1 
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Table 31, continued 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
DURATION  469 4.398721 4.442039 1  25 
HIGH 
DURATION 
 469 .2878465 .4532426 0 1 
COMMERCE  469 41038.11  86670.1 0  586510.3 
HIGH 
COMMERCE 
 469 .1705757 .3765394 0 1 
#COUNTS 
CONVICT 
 469 .2366738 .5079059 0 2 
MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT 
 469 .0383795 .1923159 0 1 
#COUNTS 
INDICT 
 469 1.321962 .5398318 1 3 
MULTI COUNTS 
INDICT 
 469 .2857143 .4522363 0 1 
COUNTS 
INDICT-
CONVICT 
 469 1.085288 .5966224 0 3 
PRICE FIX NOT 
BID RIG 
 469 .7377399  .440333 0 1 
BID RIG NOT 
PRICE FIX 
 469 .1215352 .3270971 0 1 
ANY BID RIG  469 .2324094 .4228196 0 1 
CONSUMER VIC  469 .2878465 .4532426 0 1 
CASE TIME 
SPAN 
 469 1.360341 1.187634 0 6 
DOJ WIN PREV 
YEAR BY VIOL#1 
 469 86.71215 12.07227  53 100 
DOJ WIN PREV 
YEAR 
 469 83.10021 12.523  53 100 
HIGH DOJ WIN 
PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1 
 469 .3624733 .4812278 0 1 
VAR DOJ WIN 
PREV YEAR BY 
VIOL#1 
 469 12.96607 11.49727 0  33.33333 
VAR DOJ WIN 
PREV YEAR 
 469 15.33051 9.723957 0  33.33333 
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Table 31, continued 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
SENTENCE 
YEAR 
 469 66.51812 7.842615  56  80 
POST-APPA 
SENTENCE 
YEAR 
 469 .2985075 .4580919 0 1 
POST-APPA 
INDICT YEAR 
 469 .2558635 .4368114 0 1 
REPUB JUDGE  469 .3859275 .4873334 0 1 
REPUB PRES 
SENTENCE 
YEAR 
 469 .4221748 .4944335 0 1 
PRES & JUDGE 
SAME PARTY 
SENTENCE 
YEAR 
 469 .5586354 .4970802 0 1 
PRIOR 
PROSECUTOR 
 469 .4626866 .4991382 0 1 
TENURE  469 8.840085 6.816114 0  27 
#FILINGS  469  342.565 117.9805 123 812 
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APPENDIX C 
 
CROSS-BRANCH MEANS TESTS OF THE TRIAL SELECTION MODEL 
 
 This appendix reports the results of the means tests used to test the predictions of the trial 
selection model.  Table 10 in Chapter X summarizes the results reported here.  These means tests 
test the difference in the values of the means of the values of empirical variables that represent 
case characteristics in the sample of defendants who go to trial versus the sample of defendants 
who avoid trial. 
 
 
ttest COUNTS INDICT-CONVICT, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492     1.26565    .0125013    .6240656    1.241136    1.290164 
       1 |     601    1.073211    .0240619    .5898852    1.025955    1.120467 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    1.228257    .0111869    .6221573    1.206323    1.250192 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .1924388    .0280654                .1374101    .2474675 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   6.8568 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
.  
 
 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .1175762    .0064537    .3221703     .104921    .1302315 
       1 |     601    .1397671    .0141558     .347034    .1119661     .167568 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .1218881    .0058835    .3272095    .1103522    .1334241 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0221908    .0148668               -.0513407    .0069591 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -1.4926 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0678         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1356          Pr(T > t) = 0.9322 
 
.  
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ttest PROFIT,by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    2757.115    45.56909    2274.806    2667.758    2846.473 
       1 |     601    3013.089    111.3299    2729.285    2794.446    3231.733 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    2806.854    42.64398    2371.634     2723.24    2890.467 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -255.9737    107.6961                -467.137   -44.81049 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -2.3768 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0088         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0175          Pr(T > t) = 0.9912 
 
 
 
ttest COMPENSATION, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    16078.62    275.5313    13754.51    15538.33    16618.92 
       1 |     601     14552.8    564.8349     13847.1    13443.51    15662.09 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    15782.14    247.8395    13783.53    15296.19    16268.09 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            1525.824    625.8819                298.6372     2753.01 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   2.4379 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9926         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0148          Pr(T > t) = 0.0074 
 
 
 
ttest #OTHER INDICT, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .4357945    .0357704    1.785657    .3656517    .5059373 
       1 |     601    .1647255    .0376328    .9225799    .0908174    .2386335 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .3831232    .0297933    1.656947    .3247065    .4415398 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .2710691    .0751528                .1237145    .4184236 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   3.6069 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9998         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0003          Pr(T > t) = 0.0002 
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ttest  #CORP CODEFEND, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    6.831461    .1017926     5.08148    6.631854    7.031068 
       1 |     601     7.90183    .2802384     6.87013    7.351463    8.452198 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    7.039444    .0987159    5.490059    6.845889    7.232999 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            -1.07037     .248788               -1.558176    -.582563 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -4.3023 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
 
 
.  
ttest CASE TIME SPAN, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .8896469    .0200949    1.003137    .8502424    .9290513 
       1 |     601    1.329451    .0477087    1.169593    1.235755    1.423147 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .9751051    .0189135     1.05187    .9380208    1.012189 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            -.439804    .0471502               -.5322529   -.3473552 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -9.3277 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
 
 
 
ttest  LANDMARK, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    3.387685    .0387648    1.935138     3.31167    3.463699 
       1 |     601    2.856606     .050529    1.238733    2.757371    2.955841 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    3.284491    .0329536    1.832706    3.219878    3.349104 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .5310789    .0827498                .3688287    .6933292 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   6.4179 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 241
Ttest PRIOR PROSECUTOR, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .6079454    .0097818    .4883067    .5887641    .6271267 
       1 |     601    .4908486     .020409    .5003327    .4507668    .5309303 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .5851924    .0088604    .4927685    .5678195    .6025652 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .1170968    .0222979                .0733767    .1608169 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   5.2515 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
 
 
ttest CONSUMER VIC, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .1930177    .0079076     .394746    .1775115    .2085238 
       1 |     601    .3161398    .0189822    .4653555      .27886    .3534195 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .2169415    .0074122    .4122291    .2024081    .2314749 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.1231221    .0186051               -.1596018   -.0866424 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -6.6176 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
ttest COMPETITOR VIC, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .0276886    .0032875     .164112    .0212421    .0341351 
       1 |     601    .0415973    .0081514    .1998335    .0255886     .057606 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .0303912    .0030871     .171689    .0243382    .0364442 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0139087    .0077995               -.0292015     .001384 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -1.7833 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0373         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0746          Pr(T > t) = 0.9627 
.  
 
 
 242
ttest GOV VIC, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .2207063    .0083094     .414806    .2044122    .2370004 
       1 |     601    .1780366    .0156173    .3828622    .1473654    .2087078 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .2124151    .0073557    .4090832    .1979927    .2268376 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0426697    .0185776                .0062439    .0790954 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   2.2968 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9892         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0217          Pr(T > t) = 0.0108 
.  
 
 
ttest FIRM VIC, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .5585875     .009949    .4966553    .5390782    .5780967 
       1 |     601    .4642263    .0203601     .499134    .4242406     .504212 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .5402522    .0089627    .4984577    .5226788    .5578256 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0943612     .022592                .0500643    .1386581 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   4.1767 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
ttest #COUNTS INDICT_hpsv, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    1.098716    .0085304    .4258394    1.081988    1.115443 
       1 |     601    1.043261      .01516    .3716522    1.013488    1.073034 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    1.087941     .007487    .4163851    1.073261     1.10262 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0554547    .0188991                .0183987    .0925106 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   2.9343 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9983         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0034          Pr(T > t) = 0.0017 
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ttest ANY BID RIG, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .2624398    .0088151    .4400487    .2451542    .2797255 
       1 |     601    .2312812    .0172139     .422003    .1974745    .2650879 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .2563854    .0078524    .4367077     .240989    .2717818 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0311586    .0198411               -.0077445    .0700618 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   1.5704 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9418         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1164          Pr(T > t) = 0.0582 
 
.  
.  
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT_hpsv, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .1448636     .007052    .3520339    .1310352    .1586919 
       1 |     601    .0915141    .0117714    .2885791     .068396    .1146323 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .1344973    .0061358     .341241    .1224666    .1465279 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0533494    .0154802                .0229968     .083702 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   3.4463 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9997         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0006          Pr(T > t) = 0.0003 
 
.  
 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .3138042    .0092975     .464131    .2955725    .3320358 
       1 |     601    .2595674    .0178975    .4387624     .224418    .2947167 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .3032654    .0082666    .4597432    .2870569     .319474 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0542368    .0208733                .0133099    .0951637 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   2.5984 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9953         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0094          Pr(T > t) = 0.0047 
 
.  
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ttest #COUNTS INDICT, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    1.369583    .0117608    .5871002    1.346521    1.392645 
       1 |     601    1.291181    .0211984    .5196846    1.249549    1.332813 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    1.354349    .0103458    .5753772    1.334063    1.374634 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0784013    .0261138                .0271992    .1296034 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   3.0023 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9986         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0027          Pr(T > t) = 0.0014 
 
 
 
ttest  %CRIMINAL, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .4719141    .0027866    .1391065    .4664499    .4773784 
       1 |     601    .4874542    .0048729    .1194613    .4778842    .4970243 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .4749337    .0024388    .1356336    .4701519    .4797156 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0155401    .0061584               -.0276151   -.0034651 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -2.5234 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0058         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0117          Pr(T > t) = 0.9942 
 
 
 
 
ttest DOJ TRIAL WIN PREV YEAR, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    27.02271    .4675967     23.3424    26.10579    27.93963 
       1 |     601    25.43097    .8643365    21.18947    23.73347    27.12846 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    26.71342    .4125747    22.94524    25.90447    27.52237 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            1.591745    1.042504               -.4523262    3.635816 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   1.5268 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9365         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1269          Pr(T > t) = 0.0635 
 
 
.  
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ttest DURATION, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    5.672151     .103129    5.148191    5.469924    5.874378 
       1 |     601    4.650582    .1903861    4.667373    4.276678    5.024487 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093     5.47365    .0912303    5.073748    5.294772    5.652528 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            1.021569    .2298766                .5708421    1.472295 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   4.4440 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
 
 
ttest ONLY INDIV DEFEND, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .0232745    .0030209    .1508042    .0173507    .0291983 
       1 |     601    .0449251    .0084564    .2073123    .0283173     .061533 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .0274814      .00294    .1635079    .0217168     .033246 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0216506    .0074215               -.0362022   -.0070991 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -2.9173 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0018         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0036          Pr(T > t) = 0.9982 
 
 
 
 
ttest ONLY CORP DEFEND, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .6508828     .009551    .4767867    .6321541    .6696116 
       1 |     601    .5990017    .0200083    .4905089    .5597069    .6382964 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .6408018     .008628     .479843    .6238847     .657719 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0518812    .0217896                .0091575    .0946048 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   2.3810 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9913         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0173          Pr(T > t) = 0.0087 
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ttest  DOJBUDGET, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    9102.976    80.77937    4032.501    8944.575    9261.378 
       1 |     601    8139.416    174.1327    4268.916    7797.432      8481.4 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    8915.747    73.66012    4096.589     8771.32    9060.175 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            963.5605    185.3881                600.0642    1327.057 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   5.1975 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
 
 
ttest COMMERCE, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    68945.12    3592.691    179346.9    61900.16    75990.09 
       1 |     601     45534.5    3817.383    93584.29    38037.44    53031.55 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    64396.21    2992.532    166428.9    58528.66    70263.76 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            23410.63    7552.726                8601.756     38219.5 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   3.0996 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9990         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0020          Pr(T > t) = 0.0010 
 
 
 
ttest DOJ TRIAL WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    29.15711    .5979812    29.85118    27.98452     30.3297 
       1 |     601    26.82892    1.199323    29.40176    24.47354     29.1843 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    28.70472    .5353602    29.77392    27.65502    29.75442 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            2.328188    1.352624               -.3239435     4.98032 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   1.7212 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9573         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0853          Pr(T > t) = 0.0427 
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ttest COMMERCE PER YEAR, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    18921.37     806.337    40252.29    17340.21    20502.53 
       1 |     601    14748.56    1592.712    39045.82    11620.59    17876.53 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    18110.55    720.1064    40048.53    16698.62    19522.49 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            4172.815    1818.721                 606.791    7738.839 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   2.2944 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9891         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0218          Pr(T > t) = 0.0109 
 
 
 
 
ttest PRICE FIX NOT BID RIG, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .6914125    .0092549    .4620031    .6732645    .7095606 
       1 |     601    .7204659     .018321    .4491441    .6844849    .7564469 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .6970579    .0082641    .4596047    .6808542    .7132615 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0290534    .0208832               -.0699998     .011893 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -1.3912 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0821         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1643          Pr(T > t) = 0.9179 
 
 
 
 
ttest ANY HPSV, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .9538523    .0042037    .2098469    .9456093    .9620954 
       1 |     601    .9517471    .0087488    .2144787    .9345652     .968929 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .9534433     .003789    .2107215    .9460141    .9608724 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0021052    .0095776               -.0166738    .0208842 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   0.2198 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.5870         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8260          Pr(T > t) = 0.4130 
 
.  
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ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .2905297    .0090965    .4540979    .2726922    .3083672 
       1 |     601    .2628952    .0179713    .4405727    .2276008    .2981895 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093      .28516    .0081195    .4515636    .2692399    .3010802 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0276345    .0205183               -.0125963    .0678653 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   1.3468 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9109         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1781          Pr(T > t) = 0.0891 
 
 
 
.  
ttest ANNUAL FORTUNE500, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    22.95787     .274821    13.71904    22.41896    23.49677 
       1 |     601    23.84359    .5412012    13.26771    22.78072    24.90647 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    23.12997    .2451671    13.63491    22.64926    23.61068 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.8857288    .6195232               -2.100448    .3289899 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -1.4297 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0765         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1529          Pr(T > t) = 0.9235 
 
 
 
 
ttest  #CODEFEND, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492     12.2203    .2429142    12.12626    11.74397    12.69664 
       1 |     601    11.89684    .3454948    8.469908    11.21831    12.57536 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    12.15745    .2068983     11.5066    11.75178    12.56312 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .3234664    .5229606               -.7019191    1.348852 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   0.6185 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.7319         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.5363          Pr(T > t) = 0.2681 
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ttest ONLY HIGH RANK, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .7993579    .0080241    .4005611    .7836234    .8150925 
       1 |     601    .7936772    .0165204     .405002    .7612324     .826122 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .7982541    .0072169    .4013684    .7841036    .8124046 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0056807    .0182425                -.030088    .0414495 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   0.3114 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.6222         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7555          Pr(T > t) = 0.3778 
 
 
 
ttest ONLY LOW RANK, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492     .170947    .0075428    .3765382    .1561561    .1857379 
       1 |     601    .1830283    .0157865    .3870118    .1520247    .2140319 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .1732945    .0068069    .3785629    .1599481     .186641 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0120813    .0172049               -.0458155     .021653 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -0.7022 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2413         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4826          Pr(T > t) = 0.7587 
 
.  
.  
 
ttest ANY LOW RANK, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492    .2006421    .0080241    .4005611    .1849075    .2163766 
       1 |     601    .2063228    .0165204     .405002     .173878    .2387676 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .2017459    .0072169    .4013684    .1875954    .2158964 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0056807    .0182425               -.0414495     .030088 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -0.3114 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.3778         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7555          Pr(T > t) = 0.6222 
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ttest #PREV CONVICT, by(TRIAL) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    2492     .144061    .0170156    .8494176    .1106948    .1774272 
       1 |     601    .1014975    .0280049    .6865477     .046498     .156497 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    3093    .1357905    .0147511     .820376    .1068676    .1647133 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0425635    .0372795               -.0305317    .1156586 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   1.1417 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     3091 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8732         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2537          Pr(T > t) = 0.1268 
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APPENDIX D 
 
CROSS-BRANCH MEANS TESTS OF THE TRIAL CONVICTION MODEL 
 
 This appendix reports the results of the means tests used to test the predictions of the trial 
conviction model.  Table 11 in Chapter X summarizes these results.  These means tests test the 
difference in the values of the means of the values of empirical variables that represent case 
characteristics in the sample of defendants convicted at trial versus the sample of defendants who 
go to trial but avoid trial conviction. 
 
 
 
ttest PROFIT, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    3135.177    126.7962    2745.949    2886.017    3384.337 
       1 |     132    2579.307    229.2435    2633.807    2125.809    3032.806 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    3013.089    111.3299    2729.285    2794.446    3231.733 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            555.8696    268.1779                 29.1863    1082.553 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   2.0728 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9807         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0386          Pr(T > t) = 0.0193 
 
 
 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .2857143    .0208823    .4522363    .2446795     .326749 
       1 |     132    .1666667     .032561    .3740977    .1022532    .2310801 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .2595674    .0178975    .4387624     .224418    .2947167 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .1190476    .0429926                .0346131    .2034821 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   2.7690 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9971         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0058          Pr(T > t) = 0.0029 
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ttest #HPSV COUNTS INDICT, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    1.081023    .0169312    .3666699    1.047753    1.114294 
       1 |     132    .9090909    .0312707    .3592729      .84723    .9709518 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    1.043261      .01516    .3716522    1.013488    1.073034 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .1719325    .0359695                .1012909    .2425741 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   4.7800 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
 
 
ttest MULTI HPSV, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .1108742    .0145136    .3143116    .0823544     .139394 
       1 |     132    .0227273     .013021    .1496004   -.0030315     .048486 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .0915141    .0117714    .2885791     .068396    .1146323 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0881469    .0282283                .0327085    .1435854 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   3.1226 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9991         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0019          Pr(T > t) = 0.0009 
 
.  
 
 
ttest ANY HPSV, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .9701493    .0078664    .1703572    .9546915     .985607 
       1 |     132    .8863636    .0277287    .3185781    .8315097    .9412176 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .9517471    .0087488    .2144787    .9345652     .968929 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0837856    .0208711                .0427962     .124775 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   4.0144 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0001          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
.  
.  
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ttest CONSUMER VIC, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .2878465    .0209288    .4532426    .2467204    .3289725 
       1 |     132    .4166667    .0430742    .4948848    .3314556    .5018777 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .3161398    .0189822    .4653555      .27886    .3534195 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.1288202    .0455864               -.2183488   -.0392916 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -2.8258 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0024         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0049          Pr(T > t) = 0.9976 
 
 
 
ttest FIRM VIC, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .4840085    .0231007    .5002778    .4386146    .5294024 
       1 |     132    .3939394    .0426911    .4904831    .3094863    .4783925 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .4642263    .0203601     .499134    .4242406     .504212 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0900691    .0490824               -.0063254    .1864637 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   1.8351 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9665         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0670          Pr(T > t) = 0.0335 
 
 
 
ttest #COUNTS INDICT, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    1.321962    .0249271    .5398318    1.272979    1.370945 
       1 |     132    1.181818    .0369716    .4247708     1.10868    1.254957 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    1.291181    .0211984    .5196846    1.249549    1.332813 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .1401434    .0509258                .0401286    .2401582 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   2.7519 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9969         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0061          Pr(T > t) = 0.0031 
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 ttest VAR DOJ TRIAL WIN PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    12.96607    .5308947    11.49727    11.92283     14.0093 
       1 |     132    11.00835    1.008951    11.59196    9.012399    13.00429 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    12.53608    .4706039      11.537    11.61185    13.46032 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            1.957721    1.134861               -.2710692    4.186512 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   1.7251 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9575         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0850          Pr(T > t) = 0.0425 
 
 
 
 
ttest %CRIMINAL, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .4796162    .0054224    .1174291     .468961    .4902714 
       1 |     132     .515303    .0106949    .1228755    .4941459    .5364602 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .4874542    .0048729    .1194613    .4778842    .4970243 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0356868    .0116896               -.0586445   -.0127292 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -3.0529 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0012         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0024          Pr(T > t) = 0.9988 
 
 
 
ttest #CODEFEND, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    12.55437    .3937849    8.527966    11.78057    13.32818 
       1 |     132    9.560606    .6837611    7.855817    8.207964    10.91325 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    11.89684    .3454948    8.469908    11.21831    12.57536 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            2.993765    .8262217                1.371122    4.616408 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   3.6234 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9998         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0003          Pr(T > t) = 0.0002 
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ttest PRIOR PROSECUTOR, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .4626866    .0230481    .4991382    .4173961    .5079771 
       1 |     132    .5909091    .0429571    .4935391    .5059298    .6758884 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .4908486     .020409    .5003327    .4507668    .5309303 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.1282225    .0490594               -.2245719   -.0318731 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -2.6136 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0046         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0092          Pr(T > t) = 0.9954 
 
 
 
ttest ANNUAL FORTUNE500, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    25.18763    .6467752    14.00683    23.91669    26.45858 
       1 |     132    19.06818    .7583442    8.712712      17.568    20.56837 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    23.84359    .5412012    13.26771    22.78072    24.90647 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            6.119451    1.284231                 3.59731    8.641593 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   4.7651 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
 
 
ttest ONLY INDIV DEFEND, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .0341151     .008391    .1817188    .0176265    .0506038 
       1 |     132    .0833333    .0241479    .2774383     .035563    .1311036 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .0449251    .0084564    .2073123    .0283173     .061533 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0492182    .0203442               -.0891727   -.0092637 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -2.4193 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0079         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0158          Pr(T > t) = 0.9921 
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ttest DURATION, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    4.398721    .2051143    4.442039    3.995662     4.80178 
       1 |     132    5.545455    .4626163    5.315057    4.630289     6.46062 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    4.650582    .1903861    4.667373    4.276678    5.024487 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -1.146734    .4578639               -2.045948   -.2475201 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -2.5045 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0063         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0125          Pr(T > t) = 0.9937 
 
 
 
ttest COMMERCE, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    41038.11    4002.054     86670.1    33173.89    48902.33 
       1 |     132     61510.3    9904.006    113788.4    41917.82    81102.79 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601     45534.5    3817.383    93584.29    38037.44    53031.55 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -20472.19    9190.468               -38521.65   -2422.738 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -2.2275 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0131         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0263          Pr(T > t) = 0.9869 
 
.  
 
.  
ttest PRICE FIX NOT BID RIG, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .7377399    .0203327     .440333    .6977852    .7776945 
       1 |     132    .6590909    .0414149    .4758206    .5771624    .7410194 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .7204659     .018321    .4491441    .6844849    .7564469 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |             .078649    .0441739               -.0081056    .1654035 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   1.7804 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9622         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0755          Pr(T > t) = 0.0378 
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ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .1215352    .0151039    .3270971    .0918552    .1512151 
       1 |     132    .2045455    .0352425    .4049057    .1348273    .2742636 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .1397671    .0141558     .347034    .1119661     .167568 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0830103    .0340529               -.1498879   -.0161326 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -2.4377 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0075         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0151          Pr(T > t) = 0.9925 
 
 
 
ttest ONLY HIGH RANK, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .7654584    .0195861    .4241644    .7269709     .803946 
       1 |     132    .8939394    .0269027    .3090882    .8407195    .9471593 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .7936772    .0165204     .405002    .7612324     .826122 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            -.128481    .0395912               -.2062354   -.0507265 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -3.2452 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0006         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0012          Pr(T > t) = 0.9994 
 
 
 
ttest ONLY LOW RANK, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .2089552    .0187934    .4069965    .1720254     .245885 
       1 |     132    .0909091    .0251172     .288575    .0412212     .140597 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .1830283    .0157865    .3870118    .1520247    .2140319 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .1180461    .0378577                .0436962     .192396 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   3.1182 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9990         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0019          Pr(T > t) = 0.0010 
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ttest ANY LOW RANK, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .2345416    .0195861    .4241644     .196054    .2730291 
       1 |     132    .1060606    .0269027    .3090882    .0528407    .1592805 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .2063228    .0165204     .405002     .173878    .2387676 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |             .128481    .0395912                .0507265    .2062354 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   3.2452 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9994         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0012          Pr(T > t) = 0.0006 
 
 
 
 
 ttest LANDMARK, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    2.879787    .0566061    1.225886    2.768553     2.99102 
       1 |     132    2.774242    .1118214     1.28473    2.553033    2.995452 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    2.856606     .050529    1.238733    2.757371    2.955841 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .1055444    .1220767               -.1342061    .3452948 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   0.8646 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8062         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3876          Pr(T > t) = 0.1938 
 
.  
.  
. ttest DOJBUDGET, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    8030.802    194.6973    4216.444    7648.212    8413.391 
       1 |     132    8525.326    386.9176    4445.345    7759.911    9290.742 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    8139.416    174.1327    4268.916    7797.432      8481.4 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -494.5249    420.4775               -1320.314    331.2645 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -1.1761 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.1200         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2400          Pr(T > t) = 0.8800 
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. ttest ONLY CORP DEFEND, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .5906183    .0227298    .4922448    .5459533    .6352833 
       1 |     132    .6287879    .0422112    .4849696    .5452841    .7122917 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .5990017    .0200083    .4905089    .5597069    .6382964 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0381695    .0483445               -.1331149    .0567758 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -0.7895 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2151         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4301          Pr(T > t) = 0.7849 
 
 
 
. ttest #OTHER INDICT, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .1791045    .0475827    1.030471    .0856022    .2726067 
       1 |     132    .1136364    .0277287    .3185781    .0587824    .1684903 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .1647255    .0376328    .9225799    .0908174    .2386335 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0654681    .0909373               -.1131267    .2440629 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   0.7199 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.7641         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4719          Pr(T > t) = 0.2359 
 
 
 
. ttest #PREV CONVICT, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .1130064     .035268    .7637775    .0437032    .1823096 
       1 |     132    .0606061    .0234577    .2695083    .0142012     .107011 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .1014975    .0280049    .6865477     .046498     .156497 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0524003    .0676674               -.0804939    .1852945 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   0.7744 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.7805         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4390          Pr(T > t) = 0.2195 
 
.  
.  
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. ttest COMPENSATION, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    14370.29    630.1731    13647.29    13131.97    15608.61 
       1 |     132    15201.25    1268.169    14570.15    12692.51    17709.99 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601     14552.8    564.8349     13847.1    13443.51    15662.09 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            -830.959    1365.056               -3511.837    1849.919 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -0.6087 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2715         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.5429          Pr(T > t) = 0.7285 
 
 
 
 
. ttest COMMERCE PER YEAR, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    14874.69     1824.53    39512.76     11289.4    18459.97 
       1 |     132    14300.41      3262.4    37482.12    7846.605    20754.21 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    14748.56    1592.712    39045.82    11620.59    17876.53 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            574.2793    3850.282               -6987.415    8135.973 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   0.1492 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.5593         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8815          Pr(T > t) = 0.4407 
 
 
 
ttest COUNTS INDICT-CONVICT, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    1.085288    .0275495    .5966224    1.031152    1.139424 
       1 |     132    1.030303    .0492124    .5654073    .9329492    1.127657 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    1.073211    .0240619    .5898852    1.025955    1.120467 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0549848    .0581259               -.0591704    .1691401 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   0.9460 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8277         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3445          Pr(T > t) = 0.1723 
 
.  
.  
.  
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. ttest ANY BID RIG, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .2324094     .019524    .4228196    .1940438    .2707749 
       1 |     132    .2272727    .0366143    .4206667    .1548408    .2997046 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .2312812    .0172139     .422003    .1974745    .2650879 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0051367    .0416137               -.0765898    .0868631 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   0.1234 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.5491         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9018          Pr(T > t) = 0.4509 
 
 
 
. ttest COMPETITOR VIC, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .0405117    .0091135    .1973666    .0226032    .0584203 
       1 |     132    .0454545    .0181992    .2090924    .0094523    .0814568 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .0415973    .0081514    .1998335    .0255886     .057606 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0049428    .0197048               -.0436417     .033756 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -0.2508 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4010         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8020          Pr(T > t) = 0.5990 
 
 
 
ttest GOV VIC, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .1876333    .0180471    .3908359    .1521698    .2230967 
       1 |     132    .1439394    .0306695    .3523655    .0832678    .2046109 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .1780366    .0156173    .3828622    .1473654    .2087078 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0436939    .0377123               -.0303704    .1177582 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   1.1586 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8765         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2471          Pr(T > t) = 0.1235 
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. ttest CASE TIME SPAN, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    1.360341    .0548399    1.187634    1.252578    1.468104 
       1 |     132    1.219697    .0957786    1.100412    1.030224     1.40917 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    1.329451    .0477087    1.169593    1.235755    1.423147 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .1406442    .1151917               -.0855845    .3668728 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   1.2210 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8887         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2226          Pr(T > t) = 0.1113 
 
 
 
 
. ttest VAR DOJ TRIAL WIN PREV YEAR, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    15.33051    .4490106    9.723957    14.44818    16.21283 
       1 |     132    16.40768    .7310855    8.399533    14.96141    17.85394 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    15.56709    .3855895    9.452843    14.80982    16.32436 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -1.077168    .9311162               -2.905817    .7514814 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -1.1569 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.1239         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2478          Pr(T > t) = 0.8761 
 
 
 
 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR, by(TRIAL CONVICTION) 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     469    .2558635    .0201701    .4368114    .2162284    .2954987 
       1 |     132    .2878788    .0395591    .4544992    .2096215    .3661361 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     601    .2628952    .0179713    .4405727    .2276008    .2981895 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0320152    .0434257               -.1173003    .0532699 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -0.7372 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      599 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2306         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4613          Pr(T > t) = 0.7694 
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APPENDIX E 
 
SAME-BRANCH MEANS TESTS THE CASE SELECTION MODEL 
USING SAMPLE OF INDICTED DEFENDANTS  
 
This appendix reports the results of two-sample means tests that determine the 
relationships between variables representing the characteristics of initiated cases.  All of the 
possible pairs of 14 variables allowed 91 separate means tests.  Tables 33-36 report the means 
test results, by the pairs of variables used in the means tests.  Each means test suggests two 
combinations (out of a possible four combinations) of the subject pair of variables in terms of 
their relative values.  The means tests can suggest 182 different possible combinations of pairs of 
14 variables in terms of the variables’ relative values.   
Statistical insignificance suggests that prosecutors either used a random process for 
selecting federal criminal antitrust cases to initiate from 1956 through 1979, or that the case 
selection process otherwise produced a random mix of case characteristics in initiated cases.  In 
the tables, “0” denotes statistically insignificant results.  Statistically significant results, denoted 
by “1,” that are inconsistent with the case selection model’s predictions suggest that prosecutors 
used a non-random case selection process that differs from the case selection model specification 
of that process.  All other results will lend empirical support for the case selection model’s 
predictive value.   
The means tests reported in Tables 33-36 use the sample of defendants chosen for 
indictment (n = 3093), so the case selection model’s predictions, which are summarized in Table 
4, apply.  Suppose a variable representing the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C, is 
paired with a variable representing the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, K, in a means 
test.  Then the means test will suggest either of the following combinations of C and K: i) (high 
value of C, high value of K) and (low value of C, low value of K); or ii) (high value of C, low 
value of K) and (low value of C, high value of K).  Three combinations of pairs of the relative 
values of the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C, and the defendant’s, K, in the sample 
of initiated cases, are consistent with the case selection model’s predictions: (high value of C, 
high value of K), (low value of C, low value of K) and (low value of C, high value of K).  The 
 264
combination of (high value of C, low value of K) in the sample of initiated cases is inconsistent 
with the case selection model’s predictions.   
In general, the combinations found in the sample of initiated cases that are consistent 
with the case selection model can be stated in terms of the prosecutor’s value of bringing a case, 
E(V): (low value of E(V), high value of E(V)), (high value of E(V), low value of E(V)), and (high 
value of E(V), high value of E(V)).  The combination (low value of E(V), low value of E(V)) is 
inconsistent with the case selection model.   
A two-sample means test will always suggest (high value of C, low value of K) or, more 
generally, (low value of E(V), low value of E(V)) when it suggests (low value of C, high value of 
K) or, more generally, (high value of E(V), high value of E(V)).  Thus, in the sample of 
defendants in initiated cases, the percentage of combinations that are consistent with the case 
selection model’s predictions cannot fall below 50 percent and cannot exceed 100 percent of the 
statistically significant combinations of pairs of variables that the means tests produce.  The 
reported means tests results should be judged accordingly.   Table 32 summarizes the results of 
the individual means tests covered by Tables 33-36, which follow. 
 
 
Table 32 Results of means tests of implications of the case selection process, using the 
sample of indicted defendants (n = 3093) 
 
 
Statistically Significant Results 
Appendix E Table 
Reporting Results 
 
Statistically 
Insignificant 
Results 
Number of Combinations 
Consistent with Case 
Selection Model’s 
Predictions 
Number of 
Combinations 
Inconsistent with Case 
Selection Model’s 
Predictions 
Table 33 2 14 14 10 10 
Table 34 16 13 13 17 17 
Table 35 22 7 7 7 7 
Table 36 0 0 0 3 3 
      
GRAND TOTALS 40 34 34 37 37 
 40 105 37 
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Table 33 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the prosecutor’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, C, and other variables 
from the sample of indicted defendants (n = 3093) 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Case Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by the Model of the 
Prosecutor’s Case Selection Process 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Case 
Selection 
Model 
 High C, E(V) > 0 
Low C,  
E(V) < 0 
Low C, 
E(V) > 0 
High C, 
E(V) < 0 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
ttest HIGH ANNUAL 
FORTUNE500, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 
  1 1 
ttest ONLY LOW RANK, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 6 6 6 6 
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Table 33, continued 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample Means 
Tests 
Evidence of Expected Case Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by the Model of the 
Prosecutor’s Case Selection Process 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Case 
Selection 
Model 
 High C,  E(V) > 0 
Low C,  
E(V) < 0 
Low C, 
E(V) > 0 
High C, 
E(V) < 0 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
ttest ONLY LOW RANK, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN PREV 
YEAR BY VIOL#1,  by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 8 8 4 4 
TOTALS 14 14 10 10 
 
Note: The variables HIGH DOJBUDGET and HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500, which represent 
the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C, pair with other variables in the tests 
reported here.  “0” denotes statistically insignificant results, so that the reported totals 
only reflect statistically significant results. 
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Table 34 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the defendant’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, K, and other variables 
from the sample of indicted defendants (n = 3093) 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Case Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by the Model of the 
Prosecutor’s Case Selection Process 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Case 
Selection 
Model 
 Low K, ∆E(V) > 0 
High K, 
E(V) < 0 
High K, 
E(V) > 0 
Low K, 
E(V) < 0 ∆ ∆ ∆
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(ONLY 
LOW RANK)   1 1 (p<0.10) 
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK)   1 1 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 1 1   
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 1 1   
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(ONLY 
LOW RANK)   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK)   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 0 0 0 0 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 1 1   
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 
1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 4 4 5 5 
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Table 34, continued 
  
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Case Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by the Model of the 
Prosecutor’s Case Selection Process 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Case 
Selection 
Model 
 Low K, ∆E(V) > 0 
High K, 
E(V) < 0 
High K, 
E(V) > 0 
Low K, 
E(V) < 0 ∆ ∆ ∆
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH PROFIT)   1 1 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH PROFIT)   1 1 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH PROFIT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
PROFIT) 1 1   
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH PROFIT)   1 (p<0.15) 1 (p<0.15) 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH PROFIT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH PROFIT)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH PROFIT) 1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH PROFIT) 0 0 0 0 
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(HIGH PROFIT) 
1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 3 3 4 4 
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Table 34, continued  
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Case Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by the Model of the 
Prosecutor’s Case Selection Process 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Case 
Selection 
Model 
 Low K, ∆E(V) > 0 
High K, 
E(V) < 0 
High K, 
E(V) > 0 
Low K, 
E(V) < 0 ∆ ∆ ∆
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH COMPENSATION)   1 1 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH COMPENSATION)   1 1 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
COMPENSATION) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH COMPENSATION)   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION)   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 1 1   
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 
1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 3 3 5 5 
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Table 34, continued 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Case Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by the Model of 
the Prosecutor’s Case Selection Process 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Case 
Selection 
Model 
 Low K or e, E(V) > 0 
High K or e, 
E(V) < 0 
High K or e, 
E(V) > 0 
Low K or e, 
E(V) < 0 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT)   1 1 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(ZERO 
OTHER INDICT) 1 1   
Ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT)   1 (p<0.10) 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 1 1   
Ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 
1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 3 3 3 3 
TOTALS 13 13 17 17 
 
Note: The variables ONLY LOW RANK, HIGH PROFIT, HIGH COMPENSATION, and ZERO 
OTHER INDICT, which represent the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, K, pair 
with other variables in the tests reported here.  “0” denotes statistically insignificant 
results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically significant results. 
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Table 35 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the amount or strength of the prosecutor’s evidence, e, and other variables from 
the sample of indicted defendants (n = 3093) 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Case Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by the Model of the 
Prosecutor’s Case Selection Process 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Case 
Selection 
Model 
 Low e,  ∆E(V) > 0 
High e, E(V) 
< 0 
High e, 
E(V) > 0 
Low e, 
E(V) < 0 ∆ ∆ ∆
ttest HIGH DURATION,  by(ZERO 
PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 
0 0 0 0 
     
SUB-TOTALS 1 1 0 0 
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Table 35, continued 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Case Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by the Model of the 
Prosecutor’s Case Selection Process 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Case 
Selection 
Model 
 Low e,  ∆E(V) > 0 
High e, E(V) 
< 0 
High e, 
E(V) > 0 
Low e, 
E(V) < 0 ∆ ∆ ∆
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH DURATION)   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH DURATION) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH DURATION)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH DURATION)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH DURATION)   1 1 
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(HIGH DURATION) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 0 0 5 5 
     
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE) 0 0 0 0 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE) 1 1   
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE) 
1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 1 1 
 
 273
Table 35, continued 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Case Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by the Model of the 
Prosecutor’s Case Selection Process 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Case 
Selection 
Model 
 Low e,  ∆E(V) > 0 
High e, E(V) 
< 0 
High e, 
E(V) > 0 
Low e, 
E(V) < 0 ∆ ∆ ∆
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(MULTI COUNTS CONVICT)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(MULTI COUNTS CONVICT) 1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(MULTI COUNTS CONVICT) 1 1   
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(MULTI COUNTS CONVICT) 
0 0 0 0 
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 1 1 
     
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(MULTI COUNTS INDICT) 1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(MULTI COUNTS INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(MULTI COUNTS INDICT) 
1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 0 0 
TOTALS 7 7 7 7 
 
Note: The variables ZERO PREV CONVICT, HIGH DURATION, HIGH COMMERCE, MULTI 
COUNTS CONVICT, and MULTI COUNTS INDICT, which represent the level of the 
prosecutor’s evidence, e, pair with other variables in the tests reported here.  “0” denotes 
statistically insignificant results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically 
significant results.  
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Table 36 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the litigants’ ex ante expected trial sentence, , the idiosyncratic element, TS ρ , of 
the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, and other 
variables from the sample of indicted defendants (n = 3093) 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Case Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by the Model of the 
Prosecutor’s Case Selection Process 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Case 
Selection 
Model 
 Low ,  
TS
∆E(V) > 0 
High , TS
∆E(V) < 0 
High TS , 
∆E(V) > 0 
Low 
E(V) < 0 
TS , 
∆
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(POST-APPA INDICT YEAR)   1 1 
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(POST-APPA INDICT YEAR) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 0 0 2 2 
     
 
Low ρ ρ ρ , ρ , , 
E(V) > 0 
High 
∆
, 
E(V) < 0 
High 
E(V) > 0 
Low 
∆ ∆ ∆E(V) < 0 
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  by(BID 
RIG NOT PRICE FIX) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 0 0 1 1 
TOTALS 0 0 3 3 
 
Note: The variable POST-APPA INDICT YEAR, which represents the litigants’ ex ante 
expected trial sentence, , and BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX, which represents the 
idiosyncratic element, 
TS
ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial 
conviction, pair with other variables in the tests reported here.  “0” denotes statistically 
insignificant results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically significant results.  
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APPENDIX F 
 
SAME-BRANCH MEANS TESTS OF THE TRIAL SELECTION MODEL 
USING SAMPLE OF DEFENDANTS THAT GO TO TRIAL  
 
This appendix reports the results of two-sample means tests that determine the 
relationships between variables representing the characteristics of cases that went to trial.  All of 
the possible pairs of 14 variables allowed 91 separate means tests.  Tables 38-41 report the 
means test results, by the pairs of variables used in the means tests.  Each means test suggests 
two combinations (out of a possible four combinations) of the subject pair of variables in terms 
of their relative values.  The means tests can suggest 182 different possible combinations of pairs 
of 14 variables in terms of the variables’ relative values.   
Statistical insignificance suggests that defendants either used a random process for 
deciding to go to trial in federal criminal antitrust cases to initiate from 1956 through 1979, or 
used a trial selection process that otherwise produced a random mix of case characteristics in 
cases that went to trial.  “0” denotes statistically insignificant results.  Statistically significant 
results, denoted by “1,” that are inconsistent with the trial selection model’s predictions suggest 
that defendants in the observed cases used a non-random plea decision process that differs from 
the trial selection model specification of that decision.  All other results will lend empirical 
support for the trial selection model’s predictive value.  
The means tests reported in Tables 38-41  use the sample of defendants who go to trial (n 
= 601), so the trial selection model’s predictions, which are summarized in Table 6, apply.  
Suppose a variable representing the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C, is paired with a 
variable representing the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, K, in a means test.  Then the 
means test will suggest either of the following combinations of C and K: i) (high value of C, high 
value of K) and (low value of C, low value of K); or ii) (high value of C, low value of K) and 
(low value of C, high value of K).   
Three combinations of pairs of the relative values of the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial 
expenditure, C, and the defendant’s, K, in the sample of litigated cases, are consistent with the 
trial selection model’s predictions: (low value of C, low value of K), (high value of C, low value 
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of K), and (low value of C, high value of K).  The combination of (high value of C, high value of 
K) is inconsistent with the trial selection model’s predictions.   
In general, the combinations found in the sample of defendants who choose to go to trial 
that are consistent with the trial selection model can be stated in terms of the relative value of the 
ex post probability of trial, Θ~ .  The combinations consistent with the trial selection model’s 
predictions are:: (low value of Θ~ , high value of Θ~ ), (high value of Θ~ , low value of Θ~ ), and 
(high value of Θ~ , high value of Θ~ ).  The combination (low value of Θ~ , low value of Θ~ ) is 
inconsistent with the trial selection model.   
A means test always will suggest (high value of C, high value of K) or, more generally, 
(low value of Θ~ , low value of Θ~ ) when it suggests (low value of C, low value of K) or, more 
generally, (high value of Θ~ , high value of Θ~ ).  Thus, in the sample of defendants who choose to 
go to trial, the percentage of statistically significant combinations consistent with the trial 
selection model cannot fall below 50 percent and cannot exceed 100 percent of the statistically 
signficant combinations of pairs of variables that the means tests produce.  The results should be 
judged accordingly.  Table 37 summarizes the results of the individual means tests covered by 
Tables 38-41, which follow. 
 
 
Table 37 Results of means tests of implications of the trial selection process, using the 
sample of defendants that went to trial (n = 601) 
 
Statistically Significant Results 
Appendix F Table 
Reporting Results 
 
Statistically 
Insignificant 
Results 
Number of Combinations 
Consistent with Trial 
Selection Model’s 
Predictions 
Number of 
Combinations 
Inconsistent with Trial 
Selection Model’s 
Predictions 
Table 38 10 7 7 13 13 
Table 39 30 8 8 15 15 
Table 40 18 7 7 9 9 
Table 41 0 0 0 3 3 
      
GRAND TOTALS 58 22 22 40 40 
 58 84 40 
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Table 38 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the prosecutor’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, C, and other variables 
from the sample of defendants that went to trial (n = 601) 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample Means 
Tests 
 Evidence of Expected Trial Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by Trial Selection 
Model 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Selection 
Model 
 
High C,  
> 0 
Low C, 
< 0 
Low C, 
> 0 
High C,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ < 0 
ttest HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest ONLY LOW RANK, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 0 0 0 0 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)*   1 (p<0.15) 1 (p<0.15) 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET)*   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET)*   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)* 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)* 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN PREV 
YEAR BY VIOL#1,  by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 9 9 
 
* 
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Table 38, continued  
   
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample Means 
Tests 
 Evidence of Expected Trial Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by Trial Selection 
Model 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Selection 
Model 
 
High C,  
> 0 
Low C, 
< 0 
Low C, 
> 0 
High C,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ < 0 
ttest ONLY LOW RANK, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 0 0 0 0 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN PREV 
YEAR BY VIOL#1,  by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 5 5 4 4 
TOTALS 7 7 13 13 
 
Note: The variables HIGH DOJBUDGET and HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500, which represent 
the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C, pair with other variables in the tests 
reported here.  “0” denotes statistically insignificant results, so that the reported totals 
only reflect statistically significant results.  These results assume that, ceteris paribus, 
more or better evidence, e, increases ρ  and/or and TS Θ~ . 
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Table 39 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the defendant’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, K, and other variables 
from the sample of defendants that went to trial (n = 601) 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
 Evidence of Expected Trial Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by Trial Selection 
Model 
Not Expected 
According to 
Trial 
Selection 
Model 
 
High K,  
> 0 
Low K,  
< 0 
Low K,  
> 0 
High K,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ < 0 
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(ONLY 
LOW RANK)   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK)   1 1 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK)   1 (p<0.10) 1 (p<0.10) 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK)   1 (p<0.10) 1 (p<0.10) 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(ONLY 
LOW RANK) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 0 0 0 0 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 
0 0 0 0 
     
SUB-TOTALS 1 1 4 4 
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Table 39, continued 
   
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
 Evidence of Expected Trial Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by Trial Selection 
Model 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Selection 
Model 
 
High K,  
> 0 
Low K,  
< 0 
Low K,  
> 0 
High K,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ < 0 
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH PROFIT)   1 1 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH PROFIT)   1 1 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH PROFIT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
PROFIT)   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH PROFIT   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH PROFIT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH PROFIT) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH PROFIT)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH PROFIT)   1 1 
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(HIGH PROFIT) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 1 1 7 7 
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Table 39, continued 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
 Evidence of Expected Trial Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by Trial Selection 
Model 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Selection 
Model 
 
High K,  
> 0 
Low K,  
< 0 
Low K,  
> 0 
High K,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ < 0 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 1 1   
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
COMPENSATION) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH COMPENSATION)   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION)   1 1 
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 
0 0 0 0 
     
SUB-TOTALS 3 3 3 3 
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Table 39, continued 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
 Evidence of Expected Trial Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by Trial Selection 
Model 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Selection 
Model 
 
Low e or K,  
> 0* 
High e or K,  
< 0* 
High e or K,  
> 0* 
Low e or K, 
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ < 0* 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 1 (p<0.10) 1 (p<0.10)   
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT)   1 (p<0.10) 1 (p<0.10) 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 1 (p<0.10) 1 (p<0.10)   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 
1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 3 3 1 1 
TOTALS 8 8 15 15 
 
Note: The variables ONLY LOW RANK, HIGH PROFIT, HIGH COMPENSATION, and ZERO 
OTHER INDICT, which represent the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, K, pair 
with other variables in the tests reported here.  “0” denotes statistically insignificant 
results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically significant results.  These 
results assume that, ceteris paribus, more or better evidence, e, increases ρ  and/or 
and TS Θ~ . 
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Table 40 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the amount or strength of the prosecutor’s evidence, e, and other variables from 
the sample of defendants that went to trial (n = 601) 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
 Evidence of Expected Trial Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by Trial Selection 
Model 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Selection 
Model 
 
Low e,  
> 0* 
High e,  
< 0* 
High e,  
> 0* 
Low e,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ < 0* 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(ZERO 
PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 
1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 1 1 1 1 
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Table 40, continued 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
 Evidence of Expected Trial Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by Trial Selection 
Model 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Selection 
Model 
 
Low e,  
> 0* 
High e,  
< 0* 
High e,  
> 0* 
Low e,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ < 0* 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH DURATION)   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH DURATION) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH DURATION)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH DURATION)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH DURATION)   1 1 
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(HIGH DURATION) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 0 0 5 5 
     
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE) 1 1   
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE) 
1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 2 2 
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Table 40, continued 
   
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
 Evidence of Expected Trial Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by Trial Selection 
Model 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Selection 
Model 
 
Low e,  
> 0* 
High e,  
< 0* 
High e,  
> 0* 
Low e,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ < 0* 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(MULTI COUNTS CONVICT)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(MULTI COUNTS CONVICT) 1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(MULTI COUNTS CONVICT) 1 (p<0.10) 1 (p<0.10)   
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(MULTI COUNTS CONVICT) 
0 0 0 0 
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 1 1 
     
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(MULTI COUNTS INDICT) 1 (p<0.10) 1 (p<0.10)   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(MULTI COUNTS INDICT) 1 (p<0.12) 1 (p<0.12)   
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(MULTI COUNTS INDICT) 
0 0 0 0 
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 0 0 
TOTALS 7 7 9 9 
 
Note: The variables ZERO PREV CONVICT, HIGH DURATION, HIGH COMMERCE, MULTI 
COUNTS CONVICT, and MULTI COUNTS INDICT, which represent the level of the 
prosecutor’s evidence, e, pair with other variables in the tests reported here.  “0” denotes 
statistically insignificant results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically 
significant results.  Assume that, ceteris paribus, more or better evidence, e, increases ρ  
and/or and TS Θ~ . 
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Table 41 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the litigants’ ex ante expected trial sentence, , the idiosyncratic element, TS ρ , of 
the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, and other 
variables from the sample of defendants that went to trial (n = 601) 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
 Evidence of Expected Trial Selection 
“Adjustments” Predicted by Trial Selection 
Model 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Selection 
Model 
 Low ,  
TS
∆ Θ~ > 0 
High ,  TS
∆ Θ~ < 0 
High ,  TS
> 0 
Low ,  TS
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ < 0 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(POST-APPA INDICT YEAR)   1 1 
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(POST-APPA INDICT YEAR) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 0 0 2 2 
     
 
Low ρ ,  
> 0 
High 
∆ Θ~
ρ ,  
< 0 
High 
∆ Θ~
ρ ,  
> 0 
Low ρ ,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ < 0 
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  by(BID 
RIG NOT PRICE FIX) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 0 0 1 1 
TOTALS 0 0 3 3 
 
Note: The variable POST-APPA INDICT YEAR, which represents the litigants’ ex ante 
expected trial sentence, , and BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX, which represents the 
idiosyncratic element, 
TS
ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial 
conviction, pair with other variables in the tests reported here.  “0” denotes statistically 
insignificant results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically significant results. 
pairs with other variables in the tests reported here.   
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APPENDIX G 
 
SAME-BRANCH MEANS TESTS OF THE TRIAL SELECTION MODEL 
USING SAMPLE OF DEFENDANTS THAT AVOID TRIAL  
 
Tables 43-46 report the results of means tests that use the sample of defendants who 
choose not to go to trial (n = 2492).  The means tests reported here use 14 variables are are 
similar to those reported in Appendix F.  The trial selection model’s predictions, which Table 6 
summarizes, apply with one caveat: combinations labeled “inconsistent” in Table 6 are labeled 
“consistent” here.  For example, in terms of the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C, and 
the defendant’s, K, the combination (high value of C, high value of K) is the only combination of 
C and K, in terms of the relative values of the variables, that is consistent with the trial selection 
model’s predictions.  Meanwhile, the combinations (low value of C, low value of K), (high value 
of C, low value of K), and (low value of C, high value of K) are inconsistent with the trial 
selection model’s predictions.   
In general, the combination found in the sample of defendants who do not choose to go to 
trial that is consistent with the trial selection model’s predictions can be stated in terms of the 
relative value of the ex post probability of trial, Θ~ , as follows: (low value of Θ~ , low value of 
Θ~ ).  The combinations (low value of Θ~ , high value of Θ~ ), (high value of Θ~ , low value of Θ~ ), 
and (high value of Θ~ , high value of Θ~ ) are inconsistent with the trial selection model’s 
predictions.   
A means test always will suggest (low vaue of C, low value of K) or, more generally, 
(high value of Θ~ , high value of Θ~ ) when it suggests (high value of C, high value of K) or, more 
generally, (low value of Θ~ , low value of Θ~ ).  Thus, using the sample of defendants who choose 
not to go to trial, the percentage of statistically significant combinations consistent with the trial 
selection model cannot fall below zero percent and cannot exceed 50 percent of the statistically 
significant combinations of pairs of variables that the means tests produce.  The reported results 
should be judged accordingly.  Table 42 summarizes the results of the individual means tests 
covered by Tables 43-46, which follow. 
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Table 42 Results of means tests of implications of the trial selection process, using the 
sample of defendants that did not go to trial (n = 2492) 
 
 
Statistically Significant Results 
Appendix G Table 
Reporting Results 
 
Statistically 
Insignificant 
Results 
Number of Combinations 
Inconsistent with Trial 
Selection Model’s 
Predictions 
Number of 
Combinations 
Consistent with Trial 
Selection Model’s 
Predictions 
Table 43 4 7 7 16 16 
Table 44 12 12 12 19 19 
Table 45 18 9 9 7 7 
Table 46 0 0 0 3 3 
      
GRAND TOTALS 36 28 28 45 45 
 36 101 45 
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Table 43 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the prosecutor’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, C, and other variables 
from the sample of defendants that did not go to trial (n = 2492) 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial Selection 
Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Selection 
“Adjustments” 
Predicted by 
Trial Selection 
Model 
 
Low C,  
< 0 
High C,  
> 0 
High C,  
< 0 
Low C,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ > 0 
ttest HIGH ANNUAL 
FORTUNE500, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 
  1 1 
ttest ONLY LOW RANK, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest HIGH DURATION, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 (p<0.12) 1 (p<0.12) 
ttest MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT,  by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 
1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT 
YEAR,  by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 
  1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 3 3 9 9 
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Table 43, continued 
 
  
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial Selection 
Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Selection 
“Adjustments” 
Predicted by 
Trial Selection 
Model 
 
Low C,  
< 0 
High C,  
> 0 
High C,  
< 0 
Low C,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ > 0 
ttest ONLY LOW RANK, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN PREV 
YEAR BY VIOL#1,  by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 4 4 7 7 
TOTALS     
 
Note: The variables HIGH DOJBUDGET and HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500, which 
represent the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C, pair with other 
variables in the tests reported here.  “0” denotes statistically insignificant results, 
so that the reported totals only reflect statistically significant results.  Assume 
that, ceteris paribus, more or better evidence, e, increases ρ  and/or and TS Θ~ . 
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Table 44 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the defendant’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, K, and other variables 
from the sample of defendants that did not go to trial (n = 2492) 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial Selection 
Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Selection 
“Adjustments” 
Predicted by 
Trial Selection 
Model 
 
Low K,  
< 0 
High K,  
> 0 
High K,  
< 0 
Low K,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ > 0 
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(ONLY 
LOW RANK)   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK)   1 1 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK)   1 1 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK)   1 1 
ttest HIGH DURATION, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 1 1   
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT, by(ONLY LOW 
RANK) 
   1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT 
YEAR,  by(ONLY LOW RANK) 0 0 0 0 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK)   1 1 
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 3 3 6 6 
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Table 44, continued  
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial Selection 
Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Selection 
“Adjustments” 
Predicted by 
Trial Selection 
Model 
 
Low K,  
< 0 
High K,  
> 0 
High K,  
< 0 
Low K,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ > 0 
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH PROFIT)   1 1 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH PROFIT)   1 1 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH PROFIT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION, 
by(HIGH PROFIT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH PROFIT) 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT,  by(HIGH PROFIT)   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH PROFIT) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT 
YEAR,  by(HIGH PROFIT)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH PROFIT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(HIGH PROFIT) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 5 5 
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Table 44, continued 
   
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial Selection 
Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Selection 
“Adjustments” 
Predicted by 
Trial Selection 
Model 
 
Low K,  
< 0 
High K,  
> 0 
High K,  
< 0 
Low K,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ > 0 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH COMPENSATION)   1 1 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 1 1   
ttest HIGH DURATION, 
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT,  by(HIGH 
COMPENSATION) 
1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT 
YEAR,  by(HIGH 
COMPENSATION) 
  1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION)   1 1 
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 4 4 4 4 
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Table 44, continued  
   
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial Selection 
Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Selection 
“Adjustments” 
Predicted by 
Trial Selection 
Model 
 
High K or e, 
< 0 
Low K or e, 
> 0 
Low K or e,  
< 0 
High K or e, 
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ > 0 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT)   1 1 
ttest HIGH DURATION, 
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 1 1   
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT)   1 (p<0.10) 1 (p<0.10) 
ttest MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT,  by(ZERO OTHER 
INDICT) 
  1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT 
YEAR,  by(ZERO OTHER 
INDICT) 
1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 
1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 3 3 4 4 
TOTALS     
 
Note: The variables ONLY LOW RANK, HIGH PROFIT, HIGH COMPENSATION, and ZERO 
OTHER INDICT, which represent the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, K, pair 
with other variables in the tests reported here.  “0” denotes statistically insignificant 
results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically significant results.  Assume 
that, ceteris paribus, more or better evidence, e, increases ρ  and/or and TS Θ~ . 
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Table 45 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the amount or strength of the prosecutor’s evidence, e, and other variables from 
the sample of defendants that did not go to trial (n = 2492) 
   
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial Selection 
Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Selection 
“Adjustments” 
Predicted by 
Trial Selection 
Model 
 
High e,  
< 0 
Low e,  
> 0 
Low e,  
< 0 
High e,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆  Θ~ ∆ Θ~ > 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION, 
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT, by(ZERO PREV 
CONVICT) 
0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT 
YEAR,  by(ZERO PREV 
CONVICT) 
1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 1 1   
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 
0 0 0 0 
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 0 0 
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Table 45, continued 
   
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial Selection 
Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Selection 
“Adjustments” 
Predicted by 
Trial Selection 
Model 
 
High e,  
< 0 
Low e,  
> 0 
Low e,  
< 0 
High e,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆  Θ~ ∆ Θ~ > 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH DURATION)   1 (p<0.11) 1 (p<0.11) 
ttest MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT,  by(HIGH 
DURATION) 
0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH DURATION)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT 
YEAR,  by(HIGH DURATION)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH DURATION)   1 1 
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(HIGH DURATION) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 0 0 5 5 
     
ttest MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT,  by(HIGH 
COMMERCE) 
0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT 
YEAR,  by(HIGH COMMERCE)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE) 1 1   
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE) 
1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 3 3 1 1 
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Table 45, continued 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial Selection 
Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Selection 
“Adjustments” 
Predicted by 
Trial Selection 
Model 
 
High e,  
< 0 
Low e,  
> 0 
Low e,  
< 0 
High e,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ ∆  Θ~ ∆ Θ~ > 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(MULTI COUNTS CONVICT)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT 
YEAR,  by(MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT) 
1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(MULTI COUNTS CONVICT) 1 1   
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(MULTI COUNTS CONVICT) 
0 0 0 0 
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 1 1 
     
ttest POST-APPA INDICT 
YEAR,  by(MULTI COUNTS 
INDICT) 
1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(MULTI COUNTS INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
Ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(MULTI COUNTS INDICT) 
1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 0 0 
TOTALS     
 
Note: The variables ZERO PREV CONVICT, HIGH DURATION, HIGH COMMERCE, MULTI 
COUNTS CONVICT, and MULTI COUNTS INDICT, which represent the level of the 
prosecutor’s evidence, e, pair with other variables in the tests reported here.  “0” denotes 
statistically insignificant results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically 
significant results.  Assume that, ceteris paribus, more or better evidence, e, increases ρ  
and/or and TS Θ~ . 
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Table 46 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the litigants’ ex ante expected trial sentence, , the idiosyncratic element, TS ρ , of 
the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial conviction, and other 
variables from the sample of defendants that did not go to trial (n = 2492) 
   
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial Selection 
Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Selection 
“Adjustments” 
Predicted by 
Trial Selection 
Model 
 High ,  
TS
∆ Θ~ < 0 
Low ,  TS
∆ Θ~ > 0 
Low ,  TS
< 0 
High ,  TS
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ > 0 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(POST-APPA INDICT YEAR)   1 1 
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(POST-APPA INDICT YEAR) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 0 0 2 2 
     
 
High ρ ,  
< 0 
Low 
∆ Θ~
ρ ,  
> 0 
Low 
∆ Θ~
ρ ,  
< 0 
High ρ ,  
∆ Θ~ ∆ Θ~ > 0 
ttest HIGH DOJ TRIAL WIN 
PREV YEAR BY VIOL#1,  
by(BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX) 
  1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 0 0 1 1 
TOTALS     
 
Note: The variable POST-APPA INDICT YEAR, which represents the litigants’ ex ante 
expected trial sentence, , and BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX, which represents the 
idiosyncratic element, 
TS
ρ , of the prosecutor’s ex ante expected probability of trial 
conviction, pair with other variables in the tests reported here.  “0” denotes statistically 
insignificant results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically significant results.  
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APPENDIX H 
 
SAME-BRANCH MEANS TESTS OF THE TRIAL CONVICTION MODEL 
USING SAMPLE OF DEFENDANTS CONVICTED AT TRIAL  
 
This appendix reports the results of two-sample means tests conducted to compare the 
relationship between variables representing case characteristics in the sample of defendants 
convicted at trial in order to test the predictions of the trial conviction model.  All of the possible 
pairs of 13 variables allowed 78 separate means tests.  Tables 48-51 report the means test results, 
by the pairs of variables used in the means tests.  Each means test suggests two combinations 
(out of a possible four combinations) of the subject pair of variables in terms of their relative 
values.  The means tests can suggest 156 different possible combinations of pairs of the relative 
values of the 13 variables.   
Statistically insignificant results either suggest that judges and juries randomly convicted 
defendants at trial in the observed cases, or the results suggest that the judges and juries used a 
conviction decision process that otherwise produced a random mix of case characteristics in the 
cases that end in trial conviction.  “0” denotes statistically insignificant results.  Statistically 
significant results that are inconsistent with the trial conviction model’s predictions sugges that 
the judges and juries non-randomly convicted defendants using a process that differs from the 
process specified by the trial conviction model.  All other results lend empirical support for the 
trial conviction model’s predictions. 
The tables use the sample of defendants who were convicted at trial (n = 132), so the trial 
conviction model predictions, which Table 8 summarizes, apply.  For example, if a variable 
representing the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C, is paired with a variable 
representing the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, K, in a means test, then the means test 
will suggest either of the following combinations: i) (high value of C, high value of K) and (low 
value of C, low value of K); or ii) (high value of C, low value of K) and (low value of C, high 
value of K).  The following combinations of pairs of variables representing C and K, in terms of 
the relative values of the variables, are consistent with the trial conviction model’s predictions: 
(high value of C, high value of K), (low value of C, low value of K) and (low value of C, high 
value of K).  The combination of (high value of C, low value of K) is inconsistent with the trial 
conviction model’s predictions.   
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In general, the combinations found in the sample of defendants who are convicted at trial 
that are consistent with the trial conviction model’s predictions can be stated in terms of the ex 
post probability of trial conviction, Π~ , as follows: (low value of Π~ , high value of Π~ ), (high 
value of Π~ , low value of Π~ ), and (high value of Π~ , high value of Π~ ).  The combination (low 
value of Π~ , low value of Π~ ) is inconsistent with the trial conviction model’s predictions.   
A means test always will suggest (high value of C, low value of K) or, more generally, 
(low value of Π~ , low value of Π~ ), when it suggests (low value of C, high value of K) or, more 
generally, (high value of Π~ , high value of Π~ ).  Thus, using the sample of defendants convicted 
at trial, the percentage of statistically significant combinations that are consistent with the trial 
conviction model cannot fall below 50 percent and cannot exceed 100 percent of the statistically 
significant combinations of pairs of variables that the means tests report.  The reported results 
should be judged accordingly.  Table 47 summarizes the results of the individual means tests 
covered by Tables 48-51, which follow. 
 
 
Table 47 Results of means tests of implications of the trial conviction selection process, 
using the sample of defendants convicted at trial (n = 132) 
 
Statistically Significant Results 
Appendix H Table 
Reporting Results 
 
Statistically 
Insignificant 
Results 
Number of Combinations 
Consistent with Trial 
Conviction Model’s 
Predictions 
Number of 
Combinations 
Inconsistent with Trial 
Conviction Model’s 
Predictions 
Table 48 14 7 7 9 9 
Table 49 44 7 7 5 5 
Table 50 22 2 2 7 7 
Table 51 2 0 0 0 0 
      
GRAND TOTALS 82 16 16 21 21 
 82 53 21 
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Table 48 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the prosecutor’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, C, and other variables 
from the sample of defendants convicted at trial (n = 132) 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Trial Conviction 
“Adjustment” Predicted by the Model of the 
Judge’s or Jury’s Trial Conviction Decision 
Rule 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Conviction 
Model 
 
High C,     
> 0 
Low C,      
< 0 
Low C, 
> 0 
High C, 
∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ < 0 
ttest HIGH ANNUAL 
FORTUNE500, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 
  1 1 
ttest ONLY LOW RANK, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 0 0 0 0 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 3 3 6 6 
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Table 48, continued 
   
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Trial Conviction 
“Adjustment” Predicted by the Model of the 
Judge’s or Jury’s Trial Conviction Decision 
Rule 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Conviction 
Model 
 
High C,  
> 0 
Low C,  
< 0 
Low C, 
> 0 
High C, 
∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ < 0 
ttest ONLY LOW RANK, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 (p<0.15) 1 (p<0.15)   
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 (p<0.15) 1 (p<0.15)   
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 (p<0.15) 1 (p<0.15) 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX, 
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 0 0 0 0 
     
SUB-TOTALS 4 4 3 3 
TOTALS     
 
Note: The variables HIGH DOJBUDGET and HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500, which represent the 
prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C, pair with other variables in the tests reported here.  
“0” denotes statistically insignificant results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically 
significant results.  Assume that, ceteris paribus, more evidence, e, increases the value of Π~ . 
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Table 49 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the defendant’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, K, and other variables 
from the sample of defendants convicted at trial (n = 132) 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Trial Conviction 
“Adjustment” Predicted by the Model of the 
Judge’s or Jury’s Trial Conviction Decision 
Rule 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Conviction 
Model 
 
Low K,      
> 0 
High K,     
< 0 
High K, 
> 0 
Low K, 
∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ < 0 
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(ONLY 
LOW RANK)   1 (p<0.12) 1 (p<0.12) 
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK)   1 1 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK)   1 1 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(ONLY 
LOW RANK) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 0 0 0 0 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 0 0 0 0 
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 3 3 
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Table 49, continued 
  
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Trial Conviction 
“Adjustment” Predicted by the Model of the 
Judge’s or Jury’s Trial Conviction Decision 
Rule 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Conviction 
Model 
 
Low K,      
> 0 
High K,     
< 0 
High K, 
> 0 
Low K, 
∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ < 0 
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH PROFIT)   1 1 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH PROFIT)   1 1 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH PROFIT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
PROFIT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH PROFIT) 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH PROFIT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH PROFIT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH PROFIT) 1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH PROFIT) 0 0 0 0 
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 2 2 
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Table 49, continued 
   
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Trial Conviction 
“Adjustment” Predicted by the Model of the 
Judge’s or Jury’s Trial Conviction Decision 
Rule 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Conviction 
Model 
 
Low K,      
> 0 
High K,     
< 0 
High K, 
> 0 
Low K, 
∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ < 0 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 0 0 0 0 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
COMPENSATION) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 0 0 0 0 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 0 0 
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Table 49, continued 
   
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Trial Conviction 
“Adjustment” Predicted by the Model of the 
Judge’s or Jury’s Trial Conviction Decision 
Rule 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Conviction 
Model 
 
Low K or e, 
> 0 
High K or e, 
< 0 
High K or e, 
> 0 
Low K or e, 
∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ < 0 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(ZERO 
OTHER INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
     
SUB-TOTALS 1 1 0 0 
 
Note: The variables ONLY LOW RANK, HIGH PROFIT, HIGH COMPENSATION, and ZERO 
OTHER INDICT, which represent the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, K, pair 
with other variables in the tests reported here.  “0” denotes statistically insignificant 
results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically significant results.  Assume 
that, ceteris paribus, more evidence, e, increases the value of Π~ . 
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Table 50 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the amount or strength of the prosecutor’s evidence, e, and other variables from 
the sample of defendants convicted at trial (n = 132) 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Trial Conviction 
“Adjustment” Predicted by the Model of the 
Judge’s or Jury’s Trial Conviction Decision 
Rule 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Conviction 
Model 
 
Low e,       
> 0 
High e,      
< 0 
High e, 
> 0 
Low e, 
∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ < 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(ZERO 
PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT, 
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT)   1 (p<0.15) 1 (p<0.15) 
     
SUB-TOTALS 0 0 2 2 
     
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH DURATION)   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH DURATION) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH DURATION) 0 0 0 0 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH DURATION) 0 0 0 0 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH DURATION)   1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 0 0 2 2 
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Table 50, continued 
   
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Trial Conviction 
“Adjustment” Predicted by the Model of the 
Judge’s or Jury’s Trial Conviction Decision 
Rule 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Conviction 
Model 
 
Low e,       
> 0 
High e,      
< 0 
High e, 
> 0 
Low e, 
∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ < 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE)   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE) 0 0 0 0 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE) 1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 1 1 2 2 
     
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(MULTI COUNTS CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(MULTI COUNTS CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(MULTI COUNTS CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
     
SUB-TOTALS 0 0 0 0 
     
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(MULTI COUNTS INDICT) 1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(MULTI COUNTS INDICT)   1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 1 1 1 1 
TOTALS     
 
Note: The variables ZERO PREV CONVICT, HIGH DURATION, HIGH COMMERCE, MULTI 
COUNTS CONVICT, and MULTI COUNTS INDICT, which represent the level of the 
prosecutor’s evidence, e, pair with other variables in the tests reported here.  “0” denotes 
statistically insignificant results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically 
significant results.  Assume that, ceteris paribus, more evidence, e, increases the value of 
Π~ . 
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Table 51 Descriptions of results of means tests that include an empirical variable 
representing the litigants’ ex ante expected trial sentence, , and other variables 
from the sample of defendants convicted at trial (n = 132) 
   
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Evidence of Expected Trial Conviction 
“Adjustment” Predicted by the Model of the 
Judge’s or Jury’s Trial Conviction Decision 
Rule 
Not 
Expected 
According 
to Trial 
Conviction 
Model 
TS
 Low ,       
TS
∆ Π~ > 0 
High ,      TS
∆ Π~ < 0 
High , TS
∆ Π~ > 0 
Low , TS
∆ Π~ < 0 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(POST-APPA INDICT YEAR) 0 0 0 0 
     
TOTALS 0 0 0 0 
 
Note: The variable POST-APPA INDICT YEAR, which represents the litigants’ ex ante 
expected trial sentence, , pairs with other variables in the tests reported here.  “0” 
denotes statistically insignificant results, so that the reported totals only reflect 
statistically significant results. 
 
TS
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APPENDIX I 
 
SAME-BRANCH MEANS TESTS OF THE TRIAL CONVICTION MODEL 
USING SAMPLE OF DEFENDANTS NOT CONVICTED AT TRIAL  
 
Tables 53-55 report the results of means tests that use the sample of defendants who went 
to trial but were not convicted (n = 469).  The means tests reported here use 13 variables and are 
similar to the means tests reported in Appendix H.  The trial conviction model predictions 
summarized in Table 8 apply, with one caveat: the combinations labeled “inconsistent” in Table 
8 are labeled “consistent” here.  Suppose a variable representing the prosecutor’s unit cost of trial 
expenditure, C, is paired with a variable representing the defendant’s unit cost of trial 
expenditure, K, in a means test.  The following combination of the relative values of C and K is 
consistent with the trial conviction model’s predictions: (low value of C, high value of K).  The 
combinations of (high value of C, high value of K), (low value of C, low value of K), and (high 
value of C, low value of K) are inconsistent with the trial conviction model’s predictions for the 
sample of defendants who went to trial but were not convicted (n = 469).   
In general, the combination found in the sample of defendants who go to trial but are not 
convicted that is consistent with the trial conviction model’s predictions can be stated in terms of 
the ex post probability of trial conviction, Π~ , as follows: (low value of Π~ , low value of Π~ ).  
The combinations (low value of Π~ , high value of Π~ ), (high value of Π~ , low value of Π~ ), and 
(high value of Π~ , high value of Π~ ) are inconsistent with the trial conviction model’s 
predictions.   
A means test always will suggests the combination (low value of C, high value of K) or, 
more generally, (high value of Π~ , high value of Π~ ) when it suggests (high value of C, low value 
of K) or, more generally, (low value of Π~ , low value of Π~ ).  Thus, using the sample of 
defendants who went to trial but were not convicted, the percentage of combinations consistent 
with the trial conviction model’s predictions cannot fall below zero percent and cannot exceed 50 
percent of the statistically significant combinations of pairs of variables that the means tests 
produce.  The reported results should be judged accordingly.  Table 52 summarizes the results of 
the individual means tests covered by Tables 53-55, which follow. 
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 Table 52 Results of means tests of implications of the trial conviction selection process, 
using the sample of defendants convicted at trial (n = 132) 
 
 
Statistically Significant Results 
Appendix I Table 
Reporting Results 
Statistically 
Insignificant 
Results 
Number of Combinations 
Inconsistent with Trial 
Conviction Model’s 
Predictions 
Number of 
Combinations 
Consistent with Trial 
Conviction Model’s 
Predictions 
Table 53 16 6 6 9 9 
Table 54 26 11 11 10 10 
Table 55 14 5 5 8 8 
Table 56 0 0 0 1 1 
      
GRAND TOTALS 56 22 22 28 28 
 56 72 28 
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Table 53 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the prosecutor’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, C, and other variables 
from the sample of defendants that went to trial and were not convicted (n = 469) 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial 
Conviction Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Conviction 
“Adjustment” 
 Predicted by the 
Model of the 
Judge’s or Jury’s 
Trial Conviction 
Decision Rule 
 
Low C,  
< 0 
High C,  
> 0 
High C, 
< 0 
Low C, 
∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ > 0 
ttest HIGH ANNUAL 
FORTUNE500, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 
  1 1 
ttest ONLY LOW RANK, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 0 0 0 0 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, by(HIGH 
DOJBUDGET) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH DOJBUDGET)   1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 4 4 5 5 
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Table 53, continued 
   
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial 
Conviction Model 
Evidence of Expected 
Trial Conviction 
“Adjustment” 
 Predicted by the Model 
of the Judge’s or Jury’s 
Trial Conviction 
Decision Rule 
 
Low C, 
< 0 
High C, 
> 0 
High C, 
< 0 
Low C,  
∆ Π~ ∆ Π~  ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ > 0 
ttest ONLY LOW RANK, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 0 0 0 0 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, by(HIGH 
ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS CONVICT,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500) 1 1   
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX, 
by(HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500)   1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 4 4 
TOTALS 6 6 9 9 
 
Note: The variables HIGH DOJBUDGET and HIGH ANNUAL FORTUNE500, which represent the 
prosecutor’s unit cost of trial expenditure, C, pair with other variables in the tests reported here.  
“0” denotes statistically insignificant results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically 
significant results.  Assume that, ceteris paribus, more evidence, e, increases the value of Π~ . 
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Table 54 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the defendant’s unit (opportunity) cost of trial expenditure, K, and other variables 
from the sample of defendants that went to trial and were not convicted (n = 469) 
   
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial 
Conviction Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Conviction 
“Adjustment” 
 Predicted by the 
Model of the 
Judge’s or Jury’s 
Trial Conviction 
Decision Rule 
 
High K,     
< 0 
Low K,      
> 0 
Low K, 
< 0 
High K,  
∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ > 0 
ttest HIGH PROFIT, by(ONLY 
LOW RANK)   1 1 
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 0 0 0 0 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 1 (p<0.10) 1 (p<0.10)   
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 1 (p<0.15) 1 (p<0.15)   
ttest HIGH DURATION, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT, by(ONLY LOW 
RANK) 
0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT 
YEAR,  by(ONLY LOW RANK)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX, 
by(ONLY LOW RANK) 0 0 0 0 
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 3 3 
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Table 54, continued 
   
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial 
Conviction Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Conviction 
“Adjustment” 
 Predicted by the 
Model of the 
Judge’s or Jury’s 
Trial Conviction 
Decision Rule 
 
High K,     
< 0 
Low K,      
> 0 
Low K, 
< 0 
High K,  
∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ > 0 
ttest HIGH COMPENSATION, 
by(HIGH PROFIT)   1 1 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH PROFIT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH PROFIT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION, 
by(HIGH PROFIT) 1 1   
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH PROFIT) 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT,  by(HIGH PROFIT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH PROFIT)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH PROFIT) 1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH PROFIT) 1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 4 4 2 2 
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Table 54, continued 
  
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial 
Conviction Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Conviction 
“Adjustment” 
 Predicted by 
the Model of 
the Judge’s or 
Jury’s Trial 
Conviction 
Decision Rule 
 
High K,     
< 0 
Low K,      
> 0 
Low K, 
< 0 
High K,  
∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ > 0 
ttest ZERO OTHER INDICT, 
by(HIGH COMPENSATION)   1 1 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(HIGH COMPENSATION)   1 (p<0.14) 1 (p<0.14) 
ttest HIGH DURATION, 
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 1 1   
ttest MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT,  by(HIGH 
COMPENSATION) 
  1 (p<0.14) 1 (p<0.14) 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH COMPENSATION) 1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 3 3 4 4 
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Table 54, continued 
   
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial 
Conviction Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Conviction 
“Adjustment” 
 Predicted by 
the Model of 
the Judge’s or 
Jury’s Trial 
Conviction 
Decision Rule 
 
High K or e, 
< 0 
Low K or e, 
> 0 
Low K or e, 
< 0 
High K or e, 
∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆  Π~ ∆ Π~ > 0 
ttest ZERO PREV CONVICT, 
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION, 
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 1 (p<0.10) 1 (p<0.10)   
ttest MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT,  by(ZERO OTHER 
INDICT) 
0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(ZERO OTHER INDICT) 1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 1 1 
TOTALS 11 11 10 10 
 
Note: The variables ONLY LOW RANK, HIGH PROFIT, HIGH COMPENSATION, and ZERO 
OTHER INDICT, which represent the defendant’s unit cost of trial expenditure, K, pair 
with other variables in the tests reported here.  “0” denotes statistically insignificant 
results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically significant results.  Assume 
that, ceteris paribus, more evidence, e, increases the value of Π~ . 
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Table 55 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the amount or strength of the prosecutor’s evidence, e, and other variables from 
the sample of defendants that went to trial and were not convicted (n = 469) 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial 
Conviction Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Conviction 
“Adjustment” 
 Predicted by 
the Model of 
the Judge’s or 
Jury’s Trial 
Conviction 
Decision Rule 
 
High e,      
< 0 
Low e,       
> 0 
Low e,  
< 0 
High e,  
∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆  Π~ ∆ Π~ > 0 
ttest HIGH DURATION, 
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT, by(ZERO PREV 
CONVICT) 
0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT 
YEAR,  by(ZERO PREV 
CONVICT) 
0 0 0 0 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(ZERO PREV CONVICT) 1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 1 1 1 1 
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Table 55, continued 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial 
Conviction Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Conviction 
“Adjustment” 
 Predicted by 
the Model of 
the Judge’s or 
Jury’s Trial 
Conviction 
Decision Rule 
 
High e,      
< 0 
Low e,       
> 0 
Low e,  
< 0 
High e,  
∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆  Π~ ∆ Π~ > 0 
ttest HIGH COMMERCE, 
by(HIGH DURATION)   1 1 
ttest MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT,  by(HIGH 
DURATION) 
  1 (p<0.15) 1 (p<0.15) 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH DURATION)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH DURATION)   1 1 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH DURATION)   1 1 
     
SUB-TOTALS 0 0 5 5 
     
ttest MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT,  by(HIGH 
COMMERCE) 
0 0 0 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE) 0 0 0 0 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(HIGH COMMERCE) 1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 1 1 1 1 
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Table 55, continued 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial 
Conviction Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Conviction 
“Adjustment” 
 Predicted by 
the Model of 
the Judge’s or 
Jury’s Trial 
Conviction 
Decision Rule 
 
High e,      
< 0 
Low e,       
> 0 
Low e,  
< 0 
High e,  
∆ Π~ ∆ Π~ ∆  Π~ ∆ Π~ > 0 
ttest MULTI COUNTS INDICT,  
by(MULTI COUNTS CONVICT)   1 1 
ttest POST-APPA INDICT 
YEAR,  by(MULTI COUNTS 
CONVICT) 
1 1   
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(MULTI COUNTS CONVICT) 1 (p<0.15) 1 (p<0.15)   
     
SUB-TOTALS 2 2 1 1 
     
ttest POST-APPA INDICT YEAR,  
by(MULTI COUNTS INDICT) 0 0 0 0 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(MULTI COUNTS INDICT) 1 1   
     
SUB-TOTALS 1 1 0 0 
TOTALS 5 5 8 8 
 
Note: The variables ZERO PREV CONVICT, HIGH DURATION, HIGH COMMERCE, MULTI 
COUNTS CONVICT, and MULTI COUNTS INDICT, which represent the level of the 
prosecutor’s evidence, e, pair with other variables in the tests reported here.  “0” denotes 
statistically insignificant results, so that the reported totals only reflect statistically 
significant results.  Assume that, ceteris paribus, more evidence, e, increases the value of 
Π~ . 
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Table 56 Descriptions of results of means tests that include empirical variables representing 
the litigants’ ex ante expected trial sentence, , and other variables from the 
sample of defendants that went to trial and were not convicted (n = 469) 
 
 
 
Variables Used in Two-Sample 
Means Tests 
Not Expected According to Trial 
Conviction Model 
Evidence of 
Expected Trial 
Conviction 
“Adjustment” 
 Predicted by 
the Model of 
the Judge’s or 
Jury’s Trial 
Conviction 
Decision Rule 
TS
 High ,      
TS
∆ Π~ < 0 
Low ,      TS
∆ Π~ > 0 
Low TS , 
∆ Π~ < 0 
High ,  TS
∆ Π~ > 0 
ttest BID RIG NOT PRICE FIX,  
by(POST-APPA INDICT YEAR)   1 1 
     
TOTALS 0 0 1 1 
 
Note: The variable POST-APPA INDICT YEAR, which represents the litigants’ ex ante 
expected trial sentence, , pairs with other variables in the tests reported here.  “0” 
denotes statistically insignificant results, so that the reported totals only reflect 
statistically significant results. 
 
TS
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